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diff --git a/talermerchantdemos/blog/articles/en/surveillance-vs-democracy.html b/talermerchantdemos/blog/articles/en/surveillance-vs-democracy.html index 3fc17d7..450a6d8 100644 --- a/talermerchantdemos/blog/articles/en/surveillance-vs-democracy.html +++ b/talermerchantdemos/blog/articles/en/surveillance-vs-democracy.html @@ -1,34 +1,34 @@ <!--#include virtual="/server/header.html" --> -<!-- Parent-Version: 1.90 --> +<!-- Parent-Version: 1.97 --> +<!-- This page is derived from /server/standards/boilerplate.html --> +<!--#set var="TAGS" value="essays cultural evils" --> +<!--#set var="DISABLE_TOP_ADDENDUM" value="yes" --> <title>How Much Surveillance Can Democracy Withstand? - GNU Project - Free Software Foundation</title> <style type="text/css" media="print,screen"><!-- #intro { margin: 2em auto 1.5em; } +.toc { width: auto; } .pict.wide { width: 23em; } .pict p { margin-bottom: 0; } +#conclusion { visibility: hidden; margin-top: 0; } @media (min-width: 55em) { #intro { max-width: 55em; } + .toc { max-width: 51em; } + .toc li { display: inline-block; width: 90%; } } --> </style> <!-- GNUN: localize URL /graphics/dog.small.jpg --> <!--#include virtual="/philosophy/po/surveillance-vs-democracy.translist" --> <!--#include virtual="/server/banner.html" --> +<!--#include virtual="/philosophy/ph-breadcrumb.html" --> +<!--GNUN: OUT-OF-DATE NOTICE--> +<!--#include virtual="/server/top-addendum.html" --> +<div class="article"> <h2 class="center">How Much Surveillance Can Democracy Withstand?</h2> <address class="byline center">by -<a href="http://www.stallman.org/">Richard Stallman</a></address> - -<!-- rms: I deleted the link because of Wired's announced - anti-ad-block system --> -<blockquote class="center"><p><em>A version of this article was first published in -<cite>Wired</cite> in October 2013.<br /> -Also consider reading “<a -href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/apr/03/facebook-abusing-data-law-privacy-big-tech-surveillance">A -radical proposal to keep your personal data safe</a>,” published in -<cite>The Guardian</cite> in April 2018.</em></p></blockquote> - -<div class="article"> +<a href="https://www.stallman.org/">Richard Stallman</a></address> <div id="intro"> <div class="pict wide"> @@ -70,14 +70,14 @@ of our digital lives, and that includes preventing surveillance. We can't trust nonfree software; the NSA <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20130622044225/http://blogs.computerworlduk.com/open-enterprise/2013/06/how-can-any-company-ever-trust-microsoft-again/index.htm">uses</a> and -even <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security">creates</a> +even <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security">creates</a> security weaknesses in nonfree software to invade our own computers and routers. Free software gives us control of our own computers, -but <a href="http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/149481/">that won't +but <a href="https://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/149481/">that won't protect our privacy once we set foot on the Internet</a>.</p> <p><a -href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/10/nsa-surveillance-patriot-act-author-bill">Bipartisan +href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/10/nsa-surveillance-patriot-act-author-bill">Bipartisan legislation to “curtail the domestic surveillance powers”</a> in the U.S. is being drawn up, but it relies on limiting the government's use of our virtual dossiers. That won't @@ -86,7 +86,26 @@ whistleblower” is grounds for access sufficient to identify him or her. We need to go further.</p> </div> -<h3 class="subheader" style="clear: both">The Upper Limit on Surveillance in a Democracy</h3> +<div class="toc" style="clear: both"> +<hr class="no-display" /> +<h3 class="no-display">Table of contents</h3> +<ul class="columns"> + <li><a href="#upperlimit">The Upper Limit on Surveillance in a Democracy</a></li> + <li><a href="#willbemisused">Information, Once Collected, Will Be Misused</a></li> + <li><a href="#technical">Robust Protection for Privacy Must Be Technical</a></li> + <li><a href="#commonsense">First, Don't Be Foolish</a></li> + <li><a href="#privacybydesign">We Must Design Every System for Privacy</a></li> + <li><a href="#dispersal">Remedy for Collecting Data: Leaving It Dispersed</a></li> + <li><a href="#digitalcash">Remedy for Internet Commerce Surveillance</a></li> + <li><a href="#travel">Remedy for Travel Surveillance</a></li> + <li><a href="#communications">Remedy for Communications Dossiers</a></li> + <li><a href="#necessary">But Some Surveillance Is Necessary</a></li> + <li><a href="#conclusion">Conclusion</a></li> +</ul> +<hr class="no-display" /> +</div> + +<h3 id="upperlimit">The Upper Limit on Surveillance in a Democracy</h3> <div class="columns"> <p>If whistleblowers don't dare reveal crimes and lies, we lose the @@ -97,38 +116,38 @@ democracy to endure.</p> <p>An unnamed U.S. government official ominously told journalists in 2011 that -the <a href="http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/news-media-law/news-media-and-law-summer-2011/lessons-wye-river">U.S. would +the <a href="https://www.rcfp.org/journals/news-media-and-law-summer-2011/lessons-wye-river/">U.S. would not subpoena reporters because “We know who you're talking to.”</a> -Sometimes <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/sep/24/yemen-leak-sachtleben-guilty-associated-press">journalists' +Sometimes <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/sep/24/yemen-leak-sachtleben-guilty-associated-press">journalists' phone call records are subpoenaed</a> to find this out, but Snowden has shown us that in effect they subpoena all the phone call records of everyone in the U.S., all the time, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jun/06/verizon-telephone-data-court-order">from Verizon</a> -and <a href="http://www.marketwatch.com/story/nsa-data-mining-digs-into-networks-beyond-verizon-2013-06-07">from +and <a href="https://www.marketwatch.com/story/nsa-data-mining-digs-into-networks-beyond-verizon-2013-06-07">from other companies too</a>.</p> <p>Opposition and dissident activities need to keep secrets from states that are willing to play dirty tricks on them. The ACLU has demonstrated the U.S. government's <a -href="http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/Spyfiles_2_0.pdf">systematic +href="https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/Spyfiles_2_0.pdf">systematic practice of infiltrating peaceful dissident groups</a> on the pretext that there might be terrorists among them. The point at which surveillance is too much is the point at which the state can find who spoke to a known journalist or a known dissident.</p> </div> -<h3 class="subheader">Information, Once Collected, Will Be Misused</h3> +<h3 id="willbemisused">Information, Once Collected, Will Be Misused</h3> -<div class="columns"> -<p id="willbemisused">When people recognize +<div class="columns"> +<p>When people recognize that the level of general surveillance is too high, the first response is to propose limits on access to the accumulated data. That sounds nice, but it won't fix the problem, not even slightly, even supposing that the government obeys the rules. (The NSA has misled the FISA court, which said it -was <a href="http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/09/nsa-violations/">unable +was <a href="https://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/09/nsa-violations/">unable to effectively hold the NSA accountable</a>.) Suspicion of a crime will be grounds for access, so once a whistleblower is accused of “espionage,” finding the “spy” will provide an @@ -144,7 +163,7 @@ like.</p> <p>In addition, the state's surveillance staff will misuse the data for personal reasons. Some NSA -agents <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/24/nsa-analysts-abused-surveillance-systems">used +agents <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/24/nsa-analysts-abused-surveillance-systems">used U.S. surveillance systems to track their lovers</a>—past, present, or wished-for—in a practice called “LOVEINT.” The NSA says it has caught and punished this a @@ -157,7 +176,7 @@ date.” This practice has expanded with <a href="https://theyarewatching.org/issues/risks-increase-once-data-shared">new digital systems</a>. In 2016, a prosecutor was accused of forging judges' signatures to get authorization -to <a href="http://gizmodo.com/government-officials-cant-stop-spying-on-their-crushes-1789490933"> +to <a href="https://gizmodo.com/government-officials-cant-stop-spying-on-their-crushes-1789490933"> wiretap someone who was the object of a romantic obsession</a>. The AP knows of <a href="https://apnews.com/699236946e3140659fff8a2362e16f43">many @@ -168,22 +187,35 @@ other instances in the US</a>. this is prohibited. Once the data has been accumulated and the state has the possibility of access to it, it can misuse that data in dreadful ways, as shown by examples -from <a href="http://falkvinge.net/2012/03/17/collected-personal-data-will-always-be-used-against-the-citizens/">Europe</a>, +from <a href="https://falkvinge.net/2012/03/17/collected-personal-data-will-always-be-used-against-the-citizens/">Europe</a>, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_American_internment">the US</a>, and most -recently <a href="http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/terrifying-how-a-single-line-of-computer-code-put-thousands-of-innocent-turks-in-jail-1.4495021">Turkey</a>. +recently <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/terrifying-how-a-single-line-of-computer-code-put-thousands-of-innocent-turks-in-jail-1.4495021">Turkey</a>. (Turkey's confusion about who had really used the Bylock program only exacerbated the basic deliberate injustice of arbitrarily punishing people for having used it.) </p> +<p>You may feel your government won't use your personal data for +repression, but you can't rely on that feeling, because governments do +change. As of 2021, many ostensibly democratic states +are <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/aug/21/beware-state-surveillance-of-your-lives-governments-can-change-afghanistan">ruled +by people with authoritarian leanings</a>, and the Taliban have taken +over Afghanistan's systems of biometric identification that were set +up at the instigation of the US. The UK is working on a law +to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/aug/09/police-bill-not-law-order-state-control-erosion-freedom">repress +nonviolent protests that might be described as causing “serious +disruption.”</a> The US could become permanently repressive in +2025, for all we know. +</p> + <p>Personal data collected by the state is also likely to be obtained by outside crackers that break the security of the servers, even -by <a href="https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20150612/16334231330/second-opm-hack-revealed-even-worse-than-first.shtml">crackers +by <a href="https://www.techdirt.com/2015/06/12/second-opm-hack-revealed-even-worse-than-first/">crackers working for hostile states</a>.</p> <p>Governments can easily use massive surveillance capability -to <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/22/world/europe/macedonia-government-is-blamed-for-wiretapping-scandal.html">subvert +to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/22/world/europe/macedonia-government-is-blamed-for-wiretapping-scandal.html">subvert democracy directly</a>.</p> <p>Total surveillance accessible to the state enables the state to @@ -192,7 +224,7 @@ journalism and democracy safe, we must limit the accumulation of data that is easily accessible to the state.</p> </div> -<h3 class="subheader">Robust Protection for Privacy Must Be Technical</h3> +<h3 id="technical">Robust Protection for Privacy Must Be Technical</h3> <div class="columns"> <p>The Electronic Frontier Foundation and other organizations propose @@ -207,7 +239,7 @@ forever.</p> <p>However, such legal protections are precarious: as recent history shows, they can be repealed (as in the FISA Amendments Act), suspended, or <a -href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/16/us/16nsa.html">ignored</a>.</p> +href="https://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/16/us/16nsa.html">ignored</a>.</p> <p>Meanwhile, demagogues will cite the usual excuses as grounds for total surveillance; any terrorist attack, even one that kills just a @@ -224,7 +256,7 @@ collect data starting at that date. As for suspending or momentarily ignoring this law, the idea would hardly make sense.</p> </div> -<h3 class="subheader">First, Don't Be Foolish</h3> +<h3 id="commonsense">First, Don't Be Foolish</h3> <div class="columns"> <p>To have privacy, you must not throw it away: the first one who has @@ -250,7 +282,7 @@ how your computing is done, it requires you to hand over all the pertinent data to the company's server.</p> <p>Protect your friends' and acquaintances' privacy, -too. <a href="http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/05/21/in-cybersecurity-sometimes-the-weakest-link-is-a-family-member/">Don't +too. <a href="https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/05/21/in-cybersecurity-sometimes-the-weakest-link-is-a-family-member/">Don't give out their personal information</a> except how to contact them, and never give any web site your list of email or phone contacts. Don't tell a company such as Facebook anything about your friends that @@ -269,7 +301,7 @@ make all these systems stop surveilling people other than legitimate suspects.</p> </div> -<h3 class="subheader">We Must Design Every System for Privacy</h3> +<h3 id="privacybydesign">We Must Design Every System for Privacy</h3> <div class="columns"> <p>If we don't want a total surveillance society, we must consider @@ -292,10 +324,10 @@ period. The same benefit, with no surveillance!</p> systems [<a href="#ambientprivacy">1</a>].</p> </div> -<h3 class="subheader">Remedy for Collecting Data: Leaving It Dispersed</h3> +<h3 id="dispersal">Remedy for Collecting Data: Leaving It Dispersed</h3> <div class="columns"> -<p id="dispersal">One way to make monitoring safe for privacy is +<p>One way to make monitoring safe for privacy is to keep the data dispersed and inconvenient to access. Old-fashioned security cameras were no threat to privacy(<a href="#privatespace">*</a>). The recording was stored on the premises, and kept for a few weeks at @@ -310,10 +342,10 @@ center and saved forever. In Detroit, the cops pressure businesses to give them <a href="https://eu.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/detroit-city/2018/01/23/detroit-green-light/109524794/">unlimited access to their surveillance cameras</a> so that they can look through -them at any and all times. This is already dangerous, but it is going -to get worse. Advances in face recognition may bring the day when -suspected journalists can be tracked on the street all the time to see -who they talk with.</p> +them at any and all times. This is already dangerous, but it +is going to get worse. Advances in <a href="#facial-recognition">facial +recognition</a> may bring the day when suspected journalists can +be tracked on the street all the time to see who they talk with.</p> <p>Internet-connected cameras often have lousy digital security themselves, which means <a @@ -326,13 +358,24 @@ Everyone must be free to post photos and video recordings occasionally, but the systematic accumulation of such data on the Internet must be limited.</p> +<div class="infobox" style="margin-top: 1.5em"> <p id="privatespace">(*) I assume here that the security camera points at the inside of a store, or at the street. Any camera pointed at someone's private space by someone else violates privacy, but that is another issue.</p> </div> +</div> -<h3 id="digitalcash" class="subheader">Remedy for Internet Commerce Surveillance</h3> +<div class="announcement comment" role="complementary"> +<hr class="no-display" /> +<p>Also consider reading “<a +href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/apr/03/facebook-abusing-data-law-privacy-big-tech-surveillance">A +radical proposal to keep your personal data safe</a>,” published in +<cite>The Guardian</cite> in April 2018.</p> +<hr class="no-display" /> +</div> + +<h3 id="digitalcash">Remedy for Internet Commerce Surveillance</h3> <div class="columns"> <p>Most data collection comes from people's own digital activities. @@ -343,10 +386,10 @@ business, because the data that the companies collect is systematically available to the state.</p> <p>The NSA, through PRISM, -has <a href="https://www.commondreams.org/headline/2013/08/23-2">gotten +has <a href="https://www.commondreams.org/news/2013/08/23/latest-docs-show-financial-ties-between-nsa-and-internet-companies">gotten into the databases of many large Internet corporations</a>. AT&T has saved all its phone call records since 1987 -and <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/02/us/drug-agents-use-vast-phone-trove-eclipsing-nsas.html?_r=0">makes +and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/02/us/drug-agents-use-vast-phone-trove-eclipsing-nsas.html?_r=0">makes them available to the DEA</a> to search on request. Strictly speaking, the U.S. government does not possess that data, but in practical terms it may as well possess it. Some companies are praised @@ -376,17 +419,17 @@ privacy than commitments to uphold it.</p> <p>We could correct both problems by adopting a system of anonymous payments—anonymous for the payer, that is. (We don't want to help the payee dodge -taxes.) <a href="http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/05/lets-cut-through-the-bitcoin-hype/">Bitcoin +taxes.) <a href="https://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/05/lets-cut-through-the-bitcoin-hype/">Bitcoin is not anonymous</a>, though there are efforts to develop ways to pay anonymously with Bitcoin. However, technology -for <a href="http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/2.12/emoney_pr.html">digital +for <a href="https://www.wired.com/wired/archive/2.12/emoney_pr.html">digital cash was first developed in the 1980s</a>; the GNU software for doing -this is called <a href="http://taler.net/">GNU Taler</a>. Now we need +this is called <a href="https://taler.net/">GNU Taler</a>. Now we need only suitable business arrangements, and for the state not to obstruct them.</p> <p>Another possible method for anonymous payments would -use <a href="https://stallman.org/articles/anonymous-payments-thru-phones.html">prepaid +use <a href="/philosophy/phone-anonymous-payment.html">prepaid phone cards</a>. It is less convenient, but very easy to implement.</p> @@ -397,7 +440,7 @@ this danger: a security hole in the site can't hurt you if the site knows nothing about you.</p> </div> -<h3 class="subheader">Remedy for Travel Surveillance</h3> +<h3 id="travel">Remedy for Travel Surveillance</h3> <div class="columns"> <p>We must convert digital toll collection to anonymous payment (using @@ -413,7 +456,7 @@ available over the Internet; access to the data should be limited to searching for a list of court-ordered license-numbers.</p> <p>The U.S. “no-fly” list must be abolished because it is -<a href="https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security-technology-and-liberty-racial-justice/victory-federal-court-recognizes">punishment +<a href="https://www.aclu.org/news/national-security/victory-federal-court-recognizes-constitutional">punishment without trial</a>.</p> <p>It is acceptable to have a list of people whose person and luggage @@ -457,18 +500,18 @@ borrowed can inform headquarters; in that case, it could send the borrower's identity immediately.</p> </div> -<h3 class="subheader">Remedy for Communications Dossiers</h3> +<h3 id="communications">Remedy for Communications Dossiers</h3> <div class="columns"> <p>Internet service providers and telephone companies keep extensive data on their users' contacts (browsing, phone calls, etc). With mobile phones, they -also <a href="http://www.zeit.de/digital/datenschutz/2011-03/data-protection-malte-spitz">record +also <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20210312235125/http://www.zeit.de/digital/datenschutz/2011-03/data-protection-malte-spitz">record the user's physical location</a>. They keep these dossiers for a long time: over 30 years, in the case of AT&T. Soon they will -even <a href="http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/the-trojan-horse-of-the-latest-iphone-with-the-m7-coprocessor-we-all-become-qs-activity-trackers/">record +even <a href="https://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/the-trojan-horse-of-the-latest-iphone-with-the-m7-coprocessor-we-all-become-qs-activity-trackers/">record the user's body activities</a>. It appears that -the <a href="https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security-technology-and-liberty/it-sure-sounds-nsa-tracking-your-location">NSA +the <a href="https://www.aclu.org/news/national-security/it-sure-sounds-nsa-tracking-our-locations">NSA collects cell phone location data</a> in bulk.</p> <p>Unmonitored communication is impossible where systems create such @@ -479,7 +522,7 @@ long, in the absence of a court order to surveil a certain party.</p> <p>This solution is not entirely satisfactory, because it won't physically stop the government from collecting all the information immediately as it is generated—which is what -the <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order">U.S. does +the <a href="https://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order">U.S. does with some or all phone companies</a>. We would have to rely on prohibiting that by law. However, that would be better than the current situation, where the relevant law (the PAT RIOT Act) does not @@ -499,7 +542,7 @@ that I received mail from some user of your email service, but it would be hard to determine that you had sent mail to me.</p> </div> -<h3 class="subheader">But Some Surveillance Is Necessary</h3> +<h3 id="necessary">But Some Surveillance Is Necessary</h3> <div class="columns"> <p>For the state to find criminals, it needs to be able to investigate @@ -520,7 +563,7 @@ and <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20131025014556/http://photographyisnota photographers</a>.) One city in California that required police to wear video cameras all the time -found <a href="http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2013/08/ubiquitous-surveillance-police-edition">their +found <a href="https://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2013/08/ubiquitous-surveillance-police-edition">their use of force fell by 60%</a>. The ACLU is in favor of this.</p> <p><a @@ -528,7 +571,7 @@ href="https://web.archive.org/web/20171019220057/http://action.citizen.org/p/dia are not people, and not entitled to human rights</a>. It is legitimate to require businesses to publish the details of processes that might cause chemical, biological, nuclear, fiscal, computational -(e.g., <a href="http://DefectiveByDesign.org">DRM</a>) or political +(e.g., <a href="https://DefectiveByDesign.org">DRM</a>) or political (e.g., lobbying) hazards to society, to whatever level is needed for public well-being. The danger of these operations (consider the BP oil spill, the Fukushima meltdowns, and the 2008 fiscal crisis) dwarfs @@ -537,7 +580,8 @@ that of terrorism.</p> <p>However, journalism must be protected from surveillance even when it is carried out as part of a business.</p> </div> -<div class="column-limit"></div> + +<h3 id="conclusion">Conclusion</h3> <div class="reduced-width"> <p>Digital technology has brought about a tremendous increase in the @@ -559,7 +603,6 @@ to democracy is not speculation. It exists and is visible today.</p> a grave surveillance deficit, and ought to be surveilled more than the Soviet Union and East Germany were, we must reverse this increase. That requires stopping the accumulation of big data about people.</p> -</div> <div class="column-limit"></div> <h3 class="footnote">End Note</h3> @@ -568,12 +611,28 @@ That requires stopping the accumulation of big data about people.</p> has been referred to as <a href="https://idlewords.com/2019/06/the_new_wilderness.htm">ambient privacy</a>.</li> + +<li id="facial-recognition">In the 2020s, facial recognition deepens +the danger of surveillance cameras. China already identifies people +by their faces so as to punish them, +and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2022/sep/05/iran-government-facial-recognition-technology-hijab-law-crackdown">Iran +is planning to use it to punish women who violate religion-imposed +dress codes</a>.</li> </ol> + +<div class="infobox extra" role="complementary"> +<hr /> +<!-- rms: I deleted the link because of Wired's announced + anti-ad-block system --> +<p>A version of this article was first published in +<cite>Wired</cite> in October 2013.</p> +</div> +</div> </div> </div><!-- for id="content", starts in the include above --> <!--#include virtual="/server/footer.html" --> -<div id="footer"> +<div id="footer" role="contentinfo"> <div class="unprintable"> <p>Please send general FSF & GNU inquiries to @@ -591,13 +650,13 @@ to <a href="mailto:webmasters@gnu.org"><webmasters@gnu.org></a>.</p> to <a href="mailto:web-translators@gnu.org"> <web-translators@gnu.org></a>.</p> - <p>For information on coordinating and submitting translations of + <p>For information on coordinating and contributing translations of our web pages, see <a href="/server/standards/README.translations.html">Translations README</a>. --> Please see the <a href="/server/standards/README.translations.html">Translations -README</a> for information on coordinating and submitting translations +README</a> for information on coordinating and contributing translations of this article.</p> </div> @@ -618,7 +677,7 @@ of this article.</p> There is more detail about copyright years in the GNU Maintainers Information document, www.gnu.org/prep/maintain. --> -<p>Copyright © 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020 Richard Stallman</p> +<p>Copyright © 2013-2019, 2021, 2022 Richard Stallman</p> <p>This page is licensed under a <a rel="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">Creative @@ -628,7 +687,7 @@ Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License</a>.</p> <p class="unprintable">Updated: <!-- timestamp start --> -$Date: 2020/12/17 21:13:59 $ +$Date: 2022/09/17 18:24:26 $ <!-- timestamp end --> </p> </div> |