diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem')
-rw-r--r-- | deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem/extensions.c | 1693 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c | 1991 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem/extensions_cust.c | 533 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c | 1959 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem/statem.c | 330 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem/statem.h | 51 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c | 3144 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_dtls.c | 428 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c | 1933 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_locl.h | 350 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c | 3717 |
11 files changed, 12958 insertions, 3171 deletions
diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem/extensions.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem/extensions.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..63e61c6184 --- /dev/null +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem/extensions.c @@ -0,0 +1,1693 @@ +/* + * Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html + */ + +#include <string.h> +#include "internal/nelem.h" +#include "internal/cryptlib.h" +#include "../ssl_locl.h" +#include "statem_locl.h" +#include "internal/cryptlib.h" + +static int final_renegotiate(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent); +static int init_server_name(SSL *s, unsigned int context); +static int final_server_name(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC +static int final_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent); +#endif +static int init_session_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned int context); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP +static int init_status_request(SSL *s, unsigned int context); +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG +static int init_npn(SSL *s, unsigned int context); +#endif +static int init_alpn(SSL *s, unsigned int context); +static int final_alpn(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent); +static int init_sig_algs_cert(SSL *s, unsigned int context); +static int init_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned int context); +static int init_certificate_authorities(SSL *s, unsigned int context); +static EXT_RETURN tls_construct_certificate_authorities(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, + X509 *x, + size_t chainidx); +static int tls_parse_certificate_authorities(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP +static int init_srp(SSL *s, unsigned int context); +#endif +static int init_etm(SSL *s, unsigned int context); +static int init_ems(SSL *s, unsigned int context); +static int final_ems(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent); +static int init_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, unsigned int context); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC +static int final_key_share(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent); +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP +static int init_srtp(SSL *s, unsigned int context); +#endif +static int final_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent); +static int final_early_data(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent); +static int final_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent); +static int init_post_handshake_auth(SSL *s, unsigned int context); + +/* Structure to define a built-in extension */ +typedef struct extensions_definition_st { + /* The defined type for the extension */ + unsigned int type; + /* + * The context that this extension applies to, e.g. what messages and + * protocol versions + */ + unsigned int context; + /* + * Initialise extension before parsing. Always called for relevant contexts + * even if extension not present + */ + int (*init)(SSL *s, unsigned int context); + /* Parse extension sent from client to server */ + int (*parse_ctos)(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx); + /* Parse extension send from server to client */ + int (*parse_stoc)(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx); + /* Construct extension sent from server to client */ + EXT_RETURN (*construct_stoc)(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx); + /* Construct extension sent from client to server */ + EXT_RETURN (*construct_ctos)(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx); + /* + * Finalise extension after parsing. Always called where an extensions was + * initialised even if the extension was not present. |sent| is set to 1 if + * the extension was seen, or 0 otherwise. + */ + int (*final)(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent); +} EXTENSION_DEFINITION; + +/* + * Definitions of all built-in extensions. NOTE: Changes in the number or order + * of these extensions should be mirrored with equivalent changes to the + * indexes ( TLSEXT_IDX_* ) defined in ssl_locl.h. + * Each extension has an initialiser, a client and + * server side parser and a finaliser. The initialiser is called (if the + * extension is relevant to the given context) even if we did not see the + * extension in the message that we received. The parser functions are only + * called if we see the extension in the message. The finalisers are always + * called if the initialiser was called. + * There are also server and client side constructor functions which are always + * called during message construction if the extension is relevant for the + * given context. + * The initialisation, parsing, finalisation and construction functions are + * always called in the order defined in this list. Some extensions may depend + * on others having been processed first, so the order of this list is + * significant. + * The extension context is defined by a series of flags which specify which + * messages the extension is relevant to. These flags also specify whether the + * extension is relevant to a particular protocol or protocol version. + * + * TODO(TLS1.3): Make sure we have a test to check the consistency of these + * + * NOTE: WebSphere Application Server 7+ cannot handle empty extensions at + * the end, keep these extensions before signature_algorithm. + */ +#define INVALID_EXTENSION { 0x10000, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL } +static const EXTENSION_DEFINITION ext_defs[] = { + { + TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, + SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO + | SSL_EXT_SSL3_ALLOWED | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY, + NULL, tls_parse_ctos_renegotiate, tls_parse_stoc_renegotiate, + tls_construct_stoc_renegotiate, tls_construct_ctos_renegotiate, + final_renegotiate + }, + { + TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, + SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO + | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, + init_server_name, + tls_parse_ctos_server_name, tls_parse_stoc_server_name, + tls_construct_stoc_server_name, tls_construct_ctos_server_name, + final_server_name + }, + { + TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length, + SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO + | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, + NULL, tls_parse_ctos_maxfragmentlen, tls_parse_stoc_maxfragmentlen, + tls_construct_stoc_maxfragmentlen, tls_construct_ctos_maxfragmentlen, + final_maxfragmentlen + }, +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP + { + TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, + SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY, + init_srp, tls_parse_ctos_srp, NULL, NULL, tls_construct_ctos_srp, NULL + }, +#else + INVALID_EXTENSION, +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC + { + TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, + SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO + | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY, + NULL, tls_parse_ctos_ec_pt_formats, tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats, + tls_construct_stoc_ec_pt_formats, tls_construct_ctos_ec_pt_formats, + final_ec_pt_formats + }, + { + /* + * "supported_groups" is spread across several specifications. + * It was originally specified as "elliptic_curves" in RFC 4492, + * and broadened to include named FFDH groups by RFC 7919. + * Both RFCs 4492 and 7919 do not include a provision for the server + * to indicate to the client the complete list of groups supported + * by the server, with the server instead just indicating the + * selected group for this connection in the ServerKeyExchange + * message. TLS 1.3 adds a scheme for the server to indicate + * to the client its list of supported groups in the + * EncryptedExtensions message, but none of the relevant + * specifications permit sending supported_groups in the ServerHello. + * Nonetheless (possibly due to the close proximity to the + * "ec_point_formats" extension, which is allowed in the ServerHello), + * there are several servers that send this extension in the + * ServerHello anyway. Up to and including the 1.1.0 release, + * we did not check for the presence of nonpermitted extensions, + * so to avoid a regression, we must permit this extension in the + * TLS 1.2 ServerHello as well. + * + * Note that there is no tls_parse_stoc_supported_groups function, + * so we do not perform any additional parsing, validation, or + * processing on the server's group list -- this is just a minimal + * change to preserve compatibility with these misbehaving servers. + */ + TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups, + SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS + | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO, + NULL, tls_parse_ctos_supported_groups, NULL, + tls_construct_stoc_supported_groups, + tls_construct_ctos_supported_groups, NULL + }, +#else + INVALID_EXTENSION, + INVALID_EXTENSION, +#endif + { + TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, + SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO + | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY, + init_session_ticket, tls_parse_ctos_session_ticket, + tls_parse_stoc_session_ticket, tls_construct_stoc_session_ticket, + tls_construct_ctos_session_ticket, NULL + }, +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP + { + TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, + SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO + | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + init_status_request, tls_parse_ctos_status_request, + tls_parse_stoc_status_request, tls_construct_stoc_status_request, + tls_construct_ctos_status_request, NULL + }, +#else + INVALID_EXTENSION, +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG + { + TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, + SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO + | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY, + init_npn, tls_parse_ctos_npn, tls_parse_stoc_npn, + tls_construct_stoc_next_proto_neg, tls_construct_ctos_npn, NULL + }, +#else + INVALID_EXTENSION, +#endif + { + /* + * Must appear in this list after server_name so that finalisation + * happens after server_name callbacks + */ + TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, + SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO + | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, + init_alpn, tls_parse_ctos_alpn, tls_parse_stoc_alpn, + tls_construct_stoc_alpn, tls_construct_ctos_alpn, final_alpn + }, +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP + { + TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, + SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO + | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS | SSL_EXT_DTLS_ONLY, + init_srtp, tls_parse_ctos_use_srtp, tls_parse_stoc_use_srtp, + tls_construct_stoc_use_srtp, tls_construct_ctos_use_srtp, NULL + }, +#else + INVALID_EXTENSION, +#endif + { + TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, + SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO + | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY, + init_etm, tls_parse_ctos_etm, tls_parse_stoc_etm, + tls_construct_stoc_etm, tls_construct_ctos_etm, NULL + }, +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT + { + TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp, + SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO + | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + NULL, + /* + * No server side support for this, but can be provided by a custom + * extension. This is an exception to the rule that custom extensions + * cannot override built in ones. + */ + NULL, tls_parse_stoc_sct, NULL, tls_construct_ctos_sct, NULL + }, +#else + INVALID_EXTENSION, +#endif + { + TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, + SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO + | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY, + init_ems, tls_parse_ctos_ems, tls_parse_stoc_ems, + tls_construct_stoc_ems, tls_construct_ctos_ems, final_ems + }, + { + TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms_cert, + SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + init_sig_algs_cert, tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs_cert, + tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs_cert, + /* We do not generate signature_algorithms_cert at present. */ + NULL, NULL, NULL + }, + { + TLSEXT_TYPE_post_handshake_auth, + SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY, + init_post_handshake_auth, + tls_parse_ctos_post_handshake_auth, NULL, + NULL, tls_construct_ctos_post_handshake_auth, + NULL, + }, + { + TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, + SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + init_sig_algs, tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs, + tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs, tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs, + tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs, final_sig_algs + }, + { + TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions, + SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO + | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST | SSL_EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY, + NULL, + /* Processed inline as part of version selection */ + NULL, tls_parse_stoc_supported_versions, + tls_construct_stoc_supported_versions, + tls_construct_ctos_supported_versions, NULL + }, + { + TLSEXT_TYPE_psk_kex_modes, + SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY + | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY, + init_psk_kex_modes, tls_parse_ctos_psk_kex_modes, NULL, NULL, + tls_construct_ctos_psk_kex_modes, NULL + }, +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC + { + /* + * Must be in this list after supported_groups. We need that to have + * been parsed before we do this one. + */ + TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share, + SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO + | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST | SSL_EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY + | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY, + NULL, tls_parse_ctos_key_share, tls_parse_stoc_key_share, + tls_construct_stoc_key_share, tls_construct_ctos_key_share, + final_key_share + }, +#endif + { + /* Must be after key_share */ + TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie, + SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST + | SSL_EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY, + NULL, tls_parse_ctos_cookie, tls_parse_stoc_cookie, + tls_construct_stoc_cookie, tls_construct_ctos_cookie, NULL + }, + { + /* + * Special unsolicited ServerHello extension only used when + * SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG is set + */ + TLSEXT_TYPE_cryptopro_bug, + SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY, + NULL, NULL, NULL, tls_construct_stoc_cryptopro_bug, NULL, NULL + }, + { + TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data, + SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS + | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY, + NULL, tls_parse_ctos_early_data, tls_parse_stoc_early_data, + tls_construct_stoc_early_data, tls_construct_ctos_early_data, + final_early_data + }, + { + TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_authorities, + SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST + | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY, + init_certificate_authorities, + tls_parse_certificate_authorities, tls_parse_certificate_authorities, + tls_construct_certificate_authorities, + tls_construct_certificate_authorities, NULL, + }, + { + /* Must be immediately before pre_shared_key */ + TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, + SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, + NULL, + /* We send this, but don't read it */ + NULL, NULL, NULL, tls_construct_ctos_padding, NULL + }, + { + /* Required by the TLSv1.3 spec to always be the last extension */ + TLSEXT_TYPE_psk, + SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO + | SSL_EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY, + NULL, tls_parse_ctos_psk, tls_parse_stoc_psk, tls_construct_stoc_psk, + tls_construct_ctos_psk, NULL + } +}; + +/* Check whether an extension's context matches the current context */ +static int validate_context(SSL *s, unsigned int extctx, unsigned int thisctx) +{ + /* Check we're allowed to use this extension in this context */ + if ((thisctx & extctx) == 0) + return 0; + + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { + if ((extctx & SSL_EXT_TLS_ONLY) != 0) + return 0; + } else if ((extctx & SSL_EXT_DTLS_ONLY) != 0) { + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +int tls_validate_all_contexts(SSL *s, unsigned int thisctx, RAW_EXTENSION *exts) +{ + size_t i, num_exts, builtin_num = OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs), offset; + RAW_EXTENSION *thisext; + unsigned int context; + ENDPOINT role = ENDPOINT_BOTH; + + if ((thisctx & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0) + role = ENDPOINT_SERVER; + else if ((thisctx & SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO) != 0) + role = ENDPOINT_CLIENT; + + /* Calculate the number of extensions in the extensions list */ + num_exts = builtin_num + s->cert->custext.meths_count; + + for (thisext = exts, i = 0; i < num_exts; i++, thisext++) { + if (!thisext->present) + continue; + + if (i < builtin_num) { + context = ext_defs[i].context; + } else { + custom_ext_method *meth = NULL; + + meth = custom_ext_find(&s->cert->custext, role, thisext->type, + &offset); + if (!ossl_assert(meth != NULL)) + return 0; + context = meth->context; + } + + if (!validate_context(s, context, thisctx)) + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +/* + * Verify whether we are allowed to use the extension |type| in the current + * |context|. Returns 1 to indicate the extension is allowed or unknown or 0 to + * indicate the extension is not allowed. If returning 1 then |*found| is set to + * the definition for the extension we found. + */ +static int verify_extension(SSL *s, unsigned int context, unsigned int type, + custom_ext_methods *meths, RAW_EXTENSION *rawexlist, + RAW_EXTENSION **found) +{ + size_t i; + size_t builtin_num = OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs); + const EXTENSION_DEFINITION *thisext; + + for (i = 0, thisext = ext_defs; i < builtin_num; i++, thisext++) { + if (type == thisext->type) { + if (!validate_context(s, thisext->context, context)) + return 0; + + *found = &rawexlist[i]; + return 1; + } + } + + /* Check the custom extensions */ + if (meths != NULL) { + size_t offset = 0; + ENDPOINT role = ENDPOINT_BOTH; + custom_ext_method *meth = NULL; + + if ((context & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0) + role = ENDPOINT_SERVER; + else if ((context & SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO) != 0) + role = ENDPOINT_CLIENT; + + meth = custom_ext_find(meths, role, type, &offset); + if (meth != NULL) { + if (!validate_context(s, meth->context, context)) + return 0; + *found = &rawexlist[offset + builtin_num]; + return 1; + } + } + + /* Unknown extension. We allow it */ + *found = NULL; + return 1; +} + +/* + * Check whether the context defined for an extension |extctx| means whether + * the extension is relevant for the current context |thisctx| or not. Returns + * 1 if the extension is relevant for this context, and 0 otherwise + */ +int extension_is_relevant(SSL *s, unsigned int extctx, unsigned int thisctx) +{ + int is_tls13; + + /* + * For HRR we haven't selected the version yet but we know it will be + * TLSv1.3 + */ + if ((thisctx & SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) != 0) + is_tls13 = 1; + else + is_tls13 = SSL_IS_TLS13(s); + + if ((SSL_IS_DTLS(s) + && (extctx & SSL_EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY) != 0) + || (s->version == SSL3_VERSION + && (extctx & SSL_EXT_SSL3_ALLOWED) == 0) + /* + * Note that SSL_IS_TLS13() means "TLS 1.3 has been negotiated", + * which is never true when generating the ClientHello. + * However, version negotiation *has* occurred by the time the + * ClientHello extensions are being parsed. + * Be careful to allow TLS 1.3-only extensions when generating + * the ClientHello. + */ + || (is_tls13 && (extctx & SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY) != 0) + || (!is_tls13 && (extctx & SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY) != 0 + && (thisctx & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) == 0) + || (s->server && !is_tls13 && (extctx & SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY) != 0) + || (s->hit && (extctx & SSL_EXT_IGNORE_ON_RESUMPTION) != 0)) + return 0; + return 1; +} + +/* + * Gather a list of all the extensions from the data in |packet]. |context| + * tells us which message this extension is for. The raw extension data is + * stored in |*res| on success. We don't actually process the content of the + * extensions yet, except to check their types. This function also runs the + * initialiser functions for all known extensions if |init| is nonzero (whether + * we have collected them or not). If successful the caller is responsible for + * freeing the contents of |*res|. + * + * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be + * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello. + * This function returns 1 if all extensions are unique and we have parsed their + * types, and 0 if the extensions contain duplicates, could not be successfully + * found, or an internal error occurred. We only check duplicates for + * extensions that we know about. We ignore others. + */ +int tls_collect_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *packet, unsigned int context, + RAW_EXTENSION **res, size_t *len, int init) +{ + PACKET extensions = *packet; + size_t i = 0; + size_t num_exts; + custom_ext_methods *exts = &s->cert->custext; + RAW_EXTENSION *raw_extensions = NULL; + const EXTENSION_DEFINITION *thisexd; + + *res = NULL; + + /* + * Initialise server side custom extensions. Client side is done during + * construction of extensions for the ClientHello. + */ + if ((context & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0) + custom_ext_init(&s->cert->custext); + + num_exts = OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs) + (exts != NULL ? exts->meths_count : 0); + raw_extensions = OPENSSL_zalloc(num_exts * sizeof(*raw_extensions)); + if (raw_extensions == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_COLLECT_EXTENSIONS, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } + + i = 0; + while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) { + unsigned int type, idx; + PACKET extension; + RAW_EXTENSION *thisex; + + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) || + !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_COLLECT_EXTENSIONS, + SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + goto err; + } + /* + * Verify this extension is allowed. We only check duplicates for + * extensions that we recognise. We also have a special case for the + * PSK extension, which must be the last one in the ClientHello. + */ + if (!verify_extension(s, context, type, exts, raw_extensions, &thisex) + || (thisex != NULL && thisex->present == 1) + || (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_psk + && (context & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0 + && PACKET_remaining(&extensions) != 0)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_COLLECT_EXTENSIONS, + SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + goto err; + } + idx = thisex - raw_extensions; + /*- + * Check that we requested this extension (if appropriate). Requests can + * be sent in the ClientHello and CertificateRequest. Unsolicited + * extensions can be sent in the NewSessionTicket. We only do this for + * the built-in extensions. Custom extensions have a different but + * similar check elsewhere. + * Special cases: + * - The HRR cookie extension is unsolicited + * - The renegotiate extension is unsolicited (the client signals + * support via an SCSV) + * - The signed_certificate_timestamp extension can be provided by a + * custom extension or by the built-in version. We let the extension + * itself handle unsolicited response checks. + */ + if (idx < OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs) + && (context & (SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO + | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST + | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET)) == 0 + && type != TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie + && type != TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate + && type != TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp + && (s->ext.extflags[idx] & SSL_EXT_FLAG_SENT) == 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, + SSL_F_TLS_COLLECT_EXTENSIONS, SSL_R_UNSOLICITED_EXTENSION); + goto err; + } + if (thisex != NULL) { + thisex->data = extension; + thisex->present = 1; + thisex->type = type; + thisex->received_order = i++; + if (s->ext.debug_cb) + s->ext.debug_cb(s, !s->server, thisex->type, + PACKET_data(&thisex->data), + PACKET_remaining(&thisex->data), + s->ext.debug_arg); + } + } + + if (init) { + /* + * Initialise all known extensions relevant to this context, + * whether we have found them or not + */ + for (thisexd = ext_defs, i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs); + i++, thisexd++) { + if (thisexd->init != NULL && (thisexd->context & context) != 0 + && extension_is_relevant(s, thisexd->context, context) + && !thisexd->init(s, context)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + } + } + + *res = raw_extensions; + if (len != NULL) + *len = num_exts; + return 1; + + err: + OPENSSL_free(raw_extensions); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Runs the parser for a given extension with index |idx|. |exts| contains the + * list of all parsed extensions previously collected by + * tls_collect_extensions(). The parser is only run if it is applicable for the + * given |context| and the parser has not already been run. If this is for a + * Certificate message, then we also provide the parser with the relevant + * Certificate |x| and its position in the |chainidx| with 0 being the first + * Certificate. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. If an extension is not + * present this counted as success. + */ +int tls_parse_extension(SSL *s, TLSEXT_INDEX idx, int context, + RAW_EXTENSION *exts, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) +{ + RAW_EXTENSION *currext = &exts[idx]; + int (*parser)(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) = NULL; + + /* Skip if the extension is not present */ + if (!currext->present) + return 1; + + /* Skip if we've already parsed this extension */ + if (currext->parsed) + return 1; + + currext->parsed = 1; + + if (idx < OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs)) { + /* We are handling a built-in extension */ + const EXTENSION_DEFINITION *extdef = &ext_defs[idx]; + + /* Check if extension is defined for our protocol. If not, skip */ + if (!extension_is_relevant(s, extdef->context, context)) + return 1; + + parser = s->server ? extdef->parse_ctos : extdef->parse_stoc; + + if (parser != NULL) + return parser(s, &currext->data, context, x, chainidx); + + /* + * If the parser is NULL we fall through to the custom extension + * processing + */ + } + + /* Parse custom extensions */ + return custom_ext_parse(s, context, currext->type, + PACKET_data(&currext->data), + PACKET_remaining(&currext->data), + x, chainidx); +} + +/* + * Parse all remaining extensions that have not yet been parsed. Also calls the + * finalisation for all extensions at the end if |fin| is nonzero, whether we + * collected them or not. Returns 1 for success or 0 for failure. If we are + * working on a Certificate message then we also pass the Certificate |x| and + * its position in the |chainidx|, with 0 being the first certificate. + */ +int tls_parse_all_extensions(SSL *s, int context, RAW_EXTENSION *exts, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int fin) +{ + size_t i, numexts = OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs); + const EXTENSION_DEFINITION *thisexd; + + /* Calculate the number of extensions in the extensions list */ + numexts += s->cert->custext.meths_count; + + /* Parse each extension in turn */ + for (i = 0; i < numexts; i++) { + if (!tls_parse_extension(s, i, context, exts, x, chainidx)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + } + + if (fin) { + /* + * Finalise all known extensions relevant to this context, + * whether we have found them or not + */ + for (i = 0, thisexd = ext_defs; i < OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs); + i++, thisexd++) { + if (thisexd->final != NULL && (thisexd->context & context) != 0 + && !thisexd->final(s, context, exts[i].present)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + } + } + + return 1; +} + +int should_add_extension(SSL *s, unsigned int extctx, unsigned int thisctx, + int max_version) +{ + /* Skip if not relevant for our context */ + if ((extctx & thisctx) == 0) + return 0; + + /* Check if this extension is defined for our protocol. If not, skip */ + if (!extension_is_relevant(s, extctx, thisctx) + || ((extctx & SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY) != 0 + && (thisctx & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0 + && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION))) + return 0; + + return 1; +} + +/* + * Construct all the extensions relevant to the current |context| and write + * them to |pkt|. If this is an extension for a Certificate in a Certificate + * message, then |x| will be set to the Certificate we are handling, and + * |chainidx| will indicate the position in the chainidx we are processing (with + * 0 being the first in the chain). Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. On a + * failure construction stops at the first extension to fail to construct. + */ +int tls_construct_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) +{ + size_t i; + int min_version, max_version = 0, reason; + const EXTENSION_DEFINITION *thisexd; + + if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + /* + * If extensions are of zero length then we don't even add the + * extensions length bytes to a ClientHello/ServerHello + * (for non-TLSv1.3). + */ + || ((context & + (SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO)) != 0 + && !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, + WPACKET_FLAGS_ABANDON_ON_ZERO_LENGTH))) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_EXTENSIONS, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + if ((context & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0) { + reason = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version, NULL); + if (reason != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_EXTENSIONS, + reason); + return 0; + } + } + + /* Add custom extensions first */ + if ((context & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0) { + /* On the server side with initialise during ClientHello parsing */ + custom_ext_init(&s->cert->custext); + } + if (!custom_ext_add(s, context, pkt, x, chainidx, max_version)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + + for (i = 0, thisexd = ext_defs; i < OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs); i++, thisexd++) { + EXT_RETURN (*construct)(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx); + EXT_RETURN ret; + + /* Skip if not relevant for our context */ + if (!should_add_extension(s, thisexd->context, context, max_version)) + continue; + + construct = s->server ? thisexd->construct_stoc + : thisexd->construct_ctos; + + if (construct == NULL) + continue; + + ret = construct(s, pkt, context, x, chainidx); + if (ret == EXT_RETURN_FAIL) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + if (ret == EXT_RETURN_SENT + && (context & (SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO + | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST + | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET)) != 0) + s->ext.extflags[i] |= SSL_EXT_FLAG_SENT; + } + + if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_EXTENSIONS, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +/* + * Built in extension finalisation and initialisation functions. All initialise + * or finalise the associated extension type for the given |context|. For + * finalisers |sent| is set to 1 if we saw the extension during parsing, and 0 + * otherwise. These functions return 1 on success or 0 on failure. + */ + +static int final_renegotiate(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent) +{ + if (!s->server) { + /* + * Check if we can connect to a server that doesn't support safe + * renegotiation + */ + if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT) + && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) + && !sent) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_FINAL_RENEGOTIATE, + SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); + return 0; + } + + return 1; + } + + /* Need RI if renegotiating */ + if (s->renegotiate + && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) + && !sent) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_FINAL_RENEGOTIATE, + SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); + return 0; + } + + + return 1; +} + +static int init_server_name(SSL *s, unsigned int context) +{ + if (s->server) { + s->servername_done = 0; + + OPENSSL_free(s->ext.hostname); + s->ext.hostname = NULL; + } + + return 1; +} + +static int final_server_name(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent) +{ + int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; + int altmp = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; + int was_ticket = (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) == 0; + + if (!ossl_assert(s->ctx != NULL) || !ossl_assert(s->session_ctx != NULL)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_FINAL_SERVER_NAME, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + if (s->ctx->ext.servername_cb != NULL) + ret = s->ctx->ext.servername_cb(s, &altmp, + s->ctx->ext.servername_arg); + else if (s->session_ctx->ext.servername_cb != NULL) + ret = s->session_ctx->ext.servername_cb(s, &altmp, + s->session_ctx->ext.servername_arg); + + /* + * For servers, propagate the SNI hostname from the temporary + * storage in the SSL to the persistent SSL_SESSION, now that we + * know we accepted it. + * Clients make this copy when parsing the server's response to + * the extension, which is when they find out that the negotiation + * was successful. + */ + if (s->server) { + /* TODO(OpenSSL1.2) revisit !sent case */ + if (sent && ret == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK && (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) { + /* Only store the hostname in the session if we accepted it. */ + OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.hostname); + s->session->ext.hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->ext.hostname); + if (s->session->ext.hostname == NULL && s->ext.hostname != NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_FINAL_SERVER_NAME, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + } + } + } + + /* + * If we switched contexts (whether here or in the client_hello callback), + * move the sess_accept increment from the session_ctx to the new + * context, to avoid the confusing situation of having sess_accept_good + * exceed sess_accept (zero) for the new context. + */ + if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) && s->ctx != s->session_ctx) { + tsan_counter(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept); + tsan_decr(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept); + } + + /* + * If we're expecting to send a ticket, and tickets were previously enabled, + * and now tickets are disabled, then turn off expected ticket. + * Also, if this is not a resumption, create a new session ID + */ + if (ret == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK && s->ext.ticket_expected + && was_ticket && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0) { + s->ext.ticket_expected = 0; + if (!s->hit) { + SSL_SESSION* ss = SSL_get_session(s); + + if (ss != NULL) { + OPENSSL_free(ss->ext.tick); + ss->ext.tick = NULL; + ss->ext.ticklen = 0; + ss->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = 0; + ss->ext.tick_age_add = 0; + ss->ext.tick_identity = 0; + if (!ssl_generate_session_id(s, ss)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_FINAL_SERVER_NAME, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + } else { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_FINAL_SERVER_NAME, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + } + } + + switch (ret) { + case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: + SSLfatal(s, altmp, SSL_F_FINAL_SERVER_NAME, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED); + return 0; + + case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: + /* TLSv1.3 doesn't have warning alerts so we suppress this */ + if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, altmp); + return 1; + + case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: + s->servername_done = 0; + return 1; + + default: + return 1; + } +} + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC +static int final_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent) +{ + unsigned long alg_k, alg_a; + + if (s->server) + return 1; + + alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; + alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; + + /* + * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher + * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it + * must contain uncompressed. + */ + if (s->ext.ecpointformats != NULL + && s->ext.ecpointformats_len > 0 + && s->session->ext.ecpointformats != NULL + && s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len > 0 + && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) { + /* we are using an ECC cipher */ + size_t i; + unsigned char *list = s->session->ext.ecpointformats; + + for (i = 0; i < s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len; i++) { + if (*list++ == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) + break; + } + if (i == s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_FINAL_EC_PT_FORMATS, + SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST); + return 0; + } + } + + return 1; +} +#endif + +static int init_session_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned int context) +{ + if (!s->server) + s->ext.ticket_expected = 0; + + return 1; +} + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP +static int init_status_request(SSL *s, unsigned int context) +{ + if (s->server) { + s->ext.status_type = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing; + } else { + /* + * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event + * that we don't receive a status message + */ + OPENSSL_free(s->ext.ocsp.resp); + s->ext.ocsp.resp = NULL; + s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = 0; + } + + return 1; +} +#endif + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG +static int init_npn(SSL *s, unsigned int context) +{ + s->s3->npn_seen = 0; + + return 1; +} +#endif + +static int init_alpn(SSL *s, unsigned int context) +{ + OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); + s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL; + s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0; + if (s->server) { + OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed); + s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL; + s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0; + } + return 1; +} + +static int final_alpn(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent) +{ + if (!s->server && !sent && s->session->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) + s->ext.early_data_ok = 0; + + if (!s->server || !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) + return 1; + + /* + * Call alpn_select callback if needed. Has to be done after SNI and + * cipher negotiation (HTTP/2 restricts permitted ciphers). In TLSv1.3 + * we also have to do this before we decide whether to accept early_data. + * In TLSv1.3 we've already negotiated our cipher so we do this call now. + * For < TLSv1.3 we defer it until after cipher negotiation. + * + * On failure SSLfatal() already called. + */ + return tls_handle_alpn(s); +} + +static int init_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned int context) +{ + /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */ + OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs); + s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL; + + return 1; +} + +static int init_sig_algs_cert(SSL *s, unsigned int context) +{ + /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */ + OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs); + s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs = NULL; + + return 1; +} + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP +static int init_srp(SSL *s, unsigned int context) +{ + OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login); + s->srp_ctx.login = NULL; + + return 1; +} +#endif + +static int init_etm(SSL *s, unsigned int context) +{ + s->ext.use_etm = 0; + + return 1; +} + +static int init_ems(SSL *s, unsigned int context) +{ + if (!s->server) + s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS; + + return 1; +} + +static int final_ems(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent) +{ + if (!s->server && s->hit) { + /* + * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with + * original session. + */ + if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) != + !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_FINAL_EMS, + SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS); + return 0; + } + } + + return 1; +} + +static int init_certificate_authorities(SSL *s, unsigned int context) +{ + sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names, X509_NAME_free); + s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names = NULL; + return 1; +} + +static EXT_RETURN tls_construct_certificate_authorities(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, + X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) +{ + const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = get_ca_names(s); + + if (ca_sk == NULL || sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk) == 0) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_authorities) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_AUTHORITIES, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + if (!construct_ca_names(s, ca_sk, pkt)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_AUTHORITIES, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} + +static int tls_parse_certificate_authorities(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) +{ + if (!parse_ca_names(s, pkt)) + return 0; + if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CERTIFICATE_AUTHORITIES, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + return 1; +} + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP +static int init_srtp(SSL *s, unsigned int context) +{ + if (s->server) + s->srtp_profile = NULL; + + return 1; +} +#endif + +static int final_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent) +{ + if (!sent && SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->hit) { + SSLfatal(s, TLS13_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION, SSL_F_FINAL_SIG_ALGS, + SSL_R_MISSING_SIGALGS_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC +static int final_key_share(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent) +{ + if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) + return 1; + + /* Nothing to do for key_share in an HRR */ + if ((context & SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) != 0) + return 1; + + /* + * If + * we are a client + * AND + * we have no key_share + * AND + * (we are not resuming + * OR the kex_mode doesn't allow non key_share resumes) + * THEN + * fail; + */ + if (!s->server + && !sent + && (!s->hit + || (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE) == 0)) { + /* Nothing left we can do - just fail */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION, SSL_F_FINAL_KEY_SHARE, + SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE); + return 0; + } + /* + * IF + * we are a server + * THEN + * IF + * we have a suitable key_share + * THEN + * IF + * we are stateless AND we have no cookie + * THEN + * send a HelloRetryRequest + * ELSE + * IF + * we didn't already send a HelloRetryRequest + * AND + * the client sent a key_share extension + * AND + * (we are not resuming + * OR the kex_mode allows key_share resumes) + * AND + * a shared group exists + * THEN + * send a HelloRetryRequest + * ELSE IF + * we are not resuming + * OR + * the kex_mode doesn't allow non key_share resumes + * THEN + * fail + * ELSE IF + * we are stateless AND we have no cookie + * THEN + * send a HelloRetryRequest + */ + if (s->server) { + if (s->s3->peer_tmp != NULL) { + /* We have a suitable key_share */ + if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) != 0 + && !s->ext.cookieok) { + if (!ossl_assert(s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE)) { + /* + * If we are stateless then we wouldn't know about any + * previously sent HRR - so how can this be anything other + * than 0? + */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_FINAL_KEY_SHARE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_PENDING; + return 1; + } + } else { + /* No suitable key_share */ + if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE && sent + && (!s->hit + || (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE) + != 0)) { + const uint16_t *pgroups, *clntgroups; + size_t num_groups, clnt_num_groups, i; + unsigned int group_id = 0; + + /* Check if a shared group exists */ + + /* Get the clients list of supported groups. */ + tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &clntgroups, &clnt_num_groups); + tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups); + + /* + * Find the first group we allow that is also in client's list + */ + for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) { + group_id = pgroups[i]; + + if (check_in_list(s, group_id, clntgroups, clnt_num_groups, + 1)) + break; + } + + if (i < num_groups) { + /* A shared group exists so send a HelloRetryRequest */ + s->s3->group_id = group_id; + s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_PENDING; + return 1; + } + } + if (!s->hit + || (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE) == 0) { + /* Nothing left we can do - just fail */ + SSLfatal(s, sent ? SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE + : SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION, + SSL_F_FINAL_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE); + return 0; + } + + if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) != 0 + && !s->ext.cookieok) { + if (!ossl_assert(s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE)) { + /* + * If we are stateless then we wouldn't know about any + * previously sent HRR - so how can this be anything other + * than 0? + */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_FINAL_KEY_SHARE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_PENDING; + return 1; + } + } + + /* + * We have a key_share so don't send any more HelloRetryRequest + * messages + */ + if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) + s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_COMPLETE; + } else { + /* + * For a client side resumption with no key_share we need to generate + * the handshake secret (otherwise this is done during key_share + * processing). + */ + if (!sent && !tls13_generate_handshake_secret(s, NULL, 0)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_FINAL_KEY_SHARE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + } + + return 1; +} +#endif + +static int init_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, unsigned int context) +{ + s->ext.psk_kex_mode = TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_NONE; + return 1; +} + +int tls_psk_do_binder(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *msgstart, + size_t binderoffset, const unsigned char *binderin, + unsigned char *binderout, SSL_SESSION *sess, int sign, + int external) +{ + EVP_PKEY *mackey = NULL; + EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL; + unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], binderkey[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + unsigned char finishedkey[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], tmpbinder[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + unsigned char *early_secret; + static const unsigned char resumption_label[] = "res binder"; + static const unsigned char external_label[] = "ext binder"; + const unsigned char *label; + size_t bindersize, labelsize, hashsize; + int hashsizei = EVP_MD_size(md); + int ret = -1; + int usepskfored = 0; + + /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */ + if (!ossl_assert(hashsizei >= 0)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + hashsize = (size_t)hashsizei; + + if (external + && s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING + && s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0 + && sess->ext.max_early_data > 0) + usepskfored = 1; + + if (external) { + label = external_label; + labelsize = sizeof(external_label) - 1; + } else { + label = resumption_label; + labelsize = sizeof(resumption_label) - 1; + } + + /* + * Generate the early_secret. On the server side we've selected a PSK to + * resume with (internal or external) so we always do this. On the client + * side we do this for a non-external (i.e. resumption) PSK or external PSK + * that will be used for early_data so that it is in place for sending early + * data. For client side external PSK not being used for early_data we + * generate it but store it away for later use. + */ + if (s->server || !external || usepskfored) + early_secret = (unsigned char *)s->early_secret; + else + early_secret = (unsigned char *)sess->early_secret; + + if (!tls13_generate_secret(s, md, NULL, sess->master_key, + sess->master_key_length, early_secret)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + + /* + * Create the handshake hash for the binder key...the messages so far are + * empty! + */ + mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + if (mctx == NULL + || EVP_DigestInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mctx, hash, NULL) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + /* Generate the binder key */ + if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, early_secret, label, labelsize, hash, + hashsize, binderkey, hashsize)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + + /* Generate the finished key */ + if (!tls13_derive_finishedkey(s, md, binderkey, finishedkey, hashsize)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + + if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + /* + * Get a hash of the ClientHello up to the start of the binders. If we are + * following a HelloRetryRequest then this includes the hash of the first + * ClientHello and the HelloRetryRequest itself. + */ + if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) { + size_t hdatalen; + long hdatalen_l; + void *hdata; + + hdatalen = hdatalen_l = + BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata); + if (hdatalen_l <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, + SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH); + goto err; + } + + /* + * For servers the handshake buffer data will include the second + * ClientHello - which we don't want - so we need to take that bit off. + */ + if (s->server) { + PACKET hashprefix, msg; + + /* Find how many bytes are left after the first two messages */ + if (!PACKET_buf_init(&hashprefix, hdata, hdatalen) + || !PACKET_forward(&hashprefix, 1) + || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(&hashprefix, &msg) + || !PACKET_forward(&hashprefix, 1) + || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(&hashprefix, &msg)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + hdatalen -= PACKET_remaining(&hashprefix); + } + + if (EVP_DigestUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + } + + if (EVP_DigestUpdate(mctx, msgstart, binderoffset) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mctx, hash, NULL) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + mackey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, finishedkey, + hashsize); + if (mackey == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + if (!sign) + binderout = tmpbinder; + + bindersize = hashsize; + if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, NULL, md, NULL, mackey) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hash, hashsize) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, binderout, &bindersize) <= 0 + || bindersize != hashsize) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + if (sign) { + ret = 1; + } else { + /* HMAC keys can't do EVP_DigestVerify* - use CRYPTO_memcmp instead */ + ret = (CRYPTO_memcmp(binderin, binderout, hashsize) == 0); + if (!ret) + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, + SSL_R_BINDER_DOES_NOT_VERIFY); + } + + err: + OPENSSL_cleanse(binderkey, sizeof(binderkey)); + OPENSSL_cleanse(finishedkey, sizeof(finishedkey)); + EVP_PKEY_free(mackey); + EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); + + return ret; +} + +static int final_early_data(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent) +{ + if (!sent) + return 1; + + if (!s->server) { + if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS + && sent + && !s->ext.early_data_ok) { + /* + * If we get here then the server accepted our early_data but we + * later realised that it shouldn't have done (e.g. inconsistent + * ALPN) + */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_FINAL_EARLY_DATA, + SSL_R_BAD_EARLY_DATA); + return 0; + } + + return 1; + } + + if (s->max_early_data == 0 + || !s->hit + || s->session->ext.tick_identity != 0 + || s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING + || !s->ext.early_data_ok + || s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE + || (s->ctx->allow_early_data_cb != NULL + && !s->ctx->allow_early_data_cb(s, + s->ctx->allow_early_data_cb_data))) { + s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED; + } else { + s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED; + + if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s, + SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + } + + return 1; +} + +static int final_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent) +{ + /* + * Session resumption on server-side with MFL extension active + * BUT MFL extension packet was not resent (i.e. sent == 0) + */ + if (s->server && s->hit && USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s->session) + && !sent ) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION, SSL_F_FINAL_MAXFRAGMENTLEN, + SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + + /* Current SSL buffer is lower than requested MFL */ + if (s->session && USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s->session) + && s->max_send_fragment < GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(s->session)) + /* trigger a larger buffer reallocation */ + if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +static int init_post_handshake_auth(SSL *s, unsigned int context) +{ + s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_NONE; + + return 1; +} diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ab4dbf6713 --- /dev/null +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c @@ -0,0 +1,1991 @@ +/* + * Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html + */ + +#include <openssl/ocsp.h> +#include "../ssl_locl.h" +#include "internal/cryptlib.h" +#include "statem_locl.h" + +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) +{ + /* Add RI if renegotiating */ + if (!s->renegotiate) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished, + s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} + +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) +{ + if (s->ext.hostname == NULL) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */ + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) + /* Sub-packet for server_name extension */ + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + /* Sub-packet for servername list (always 1 hostname)*/ + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.hostname, + strlen(s->ext.hostname)) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SERVER_NAME, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} + +/* Push a Max Fragment Len extension into ClientHello */ +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) +{ + if (s->ext.max_fragment_len_mode == TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + /* Add Max Fragment Length extension if client enabled it. */ + /*- + * 4 bytes for this extension type and extension length + * 1 byte for the Max Fragment Length code value. + */ + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length) + /* Sub-packet for Max Fragment Length extension (1 byte) */ + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.max_fragment_len_mode) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) +{ + /* Add SRP username if there is one */ + if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) + /* Sub-packet for SRP extension */ + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt) + /* login must not be zero...internal error if so */ + || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH) + || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->srp_ctx.login, + strlen(s->srp_ctx.login)) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SRP, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} +#endif + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC +static int use_ecc(SSL *s) +{ + int i, end, ret = 0; + unsigned long alg_k, alg_a; + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = NULL; + + /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */ + if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) + return 0; + + cipher_stack = SSL_get1_supported_ciphers(s); + end = sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); + for (i = 0; i < end; i++) { + const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i); + + alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey; + alg_a = c->algorithm_auth; + if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) + || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) + || c->min_tls >= TLS1_3_VERSION) { + ret = 1; + break; + } + } + + sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipher_stack); + return ret; +} + +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) +{ + const unsigned char *pformats; + size_t num_formats; + + if (!use_ecc(s)) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */ + tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats); + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) + /* Sub-packet for formats extension */ + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, pformats, num_formats) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} + +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) +{ + const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL; + size_t num_groups = 0, i; + + if (!use_ecc(s)) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + /* + * Add TLS extension supported_groups to the ClientHello message + */ + /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for DHE groups */ + tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups); + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups) + /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */ + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + /* Copy curve ID if supported */ + for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) { + uint16_t ctmp = pgroups[i]; + + if (tls_curve_allowed(s, ctmp, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) { + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, ctmp)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + } + } + if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} +#endif + +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) +{ + size_t ticklen; + + if (!tls_use_ticket(s)) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + if (!s->new_session && s->session != NULL + && s->session->ext.tick != NULL + && s->session->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION) { + ticklen = s->session->ext.ticklen; + } else if (s->session && s->ext.session_ticket != NULL + && s->ext.session_ticket->data != NULL) { + ticklen = s->ext.session_ticket->length; + s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); + if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + memcpy(s->session->ext.tick, + s->ext.session_ticket->data, ticklen); + s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen; + } else { + ticklen = 0; + } + + if (ticklen == 0 && s->ext.session_ticket != NULL && + s->ext.session_ticket->data == NULL) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} + +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) +{ + size_t salglen; + const uint16_t *salg; + + if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &salg); + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) + /* Sub-packet for sig-algs extension */ + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + /* Sub-packet for the actual list */ + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, salg, salglen) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SIG_ALGS, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) +{ + int i; + + /* This extension isn't defined for client Certificates */ + if (x != NULL) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) + /* Sub-packet for status request extension */ + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) + /* Sub-packet for the ids */ + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->ext.ocsp.ids); i++) { + unsigned char *idbytes; + OCSP_RESPID *id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->ext.ocsp.ids, i); + int idlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL); + + if (idlen <= 0 + /* Sub-packet for an individual id */ + || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, idlen, &idbytes) + || i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &idbytes) != idlen) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + } + if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + if (s->ext.ocsp.exts) { + unsigned char *extbytes; + int extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->ext.ocsp.exts, NULL); + + if (extlen < 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, extlen, &extbytes) + || i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->ext.ocsp.exts, &extbytes) + != extlen) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + } + if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} +#endif + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_npn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) +{ + if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb == NULL || !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + /* + * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support + * for Next Protocol Negotiation + */ + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_NPN, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} +#endif + +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) +{ + s->s3->alpn_sent = 0; + + if (s->ext.alpn == NULL || !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, + TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) + /* Sub-packet ALPN extension */ + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.alpn, s->ext.alpn_len) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_ALPN, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + s->s3->alpn_sent = 1; + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} + + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) +{ + STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s); + int i, end; + + if (clnt == NULL) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) + /* Sub-packet for SRTP extension */ + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + /* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */ + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + end = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt); + for (i = 0; i < end; i++) { + const SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof = + sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i); + + if (prof == NULL || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, prof->id)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + } + if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) + /* Add an empty use_mki value */ + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} +#endif + +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) +{ + if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_ETM, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_sct(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) +{ + if (s->ct_validation_callback == NULL) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + /* Not defined for client Certificates */ + if (x != NULL) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SCT, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} +#endif + +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) +{ + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EMS, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} + +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_supported_versions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) +{ + int currv, min_version, max_version, reason; + + reason = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version, NULL); + if (reason != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, reason); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + /* + * Don't include this if we can't negotiate TLSv1.3. We can do a straight + * comparison here because we will never be called in DTLS. + */ + if (max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + for (currv = max_version; currv >= min_version; currv--) { + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, currv)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + } + if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} + +/* + * Construct a psk_kex_modes extension. + */ +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) +{ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 + int nodhe = s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_NO_DHE_KEX; + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk_kex_modes) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE_DHE) + || (nodhe && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE)) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK_KEX_MODES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + s->ext.psk_kex_mode = TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE; + if (nodhe) + s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE; +#endif + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 +static int add_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int curve_id) +{ + unsigned char *encoded_point = NULL; + EVP_PKEY *key_share_key = NULL; + size_t encodedlen; + + if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) { + if (!ossl_assert(s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + /* + * Could happen if we got an HRR that wasn't requesting a new key_share + */ + key_share_key = s->s3->tmp.pkey; + } else { + key_share_key = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id); + if (key_share_key == NULL) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + } + + /* Encode the public key. */ + encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(key_share_key, + &encoded_point); + if (encodedlen == 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); + goto err; + } + + /* Create KeyShareEntry */ + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, curve_id) + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encoded_point, encodedlen)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + /* + * TODO(TLS1.3): When changing to send more than one key_share we're + * going to need to be able to save more than one EVP_PKEY. For now + * we reuse the existing tmp.pkey + */ + s->s3->tmp.pkey = key_share_key; + s->s3->group_id = curve_id; + OPENSSL_free(encoded_point); + + return 1; + err: + if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) + EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key); + OPENSSL_free(encoded_point); + return 0; +} +#endif + +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) +{ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 + size_t i, num_groups = 0; + const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL; + uint16_t curve_id = 0; + + /* key_share extension */ + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share) + /* Extension data sub-packet */ + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + /* KeyShare list sub-packet */ + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups); + + /* + * TODO(TLS1.3): Make the number of key_shares sent configurable. For + * now, just send one + */ + if (s->s3->group_id != 0) { + curve_id = s->s3->group_id; + } else { + for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) { + + if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pgroups[i], SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) + continue; + + curve_id = pgroups[i]; + break; + } + } + + if (curve_id == 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, + SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + if (!add_key_share(s, pkt, curve_id)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +#else + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; +#endif +} + +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_cookie(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) +{ + EXT_RETURN ret = EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + + /* Should only be set if we've had an HRR */ + if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie) + /* Extension data sub-packet */ + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.tls13_cookie, + s->ext.tls13_cookie_len) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_COOKIE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto end; + } + + ret = EXT_RETURN_SENT; + end: + OPENSSL_free(s->ext.tls13_cookie); + s->ext.tls13_cookie = NULL; + s->ext.tls13_cookie_len = 0; + + return ret; +} + +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) +{ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK + char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1]; +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ + const unsigned char *id = NULL; + size_t idlen = 0; + SSL_SESSION *psksess = NULL; + SSL_SESSION *edsess = NULL; + const EVP_MD *handmd = NULL; + + if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) + handmd = ssl_handshake_md(s); + + if (s->psk_use_session_cb != NULL + && (!s->psk_use_session_cb(s, handmd, &id, &idlen, &psksess) + || (psksess != NULL + && psksess->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION))) { + SSL_SESSION_free(psksess); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, + SSL_R_BAD_PSK); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK + if (psksess == NULL && s->psk_client_callback != NULL) { + unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN]; + size_t psklen = 0; + + memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity)); + psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, NULL, identity, sizeof(identity) - 1, + psk, sizeof(psk)); + + if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } else if (psklen > 0) { + const unsigned char tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id[] = { 0x13, 0x01 }; + const SSL_CIPHER *cipher; + + idlen = strlen(identity); + if (idlen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + id = (unsigned char *)identity; + + /* + * We found a PSK using an old style callback. We don't know + * the digest so we default to SHA256 as per the TLSv1.3 spec + */ + cipher = SSL_CIPHER_find(s, tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id); + if (cipher == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + psksess = SSL_SESSION_new(); + if (psksess == NULL + || !SSL_SESSION_set1_master_key(psksess, psk, psklen) + || !SSL_SESSION_set_cipher(psksess, cipher) + || !SSL_SESSION_set_protocol_version(psksess, TLS1_3_VERSION)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen); + } + } +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ + + SSL_SESSION_free(s->psksession); + s->psksession = psksess; + if (psksess != NULL) { + OPENSSL_free(s->psksession_id); + s->psksession_id = OPENSSL_memdup(id, idlen); + if (s->psksession_id == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + s->psksession_id_len = idlen; + } + + if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING + || (s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0 + && (psksess == NULL || psksess->ext.max_early_data == 0))) { + s->max_early_data = 0; + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + } + edsess = s->session->ext.max_early_data != 0 ? s->session : psksess; + s->max_early_data = edsess->ext.max_early_data; + + if (edsess->ext.hostname != NULL) { + if (s->ext.hostname == NULL + || (s->ext.hostname != NULL + && strcmp(s->ext.hostname, edsess->ext.hostname) != 0)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, + SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_SNI); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + } + + if ((s->ext.alpn == NULL && edsess->ext.alpn_selected != NULL)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, + SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_ALPN); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + /* + * Verify that we are offering an ALPN protocol consistent with the early + * data. + */ + if (edsess->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) { + PACKET prots, alpnpkt; + int found = 0; + + if (!PACKET_buf_init(&prots, s->ext.alpn, s->ext.alpn_len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&prots, &alpnpkt)) { + if (PACKET_equal(&alpnpkt, edsess->ext.alpn_selected, + edsess->ext.alpn_selected_len)) { + found = 1; + break; + } + } + if (!found) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, + SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_ALPN); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + } + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + /* + * We set this to rejected here. Later, if the server acknowledges the + * extension, we set it to accepted. + */ + s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED; + s->ext.early_data_ok = 1; + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} + +#define F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN 0xff +#define F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN 0x200 + +/* + * PSK pre binder overhead = + * 2 bytes for TLSEXT_TYPE_psk + * 2 bytes for extension length + * 2 bytes for identities list length + * 2 bytes for identity length + * 4 bytes for obfuscated_ticket_age + * 2 bytes for binder list length + * 1 byte for binder length + * The above excludes the number of bytes for the identity itself and the + * subsequent binder bytes + */ +#define PSK_PRE_BINDER_OVERHEAD (2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 4 + 2 + 1) + +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_padding(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) +{ + unsigned char *padbytes; + size_t hlen; + + if ((s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) == 0) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + /* + * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See RFC7685. + * This code calculates the length of all extensions added so far but + * excludes the PSK extension (because that MUST be written last). Therefore + * this extension MUST always appear second to last. + */ + if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &hlen)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PADDING, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + /* + * If we're going to send a PSK then that will be written out after this + * extension, so we need to calculate how long it is going to be. + */ + if (s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION + && s->session->ext.ticklen != 0 + && s->session->cipher != NULL) { + const EVP_MD *md = ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2); + + if (md != NULL) { + /* + * Add the fixed PSK overhead, the identity length and the binder + * length. + */ + hlen += PSK_PRE_BINDER_OVERHEAD + s->session->ext.ticklen + + EVP_MD_size(md); + } + } + + if (hlen > F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN && hlen < F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN) { + /* Calculate the amount of padding we need to add */ + hlen = F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN - hlen; + + /* + * Take off the size of extension header itself (2 bytes for type and + * 2 bytes for length bytes), but ensure that the extension is at least + * 1 byte long so as not to have an empty extension last (WebSphere 7.x, + * 8.x are intolerant of that condition) + */ + if (hlen > 4) + hlen -= 4; + else + hlen = 1; + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding) + || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, hlen, &padbytes)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PADDING, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + memset(padbytes, 0, hlen); + } + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} + +/* + * Construct the pre_shared_key extension + */ +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) +{ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 + uint32_t now, agesec, agems = 0; + size_t reshashsize = 0, pskhashsize = 0, binderoffset, msglen; + unsigned char *resbinder = NULL, *pskbinder = NULL, *msgstart = NULL; + const EVP_MD *handmd = NULL, *mdres = NULL, *mdpsk = NULL; + int dores = 0; + + s->session->ext.tick_identity = TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY; + + /* + * Note: At this stage of the code we only support adding a single + * resumption PSK. If we add support for multiple PSKs then the length + * calculations in the padding extension will need to be adjusted. + */ + + /* + * If this is an incompatible or new session then we have nothing to resume + * so don't add this extension. + */ + if (s->session->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION + || (s->session->ext.ticklen == 0 && s->psksession == NULL)) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) + handmd = ssl_handshake_md(s); + + if (s->session->ext.ticklen != 0) { + /* Get the digest associated with the ciphersuite in the session */ + if (s->session->cipher == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + mdres = ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2); + if (mdres == NULL) { + /* + * Don't recognize this cipher so we can't use the session. + * Ignore it + */ + goto dopsksess; + } + + if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING && mdres != handmd) { + /* + * Selected ciphersuite hash does not match the hash for the session + * so we can't use it. + */ + goto dopsksess; + } + + /* + * Technically the C standard just says time() returns a time_t and says + * nothing about the encoding of that type. In practice most + * implementations follow POSIX which holds it as an integral type in + * seconds since epoch. We've already made the assumption that we can do + * this in multiple places in the code, so portability shouldn't be an + * issue. + */ + now = (uint32_t)time(NULL); + agesec = now - (uint32_t)s->session->time; + /* + * We calculate the age in seconds but the server may work in ms. Due to + * rounding errors we could overestimate the age by up to 1s. It is + * better to underestimate it. Otherwise, if the RTT is very short, when + * the server calculates the age reported by the client it could be + * bigger than the age calculated on the server - which should never + * happen. + */ + if (agesec > 0) + agesec--; + + if (s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint < agesec) { + /* Ticket is too old. Ignore it. */ + goto dopsksess; + } + + /* + * Calculate age in ms. We're just doing it to nearest second. Should be + * good enough. + */ + agems = agesec * (uint32_t)1000; + + if (agesec != 0 && agems / (uint32_t)1000 != agesec) { + /* + * Overflow. Shouldn't happen unless this is a *really* old session. + * If so we just ignore it. + */ + goto dopsksess; + } + + /* + * Obfuscate the age. Overflow here is fine, this addition is supposed + * to be mod 2^32. + */ + agems += s->session->ext.tick_age_add; + + reshashsize = EVP_MD_size(mdres); + dores = 1; + } + + dopsksess: + if (!dores && s->psksession == NULL) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + if (s->psksession != NULL) { + mdpsk = ssl_md(s->psksession->cipher->algorithm2); + if (mdpsk == NULL) { + /* + * Don't recognize this cipher so we can't use the session. + * If this happens it's an application bug. + */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, + SSL_R_BAD_PSK); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING && mdpsk != handmd) { + /* + * Selected ciphersuite hash does not match the hash for the PSK + * session. This is an application bug. + */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, + SSL_R_BAD_PSK); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + pskhashsize = EVP_MD_size(mdpsk); + } + + /* Create the extension, but skip over the binder for now */ + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + if (dores) { + if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, + s->session->ext.ticklen) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, agems)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + } + + if (s->psksession != NULL) { + if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->psksession_id, + s->psksession_id_len) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + } + + if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) + || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &binderoffset) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || (dores + && !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, reshashsize, &resbinder)) + || (s->psksession != NULL + && !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, pskhashsize, &pskbinder)) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt) + || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &msglen) + /* + * We need to fill in all the sub-packet lengths now so we can + * calculate the HMAC of the message up to the binders + */ + || !WPACKET_fill_lengths(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + msgstart = WPACKET_get_curr(pkt) - msglen; + + if (dores + && tls_psk_do_binder(s, mdres, msgstart, binderoffset, NULL, + resbinder, s->session, 1, 0) != 1) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + if (s->psksession != NULL + && tls_psk_do_binder(s, mdpsk, msgstart, binderoffset, NULL, + pskbinder, s->psksession, 1, 1) != 1) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + if (dores) + s->session->ext.tick_identity = 0; + if (s->psksession != NULL) + s->psksession->ext.tick_identity = (dores ? 1 : 0); + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +#else + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; +#endif +} + +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_post_handshake_auth(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) +{ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 + if (!s->pha_enabled) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + /* construct extension - 0 length, no contents */ + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_post_handshake_auth) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT; + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +#else + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; +#endif +} + + +/* + * Parse the server's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right + */ +int tls_parse_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) +{ + size_t expected_len = s->s3->previous_client_finished_len + + s->s3->previous_server_finished_len; + size_t ilen; + const unsigned char *data; + + /* Check for logic errors */ + if (!ossl_assert(expected_len == 0 + || s->s3->previous_client_finished_len != 0) + || !ossl_assert(expected_len == 0 + || s->s3->previous_server_finished_len != 0)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + /* Parse the length byte */ + if (!PACKET_get_1_len(pkt, &ilen)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE, + SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR); + return 0; + } + + /* Consistency check */ + if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ilen) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE, + SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR); + return 0; + } + + /* Check that the extension matches */ + if (ilen != expected_len) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE, + SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); + return 0; + } + + if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) + || memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_client_finished, + s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE, + SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); + return 0; + } + + if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, s->s3->previous_server_finished_len) + || memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_server_finished, + s->s3->previous_server_finished_len) != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE, + SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); + return 0; + } + s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1; + + return 1; +} + +/* Parse the server's max fragment len extension packet */ +int tls_parse_stoc_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) +{ + unsigned int value; + + if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 1 || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &value)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN, + SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + + /* |value| should contains a valid max-fragment-length code. */ + if (!IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(value)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN, + SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH); + return 0; + } + + /* Must be the same value as client-configured one who was sent to server */ + /*- + * RFC 6066: if a client receives a maximum fragment length negotiation + * response that differs from the length it requested, ... + * It must abort with SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER alert + */ + if (value != s->ext.max_fragment_len_mode) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN, + SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH); + return 0; + } + + /* + * Maximum Fragment Length Negotiation succeeded. + * The negotiated Maximum Fragment Length is binding now. + */ + s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = value; + + return 1; +} + +int tls_parse_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) +{ + if (s->ext.hostname == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SERVER_NAME, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SERVER_NAME, + SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + + if (!s->hit) { + if (s->session->ext.hostname != NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SERVER_NAME, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + s->session->ext.hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->ext.hostname); + if (s->session->ext.hostname == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SERVER_NAME, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + } + + return 1; +} + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC +int tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) +{ + size_t ecpointformats_len; + PACKET ecptformatlist; + + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ecptformatlist)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, + SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + if (!s->hit) { + ecpointformats_len = PACKET_remaining(&ecptformatlist); + if (ecpointformats_len == 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); + return 0; + } + + s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len = 0; + OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.ecpointformats); + s->session->ext.ecpointformats = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformats_len); + if (s->session->ext.ecpointformats == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len = ecpointformats_len; + + if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&ecptformatlist, + s->session->ext.ecpointformats, + ecpointformats_len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + } + + return 1; +} +#endif + +int tls_parse_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) +{ + if (s->ext.session_ticket_cb != NULL && + !s->ext.session_ticket_cb(s, PACKET_data(pkt), + PACKET_remaining(pkt), + s->ext.session_ticket_cb_arg)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + + if (!tls_use_ticket(s)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + + s->ext.ticket_expected = 1; + + return 1; +} + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP +int tls_parse_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) +{ + if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) { + /* We ignore this if the server sends a CertificateRequest */ + /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for this */ + return 1; + } + + /* + * MUST only be sent if we've requested a status + * request message. In TLS <= 1.2 it must also be empty. + */ + if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + /* We only know how to handle this if it's for the first Certificate in + * the chain. We ignore any other responses. + */ + if (chainidx != 0) + return 1; + + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt); + } + + /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */ + s->ext.status_expected = 1; + + return 1; +} +#endif + + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT +int tls_parse_stoc_sct(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) +{ + if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) { + /* We ignore this if the server sends it in a CertificateRequest */ + /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for this */ + return 1; + } + + /* + * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation + * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we + * need to let control continue to flow to that. + */ + if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) { + size_t size = PACKET_remaining(pkt); + + /* Simply copy it off for later processing */ + OPENSSL_free(s->ext.scts); + s->ext.scts = NULL; + + s->ext.scts_len = (uint16_t)size; + if (size > 0) { + s->ext.scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size); + if (s->ext.scts == NULL + || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.scts, size)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SCT, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + } + } else { + ENDPOINT role = (context & SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO) != 0 + ? ENDPOINT_CLIENT : ENDPOINT_BOTH; + + /* + * If we didn't ask for it then there must be a custom extension, + * otherwise this is unsolicited. + */ + if (custom_ext_find(&s->cert->custext, role, + TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp, + NULL) == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SCT, + SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + + if (!custom_ext_parse(s, context, + TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp, + PACKET_data(pkt), PACKET_remaining(pkt), + x, chainidx)) { + /* SSLfatal already called */ + return 0; + } + } + + return 1; +} +#endif + + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG +/* + * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No + * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly + * fill the length of the block. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. + */ +static int ssl_next_proto_validate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) +{ + PACKET tmp_protocol; + + while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol) + || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_NEXT_PROTO_VALIDATE, + SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + } + + return 1; +} + +int tls_parse_stoc_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) +{ + unsigned char *selected; + unsigned char selected_len; + PACKET tmppkt; + + /* Check if we are in a renegotiation. If so ignore this extension */ + if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) + return 1; + + /* We must have requested it. */ + if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_NPN, + SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + + /* The data must be valid */ + tmppkt = *pkt; + if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(s, &tmppkt)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, + PACKET_data(pkt), + PACKET_remaining(pkt), + s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb_arg) != + SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_NPN, + SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + + /* + * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in + * a single Serverhello + */ + OPENSSL_free(s->ext.npn); + s->ext.npn = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len); + if (s->ext.npn == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_NPN, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + memcpy(s->ext.npn, selected, selected_len); + s->ext.npn_len = selected_len; + s->s3->npn_seen = 1; + + return 1; +} +#endif + +int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) +{ + size_t len; + + /* We must have requested it. */ + if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN, + SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + /*- + * The extension data consists of: + * uint16 list_length + * uint8 proto_length; + * uint8 proto[proto_length]; + */ + if (!PACKET_get_net_2_len(pkt, &len) + || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1_len(pkt, &len) + || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != len) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN, + SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); + s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len); + if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN, + SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len; + + if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL + || s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len != len + || memcmp(s->session->ext.alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected, len) + != 0) { + /* ALPN not consistent with the old session so cannot use early_data */ + s->ext.early_data_ok = 0; + } + if (!s->hit) { + /* + * This is a new session and so alpn_selected should have been + * initialised to NULL. We should update it with the selected ALPN. + */ + if (!ossl_assert(s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + s->session->ext.alpn_selected = + OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3->alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected_len); + if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len; + } + + return 1; +} + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP +int tls_parse_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) +{ + unsigned int id, ct, mki; + int i; + STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt; + SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof; + + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct) || ct != 2 + || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &id) + || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki) + || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP, + SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); + return 0; + } + + if (mki != 0) { + /* Must be no MKI, since we never offer one */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP, + SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE); + return 0; + } + + /* Throw an error if the server gave us an unsolicited extension */ + clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s); + if (clnt == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP, + SSL_R_NO_SRTP_PROFILES); + return 0; + } + + /* + * Check to see if the server gave us something we support (and + * presumably offered) + */ + for (i = 0; i < sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt); i++) { + prof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i); + + if (prof->id == id) { + s->srtp_profile = prof; + return 1; + } + } + + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP, + SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); + return 0; +} +#endif + +int tls_parse_stoc_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) +{ + /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */ + if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD + && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4) + s->ext.use_etm = 1; + + return 1; +} + +int tls_parse_stoc_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) +{ + s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS; + if (!s->hit) + s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS; + + return 1; +} + +int tls_parse_stoc_supported_versions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) +{ + unsigned int version; + + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &version) + || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return 0; + } + + /* + * The only protocol version we support which is valid in this extension in + * a ServerHello is TLSv1.3 therefore we shouldn't be getting anything else. + */ + if (version != TLS1_3_VERSION) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, + SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); + return 0; + } + + /* We ignore this extension for HRRs except to sanity check it */ + if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) + return 1; + + /* We just set it here. We validate it in ssl_choose_client_version */ + s->version = version; + + return 1; +} + +int tls_parse_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) +{ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 + unsigned int group_id; + PACKET encoded_pt; + EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->tmp.pkey, *skey = NULL; + + /* Sanity check */ + if (ckey == NULL || s->s3->peer_tmp != NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &group_id)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return 0; + } + + if ((context & SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) != 0) { + const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL; + size_t i, num_groups; + + if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return 0; + } + + /* + * It is an error if the HelloRetryRequest wants a key_share that we + * already sent in the first ClientHello + */ + if (group_id == s->s3->group_id) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE); + return 0; + } + + /* Validate the selected group is one we support */ + tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups); + for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) { + if (group_id == pgroups[i]) + break; + } + if (i >= num_groups + || !tls_curve_allowed(s, group_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE); + return 0; + } + + s->s3->group_id = group_id; + EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey); + s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL; + return 1; + } + + if (group_id != s->s3->group_id) { + /* + * This isn't for the group that we sent in the original + * key_share! + */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, + SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE); + return 0; + } + + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &encoded_pt) + || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return 0; + } + + skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey); + if (skey == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } + if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt), + PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, + SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT); + EVP_PKEY_free(skey); + return 0; + } + + if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 1) == 0) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + EVP_PKEY_free(skey); + return 0; + } + s->s3->peer_tmp = skey; +#endif + + return 1; +} + +int tls_parse_stoc_cookie(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) +{ + PACKET cookie; + + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cookie) + || !PACKET_memdup(&cookie, &s->ext.tls13_cookie, + &s->ext.tls13_cookie_len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_COOKIE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +int tls_parse_stoc_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) +{ + if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) { + unsigned long max_early_data; + + if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &max_early_data) + || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EARLY_DATA, + SSL_R_INVALID_MAX_EARLY_DATA); + return 0; + } + + s->session->ext.max_early_data = max_early_data; + + return 1; + } + + if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EARLY_DATA, + SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + + if (!s->ext.early_data_ok + || !s->hit + || s->session->ext.tick_identity != 0) { + /* + * If we get here then we didn't send early data, or we didn't resume + * using the first identity, or the SNI/ALPN is not consistent so the + * server should not be accepting it. + */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EARLY_DATA, + SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + + s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED; + + return 1; +} + +int tls_parse_stoc_psk(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) +{ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 + unsigned int identity; + + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &identity) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return 0; + } + + if (s->session->ext.tick_identity == (int)identity) { + s->hit = 1; + SSL_SESSION_free(s->psksession); + s->psksession = NULL; + return 1; + } + + if (s->psksession == NULL + || s->psksession->ext.tick_identity != (int)identity) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK, + SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY); + return 0; + } + + /* + * If we used the external PSK for sending early_data then s->early_secret + * is already set up, so don't overwrite it. Otherwise we copy the + * early_secret across that we generated earlier. + */ + if ((s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY + && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) + || s->session->ext.max_early_data > 0 + || s->psksession->ext.max_early_data == 0) + memcpy(s->early_secret, s->psksession->early_secret, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); + + SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); + s->session = s->psksession; + s->psksession = NULL; + s->hit = 1; +#endif + + return 1; +} diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem/extensions_cust.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem/extensions_cust.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a4cdc81d68 --- /dev/null +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem/extensions_cust.c @@ -0,0 +1,533 @@ +/* + * Copyright 2014-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html + */ + +/* Custom extension utility functions */ + +#include <openssl/ct.h> +#include "../ssl_locl.h" +#include "internal/cryptlib.h" +#include "statem_locl.h" + +typedef struct { + void *add_arg; + custom_ext_add_cb add_cb; + custom_ext_free_cb free_cb; +} custom_ext_add_cb_wrap; + +typedef struct { + void *parse_arg; + custom_ext_parse_cb parse_cb; +} custom_ext_parse_cb_wrap; + +/* + * Provide thin wrapper callbacks which convert new style arguments to old style + */ +static int custom_ext_add_old_cb_wrap(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type, + unsigned int context, + const unsigned char **out, + size_t *outlen, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, + int *al, void *add_arg) +{ + custom_ext_add_cb_wrap *add_cb_wrap = (custom_ext_add_cb_wrap *)add_arg; + + if (add_cb_wrap->add_cb == NULL) + return 1; + + return add_cb_wrap->add_cb(s, ext_type, out, outlen, al, + add_cb_wrap->add_arg); +} + +static void custom_ext_free_old_cb_wrap(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type, + unsigned int context, + const unsigned char *out, void *add_arg) +{ + custom_ext_add_cb_wrap *add_cb_wrap = (custom_ext_add_cb_wrap *)add_arg; + + if (add_cb_wrap->free_cb == NULL) + return; + + add_cb_wrap->free_cb(s, ext_type, out, add_cb_wrap->add_arg); +} + +static int custom_ext_parse_old_cb_wrap(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type, + unsigned int context, + const unsigned char *in, + size_t inlen, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, + int *al, void *parse_arg) +{ + custom_ext_parse_cb_wrap *parse_cb_wrap = + (custom_ext_parse_cb_wrap *)parse_arg; + + if (parse_cb_wrap->parse_cb == NULL) + return 1; + + return parse_cb_wrap->parse_cb(s, ext_type, in, inlen, al, + parse_cb_wrap->parse_arg); +} + +/* + * Find a custom extension from the list. The |role| param is there to + * support the legacy API where custom extensions for client and server could + * be set independently on the same SSL_CTX. It is set to ENDPOINT_SERVER if we + * are trying to find a method relevant to the server, ENDPOINT_CLIENT for the + * client, or ENDPOINT_BOTH for either + */ +custom_ext_method *custom_ext_find(const custom_ext_methods *exts, + ENDPOINT role, unsigned int ext_type, + size_t *idx) +{ + size_t i; + custom_ext_method *meth = exts->meths; + + for (i = 0; i < exts->meths_count; i++, meth++) { + if (ext_type == meth->ext_type + && (role == ENDPOINT_BOTH || role == meth->role + || meth->role == ENDPOINT_BOTH)) { + if (idx != NULL) + *idx = i; + return meth; + } + } + return NULL; +} + +/* + * Initialise custom extensions flags to indicate neither sent nor received. + */ +void custom_ext_init(custom_ext_methods *exts) +{ + size_t i; + custom_ext_method *meth = exts->meths; + + for (i = 0; i < exts->meths_count; i++, meth++) + meth->ext_flags = 0; +} + +/* Pass received custom extension data to the application for parsing. */ +int custom_ext_parse(SSL *s, unsigned int context, unsigned int ext_type, + const unsigned char *ext_data, size_t ext_size, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) +{ + int al; + custom_ext_methods *exts = &s->cert->custext; + custom_ext_method *meth; + ENDPOINT role = ENDPOINT_BOTH; + + if ((context & (SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO)) != 0) + role = s->server ? ENDPOINT_SERVER : ENDPOINT_CLIENT; + + meth = custom_ext_find(exts, role, ext_type, NULL); + /* If not found return success */ + if (!meth) + return 1; + + /* Check if extension is defined for our protocol. If not, skip */ + if (!extension_is_relevant(s, meth->context, context)) + return 1; + + if ((context & (SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO + | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO + | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS)) != 0) { + /* + * If it's ServerHello or EncryptedExtensions we can't have any + * extensions not sent in ClientHello. + */ + if ((meth->ext_flags & SSL_EXT_FLAG_SENT) == 0) { + SSLfatal(s, TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_F_CUSTOM_EXT_PARSE, + SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + } + + /* + * Extensions received in the ClientHello are marked with the + * SSL_EXT_FLAG_RECEIVED. This is so we know to add the equivalent + * extensions in the ServerHello/EncryptedExtensions message + */ + if ((context & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0) + meth->ext_flags |= SSL_EXT_FLAG_RECEIVED; + + /* If no parse function set return success */ + if (!meth->parse_cb) + return 1; + + if (meth->parse_cb(s, ext_type, context, ext_data, ext_size, x, chainidx, + &al, meth->parse_arg) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, al, SSL_F_CUSTOM_EXT_PARSE, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +/* + * Request custom extension data from the application and add to the return + * buffer. + */ +int custom_ext_add(SSL *s, int context, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, + int maxversion) +{ + custom_ext_methods *exts = &s->cert->custext; + custom_ext_method *meth; + size_t i; + int al; + + for (i = 0; i < exts->meths_count; i++) { + const unsigned char *out = NULL; + size_t outlen = 0; + + meth = exts->meths + i; + + if (!should_add_extension(s, meth->context, context, maxversion)) + continue; + + if ((context & (SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO + | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO + | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS + | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE + | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST)) != 0) { + /* Only send extensions present in ClientHello. */ + if (!(meth->ext_flags & SSL_EXT_FLAG_RECEIVED)) + continue; + } + /* + * We skip it if the callback is absent - except for a ClientHello where + * we add an empty extension. + */ + if ((context & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) == 0 && meth->add_cb == NULL) + continue; + + if (meth->add_cb != NULL) { + int cb_retval = meth->add_cb(s, meth->ext_type, context, &out, + &outlen, x, chainidx, &al, + meth->add_arg); + + if (cb_retval < 0) { + SSLfatal(s, al, SSL_F_CUSTOM_EXT_ADD, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED); + return 0; /* error */ + } + if (cb_retval == 0) + continue; /* skip this extension */ + } + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, meth->ext_type) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || (outlen > 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, out, outlen)) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CUSTOM_EXT_ADD, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + if ((context & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0) { + /* + * We can't send duplicates: code logic should prevent this. + */ + if (!ossl_assert((meth->ext_flags & SSL_EXT_FLAG_SENT) == 0)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CUSTOM_EXT_ADD, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + /* + * Indicate extension has been sent: this is both a sanity check to + * ensure we don't send duplicate extensions and indicates that it + * is not an error if the extension is present in ServerHello. + */ + meth->ext_flags |= SSL_EXT_FLAG_SENT; + } + if (meth->free_cb != NULL) + meth->free_cb(s, meth->ext_type, context, out, meth->add_arg); + } + return 1; +} + +/* Copy the flags from src to dst for any extensions that exist in both */ +int custom_exts_copy_flags(custom_ext_methods *dst, + const custom_ext_methods *src) +{ + size_t i; + custom_ext_method *methsrc = src->meths; + + for (i = 0; i < src->meths_count; i++, methsrc++) { + custom_ext_method *methdst = custom_ext_find(dst, methsrc->role, + methsrc->ext_type, NULL); + + if (methdst == NULL) + continue; + + methdst->ext_flags = methsrc->ext_flags; + } + + return 1; +} + +/* Copy table of custom extensions */ +int custom_exts_copy(custom_ext_methods *dst, const custom_ext_methods *src) +{ + size_t i; + int err = 0; + + if (src->meths_count > 0) { + dst->meths = + OPENSSL_memdup(src->meths, + sizeof(*src->meths) * src->meths_count); + if (dst->meths == NULL) + return 0; + dst->meths_count = src->meths_count; + + for (i = 0; i < src->meths_count; i++) { + custom_ext_method *methsrc = src->meths + i; + custom_ext_method *methdst = dst->meths + i; + + if (methsrc->add_cb != custom_ext_add_old_cb_wrap) + continue; + + /* + * We have found an old style API wrapper. We need to copy the + * arguments too. + */ + + if (err) { + methdst->add_arg = NULL; + methdst->parse_arg = NULL; + continue; + } + + methdst->add_arg = OPENSSL_memdup(methsrc->add_arg, + sizeof(custom_ext_add_cb_wrap)); + methdst->parse_arg = OPENSSL_memdup(methsrc->parse_arg, + sizeof(custom_ext_parse_cb_wrap)); + + if (methdst->add_arg == NULL || methdst->parse_arg == NULL) + err = 1; + } + } + + if (err) { + custom_exts_free(dst); + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +void custom_exts_free(custom_ext_methods *exts) +{ + size_t i; + custom_ext_method *meth; + + for (i = 0, meth = exts->meths; i < exts->meths_count; i++, meth++) { + if (meth->add_cb != custom_ext_add_old_cb_wrap) + continue; + + /* Old style API wrapper. Need to free the arguments too */ + OPENSSL_free(meth->add_arg); + OPENSSL_free(meth->parse_arg); + } + OPENSSL_free(exts->meths); +} + +/* Return true if a client custom extension exists, false otherwise */ +int SSL_CTX_has_client_custom_ext(const SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned int ext_type) +{ + return custom_ext_find(&ctx->cert->custext, ENDPOINT_CLIENT, ext_type, + NULL) != NULL; +} + +static int add_custom_ext_intern(SSL_CTX *ctx, ENDPOINT role, + unsigned int ext_type, + unsigned int context, + SSL_custom_ext_add_cb_ex add_cb, + SSL_custom_ext_free_cb_ex free_cb, + void *add_arg, + SSL_custom_ext_parse_cb_ex parse_cb, + void *parse_arg) +{ + custom_ext_methods *exts = &ctx->cert->custext; + custom_ext_method *meth, *tmp; + + /* + * Check application error: if add_cb is not set free_cb will never be + * called. + */ + if (add_cb == NULL && free_cb != NULL) + return 0; + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT + /* + * We don't want applications registering callbacks for SCT extensions + * whilst simultaneously using the built-in SCT validation features, as + * these two things may not play well together. + */ + if (ext_type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp + && (context & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0 + && SSL_CTX_ct_is_enabled(ctx)) + return 0; +#endif + + /* + * Don't add if extension supported internally, but make exception + * for extension types that previously were not supported, but now are. + */ + if (SSL_extension_supported(ext_type) + && ext_type != TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp) + return 0; + + /* Extension type must fit in 16 bits */ + if (ext_type > 0xffff) + return 0; + /* Search for duplicate */ + if (custom_ext_find(exts, role, ext_type, NULL)) + return 0; + tmp = OPENSSL_realloc(exts->meths, + (exts->meths_count + 1) * sizeof(custom_ext_method)); + if (tmp == NULL) + return 0; + + exts->meths = tmp; + meth = exts->meths + exts->meths_count; + memset(meth, 0, sizeof(*meth)); + meth->role = role; + meth->context = context; + meth->parse_cb = parse_cb; + meth->add_cb = add_cb; + meth->free_cb = free_cb; + meth->ext_type = ext_type; + meth->add_arg = add_arg; + meth->parse_arg = parse_arg; + exts->meths_count++; + return 1; +} + +static int add_old_custom_ext(SSL_CTX *ctx, ENDPOINT role, + unsigned int ext_type, + unsigned int context, + custom_ext_add_cb add_cb, + custom_ext_free_cb free_cb, + void *add_arg, + custom_ext_parse_cb parse_cb, void *parse_arg) +{ + custom_ext_add_cb_wrap *add_cb_wrap + = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*add_cb_wrap)); + custom_ext_parse_cb_wrap *parse_cb_wrap + = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*parse_cb_wrap)); + int ret; + + if (add_cb_wrap == NULL || parse_cb_wrap == NULL) { + OPENSSL_free(add_cb_wrap); + OPENSSL_free(parse_cb_wrap); + return 0; + } + + add_cb_wrap->add_arg = add_arg; + add_cb_wrap->add_cb = add_cb; + add_cb_wrap->free_cb = free_cb; + parse_cb_wrap->parse_arg = parse_arg; + parse_cb_wrap->parse_cb = parse_cb; + + ret = add_custom_ext_intern(ctx, role, ext_type, + context, + custom_ext_add_old_cb_wrap, + custom_ext_free_old_cb_wrap, + add_cb_wrap, + custom_ext_parse_old_cb_wrap, + parse_cb_wrap); + + if (!ret) { + OPENSSL_free(add_cb_wrap); + OPENSSL_free(parse_cb_wrap); + } + + return ret; +} + +/* Application level functions to add the old custom extension callbacks */ +int SSL_CTX_add_client_custom_ext(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned int ext_type, + custom_ext_add_cb add_cb, + custom_ext_free_cb free_cb, + void *add_arg, + custom_ext_parse_cb parse_cb, void *parse_arg) +{ + return add_old_custom_ext(ctx, ENDPOINT_CLIENT, ext_type, + SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY + | SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO + | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO + | SSL_EXT_IGNORE_ON_RESUMPTION, + add_cb, free_cb, add_arg, parse_cb, parse_arg); +} + +int SSL_CTX_add_server_custom_ext(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned int ext_type, + custom_ext_add_cb add_cb, + custom_ext_free_cb free_cb, + void *add_arg, + custom_ext_parse_cb parse_cb, void *parse_arg) +{ + return add_old_custom_ext(ctx, ENDPOINT_SERVER, ext_type, + SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY + | SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO + | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO + | SSL_EXT_IGNORE_ON_RESUMPTION, + add_cb, free_cb, add_arg, parse_cb, parse_arg); +} + +int SSL_CTX_add_custom_ext(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned int ext_type, + unsigned int context, + SSL_custom_ext_add_cb_ex add_cb, + SSL_custom_ext_free_cb_ex free_cb, + void *add_arg, + SSL_custom_ext_parse_cb_ex parse_cb, void *parse_arg) +{ + return add_custom_ext_intern(ctx, ENDPOINT_BOTH, ext_type, context, add_cb, + free_cb, add_arg, parse_cb, parse_arg); +} + +int SSL_extension_supported(unsigned int ext_type) +{ + switch (ext_type) { + /* Internally supported extensions. */ + case TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation: +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC + case TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats: + case TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups: + case TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share: +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG + case TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg: +#endif + case TLSEXT_TYPE_padding: + case TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate: + case TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length: + case TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name: + case TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket: + case TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms: +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP + case TLSEXT_TYPE_srp: +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP + case TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request: +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT + case TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp: +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP + case TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp: +#endif + case TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac: + case TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions: + case TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret: + case TLSEXT_TYPE_psk_kex_modes: + case TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie: + case TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data: + case TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_authorities: + case TLSEXT_TYPE_psk: + case TLSEXT_TYPE_post_handshake_auth: + return 1; + default: + return 0; + } +} diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0f2b22392b --- /dev/null +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c @@ -0,0 +1,1959 @@ +/* + * Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html + */ + +#include <openssl/ocsp.h> +#include "../ssl_locl.h" +#include "statem_locl.h" +#include "internal/cryptlib.h" + +#define COOKIE_STATE_FORMAT_VERSION 0 + +/* + * 2 bytes for packet length, 2 bytes for format version, 2 bytes for + * protocol version, 2 bytes for group id, 2 bytes for cipher id, 1 byte for + * key_share present flag, 4 bytes for timestamp, 2 bytes for the hashlen, + * EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE for transcript hash, 1 byte for app cookie length, app cookie + * length bytes, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH bytes for the HMAC of the whole thing. + */ +#define MAX_COOKIE_SIZE (2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 1 + 4 + 2 + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + 1 \ + + SSL_COOKIE_LENGTH + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) + +/* + * Message header + 2 bytes for protocol version + number of random bytes + + * + 1 byte for legacy session id length + number of bytes in legacy session id + * + 2 bytes for ciphersuite + 1 byte for legacy compression + * + 2 bytes for extension block length + 6 bytes for key_share extension + * + 4 bytes for cookie extension header + the number of bytes in the cookie + */ +#define MAX_HRR_SIZE (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1 \ + + SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH + 2 + 1 + 2 + 6 + 4 \ + + MAX_COOKIE_SIZE) + +/* + * Parse the client's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right + */ +int tls_parse_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) +{ + unsigned int ilen; + const unsigned char *data; + + /* Parse the length byte */ + if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ilen) + || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ilen)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE, + SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR); + return 0; + } + + /* Check that the extension matches */ + if (ilen != s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE, + SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); + return 0; + } + + if (memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_client_finished, + s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE, + SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); + return 0; + } + + s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1; + + return 1; +} + +/*- + * The servername extension is treated as follows: + * + * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255. + * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros, + * in which case an fatal alert is generated. + * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache. + * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order + * to allow the application to position itself to the right context. + * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when + * it is identical to a previously used for the same session. + * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time + * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the + * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and + * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername + * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches + * the value of the Host: field. + * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION + * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the + * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername + * extension. + * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent. + */ +int tls_parse_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) +{ + unsigned int servname_type; + PACKET sni, hostname; + + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sni) + /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */ + || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME, + SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + + /* + * Although the intent was for server_name to be extensible, RFC 4366 + * was not clear about it; and so OpenSSL among other implementations, + * always and only allows a 'host_name' name types. + * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types + * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other + * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing. + * + * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type, + * i.e., we can only have a single hostname. + */ + if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type) + || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name + || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME, + SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + + if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME, + SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + + if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME, + SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + + /* + * Store the requested SNI in the SSL as temporary storage. + * If we accept it, it will get stored in the SSL_SESSION as well. + */ + OPENSSL_free(s->ext.hostname); + s->ext.hostname = NULL; + if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->ext.hostname)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + s->servername_done = 1; + } + if (s->hit) { + /* + * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST + * fall back to a full handshake. + */ + s->servername_done = (s->session->ext.hostname != NULL) + && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->ext.hostname, + strlen(s->session->ext.hostname)); + + if (!s->servername_done && s->session->ext.hostname != NULL) + s->ext.early_data_ok = 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +int tls_parse_ctos_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) +{ + unsigned int value; + + if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 1 || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &value)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN, + SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + + /* Received |value| should be a valid max-fragment-length code. */ + if (!IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(value)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN, + SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH); + return 0; + } + + /* + * RFC 6066: The negotiated length applies for the duration of the session + * including session resumptions. + * We should receive the same code as in resumed session ! + */ + if (s->hit && s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode != value) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN, + SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH); + return 0; + } + + /* + * Store it in session, so it'll become binding for us + * and we'll include it in a next Server Hello. + */ + s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = value; + return 1; +} + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP +int tls_parse_ctos_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) +{ + PACKET srp_I; + + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &srp_I) + || PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SRP, + SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + + /* + * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user + * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login. + */ + if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SRP, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} +#endif + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC +int tls_parse_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) +{ + PACKET ec_point_format_list; + + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ec_point_format_list) + || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EC_PT_FORMATS, + SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + + if (!s->hit) { + if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list, + &s->session->ext.ecpointformats, + &s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + } + + return 1; +} +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ + +int tls_parse_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) +{ + if (s->ext.session_ticket_cb && + !s->ext.session_ticket_cb(s, PACKET_data(pkt), + PACKET_remaining(pkt), + s->ext.session_ticket_cb_arg)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +int tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs_cert(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) +{ + PACKET supported_sig_algs; + + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_sig_algs) + || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS_CERT, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + + if (!s->hit && !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &supported_sig_algs, 1)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS_CERT, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +int tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) +{ + PACKET supported_sig_algs; + + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_sig_algs) + || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + + if (!s->hit && !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &supported_sig_algs, 0)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP +int tls_parse_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) +{ + PACKET responder_id_list, exts; + + /* We ignore this in a resumption handshake */ + if (s->hit) + return 1; + + /* Not defined if we get one of these in a client Certificate */ + if (x != NULL) + return 1; + + if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->ext.status_type)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + + if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { + /* + * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it. + */ + s->ext.status_type = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing; + return 1; + } + + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2 (pkt, &responder_id_list)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + + /* + * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake + * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304 + */ + sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->ext.ocsp.ids, OCSP_RESPID_free); + if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) { + s->ext.ocsp.ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null(); + if (s->ext.ocsp.ids == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } + } else { + s->ext.ocsp.ids = NULL; + } + + while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) { + OCSP_RESPID *id; + PACKET responder_id; + const unsigned char *id_data; + + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list, &responder_id) + || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + + id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id); + /* TODO(size_t): Convert d2i_* to size_t */ + id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data, + (int)PACKET_remaining(&responder_id)); + if (id == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + + if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) { + OCSP_RESPID_free(id); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + + return 0; + } + + if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->ext.ocsp.ids, id)) { + OCSP_RESPID_free(id); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + + return 0; + } + } + + /* Read in request_extensions */ + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &exts)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + + if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) { + const unsigned char *ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts); + + sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->ext.ocsp.exts, + X509_EXTENSION_free); + s->ext.ocsp.exts = + d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data, (int)PACKET_remaining(&exts)); + if (s->ext.ocsp.exts == NULL || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + } + + return 1; +} +#endif + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG +int tls_parse_ctos_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) +{ + /* + * We shouldn't accept this extension on a + * renegotiation. + */ + if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) + s->s3->npn_seen = 1; + + return 1; +} +#endif + +/* + * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.|pkt| holds the contents of the ALPN + * extension, not including type and length. Returns: 1 on success, 0 on error. + */ +int tls_parse_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) +{ + PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol; + + if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) + return 1; + + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list) + || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_ALPN, + SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + + save_protocol_list = protocol_list; + do { + /* Protocol names can't be empty. */ + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol) + || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_ALPN, + SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0); + + OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed); + s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL; + s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0; + if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list, + &s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_ALPN, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP +int tls_parse_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) +{ + STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srvr; + unsigned int ct, mki_len, id; + int i, srtp_pref; + PACKET subpkt; + + /* Ignore this if we have no SRTP profiles */ + if (SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s) == NULL) + return 1; + + /* Pull off the length of the cipher suite list and check it is even */ + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct) || (ct & 1) != 0 + || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &subpkt, ct)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP, + SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); + return 0; + } + + srvr = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s); + s->srtp_profile = NULL; + /* Search all profiles for a match initially */ + srtp_pref = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(srvr); + + while (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) { + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &id)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP, + SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); + return 0; + } + + /* + * Only look for match in profiles of higher preference than + * current match. + * If no profiles have been have been configured then this + * does nothing. + */ + for (i = 0; i < srtp_pref; i++) { + SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *sprof = + sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(srvr, i); + + if (sprof->id == id) { + s->srtp_profile = sprof; + srtp_pref = i; + break; + } + } + } + + /* Now extract the MKI value as a sanity check, but discard it for now */ + if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki_len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP, + SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); + return 0; + } + + if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, mki_len) + || PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP, + SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE); + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} +#endif + +int tls_parse_ctos_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) +{ + if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)) + s->ext.use_etm = 1; + + return 1; +} + +/* + * Process a psk_kex_modes extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains + * the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. + */ +int tls_parse_ctos_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) +{ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 + PACKET psk_kex_modes; + unsigned int mode; + + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &psk_kex_modes) + || PACKET_remaining(&psk_kex_modes) == 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK_KEX_MODES, + SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + + while (PACKET_get_1(&psk_kex_modes, &mode)) { + if (mode == TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE_DHE) + s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE; + else if (mode == TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE + && (s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_NO_DHE_KEX) != 0) + s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE; + } +#endif + + return 1; +} + +/* + * Process a key_share extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains + * the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. + */ +int tls_parse_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) +{ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 + unsigned int group_id; + PACKET key_share_list, encoded_pt; + const uint16_t *clntgroups, *srvrgroups; + size_t clnt_num_groups, srvr_num_groups; + int found = 0; + + if (s->hit && (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE) == 0) + return 1; + + /* Sanity check */ + if (s->s3->peer_tmp != NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &key_share_list)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return 0; + } + + /* Get our list of supported groups */ + tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &srvrgroups, &srvr_num_groups); + /* Get the clients list of supported groups. */ + tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &clntgroups, &clnt_num_groups); + if (clnt_num_groups == 0) { + /* + * This can only happen if the supported_groups extension was not sent, + * because we verify that the length is non-zero when we process that + * extension. + */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, + SSL_R_MISSING_SUPPORTED_GROUPS_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + + if (s->s3->group_id != 0 && PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) == 0) { + /* + * If we set a group_id already, then we must have sent an HRR + * requesting a new key_share. If we haven't got one then that is an + * error + */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, + SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE); + return 0; + } + + while (PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) > 0) { + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&key_share_list, &group_id) + || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&key_share_list, &encoded_pt) + || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return 0; + } + + /* + * If we already found a suitable key_share we loop through the + * rest to verify the structure, but don't process them. + */ + if (found) + continue; + + /* + * If we sent an HRR then the key_share sent back MUST be for the group + * we requested, and must be the only key_share sent. + */ + if (s->s3->group_id != 0 + && (group_id != s->s3->group_id + || PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) != 0)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE); + return 0; + } + + /* Check if this share is in supported_groups sent from client */ + if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, clntgroups, clnt_num_groups, 0)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE); + return 0; + } + + /* Check if this share is for a group we can use */ + if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, srvrgroups, srvr_num_groups, 1)) { + /* Share not suitable */ + continue; + } + + if ((s->s3->peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(group_id)) == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, + SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS); + return 0; + } + + s->s3->group_id = group_id; + + if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp, + PACKET_data(&encoded_pt), + PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT); + return 0; + } + + found = 1; + } +#endif + + return 1; +} + +int tls_parse_ctos_cookie(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) +{ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 + unsigned int format, version, key_share, group_id; + EVP_MD_CTX *hctx; + EVP_PKEY *pkey; + PACKET cookie, raw, chhash, appcookie; + WPACKET hrrpkt; + const unsigned char *data, *mdin, *ciphdata; + unsigned char hmac[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + unsigned char hrr[MAX_HRR_SIZE]; + size_t rawlen, hmaclen, hrrlen, ciphlen; + unsigned long tm, now; + + /* Ignore any cookie if we're not set up to verify it */ + if (s->ctx->verify_stateless_cookie_cb == NULL + || (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0) + return 1; + + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cookie)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return 0; + } + + raw = cookie; + data = PACKET_data(&raw); + rawlen = PACKET_remaining(&raw); + if (rawlen < SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH + || !PACKET_forward(&raw, rawlen - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return 0; + } + mdin = PACKET_data(&raw); + + /* Verify the HMAC of the cookie */ + hctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create(); + pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, + s->session_ctx->ext.cookie_hmac_key, + sizeof(s->session_ctx->ext + .cookie_hmac_key)); + if (hctx == NULL || pkey == NULL) { + EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx); + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } + + hmaclen = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH; + if (EVP_DigestSignInit(hctx, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL, pkey) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestSign(hctx, hmac, &hmaclen, data, + rawlen - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) <= 0 + || hmaclen != SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) { + EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx); + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx); + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + + if (CRYPTO_memcmp(hmac, mdin, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, + SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); + return 0; + } + + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cookie, &format)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return 0; + } + /* Check the cookie format is something we recognise. Ignore it if not */ + if (format != COOKIE_STATE_FORMAT_VERSION) + return 1; + + /* + * The rest of these checks really shouldn't fail since we have verified the + * HMAC above. + */ + + /* Check the version number is sane */ + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cookie, &version)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return 0; + } + if (version != TLS1_3_VERSION) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, + SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); + return 0; + } + + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cookie, &group_id)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return 0; + } + + ciphdata = PACKET_data(&cookie); + if (!PACKET_forward(&cookie, 2)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return 0; + } + if (group_id != s->s3->group_id + || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher + != ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, ciphdata, 0)) { + /* + * We chose a different cipher or group id this time around to what is + * in the cookie. Something must have changed. + */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, + SSL_R_BAD_CIPHER); + return 0; + } + + if (!PACKET_get_1(&cookie, &key_share) + || !PACKET_get_net_4(&cookie, &tm) + || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&cookie, &chhash) + || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&cookie, &appcookie) + || PACKET_remaining(&cookie) != SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return 0; + } + + /* We tolerate a cookie age of up to 10 minutes (= 60 * 10 seconds) */ + now = (unsigned long)time(NULL); + if (tm > now || (now - tm) > 600) { + /* Cookie is stale. Ignore it */ + return 1; + } + + /* Verify the app cookie */ + if (s->ctx->verify_stateless_cookie_cb(s, PACKET_data(&appcookie), + PACKET_remaining(&appcookie)) == 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, + SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); + return 0; + } + + /* + * Reconstruct the HRR that we would have sent in response to the original + * ClientHello so we can add it to the transcript hash. + * Note: This won't work with custom HRR extensions + */ + if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&hrrpkt, hrr, sizeof(hrr), 0)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&hrrpkt, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(&hrrpkt) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLS1_2_VERSION) + || !WPACKET_memcpy(&hrrpkt, hrrrandom, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(&hrrpkt, s->tmp_session_id, + s->tmp_session_id_len) + || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &hrrpkt, + &ciphlen) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&hrrpkt, 0) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt)) { + WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, s->version) + || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt)) { + WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + if (key_share) { + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, s->s3->group_id) + || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt)) { + WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + } + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt) + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(&hrrpkt, data, rawlen) + || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt) /* cookie extension */ + || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt) /* extension block */ + || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt) /* message */ + || !WPACKET_get_total_written(&hrrpkt, &hrrlen) + || !WPACKET_finish(&hrrpkt)) { + WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + /* Reconstruct the transcript hash */ + if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, PACKET_data(&chhash), + PACKET_remaining(&chhash), hrr, + hrrlen)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + + /* Act as if this ClientHello came after a HelloRetryRequest */ + s->hello_retry_request = 1; + + s->ext.cookieok = 1; +#endif + + return 1; +} + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC +int tls_parse_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) +{ + PACKET supported_groups_list; + + /* Each group is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */ + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_groups_list) + || PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) == 0 + || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) % 2) != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + + if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.supportedgroups); + s->session->ext.supportedgroups = NULL; + s->session->ext.supportedgroups_len = 0; + if (!tls1_save_u16(&supported_groups_list, + &s->session->ext.supportedgroups, + &s->session->ext.supportedgroups_len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + } + + return 1; +} +#endif + +int tls_parse_ctos_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) +{ + /* The extension must always be empty */ + if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EMS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + + s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS; + + return 1; +} + + +int tls_parse_ctos_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) +{ + if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + + if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +static SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_get_stateful_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *tick, + SSL_SESSION **sess) +{ + SSL_SESSION *tmpsess = NULL; + + s->ext.ticket_expected = 1; + + switch (PACKET_remaining(tick)) { + case 0: + return SSL_TICKET_EMPTY; + + case SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH: + break; + + default: + return SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT; + } + + tmpsess = lookup_sess_in_cache(s, PACKET_data(tick), + SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH); + + if (tmpsess == NULL) + return SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT; + + *sess = tmpsess; + return SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS; +} + +int tls_parse_ctos_psk(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) +{ + PACKET identities, binders, binder; + size_t binderoffset, hashsize; + SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL; + unsigned int id, i, ext = 0; + const EVP_MD *md = NULL; + + /* + * If we have no PSK kex mode that we recognise then we can't resume so + * ignore this extension + */ + if ((s->ext.psk_kex_mode + & (TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE | TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE)) == 0) + return 1; + + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &identities)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + + s->ext.ticket_expected = 0; + for (id = 0; PACKET_remaining(&identities) != 0; id++) { + PACKET identity; + unsigned long ticket_agel; + size_t idlen; + + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&identities, &identity) + || !PACKET_get_net_4(&identities, &ticket_agel)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + + idlen = PACKET_remaining(&identity); + if (s->psk_find_session_cb != NULL + && !s->psk_find_session_cb(s, PACKET_data(&identity), idlen, + &sess)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK + if(sess == NULL + && s->psk_server_callback != NULL + && idlen <= PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { + char *pskid = NULL; + unsigned char pskdata[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN]; + unsigned int pskdatalen; + + if (!PACKET_strndup(&identity, &pskid)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + pskdatalen = s->psk_server_callback(s, pskid, pskdata, + sizeof(pskdata)); + OPENSSL_free(pskid); + if (pskdatalen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } else if (pskdatalen > 0) { + const SSL_CIPHER *cipher; + const unsigned char tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id[] = { 0x13, 0x01 }; + + /* + * We found a PSK using an old style callback. We don't know + * the digest so we default to SHA256 as per the TLSv1.3 spec + */ + cipher = SSL_CIPHER_find(s, tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id); + if (cipher == NULL) { + OPENSSL_cleanse(pskdata, pskdatalen); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + sess = SSL_SESSION_new(); + if (sess == NULL + || !SSL_SESSION_set1_master_key(sess, pskdata, + pskdatalen) + || !SSL_SESSION_set_cipher(sess, cipher) + || !SSL_SESSION_set_protocol_version(sess, + TLS1_3_VERSION)) { + OPENSSL_cleanse(pskdata, pskdatalen); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + OPENSSL_cleanse(pskdata, pskdatalen); + } + } +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ + + if (sess != NULL) { + /* We found a PSK */ + SSL_SESSION *sesstmp = ssl_session_dup(sess, 0); + + if (sesstmp == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + SSL_SESSION_free(sess); + sess = sesstmp; + + /* + * We've just been told to use this session for this context so + * make sure the sid_ctx matches up. + */ + memcpy(sess->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length); + sess->sid_ctx_length = s->sid_ctx_length; + ext = 1; + if (id == 0) + s->ext.early_data_ok = 1; + s->ext.ticket_expected = 1; + } else { + uint32_t ticket_age = 0, now, agesec, agems; + int ret; + + /* + * If we are using anti-replay protection then we behave as if + * SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set - we are caching tickets anyway so there + * is no point in using full stateless tickets. + */ + if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0 + || (s->max_early_data > 0 + && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0)) + ret = tls_get_stateful_ticket(s, &identity, &sess); + else + ret = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&identity), + PACKET_remaining(&identity), NULL, 0, + &sess); + + if (ret == SSL_TICKET_EMPTY) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, + SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + return 0; + } + + if (ret == SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC + || ret == SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + if (ret == SSL_TICKET_NONE || ret == SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT) + continue; + + /* Check for replay */ + if (s->max_early_data > 0 + && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0 + && !SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, sess)) { + SSL_SESSION_free(sess); + sess = NULL; + continue; + } + + ticket_age = (uint32_t)ticket_agel; + now = (uint32_t)time(NULL); + agesec = now - (uint32_t)sess->time; + agems = agesec * (uint32_t)1000; + ticket_age -= sess->ext.tick_age_add; + + /* + * For simplicity we do our age calculations in seconds. If the + * client does it in ms then it could appear that their ticket age + * is longer than ours (our ticket age calculation should always be + * slightly longer than the client's due to the network latency). + * Therefore we add 1000ms to our age calculation to adjust for + * rounding errors. + */ + if (id == 0 + && sess->timeout >= (long)agesec + && agems / (uint32_t)1000 == agesec + && ticket_age <= agems + 1000 + && ticket_age + TICKET_AGE_ALLOWANCE >= agems + 1000) { + /* + * Ticket age is within tolerance and not expired. We allow it + * for early data + */ + s->ext.early_data_ok = 1; + } + } + + md = ssl_md(sess->cipher->algorithm2); + if (md != ssl_md(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2)) { + /* The ciphersuite is not compatible with this session. */ + SSL_SESSION_free(sess); + sess = NULL; + s->ext.early_data_ok = 0; + s->ext.ticket_expected = 0; + continue; + } + break; + } + + if (sess == NULL) + return 1; + + binderoffset = PACKET_data(pkt) - (const unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; + hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md); + + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &binders)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, + SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + goto err; + } + + for (i = 0; i <= id; i++) { + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&binders, &binder)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, + SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + goto err; + } + } + + if (PACKET_remaining(&binder) != hashsize) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, + SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + goto err; + } + if (tls_psk_do_binder(s, md, (const unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, + binderoffset, PACKET_data(&binder), NULL, sess, 0, + ext) != 1) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + + sess->ext.tick_identity = id; + + SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); + s->session = sess; + return 1; +err: + SSL_SESSION_free(sess); + return 0; +} + +int tls_parse_ctos_post_handshake_auth(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) +{ + if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH, + SSL_R_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH_ENCODING_ERR); + return 0; + } + + s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED; + + return 1; +} + +/* + * Add the server's renegotiation binding + */ +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) +{ + if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + /* Still add this even if SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION is set */ + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt) + || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished, + s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) + || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->previous_server_finished, + s->s3->previous_server_finished_len) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_RENEGOTIATE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} + +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) +{ + if (s->hit || s->servername_done != 1 + || s->ext.hostname == NULL) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SERVER_NAME, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} + +/* Add/include the server's max fragment len extension into ServerHello */ +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) +{ + if (!USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s->session)) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + /*- + * 4 bytes for this extension type and extension length + * 1 byte for the Max Fragment Length code value. + */ + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) +{ + unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; + unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; + int using_ecc = ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) + && (s->session->ext.ecpointformats != NULL); + const unsigned char *plist; + size_t plistlen; + + if (!using_ecc) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen); + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, plist, plistlen) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} +#endif + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_supported_groups(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) +{ + const uint16_t *groups; + size_t numgroups, i, first = 1; + + /* s->s3->group_id is non zero if we accepted a key_share */ + if (s->s3->group_id == 0) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + /* Get our list of supported groups */ + tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &groups, &numgroups); + if (numgroups == 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + /* Copy group ID if supported */ + for (i = 0; i < numgroups; i++) { + uint16_t group = groups[i]; + + if (tls_curve_allowed(s, group, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) { + if (first) { + /* + * Check if the client is already using our preferred group. If + * so we don't need to add this extension + */ + if (s->s3->group_id == group) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + /* Add extension header */ + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups) + /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */ + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + first = 0; + } + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, group)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + } + } + + if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} +#endif + +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) +{ + if (!s->ext.ticket_expected || !tls_use_ticket(s)) { + s->ext.ticket_expected = 0; + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + } + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) +{ + if (!s->ext.status_expected) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && chainidx != 0) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + /* + * In TLSv1.3 we include the certificate status itself. In <= TLSv1.2 we + * send back an empty extension, with the certificate status appearing as a + * separate message + */ + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} +#endif + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_next_proto_neg(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) +{ + const unsigned char *npa; + unsigned int npalen; + int ret; + int npn_seen = s->s3->npn_seen; + + s->s3->npn_seen = 0; + if (!npn_seen || s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb == NULL) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + ret = s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, + s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb_arg); + if (ret == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg) + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, npa, npalen)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_NEXT_PROTO_NEG, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + s->s3->npn_seen = 1; + } + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} +#endif + +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) +{ + if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, + TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, + s->s3->alpn_selected_len) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_ALPN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) +{ + if (s->srtp_profile == NULL) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 2) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->srtp_profile->id) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_USE_SRTP, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} +#endif + +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) +{ + if (!s->ext.use_etm) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + /* + * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable + * for other cases too. + */ + if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD + || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4 + || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT + || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12) { + s->ext.use_etm = 0; + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + } + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_ETM, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} + +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) +{ + if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) == 0) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EMS, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} + +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_supported_versions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) +{ + if (!ossl_assert(SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->version) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} + +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) +{ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 + unsigned char *encodedPoint; + size_t encoded_pt_len = 0; + EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->peer_tmp, *skey = NULL; + + if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) { + if (ckey != NULL) { + /* Original key_share was acceptable so don't ask for another one */ + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + } + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; + } + + if (ckey == NULL) { + /* No key_share received from client - must be resuming */ + if (!s->hit || !tls13_generate_handshake_secret(s, NULL, 0)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + } + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey); + if (skey == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + /* Generate encoding of server key */ + encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, &encodedPoint); + if (encoded_pt_len == 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, + ERR_R_EC_LIB); + EVP_PKEY_free(skey); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + EVP_PKEY_free(skey); + OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); + + /* This causes the crypto state to be updated based on the derived keys */ + s->s3->tmp.pkey = skey; + if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +#else + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; +#endif +} + +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_cookie(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) +{ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 + unsigned char *hashval1, *hashval2, *appcookie1, *appcookie2, *cookie; + unsigned char *hmac, *hmac2; + size_t startlen, ciphlen, totcookielen, hashlen, hmaclen, appcookielen; + EVP_MD_CTX *hctx; + EVP_PKEY *pkey; + int ret = EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + + if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + if (s->ctx->gen_stateless_cookie_cb == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE, + SSL_R_NO_COOKIE_CALLBACK_SET); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &startlen) + || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, MAX_COOKIE_SIZE, &cookie) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, COOKIE_STATE_FORMAT_VERSION) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id) + || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, + &ciphlen) + /* Is there a key_share extension present in this HRR? */ + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, (unsigned int)time(NULL)) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashval1)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + /* + * Get the hash of the initial ClientHello. ssl_handshake_hash() operates + * on raw buffers, so we first reserve sufficient bytes (above) and then + * subsequently allocate them (below) + */ + if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0) + || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashval1, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hashlen, &hashval2) + || !ossl_assert(hashval1 == hashval2) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt) + || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, SSL_COOKIE_LENGTH, &appcookie1)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + /* Generate the application cookie */ + if (s->ctx->gen_stateless_cookie_cb(s, appcookie1, &appcookielen) == 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE, + SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, appcookielen, &appcookie2) + || !ossl_assert(appcookie1 == appcookie2) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt) + || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &totcookielen) + || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, &hmac)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + hmaclen = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH; + + totcookielen -= startlen; + if (!ossl_assert(totcookielen <= MAX_COOKIE_SIZE - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + /* HMAC the cookie */ + hctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create(); + pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, + s->session_ctx->ext.cookie_hmac_key, + sizeof(s->session_ctx->ext + .cookie_hmac_key)); + if (hctx == NULL || pkey == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + if (EVP_DigestSignInit(hctx, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL, pkey) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestSign(hctx, hmac, &hmaclen, cookie, + totcookielen) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + if (!ossl_assert(totcookielen + hmaclen <= MAX_COOKIE_SIZE)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hmaclen, &hmac2) + || !ossl_assert(hmac == hmac2) + || !ossl_assert(cookie == hmac - totcookielen) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + ret = EXT_RETURN_SENT; + + err: + EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx); + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + return ret; +#else + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; +#endif +} + +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_cryptopro_bug(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) +{ + const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = { + 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */ + 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */ + 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, + 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, + 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08, + 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17 + }; + + if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x80 + && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x81) + || (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG) == 0) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext))) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_CRYPTOPRO_BUG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} + +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx) +{ + if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) { + if (s->max_early_data == 0) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, s->max_early_data) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; + } + + if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EARLY_DATA, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} + +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx) +{ + if (!s->hit) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick_identity) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem/statem.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem/statem.c index 69bb40f00e..f76c0e4803 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem/statem.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem/statem.c @@ -7,9 +7,11 @@ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ +#include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include <openssl/rand.h> #include "../ssl_locl.h" #include "statem_locl.h" +#include <assert.h> /* * This file implements the SSL/TLS/DTLS state machines. @@ -66,17 +68,17 @@ OSSL_HANDSHAKE_STATE SSL_get_state(const SSL *ssl) return ssl->statem.hand_state; } -int SSL_in_init(SSL *s) +int SSL_in_init(const SSL *s) { return s->statem.in_init; } -int SSL_is_init_finished(SSL *s) +int SSL_is_init_finished(const SSL *s) { return !(s->statem.in_init) && (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_OK); } -int SSL_in_before(SSL *s) +int SSL_in_before(const SSL *s) { /* * Historically being "in before" meant before anything had happened. In the @@ -105,20 +107,42 @@ void ossl_statem_clear(SSL *s) */ void ossl_statem_set_renegotiate(SSL *s) { - s->statem.state = MSG_FLOW_RENEGOTIATE; s->statem.in_init = 1; + s->statem.request_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ; } /* - * Put the state machine into an error state. This is a permanent error for - * the current connection. + * Put the state machine into an error state and send an alert if appropriate. + * This is a permanent error for the current connection. */ -void ossl_statem_set_error(SSL *s) +void ossl_statem_fatal(SSL *s, int al, int func, int reason, const char *file, + int line) { + ERR_put_error(ERR_LIB_SSL, func, reason, file, line); + /* We shouldn't call SSLfatal() twice. Once is enough */ + if (s->statem.in_init && s->statem.state == MSG_FLOW_ERROR) + return; + s->statem.in_init = 1; s->statem.state = MSG_FLOW_ERROR; + if (al != SSL_AD_NO_ALERT + && s->statem.enc_write_state != ENC_WRITE_STATE_INVALID) + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); } /* + * This macro should only be called if we are already expecting to be in + * a fatal error state. We verify that we are, and set it if not (this would + * indicate a bug). + */ +#define check_fatal(s, f) \ + do { \ + if (!ossl_assert((s)->statem.in_init \ + && (s)->statem.state == MSG_FLOW_ERROR)) \ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, (f), \ + SSL_R_MISSING_FATAL); \ + } while (0) + +/* * Discover whether the current connection is in the error state. * * Valid return values are: @@ -151,6 +175,62 @@ void ossl_statem_set_in_handshake(SSL *s, int inhand) s->statem.in_handshake--; } +/* Are we in a sensible state to skip over unreadable early data? */ +int ossl_statem_skip_early_data(SSL *s) +{ + if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED) + return 0; + + if (!s->server + || s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA + || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_COMPLETE) + return 0; + + return 1; +} + +/* + * Called when we are in SSL_read*(), SSL_write*(), or SSL_accept() + * /SSL_connect()/SSL_do_handshake(). Used to test whether we are in an early + * data state and whether we should attempt to move the handshake on if so. + * |sending| is 1 if we are attempting to send data (SSL_write*()), 0 if we are + * attempting to read data (SSL_read*()), or -1 if we are in SSL_do_handshake() + * or similar. + */ +void ossl_statem_check_finish_init(SSL *s, int sending) +{ + if (sending == -1) { + if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END + || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA) { + ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1); + if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY) { + /* + * SSL_connect() or SSL_do_handshake() has been called directly. + * We don't allow any more writing of early data. + */ + s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING; + } + } + } else if (!s->server) { + if ((sending && (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END + || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA) + && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING) + || (!sending && s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA)) { + ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1); + /* + * SSL_write() has been called directly. We don't allow any more + * writing of early data. + */ + if (sending && s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY) + s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING; + } + } else { + if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING + && s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA) + ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1); + } +} + void ossl_statem_set_hello_verify_done(SSL *s) { s->statem.state = MSG_FLOW_UNINITED; @@ -189,10 +269,10 @@ static info_cb get_callback(SSL *s) /* * The main message flow state machine. We start in the MSG_FLOW_UNINITED or - * MSG_FLOW_RENEGOTIATE state and finish in MSG_FLOW_FINISHED. Valid states and + * MSG_FLOW_FINISHED state and finish in MSG_FLOW_FINISHED. Valid states and * transitions are as follows: * - * MSG_FLOW_UNINITED MSG_FLOW_RENEGOTIATE + * MSG_FLOW_UNINITED MSG_FLOW_FINISHED * | | * +-----------------------+ * v @@ -218,7 +298,6 @@ static info_cb get_callback(SSL *s) static int state_machine(SSL *s, int server) { BUF_MEM *buf = NULL; - unsigned long Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL); void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; int ret = -1; @@ -229,7 +308,6 @@ static int state_machine(SSL *s, int server) return -1; } - RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0); ERR_clear_error(); clear_sys_error(); @@ -237,7 +315,11 @@ static int state_machine(SSL *s, int server) st->in_handshake++; if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) { - if (!SSL_clear(s)) + /* + * If we are stateless then we already called SSL_clear() - don't do + * it again and clear the STATELESS flag itself. + */ + if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0 && !SSL_clear(s)) return -1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP @@ -251,60 +333,54 @@ static int state_machine(SSL *s, int server) } #endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS - /* - * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and - * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during - * handshakes anyway. - */ - if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) { - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) - dtls1_stop_timer(s); - s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0; - s->tlsext_hb_seq++; - } -#endif - /* Initialise state machine */ - - if (st->state == MSG_FLOW_RENEGOTIATE) { - s->renegotiate = 1; - if (!server) - s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++; - } - - if (st->state == MSG_FLOW_UNINITED || st->state == MSG_FLOW_RENEGOTIATE) { + if (st->state == MSG_FLOW_UNINITED + || st->state == MSG_FLOW_FINISHED) { if (st->state == MSG_FLOW_UNINITED) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE; + st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE; } s->server = server; if (cb != NULL) cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1); + /* + * Fatal errors in this block don't send an alert because we have + * failed to even initialise properly. Sending an alert is probably + * doomed to failure. + */ + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { if ((s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00) && (server || (s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_BAD_VER & 0xff00))) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto end; } } else { if ((s->version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto end; } } if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, s->version, NULL)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto end; } if (s->init_buf == NULL) { if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto end; } if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto end; } s->init_buf = buf; @@ -312,6 +388,8 @@ static int state_machine(SSL *s, int server) } if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto end; } s->init_num = 0; @@ -329,65 +407,24 @@ static int state_machine(SSL *s, int server) if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || !BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) #endif if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto end; } - if (!server || st->state != MSG_FLOW_RENEGOTIATE) { - if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { - ossl_statem_set_error(s); - goto end; - } - } - - if (server) { - if (st->state != MSG_FLOW_RENEGOTIATE) { - s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++; - } else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) { - /* - * Shouldn't happen? The record layer should have prevented this - */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); - ossl_statem_set_error(s); + if ((SSL_in_before(s)) + || s->renegotiate) { + if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto end; - } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding && - !(s->options & - SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { - /* - * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't - * support secure renegotiation. - */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE, - SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - ossl_statem_set_error(s); - goto end; - } else { - /* - * st->state == MSG_FLOW_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a - * HelloRequest - */ - s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++; } - s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0; - } else { - s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++; - - /* mark client_random uninitialized */ - memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3->client_random)); - s->hit = 0; - - s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0; - - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { - st->use_timer = 1; - } + if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) + st->read_state_first_init = 1; } st->state = MSG_FLOW_WRITING; init_write_state_machine(s); - st->read_state_first_init = 1; } while (st->state != MSG_FLOW_FINISHED) { @@ -413,12 +450,12 @@ static int state_machine(SSL *s, int server) } } else { /* Error */ - ossl_statem_set_error(s); + check_fatal(s, SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE); + SSLerr(SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); goto end; } } - st->state = MSG_FLOW_UNINITED; ret = 1; end: @@ -500,12 +537,12 @@ static SUB_STATE_RETURN read_state_machine(SSL *s) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; int ret, mt; - unsigned long len = 0; + size_t len = 0; int (*transition) (SSL *s, int mt); PACKET pkt; MSG_PROCESS_RETURN(*process_message) (SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); WORK_STATE(*post_process_message) (SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst); - unsigned long (*max_message_size) (SSL *s); + size_t (*max_message_size) (SSL *s); void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; cb = get_callback(s); @@ -560,8 +597,8 @@ static SUB_STATE_RETURN read_state_machine(SSL *s) return SUB_STATE_ERROR; if (s->s3->tmp.message_size > max_message_size(s)) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); - SSLerr(SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE, + SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); return SUB_STATE_ERROR; } @@ -570,8 +607,8 @@ static SUB_STATE_RETURN read_state_machine(SSL *s) && s->s3->tmp.message_size > 0 && !grow_init_buf(s, s->s3->tmp.message_size + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); - SSLerr(SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE, + ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return SUB_STATE_ERROR; } @@ -590,8 +627,8 @@ static SUB_STATE_RETURN read_state_machine(SSL *s) s->first_packet = 0; if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, s->init_msg, len)) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); - SSLerr(SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return SUB_STATE_ERROR; } ret = process_message(s, &pkt); @@ -601,6 +638,7 @@ static SUB_STATE_RETURN read_state_machine(SSL *s) switch (ret) { case MSG_PROCESS_ERROR: + check_fatal(s, SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE); return SUB_STATE_ERROR; case MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING: @@ -623,7 +661,12 @@ static SUB_STATE_RETURN read_state_machine(SSL *s) case READ_STATE_POST_PROCESS: st->read_state_work = post_process_message(s, st->read_state_work); switch (st->read_state_work) { - default: + case WORK_ERROR: + check_fatal(s, SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE); + /* Fall through */ + case WORK_MORE_A: + case WORK_MORE_B: + case WORK_MORE_C: return SUB_STATE_ERROR; case WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE: @@ -640,9 +683,8 @@ static SUB_STATE_RETURN read_state_machine(SSL *s) default: /* Shouldn't happen */ - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); - SSLerr(SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - ossl_statem_set_error(s); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return SUB_STATE_ERROR; } } @@ -714,8 +756,13 @@ static SUB_STATE_RETURN write_state_machine(SSL *s) WRITE_TRAN(*transition) (SSL *s); WORK_STATE(*pre_work) (SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst); WORK_STATE(*post_work) (SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst); - int (*construct_message) (SSL *s); + int (*get_construct_message_f) (SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + int (**confunc) (SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt), + int *mt); void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; + int (*confunc) (SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt); + int mt; + WPACKET pkt; cb = get_callback(s); @@ -723,12 +770,12 @@ static SUB_STATE_RETURN write_state_machine(SSL *s) transition = ossl_statem_server_write_transition; pre_work = ossl_statem_server_pre_work; post_work = ossl_statem_server_post_work; - construct_message = ossl_statem_server_construct_message; + get_construct_message_f = ossl_statem_server_construct_message; } else { transition = ossl_statem_client_write_transition; pre_work = ossl_statem_client_pre_work; post_work = ossl_statem_client_post_work; - construct_message = ossl_statem_client_construct_message; + get_construct_message_f = ossl_statem_client_construct_message; } while (1) { @@ -751,14 +798,20 @@ static SUB_STATE_RETURN write_state_machine(SSL *s) return SUB_STATE_FINISHED; break; - default: + case WRITE_TRAN_ERROR: + check_fatal(s, SSL_F_WRITE_STATE_MACHINE); return SUB_STATE_ERROR; } break; case WRITE_STATE_PRE_WORK: switch (st->write_state_work = pre_work(s, st->write_state_work)) { - default: + case WORK_ERROR: + check_fatal(s, SSL_F_WRITE_STATE_MACHINE); + /* Fall through */ + case WORK_MORE_A: + case WORK_MORE_B: + case WORK_MORE_C: return SUB_STATE_ERROR; case WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE: @@ -768,8 +821,35 @@ static SUB_STATE_RETURN write_state_machine(SSL *s) case WORK_FINISHED_STOP: return SUB_STATE_END_HANDSHAKE; } - if (construct_message(s) == 0) + if (!get_construct_message_f(s, &pkt, &confunc, &mt)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return SUB_STATE_ERROR; + } + if (mt == SSL3_MT_DUMMY) { + /* Skip construction and sending. This isn't a "real" state */ + st->write_state = WRITE_STATE_POST_WORK; + st->write_state_work = WORK_MORE_A; + break; + } + if (!WPACKET_init(&pkt, s->init_buf) + || !ssl_set_handshake_header(s, &pkt, mt)) { + WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_WRITE_STATE_MACHINE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return SUB_STATE_ERROR; + } + if (confunc != NULL && !confunc(s, &pkt)) { + WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt); + check_fatal(s, SSL_F_WRITE_STATE_MACHINE); + return SUB_STATE_ERROR; + } + if (!ssl_close_construct_packet(s, &pkt, mt) + || !WPACKET_finish(&pkt)) { + WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_WRITE_STATE_MACHINE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return SUB_STATE_ERROR; + } /* Fall through */ @@ -787,7 +867,12 @@ static SUB_STATE_RETURN write_state_machine(SSL *s) case WRITE_STATE_POST_WORK: switch (st->write_state_work = post_work(s, st->write_state_work)) { - default: + case WORK_ERROR: + check_fatal(s, SSL_F_WRITE_STATE_MACHINE); + /* Fall through */ + case WORK_MORE_A: + case WORK_MORE_B: + case WORK_MORE_C: return SUB_STATE_ERROR; case WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE: @@ -800,6 +885,8 @@ static SUB_STATE_RETURN write_state_machine(SSL *s) break; default: + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_WRITE_STATE_MACHINE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return SUB_STATE_ERROR; } } @@ -821,7 +908,7 @@ int statem_flush(SSL *s) /* * Called by the record layer to determine whether application data is - * allowed to be sent in the current handshake state or not. + * allowed to be received in the current handshake state or not. * * Return values are: * 1: Yes (application data allowed) @@ -831,7 +918,7 @@ int ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(SSL *s) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; - if (st->state == MSG_FLOW_UNINITED || st->state == MSG_FLOW_RENEGOTIATE) + if (st->state == MSG_FLOW_UNINITED) return 0; if (!s->s3->in_read_app_data || (s->s3->total_renegotiations == 0)) @@ -856,3 +943,28 @@ int ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(SSL *s) return 0; } + +/* + * This function returns 1 if TLS exporter is ready to export keying + * material, or 0 if otherwise. + */ +int ossl_statem_export_allowed(SSL *s) +{ + return s->s3->previous_server_finished_len != 0 + && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED; +} + +/* + * Return 1 if early TLS exporter is ready to export keying material, + * or 0 if otherwise. + */ +int ossl_statem_export_early_allowed(SSL *s) +{ + /* + * The early exporter secret is only present on the server if we + * have accepted early_data. It is present on the client as long + * as we have sent early_data. + */ + return s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED + || (!s->server && s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_NOT_SENT); +} diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem/statem.h b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem/statem.h index c669ee9e78..144d930fc7 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem/statem.h +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem/statem.h @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2015-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -27,7 +27,9 @@ typedef enum { /* We're working on phase A */ WORK_MORE_A, /* We're working on phase B */ - WORK_MORE_B + WORK_MORE_B, + /* We're working on phase C */ + WORK_MORE_C } WORK_STATE; /* Write transition return codes */ @@ -46,8 +48,6 @@ typedef enum { MSG_FLOW_UNINITED, /* A permanent error with this connection */ MSG_FLOW_ERROR, - /* We are about to renegotiate */ - MSG_FLOW_RENEGOTIATE, /* We are reading messages */ MSG_FLOW_READING, /* We are writing messages */ @@ -71,6 +71,22 @@ typedef enum { WRITE_STATE_POST_WORK } WRITE_STATE; +typedef enum { + /* The enc_write_ctx can be used normally */ + ENC_WRITE_STATE_VALID, + /* The enc_write_ctx cannot be used */ + ENC_WRITE_STATE_INVALID, + /* Write alerts in plaintext, but otherwise use the enc_write_ctx */ + ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS +} ENC_WRITE_STATES; + +typedef enum { + /* The enc_read_ctx can be used normally */ + ENC_READ_STATE_VALID, + /* We may receive encrypted or plaintext alerts */ + ENC_READ_STATE_ALLOW_PLAIN_ALERTS +} ENC_READ_STATES; + /***************************************************************************** * * * This structure should be considered "opaque" to anything outside of the * @@ -86,13 +102,22 @@ struct ossl_statem_st { READ_STATE read_state; WORK_STATE read_state_work; OSSL_HANDSHAKE_STATE hand_state; + /* The handshake state requested by an API call (e.g. HelloRequest) */ + OSSL_HANDSHAKE_STATE request_state; int in_init; int read_state_first_init; /* true when we are actually in SSL_accept() or SSL_connect() */ int in_handshake; + /* + * True when are processing a "real" handshake that needs cleaning up (not + * just a HelloRequest or similar). + */ + int cleanuphand; /* Should we skip the CertificateVerify message? */ unsigned int no_cert_verify; int use_timer; + ENC_WRITE_STATES enc_write_state; + ENC_READ_STATES enc_read_state; }; typedef struct ossl_statem_st OSSL_STATEM; @@ -107,10 +132,26 @@ __owur int ossl_statem_accept(SSL *s); __owur int ossl_statem_connect(SSL *s); void ossl_statem_clear(SSL *s); void ossl_statem_set_renegotiate(SSL *s); -void ossl_statem_set_error(SSL *s); +void ossl_statem_fatal(SSL *s, int al, int func, int reason, const char *file, + int line); +# define SSL_AD_NO_ALERT -1 +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR +# define SSLfatal(s, al, f, r) ossl_statem_fatal((s), (al), (f), (r), \ + OPENSSL_FILE, OPENSSL_LINE) +# else +# define SSLfatal(s, al, f, r) ossl_statem_fatal((s), (al), (f), (r), NULL, 0) +# endif + int ossl_statem_in_error(const SSL *s); void ossl_statem_set_in_init(SSL *s, int init); int ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(SSL *s); void ossl_statem_set_in_handshake(SSL *s, int inhand); +__owur int ossl_statem_skip_early_data(SSL *s); +void ossl_statem_check_finish_init(SSL *s, int send); void ossl_statem_set_hello_verify_done(SSL *s); __owur int ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(SSL *s); +__owur int ossl_statem_export_allowed(SSL *s); +__owur int ossl_statem_export_early_allowed(SSL *s); + +/* Flush the write BIO */ +int statem_flush(SSL *s); diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c index ed993553c5..0a11b88183 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c @@ -1,5 +1,7 @@ /* * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved + * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -7,47 +9,9 @@ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. - * - * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by - * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. - * - * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source - * license provided above. - * - * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by - * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. - * - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. - * - * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by - * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source - * license. - * - * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of - * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites - * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. - * - * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in - * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received - * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. - * - * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not - * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third - * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights - * to make use of the Contribution. - * - * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN - * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA - * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY - * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR - * OTHERWISE. - */ - #include <stdio.h> +#include <time.h> +#include <assert.h> #include "../ssl_locl.h" #include "statem_locl.h" #include <openssl/buffer.h> @@ -58,12 +22,15 @@ #include <openssl/dh.h> #include <openssl/bn.h> #include <openssl/engine.h> +#include <internal/cryptlib.h> + +static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); +static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s); static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s); -static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b); static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, - unsigned char *p); + WPACKET *pkt); /* * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not? @@ -108,20 +75,148 @@ static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s) /* * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed + * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the + * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The + * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|. + * + * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error + * (transition not allowed) + */ +static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) +{ + OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; + + /* + * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't + * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by + * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() + */ + + switch (st->hand_state) { + default: + break; + + case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: + /* + * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only + * thing we can get now is a ServerHello. + */ + if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO; + return 1; + } + break; + + case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: + if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS; + return 1; + } + break; + + case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: + if (s->hit) { + if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED; + return 1; + } + } else { + if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ; + return 1; + } + if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT; + return 1; + } + } + break; + + case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: + if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT; + return 1; + } + break; + + case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: + if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY; + return 1; + } + break; + + case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY: + if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED; + return 1; + } + break; + + case TLS_ST_OK: + if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET; + return 1; + } + if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE; + return 1; + } + if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) { +#if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION +# error TODO(DTLS1.3): Restore digest for PHA before adding message. +#endif + if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT) { + s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED; + /* + * In TLS, this is called before the message is added to the + * digest. In DTLS, this is expected to be called after adding + * to the digest. Either move the digest restore, or add the + * message here after the swap, or do it after the clientFinished? + */ + if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ; + return 1; + } + } + break; + } + + /* No valid transition found */ + return 0; +} + +/* + * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|. * - * Return values are: - * 1: Success (transition allowed) - * 0: Error (transition not allowed) + * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error + * (transition not allowed) */ int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; int ske_expected; + /* + * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version + * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later. + */ + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt)) + goto err; + return 1; + } + switch (st->hand_state) { + default: + break; + case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO; @@ -136,9 +231,21 @@ int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) } break; + case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: + /* + * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early + * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a + * HelloRetryRequest. + */ + if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO; + return 1; + } + break; + case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: if (s->hit) { - if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) { + if (s->ext.ticket_expected) { if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET; return 1; @@ -152,8 +259,8 @@ int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; return 1; } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION - && s->tls_session_secret_cb != NULL - && s->session->tlsext_tick != NULL + && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL + && s->session->ext.tick != NULL && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { /* * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session @@ -195,9 +302,9 @@ int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: /* * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if - * |tlsext_status_expected| is set + * |ext.status_expected| is set */ - if (s->tlsext_status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) { + if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS; return 1; } @@ -234,7 +341,7 @@ int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) break; case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: - if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) { + if (s->ext.ticket_expected) { if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET; return 1; @@ -259,7 +366,11 @@ int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) } break; - default: + case TLS_ST_OK: + if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ; + return 1; + } break; } @@ -279,34 +390,184 @@ int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) BIO_set_retry_read(rbio); return 0; } - ossl_statem_set_error(s); - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); - SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, + SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION, + SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); return 0; } /* - * client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next - * when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server. + * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to + * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the + * server. + */ +static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s) +{ + OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; + + /* + * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated + * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by + * ossl_statem_client_write_transition(). + */ + switch (st->hand_state) { + default: + /* Shouldn't happen */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; + + case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: + if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + } + /* + * We should only get here if we received a CertificateRequest after + * we already sent close_notify + */ + if (!ossl_assert((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0)) { + /* Shouldn't happen - same as default case */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; + } + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + + case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: + if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY + || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END; + else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0 + && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE) + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; + else + st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT + : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + + case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END: + if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + } + /* Fall through */ + + case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: + case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: + st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT + : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + + case TLS_ST_CW_CERT: + /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */ + st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY + : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + + case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY: + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + + case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE: + if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + } + /* Fall through */ + + case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE: + case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET: + case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + + case TLS_ST_OK: + if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + } + + /* Try to read from the server instead */ + return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; + } +} + +/* + * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to + * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server. */ WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; + /* + * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what + * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until + * later + */ + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) + return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s); + switch (st->hand_state) { + default: + /* Shouldn't happen */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_WRITE_TRANSITION, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; + case TLS_ST_OK: - /* Renegotiation - fall through */ + if (!s->renegotiate) { + /* + * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have + * received a message from the server. Better read it. + */ + return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; + } + /* Renegotiation */ + /* fall thru */ case TLS_ST_BEFORE: st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: + if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) { + /* + * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't + * actually selected a version yet. + */ + if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0) + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; + else + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + } /* * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what * we will be sent */ return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; + case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: + /* + * We only get here in TLSv1.3. We just received an HRR, so issue a + * CCS unless middlebox compat mode is off, or we already issued one + * because we did early data. + */ + if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0 + && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; + else + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + + case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: + return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; + case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; @@ -348,14 +609,20 @@ WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s) return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: + if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; + } else if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA; + } else { #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) - st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; -#else - if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) - st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO; - else st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; +#else + if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->npn_seen) + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO; + else + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; #endif + } return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) @@ -367,7 +634,6 @@ WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s) case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: if (s->hit) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; - ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; } else { return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; @@ -379,13 +645,24 @@ WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s) return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; } else { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; - ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; } - default: - /* Shouldn't happen */ - return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; + case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ: + /* + * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more + * convenient time. + */ + if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s, 1)) { + if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; + } + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + } + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; } } @@ -398,12 +675,16 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; switch (st->hand_state) { + default: + /* No pre work to be done */ + break; + case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: s->shutdown = 0; if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */ if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { - ossl_statem_set_error(s); + /* SSLfatal() already called */ return WORK_ERROR; } } @@ -419,18 +700,31 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) st->use_timer = 0; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP - if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) + if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { + /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */ return dtls_wait_for_dry(s); + } #endif } - return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; + break; - case TLS_ST_OK: - return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst); + case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END: + /* + * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not + * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press + * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here. + */ + if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING + || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE) + return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; + /* Fall through */ - default: - /* No pre work to be done */ - break; + case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: + return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 1); + + case TLS_ST_OK: + /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */ + return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1); } return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; @@ -447,9 +741,29 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) s->init_num = 0; switch (st->hand_state) { + default: + /* No post work to be done */ + break; + case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: - if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && statem_flush(s) != 1) + if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING + && s->max_early_data > 0) { + /* + * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change + * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead + * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly. + */ + if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0) { + if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s, + SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return WORK_ERROR; + } + } + /* else we're in compat mode so we delay flushing until after CCS */ + } else if (!statem_flush(s)) { return WORK_MORE_A; + } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { /* Treat the next message as the first packet */ @@ -457,12 +771,37 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) } break; + case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: + /* + * We set the enc_write_ctx back to NULL because we may end up writing + * in cleartext again if we get a HelloRetryRequest from the server. + */ + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx); + s->enc_write_ctx = NULL; + break; + case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH: - if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0) + if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ return WORK_ERROR; + } break; case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) + break; + if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING + && s->max_early_data > 0) { + /* + * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change + * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead + * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly. + */ + if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s, + SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) + return WORK_ERROR; + break; + } s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP s->session->compress_meth = 0; @@ -472,12 +811,16 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) else s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; #endif - if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) + if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ return WORK_ERROR; + } if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, - SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) + SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ return WORK_ERROR; + } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP @@ -508,10 +851,29 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) #endif if (statem_flush(s) != 1) return WORK_MORE_B; + + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + if (!tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return WORK_ERROR; + } + if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) { + if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, + SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return WORK_ERROR; + } + } + } break; - default: - /* No post work to be done */ + case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE: + if (statem_flush(s) != 1) + return WORK_MORE_A; + if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return WORK_ERROR; + } break; } @@ -519,63 +881,97 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) } /* - * Construct a message to be sent from the client to the server. + * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the + * client * * Valid return values are: * 1: Success * 0: Error */ -int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s) +int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + confunc_f *confunc, int *mt) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; switch (st->hand_state) { + default: + /* Shouldn't happen */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE, + SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE); + return 0; + + case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) + *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec; + else + *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec; + *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; + break; + case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: - return tls_construct_client_hello(s); + *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello; + *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO; + break; + + case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: + *confunc = tls_construct_end_of_early_data; + *mt = SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA; + break; + + case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END: + *confunc = NULL; + *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY; + break; case TLS_ST_CW_CERT: - return tls_construct_client_certificate(s); + *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate; + *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE; + break; case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH: - return tls_construct_client_key_exchange(s); + *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange; + *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE; + break; case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY: - return tls_construct_client_verify(s); - - case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) - return dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s); - else - return tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s); + *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify; + *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY; + break; #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO: - return tls_construct_next_proto(s); + *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto; + *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO; + break; #endif case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: - return tls_construct_finished(s, - s->method-> - ssl3_enc->client_finished_label, - s->method-> - ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len); + *confunc = tls_construct_finished; + *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED; + break; - default: - /* Shouldn't happen */ + case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE: + *confunc = tls_construct_key_update; + *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE; break; } - return 0; + return 1; } /* * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are * reading. Excludes the message header. */ -unsigned long ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s) +size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; switch (st->hand_state) { + default: + /* Shouldn't happen */ + return 0; + case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH; @@ -585,6 +981,9 @@ unsigned long ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s) case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: return s->max_cert_list; + case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY: + return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; + case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS: return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; @@ -613,12 +1012,12 @@ unsigned long ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s) case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH; - default: - /* Shouldn't happen */ - break; - } + case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: + return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH; - return 0; + case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE: + return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH; + } } /* @@ -629,6 +1028,13 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; switch (st->hand_state) { + default: + /* Shouldn't happen */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_PROCESS_MESSAGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt); @@ -638,6 +1044,9 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt); + case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY: + return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt); + case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS: return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt); @@ -659,12 +1068,15 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: return tls_process_finished(s, pkt); - default: - /* Shouldn't happen */ - break; - } + case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ: + return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt); - return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: + return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt); + + case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE: + return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt); + } } /* @@ -676,49 +1088,53 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; switch (st->hand_state) { + default: + /* Shouldn't happen */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return WORK_ERROR; + + case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY: case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst); - - default: - break; } - - /* Shouldn't happen */ - return WORK_ERROR; } -int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s) +int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) { - unsigned char *buf; - unsigned char *p, *d; - int i; - int protverr; - unsigned long l; - int al = 0; + unsigned char *p; + size_t sess_id_len; + int i, protverr; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP - int j; SSL_COMP *comp; #endif SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session; + unsigned char *session_id; - buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; + if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) { + /* Should not happen */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */ protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s); if (protverr != 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr); - goto err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, + protverr); + return 0; } - if ((sess == NULL) || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version) || - /* - * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared - * "ticket" without a session ID. - */ - (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) || - (sess->not_resumable)) { - if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) - goto err; + if (sess == NULL + || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version, NULL) + || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess)) { + if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE + && !ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } } /* else use the pre-loaded session */ @@ -737,14 +1153,16 @@ int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s) break; } } - } else - i = 1; - - if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0) - goto err; + } else { + i = (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE); + } - /* Do the message type and length last */ - d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s); + if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random), + DOWNGRADE_NONE) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } /*- * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from @@ -775,273 +1193,465 @@ int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s) * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to * the negotiated version. + * + * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the + * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions. */ - *(p++) = s->client_version >> 8; - *(p++) = s->client_version & 0xff; - - /* Random stuff */ - memcpy(p, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version) + || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } /* Session ID */ - if (s->new_session) - i = 0; - else - i = s->session->session_id_length; - *(p++) = i; - if (i != 0) { - if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; + session_id = s->session->session_id; + if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION) { + if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION + && (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0) { + sess_id_len = sizeof(s->tmp_session_id); + s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len; + session_id = s->tmp_session_id; + if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE + && RAND_bytes(s->tmp_session_id, sess_id_len) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + } else { + sess_id_len = 0; } - memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, i); - p += i; + } else { + assert(s->session->session_id_length <= sizeof(s->session->session_id)); + sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length; + if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) { + s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len; + memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->session->session_id, sess_id_len); + } + } + if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt) + || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, session_id, + sess_id_len)) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; } /* cookie stuff for DTLS */ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { - if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; + if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie) + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie, + s->d1->cookie_len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; } - *(p++) = s->d1->cookie_len; - memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len); - p += s->d1->cookie_len; } /* Ciphers supported */ - i = ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), &(p[2])); - if (i == 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE); - goto err; + if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; } -#ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH - /* - * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround - * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we - * use TLS v1.2 - */ - if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION - && i > OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH) - i = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1; -#endif - s2n(i, p); - p += i; - /* COMPRESSION */ -#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP - *(p++) = 1; -#else - - if (!ssl_allow_compression(s) || !s->ctx->comp_methods) - j = 0; - else - j = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); - *(p++) = 1 + j; - for (i = 0; i < j; i++) { - comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i); - *(p++) = comp->id; + if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; } -#endif - *(p++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */ - /* TLS extensions */ - if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); - goto err; + /* COMPRESSION */ + if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; } - if ((p = - ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, - &al)) == NULL) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP + if (ssl_allow_compression(s) + && s->ctx->comp_methods + && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->s3->tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) { + int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); + for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) { + comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i); + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + } + } +#endif + /* Add the NULL method */ + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; } - l = p - d; - if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, l)) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; + /* TLS extensions */ + if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; } return 1; - err: - ossl_statem_set_error(s); - return 0; } MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { - int al; - unsigned int cookie_len; + size_t cookie_len; PACKET cookiepkt; if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2) || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt); if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) { - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, + SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len; return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; - f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - ossl_statem_set_error(s); - return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } -MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) +static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL *s, const unsigned char *cipherchars) { STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; const SSL_CIPHER *c; - PACKET session_id; + int i; + + c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0); + if (c == NULL) { + /* unknown cipher */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, + SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED); + return 0; + } + /* + * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello, + * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error. + */ + if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK, 1)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, + SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); + return 0; + } + + sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s); + i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c); + if (i < 0) { + /* we did not say we would use this cipher */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, + SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); + return 0; + } + + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher != NULL + && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != c->id) { + /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, + SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); + return 0; + } + + /* + * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher + * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is + * set and use it for comparison. + */ + if (s->session->cipher != NULL) + s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id; + if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) { + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + /* + * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different + * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same. + */ + if (ssl_md(c->algorithm2) + != ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, + SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED); + return 0; + } + } else { + /* + * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same + * ciphersuite. + */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, + SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED); + return 0; + } + } + s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c; + + return 1; +} + +MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) +{ + PACKET session_id, extpkt; size_t session_id_len; const unsigned char *cipherchars; - int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + int hrr = 0; unsigned int compression; unsigned int sversion; - int protverr; + unsigned int context; + RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP SSL_COMP *comp; #endif if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - - protverr = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion); - if (protverr != 0) { - al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, protverr); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; } - /* load the server hello data */ /* load the server random */ - if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; + if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION + && sversion == TLS1_2_VERSION + && PACKET_remaining(pkt) >= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + && memcmp(hrrrandom, PACKET_data(pkt), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) == 0) { + s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_PENDING; + hrr = 1; + if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + } else { + if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } } - s->hit = 0; - /* Get the session-id. */ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; } session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id); if (session_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id) || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) { - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, + SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG); + goto err; } if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + + if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + + /* TLS extensions */ + if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0 && !hrr) { + PACKET_null_init(&extpkt); + } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt) + || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, + SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); + goto err; + } + + if (!hrr) { + if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, + SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO + | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO, + &extensions, NULL, 1)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + + if (!ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion, extensions)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + } + + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || hrr) { + if (compression != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, + SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); + goto err; + } + + if (session_id_len != s->tmp_session_id_len + || memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->tmp_session_id, + session_id_len) != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INVALID_SESSION_ID); + goto err; + } + } + + if (hrr) { + if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + + return tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(s, &extpkt); } /* - * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret. - * EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption. - * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs. - * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs) - * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application - * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST - * servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone - * is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if - * we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the - * server wants to resume. + * Now we have chosen the version we need to check again that the extensions + * are appropriate for this version. */ - if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb && - s->session->tlsext_tick) { - const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; - s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); - if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, - &s->session->master_key_length, - NULL, &pref_cipher, - s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) { - s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ? - pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars); - } else { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto f_err; + context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO + : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO; + if (!tls_validate_all_contexts(s, context, extensions)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, + SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + goto err; + } + + s->hit = 0; + + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + /* + * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of + * the message must be on a record boundary. + */ + if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, + SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); + goto err; + } + + /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */ + if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk, + SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO, + extensions, NULL, 0)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + } else { + /* + * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared + * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption. + * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs. + * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs) + * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application + * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether + * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session + * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we + * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake + * message to see if the server wants to resume. + */ + if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION + && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) { + const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; + /* + * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for + * backwards compat reasons + */ + int master_key_length; + master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); + if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, + &master_key_length, + NULL, &pref_cipher, + s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg) + && master_key_length > 0) { + s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length; + s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ? + pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0); + } else { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } } + + if (session_id_len != 0 + && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length + && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id, + session_id_len) == 0) + s->hit = 1; } - if (session_id_len != 0 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length - && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id, - session_id_len) == 0) { + if (s->hit) { if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length - || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) { + || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) { /* actually a client application bug */ - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, - SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, + SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT); + goto err; } - s->hit = 1; } else { /* * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server - * didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION. + * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION. * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID, * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be * overwritten if the server refuses resumption. */ - if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) { - s->ctx->stats.sess_miss++; + if (s->session->session_id_length > 0 + || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) + && s->session->ext.tick_identity + != TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY)) { + tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss); if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) { - goto f_err; + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; } } s->session->ssl_version = s->version; - s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len; - /* session_id_len could be 0 */ - if (session_id_len > 0) - memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id), - session_id_len); + /* + * In TLSv1.2 and below we save the session id we were sent so we can + * resume it later. In TLSv1.3 the session id we were sent is just an + * echo of what we originally sent in the ClientHello and should not be + * used for resumption. + */ + if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len; + /* session_id_len could be 0 */ + if (session_id_len > 0) + memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id), + session_id_len); + } } /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */ if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) { - al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; - - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, - SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - - c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars); - if (c == NULL) { - /* unknown cipher */ - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, + SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH); + goto err; } /* * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed @@ -1049,100 +1659,57 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) */ s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version; s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version; - /* - * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello, - * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error. - */ - if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK, 1)) { - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); - goto f_err; - } - sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s); - i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c); - if (i < 0) { - /* we did not say we would use this cipher */ - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); - goto f_err; + if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; } - /* - * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher - * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is - * set and use it for comparison. - */ - if (s->session->cipher) - s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id; - if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) { - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, - SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED); - goto f_err; - } - s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c; - /* lets get the compression algorithm */ - /* COMPRESSION */ - if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP if (compression != 0) { - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, - SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, + SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); + goto err; } /* * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session * using compression. */ if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, + SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); + goto err; } #else if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) { - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, - SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, + SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED); + goto err; } if (compression == 0) comp = NULL; else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) { - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, + SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED); + goto err; } else { comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression); } if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, - SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, + SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); + goto err; } else { s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp; } #endif - /* TLS extensions */ - if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); + if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } - if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { - /* wrong packet length */ - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); - goto f_err; - } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) { unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; @@ -1158,8 +1725,11 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, - sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) + sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; + } BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, @@ -1167,58 +1737,168 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) } #endif + /* + * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise + * we're done with this message + */ + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) + && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s) + || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, + SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + + OPENSSL_free(extensions); return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; - f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); err: - ossl_statem_set_error(s); + OPENSSL_free(extensions); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; +} + +static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, + PACKET *extpkt) +{ + RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL; + + /* + * If we were sending early_data then the enc_write_ctx is now invalid and + * should not be used. + */ + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx); + s->enc_write_ctx = NULL; + + if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, extpkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, + &extensions, NULL, 1) + || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, + extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + + OPENSSL_free(extensions); + extensions = NULL; + + if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0 +#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) + && s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL +#endif + ) { + /* + * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next + * ClientHello will not change + */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_AS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, + SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR); + goto err; + } + + /* + * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with + * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1. + */ + if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + + /* + * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done + * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the + * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now + * for HRR messages. + */ + if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, + s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + + return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; + err: + OPENSSL_free(extensions); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { - int al, i, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR, exp_idx; + int i; + MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len; X509 *x = NULL; const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes; STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + size_t chainidx, certidx; + unsigned int context = 0; + const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu; if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } - if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len) - || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; + if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context)) + || context != 0 + || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len) + || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len + || PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; } - while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { + for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) { if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, - SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; } certstart = certbytes; x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len); if (x == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); + goto err; } if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, - SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; } + + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL; + PACKET extensions; + + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); + goto err; + } + if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, + SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts, + NULL, chainidx == 0) + || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, + rawexts, x, chainidx, + PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) { + OPENSSL_free(rawexts); + /* SSLfatal already called */ + goto err; + } + OPENSSL_free(rawexts); + } + if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } x = NULL; @@ -1240,16 +1920,16 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) * set. The *documented* interface remains the same. */ if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) { - al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, - SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result), + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); + goto err; } ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */ if (i > 1) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i); - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i); + goto err; } s->session->peer_chain = sk; @@ -1264,54 +1944,58 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) { x = NULL; - al = SSL3_AL_FATAL; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, - SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS); + goto err; } - i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey); - if (i < 0) { + if ((clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &certidx)) == NULL) { x = NULL; - al = SSL3_AL_FATAL; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, - SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); + goto err; } - - exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher); - if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx - && (exp_idx != SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC || - (i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 - && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST01))) { - x = NULL; - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, - SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); - goto f_err; + /* + * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3 + * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate + * type. + */ + if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + if ((clu->amask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0) { + x = NULL; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); + goto err; + } } - s->session->peer_type = i; + s->session->peer_type = certidx; X509_free(s->session->peer); X509_up_ref(x); s->session->peer = x; s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; - x = NULL; + + /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */ + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) + && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash, + sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash), + &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */; + goto err; + } + ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; - goto done; - f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); err: - ossl_statem_set_error(s); - done: X509_free(x); sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); return ret; } -static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) +static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK PACKET psk_identity_hint; @@ -1319,8 +2003,8 @@ static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return 0; } @@ -1331,8 +2015,9 @@ static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) * identity. */ if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { - *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, + SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); return 0; } @@ -1341,19 +2026,20 @@ static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL; } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint, &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } return 1; #else - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; #endif } -static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al) +static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub; @@ -1362,31 +2048,31 @@ static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al) || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator) || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt) || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return 0; } + /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */ if ((s->srp_ctx.N = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), - PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL + (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL || (s->srp_ctx.g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), - PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL + (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL || (s->srp_ctx.s = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt), - PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL + (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL || (s->srp_ctx.B = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub), - PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB); + (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, + ERR_R_BN_LIB); return 0; } - if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, al)) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS); + if (!srp_verify_server_param(s)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ return 0; } @@ -1396,13 +2082,13 @@ static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al) return 1; #else - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; #endif } -static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al) +static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH PACKET prime, generator, pub_key; @@ -1416,8 +2102,8 @@ static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al) if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime) || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator) || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return 0; } @@ -1425,57 +2111,59 @@ static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al) dh = DH_new(); if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } - p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL); - g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL); - bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key), PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), - NULL); + /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */ + p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL); + g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), + NULL); + bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key), + (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL); if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, + ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } /* test non-zero pubkey */ if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, + SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE); goto err; } if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, + ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } p = g = NULL; if (DH_check_params(dh, &check_bits) == 0 || check_bits != 0) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, + SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE); goto err; } if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, + ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } bnpub_key = NULL; if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) { - *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, + SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL); goto err; } if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, + ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } @@ -1500,87 +2188,56 @@ static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al) return 0; #else - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; #endif } -static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al) +static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC PACKET encoded_pt; - const unsigned char *ecparams; - int curve_nid; - unsigned int curve_flags; - EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; + unsigned int curve_type, curve_id; /* * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH - * public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and + * public key. We only support named (not generic) curves and * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. */ - if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &ecparams, 3)) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &curve_type) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &curve_id)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); return 0; } /* - * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an - * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes. + * Check curve is named curve type and one of our preferences, if not + * server has sent an invalid curve. */ - if (!tls1_check_curve(s, ecparams, 3)) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE); + if (curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE + || !tls1_check_group_id(s, curve_id, 1)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, + SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE); return 0; } - curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams + 2), &curve_flags); - - if (curve_nid == 0) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, - SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS); + if ((s->s3->peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(curve_id)) == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, + SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS); return 0; } - if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) { - EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new(); - - if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, curve_nid)) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); - EVP_PKEY_free(key); - return 0; - } - s->s3->peer_tmp = key; - } else { - /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */ - pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL); - if (pctx == NULL - || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0 - || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx, curve_nid) <= 0 - || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); - EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); - return 0; - } - EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); - pctx = NULL; - } - if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return 0; } if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt), PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, + SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT); return 0; } @@ -1597,17 +2254,18 @@ static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al) return 1; #else - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; #endif } MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { - int al = -1; long alg_k; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL; + EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; PACKET save_param_start, signature; alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; @@ -1620,24 +2278,32 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) #endif if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) { - if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al)) + if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; + } } /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */ if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { - if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey, &al)) + if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; + } } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { - if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al)) + if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; + } } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { - if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al)) + if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; + } } else if (alg_k) { - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); goto err; } @@ -1646,7 +2312,9 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) PACKET params; int maxsig; const EVP_MD *md = NULL; - EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx; + unsigned char *tbs; + size_t tbslen; + int rv; /* * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference @@ -1655,46 +2323,49 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms, PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) - PACKET_remaining(pkt))) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { - const unsigned char *sigalgs; - int rv; - if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sigalgs, 2)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + unsigned int sigalg; + + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto err; } - rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sigalgs, pkey); - if (rv == -1) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto err; - } else if (rv == 0) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <=0) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } + } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } #ifdef SSL_DEBUG + if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); #endif - } else if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { - md = EVP_md5_sha1(); - } else { - md = EVP_sha1(); - } if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); if (maxsig < 0) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } @@ -1703,255 +2374,324 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) */ if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) { /* wrong packet length */ - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH); goto err; } md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (md_ctx == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } - if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0 - || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), - SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 - || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), - SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 - || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, PACKET_data(¶ms), - PACKET_remaining(¶ms)) <= 0) { - EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; + } + if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) { + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 + || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, + RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; + } + } + tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs, PACKET_data(¶ms), + PACKET_remaining(¶ms)); + if (tbslen == 0) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } - if (EVP_VerifyFinal(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature), - PACKET_remaining(&signature), pkey) <= 0) { - /* bad signature */ - EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); - al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); + + rv = EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature), + PACKET_remaining(&signature), tbs, tbslen); + OPENSSL_free(tbs); + if (rv <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); goto err; } EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); + md_ctx = NULL; } else { /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */ if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) { /* Might be wrong key type, check it */ if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) { - /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */ - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - } else { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_BAD_DATA); } + /* else this shouldn't happen, SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } /* still data left over */ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE); goto err; } } return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; err: - if (al != -1) - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - ossl_statem_set_error(s); + EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { - int ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; - unsigned int list_len, ctype_num, i, name_len; - X509_NAME *xn = NULL; - const unsigned char *data; - const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes; - STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL; + size_t i; - if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } + /* Clear certificate validity flags */ + for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) + s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0; - /* get the certificate types */ - if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ctype_num) - || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ctype_num)) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto err; - } - OPENSSL_free(s->cert->ctypes); - s->cert->ctypes = NULL; - if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER) { - /* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */ - s->cert->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num); - if (s->cert->ctypes == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + PACKET reqctx, extensions; + RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL; + + if ((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0) { + /* + * We already sent close_notify. This can only happen in TLSv1.3 + * post-handshake messages. We can't reasonably respond to this, so + * we just ignore it + */ + return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; } - memcpy(s->cert->ctypes, data, ctype_num); - s->cert->ctype_num = (size_t)ctype_num; - ctype_num = SSL3_CT_NUMBER; - } - for (i = 0; i < ctype_num; i++) - s->s3->tmp.ctype[i] = data[i]; - if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { - if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len) - || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, list_len)) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, - SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto err; + /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */ + OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ctype); + s->s3->tmp.ctype = NULL; + s->s3->tmp.ctype_len = 0; + OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context); + s->pha_context = NULL; + + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx) || + !PACKET_memdup(&reqctx, &s->pha_context, &s->pha_context_len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } - /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */ - for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { - s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL; - s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0; + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } - if ((list_len & 1) || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, list_len)) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, - SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR); - goto err; + if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, + SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + &rawexts, NULL, 1) + || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + OPENSSL_free(rawexts); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } + OPENSSL_free(rawexts); if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } } else { - ssl_set_default_md(s); - } + PACKET ctypes; - /* get the CA RDNs */ - if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len) - || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != list_len) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto err; - } + /* get the certificate types */ + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } - while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { - if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &name_len) - || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &namebytes, name_len)) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, - SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto err; + if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3->tmp.ctype, &s->s3->tmp.ctype_len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } - namestart = namebytes; + if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { + PACKET sigalgs; - if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&namebytes, - name_len)) == NULL) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); - goto err; - } + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } - if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, - SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto err; + /* + * Despite this being for certificates, preserve compatibility + * with pre-TLS 1.3 and use the regular sigalgs field. + */ + if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs, 0)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } } - if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; + + /* get the CA RDNs */ + if (!parse_ca_names(s, pkt)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } - xn = NULL; + } + + if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */ s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1; - s->s3->tmp.ctype_num = ctype_num; - sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free); - s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk; - ca_sk = NULL; - ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; - goto done; - err: - ossl_statem_set_error(s); - done: - X509_NAME_free(xn); - sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free); - return ret; -} + /* + * In TLSv1.3 we don't prepare the client certificate yet. We wait until + * after the CertificateVerify message has been received. This is because + * in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest arrives before the Certificate message + * but in TLSv1.2 it is the other way around. We want to make sure that + * SSL_get_peer_certificate() returns something sensible in + * client_cert_cb. + */ + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) + return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; -static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b) -{ - return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b)); + return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; } MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { - int al; unsigned int ticklen; - unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint; + unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0; + unsigned int sess_len; + RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL; + PACKET nonce; + + PACKET_null_init(&nonce); if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint) + || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) + && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add) + || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &nonce))) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen) - || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; + || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? (ticklen == 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen) + : PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; } - /* Server is allowed to change its mind and send an empty ticket. */ + /* + * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty + * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never + * be 0 here in that instance + */ if (ticklen == 0) return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; - if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) { - int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode; + /* + * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise + * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions, + * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every + * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive + * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session + * cache. + */ + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->session->session_id_length > 0) { SSL_SESSION *new_sess; + /* * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new * one */ - if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) { + if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0 + && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { /* - * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails + * In TLSv1.2 and below the arrival of a new tickets signals that + * any old ticket we were using is now out of date, so we remove the + * old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails */ SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session); } - if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto f_err; - } - SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); s->session = new_sess; } - OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick); - s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0; + /* + * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard - + * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok. + */ + s->session->time = (long)time(NULL); + + OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick); + s->session->ext.tick = NULL; + s->session->ext.ticklen = 0; - s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); - if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); + if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } - if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; + if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + + s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint; + s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add; + s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen; + + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + PACKET extpkt; + + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt) + || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + + if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, + SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, &exts, + NULL, 1) + || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, + SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, + exts, NULL, 0, 1)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } } - s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint; - s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen; /* * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in @@ -1963,123 +2703,186 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket. */ - if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen, - s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length, + /* + * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int + * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t + */ + if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen, + s->session->session_id, &sess_len, EVP_sha256(), NULL)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, + ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } + s->session->session_id_length = sess_len; + s->session->not_resumable = 0; + + /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */ + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s); + int hashleni = EVP_MD_size(md); + size_t hashlen; + static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption"; + + /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */ + if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + hashlen = (size_t)hashleni; + + if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret, + nonce_label, + sizeof(nonce_label) - 1, + PACKET_data(&nonce), + PACKET_remaining(&nonce), + s->session->master_key, + hashlen)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + s->session->master_key_length = hashlen; + + OPENSSL_free(exts); + ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); + return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; + } + return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; - f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); err: - ossl_statem_set_error(s); + OPENSSL_free(exts); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } -MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) +/* + * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to + * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure + */ +int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { - int al; - unsigned long resplen; + size_t resplen; unsigned int type; if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type) || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, + SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE); + return 0; } - if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &resplen) + if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen); - if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto f_err; - } - if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, resplen)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen; - return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; - f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - ossl_statem_set_error(s); - return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return 0; + } + s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen); + if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } + if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return 0; + } + s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen; + + return 1; } -MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) + +MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { - if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { - /* should contain no data */ - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - ossl_statem_set_error(s); + if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) { - if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC); - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); - ossl_statem_set_error(s); - return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; - } - } -#endif + return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; +} + +/* + * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the + * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message. + * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0 + * on failure. + */ +int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s) +{ /* * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from * the server */ if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - ossl_statem_set_error(s); - return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; } /* - * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |tlsext_ocsp_resp| and - * |tlsext_ocsp_resplen| values will be set if we actually received a status + * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and + * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise */ - if (s->tlsext_status_type != -1 && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb != NULL) { - int ret; - ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); + if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing + && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) { + int ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg); + if (ret == 0) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, - SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE); - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, - SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE); - return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT, + SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE); + return 0; } if (ret < 0) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; } } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) { /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */ if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + } +#endif + + return 1; +} + +MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) +{ + if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { + /* should contain no data */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP + if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) { + if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, + SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } } #endif + if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; } -static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, - size_t *pskhdrlen, int *al) +static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK int ret = 0; @@ -2096,8 +2899,8 @@ static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, size_t psklen = 0; if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB); - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, + SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB); goto err; } @@ -2108,28 +2911,28 @@ static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, psk, sizeof(psk)); if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } else if (psklen == 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, - SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); - *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, + SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); goto err; } identitylen = strlen(identity); if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen); tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity); if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } @@ -2140,10 +2943,12 @@ static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity); s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity; tmpidentity = NULL; - s2n(identitylen, *p); - memcpy(*p, identity, identitylen); - *pskhdrlen = 2 + identitylen; - *p += identitylen; + + if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } ret = 1; @@ -2155,16 +2960,16 @@ static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, return ret; #else - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; #endif } -static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al) +static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - unsigned char *q; + unsigned char *encdata = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; size_t enclen; @@ -2175,58 +2980,68 @@ static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al) /* * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA. */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen); if (pms == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8; pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff; - if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, pmslen - 2) <= 0) { + /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */ + if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } - q = *p; /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */ - if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) - *p += 2; + if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL); if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, + ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } - if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, *p, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT); + if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata) + || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, + SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT); goto err; } - *len = enclen; EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); pctx = NULL; -# ifdef PKCS1_CHECK - if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1) - (*p)[1]++; - if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2) - tmp_buf[0] = 0x70; -# endif /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */ - if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) { - s2n(*len, q); - *len += 2; + if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */ + if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; } s->s3->tmp.pms = pms; @@ -2239,75 +3054,94 @@ static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al) return 0; #else - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; #endif } -static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al) +static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH DH *dh_clnt = NULL; const BIGNUM *pub_key; EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL; + unsigned char *keybytes = NULL; skey = s->s3->peer_tmp; if (skey == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; } + ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey); if (ckey == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; } dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey); - if (dh_clnt == NULL || ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey) == 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); - return 0; + if (dh_clnt == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; } /* send off the data */ DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL); - *len = BN_num_bytes(pub_key); - s2n(*len, *p); - BN_bn2bin(pub_key, *p); - *len += 2; + if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(pub_key), + &keybytes)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + BN_bn2bin(pub_key, keybytes); EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); return 1; + err: + EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); + return 0; #else - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; #endif } -static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al) +static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; - int encoded_pt_len = 0; + size_t encoded_pt_len = 0; EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL; + int ret = 0; skey = s->s3->peer_tmp; if (skey == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey); if (ckey == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } - if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey) == 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } @@ -2315,37 +3149,30 @@ static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al) encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint); if (encoded_pt_len == 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, + ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } - EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); - ckey = NULL; - - *len = encoded_pt_len; - - /* length of encoded point */ - **p = *len; - *p += 1; - /* copy the point */ - memcpy(*p, encodedPoint, *len); - /* increment len to account for length field */ - *len += 1; - - OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); + if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } - return 1; + ret = 1; err: + OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); - return 0; + return ret; #else - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; #endif } -static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al) +static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST /* GOST key exchange message creation */ @@ -2367,16 +3194,15 @@ static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al) */ peer_cert = s->session->peer; if (!peer_cert) { - *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER); return 0; } pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL); if (pkey_ctx == NULL) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } /* @@ -2389,16 +3215,18 @@ static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al) pmslen = 32; pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen); if (pms == NULL) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0 - /* Generate session key */ - || RAND_bytes(pms, pmslen) <= 0) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + /* Generate session key + * TODO(size_t): Convert this function + */ + || RAND_bytes(pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; }; /* @@ -2413,38 +3241,36 @@ static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al) || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash); ukm_hash = NULL; if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, + SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); goto err; } /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */ /* * Encapsulate it into sequence */ - *((*p)++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED; msglen = 255; if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, + SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); goto err; } - if (msglen >= 0x80) { - *((*p)++) = 0x81; - *((*p)++) = msglen & 0xff; - *len = msglen + 3; - } else { - *((*p)++) = msglen & 0xff; - *len = msglen + 2; + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED) + || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81)) + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; } - memcpy(*p, tmp, msglen); EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); s->s3->tmp.pms = pms; @@ -2457,98 +3283,85 @@ static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al) EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash); return 0; #else - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; #endif } -static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al) +static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - if (s->srp_ctx.A != NULL) { - /* send off the data */ - *len = BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A); - s2n(*len, *p); - BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, *p); - *len += 2; - } else { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + unsigned char *abytes = NULL; + + if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL + || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A), + &abytes)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } + BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes); + OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username); s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } return 1; #else - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; #endif } -int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) +int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) { - unsigned char *p; - int len; - size_t pskhdrlen = 0; unsigned long alg_k; - int al = -1; alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; - p = ssl_handshake_start(s); - + /* + * All of the construct functions below call SSLfatal() if necessary so + * no need to do so here. + */ if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) - && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, &p, &pskhdrlen, &al)) + && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) goto err; - if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) { - len = 0; - } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { - if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, &p, &len, &al)) + if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { + if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt)) goto err; } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { - if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, &p, &len, &al)) + if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt)) goto err; } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { - if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, &p, &len, &al)) + if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt)) goto err; } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { - if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, &p, &len, &al)) + if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt)) goto err; } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { - if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, &p, &len, &al)) + if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt)) goto err; - } else { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - - len += pskhdrlen; - - if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, len)) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } return 1; err: - if (al != -1) - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen); s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen); s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL; #endif - ossl_statem_set_error(s); return 0; } @@ -2564,8 +3377,7 @@ int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s) /* Check for SRP */ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) { if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } return 1; @@ -2573,13 +3385,12 @@ int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s) #endif if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + /* SSLfatal() already called */ /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */ pms = NULL; pmslen = 0; @@ -2602,8 +3413,12 @@ int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s) if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, - sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) + sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; + } BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); @@ -2617,79 +3432,6 @@ int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s) return 0; } -int tls_construct_client_verify(SSL *s) -{ - unsigned char *p; - EVP_PKEY *pkey; - const EVP_MD *md = s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys]; - EVP_MD_CTX *mctx; - unsigned u = 0; - unsigned long n = 0; - long hdatalen = 0; - void *hdata; - - mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); - if (mctx == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - p = ssl_handshake_start(s); - pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey; - - hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata); - if (hdatalen <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { - if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - p += 2; - n = 2; - } -#ifdef SSL_DEBUG - fprintf(stderr, "Using client alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); -#endif - if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL) - || !EVP_SignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) - || (s->version == SSL3_VERSION - && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, - s->session->master_key_length, - s->session->master_key)) - || !EVP_SignFinal(mctx, p + 2, &u, pkey)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); - goto err; - } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST - { - int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey); - if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 - || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 - || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) - BUF_reverse(p + 2, NULL, u); - } -#endif - - s2n(u, p); - n += u + 2; - /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */ - if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) - goto err; - if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, n)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - - EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); - return 1; - err: - EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); - return 0; -} - /* * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client @@ -2697,10 +3439,8 @@ int tls_construct_client_verify(SSL *s) */ static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s) { - if (!s->cert || !s->cert->key->x509 || !s->cert->key->privatekey) - return 0; /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */ - if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys]) + if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 0) || s->s3->tmp.sigalg == NULL) return 0; /* * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also @@ -2727,14 +3467,19 @@ WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) return WORK_MORE_A; } if (i == 0) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); - ossl_statem_set_error(s); - return 0; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED); + return WORK_ERROR; } s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; } - if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s)) + if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s)) { + if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) { + return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; + } return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; + } /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */ wst = WORK_MORE_B; @@ -2773,131 +3518,194 @@ WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) } else { s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2; if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); - ossl_statem_set_error(s); - return 0; + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return WORK_ERROR; } } } + if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) + return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; } /* Shouldn't ever get here */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return WORK_ERROR; } -int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s) +int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) { - if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, - (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == - 2) ? NULL : s->cert->key)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); - ossl_statem_set_error(s); + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + if (s->pha_context == NULL) { + /* no context available, add 0-length context */ + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + } else if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + } + if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, + (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL + : s->cert->key)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) + && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) + && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, + SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) { + /* + * This is a fatal error, which leaves enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent + * state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash. + */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER); return 0; } return 1; } -#define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m)) - int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s) { - int i; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - int idx; -#endif + const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu; + size_t idx; long alg_k, alg_a; - EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; - int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; /* we don't have a certificate */ - if ((alg_a & SSL_aNULL) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) - return (1); + if (!(alg_a & SSL_aCERT)) + return 1; /* This is the passed certificate */ + clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer), &idx); -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - idx = s->session->peer_type; - if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) { - if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s) == 0) { - /* check failed */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT); - goto f_err; - } else { - return 1; - } - } else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, - SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT); - goto f_err; + /* Check certificate is recognised and suitable for cipher */ + if (clu == NULL || (alg_a & clu->amask) == 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, + SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT); + return 0; } -#endif - pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); - i = X509_certificate_type(s->session->peer, pkey); - /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */ - if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, - SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT); - goto f_err; - } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA - else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, - SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT); - goto f_err; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC + if (clu->amask & SSL_aECDSA) { + if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s)) + return 1; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT); + return 0; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) && - !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, - SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT); - goto f_err; + if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) && idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, + SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT); + return 0; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; } #endif - return (1); - f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - return (0); + return 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s) +int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) { - unsigned int len, padding_len; - unsigned char *d; + size_t len, padding_len; + unsigned char *padding = NULL; - len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len; + len = s->ext.npn_len; padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32); - d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; - d[4] = len; - memcpy(d + 5, s->next_proto_negotiated, len); - d[5 + len] = padding_len; - memset(d + 6 + len, 0, padding_len); - *(d++) = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO; - l2n3(2 + len + padding_len, d); - s->init_num = 4 + 2 + len + padding_len; - s->init_off = 0; + + if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len) + || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + memset(padding, 0, padding_len); return 1; } #endif +MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) +{ + if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { + /* should contain no data */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + + if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) { + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); + return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; + } + + /* + * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for + * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will + * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a + * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable + * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd. + */ + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) + SSL_renegotiate(s); + else + SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s); + + return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; +} + +static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) +{ + PACKET extensions; + RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL; + + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions) + || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + + if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, + SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, &rawexts, + NULL, 1) + || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, + rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + + OPENSSL_free(rawexts); + return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; + + err: + OPENSSL_free(rawexts); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; +} + int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey) { int i = 0; @@ -2915,47 +3723,123 @@ int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey) return i; } -int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, unsigned char *p) +int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt) { - int i, j = 0; - const SSL_CIPHER *c; - unsigned char *q; + int i; + size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen, maxverok = 0; int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate; + /* Set disabled masks for this session */ - ssl_set_client_disabled(s); + if (!ssl_set_client_disabled(s)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, + SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE); + return 0; + } + + if (sk == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } - if (sk == NULL) - return (0); - q = p; +#ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH +# if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6 +# error Max cipher length too short +# endif + /* + * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround + * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we + * use TLS v1.2 + */ + if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) + maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1; + else +#endif + /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */ + maxlen = 0xfffe; + + if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) + maxlen -= 2; + if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) + maxlen -= 2; + + for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) { + const SSL_CIPHER *c; - for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) { c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i); /* Skip disabled ciphers */ if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0)) continue; - j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, p); - p += j; + + if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */ + if (!maxverok) { + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { + if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver) + && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)) + maxverok = 1; + } else { + if (c->max_tls >= s->s3->tmp.max_ver + && c->min_tls <= s->s3->tmp.max_ver) + maxverok = 1; + } + } + + totlen += len; } - /* - * If p == q, no ciphers; caller indicates an error. Otherwise, add - * applicable SCSVs. - */ - if (p != q) { + + if (totlen == 0 || !maxverok) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, + SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE); + + if (!maxverok) + ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported " + "SSL/TLS version"); + + return 0; + } + + if (totlen != 0) { if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) { static SSL_CIPHER scsv = { - 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 + 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }; - j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, p); - p += j; + if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } } if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) { static SSL_CIPHER scsv = { - 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 + 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }; - j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, p); - p += j; + if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } } } - return (p - q); + return 1; +} + +int tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) +{ + if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY + && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, + ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); + return 0; + } + + s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING; + return 1; } diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_dtls.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_dtls.c index 5b34425445..b016fa7cff 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_dtls.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_dtls.c @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ #include <stdio.h> #include "../ssl_locl.h" #include "statem_locl.h" +#include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include <openssl/buffer.h> #include <openssl/objects.h> #include <openssl/evp.h> @@ -32,7 +33,6 @@ #define RSMBLY_BITMASK_IS_COMPLETE(bitmask, msg_len, is_complete) { \ long ii; \ - OPENSSL_assert((msg_len) > 0); \ is_complete = 1; \ if (bitmask[(((msg_len) - 1) >> 3)] != bitmask_end_values[((msg_len) & 7)]) is_complete = 0; \ if (is_complete) for (ii = (((msg_len) - 1) >> 3) - 1; ii >= 0 ; ii--) \ @@ -43,30 +43,30 @@ static unsigned char bitmask_start_values[] = static unsigned char bitmask_end_values[] = { 0xff, 0x01, 0x03, 0x07, 0x0f, 0x1f, 0x3f, 0x7f }; -static void dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned long frag_off, - unsigned long frag_len); +static void dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL *s, size_t frag_off, + size_t frag_len); static unsigned char *dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p); static void dtls1_set_message_header_int(SSL *s, unsigned char mt, - unsigned long len, + size_t len, unsigned short seq_num, - unsigned long frag_off, - unsigned long frag_len); -static int dtls_get_reassembled_message(SSL *s, long *len); + size_t frag_off, + size_t frag_len); +static int dtls_get_reassembled_message(SSL *s, int *errtype, size_t *len); -static hm_fragment *dtls1_hm_fragment_new(unsigned long frag_len, - int reassembly) +static hm_fragment *dtls1_hm_fragment_new(size_t frag_len, int reassembly) { hm_fragment *frag = NULL; unsigned char *buf = NULL; unsigned char *bitmask = NULL; - frag = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*frag)); - if (frag == NULL) + if ((frag = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*frag))) == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; + } if (frag_len) { - buf = OPENSSL_malloc(frag_len); - if (buf == NULL) { + if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(frag_len)) == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); OPENSSL_free(frag); return NULL; } @@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ static hm_fragment *dtls1_hm_fragment_new(unsigned long frag_len, if (reassembly) { bitmask = OPENSSL_zalloc(RSMBLY_BITMASK_SIZE(frag_len)); if (bitmask == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); OPENSSL_free(buf); OPENSSL_free(frag); return NULL; @@ -111,9 +112,10 @@ void dtls1_hm_fragment_free(hm_fragment *frag) int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type) { int ret; - unsigned int curr_mtu; + size_t written; + size_t curr_mtu; int retry = 1; - unsigned int len, frag_off, mac_size, blocksize, used_len; + size_t len, frag_off, mac_size, blocksize, used_len; if (!dtls1_query_mtu(s)) return -1; @@ -122,9 +124,11 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type) /* should have something reasonable now */ return -1; - if (s->init_off == 0 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) - OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num == - (int)s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH); + if (s->init_off == 0 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { + if (!ossl_assert(s->init_num == + s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) + return -1; + } if (s->write_hash) { if (s->enc_write_ctx @@ -235,7 +239,8 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type) data[s->init_off]); } - ret = dtls1_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], len); + ret = dtls1_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], len, + &written); if (ret < 0) { /* * might need to update MTU here, but we don't know which @@ -253,7 +258,7 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type) } else return -1; } else { - return (-1); + return -1; } } else { @@ -261,7 +266,8 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type) * bad if this assert fails, only part of the handshake message * got sent. but why would this happen? */ - OPENSSL_assert(len == (unsigned int)ret); + if (!ossl_assert(len == written)) + return -1; if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && !s->d1->retransmitting) { /* @@ -271,7 +277,7 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type) unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off]; const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr; - int xlen; + size_t xlen; if (frag_off == 0 && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) { /* @@ -284,17 +290,17 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type) l2n3(0, p); l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len, p); p -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; - xlen = ret; + xlen = written; } else { p += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; - xlen = ret - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; + xlen = written - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; } if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, xlen)) return -1; } - if (ret == s->init_num) { + if (written == s->init_num) { if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s, @@ -303,12 +309,12 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type) s->init_off = 0; /* done writing this message */ s->init_num = 0; - return (1); + return 1; } - s->init_off += ret; - s->init_num -= ret; - ret -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; - frag_off += ret; + s->init_off += written; + s->init_num -= written; + written -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; + frag_off += written; /* * We save the fragment offset for the next fragment so we have it @@ -319,32 +325,34 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type) dtls1_fix_message_header(s, frag_off, 0); } } - return (0); + return 0; } -int dtls_get_message(SSL *s, int *mt, unsigned long *len) +int dtls_get_message(SSL *s, int *mt, size_t *len) { struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr; unsigned char *p; - unsigned long msg_len; - int ok; - long tmplen; + size_t msg_len; + size_t tmplen; + int errtype; msg_hdr = &s->d1->r_msg_hdr; memset(msg_hdr, 0, sizeof(*msg_hdr)); again: - ok = dtls_get_reassembled_message(s, &tmplen); - if (tmplen == DTLS1_HM_BAD_FRAGMENT || tmplen == DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY) { - /* bad fragment received */ - goto again; - } else if (tmplen <= 0 && !ok) { + if (!dtls_get_reassembled_message(s, &errtype, &tmplen)) { + if (errtype == DTLS1_HM_BAD_FRAGMENT + || errtype == DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY) { + /* bad fragment received */ + goto again; + } return 0; } *mt = s->s3->tmp.message_type; p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; + *len = s->init_num; if (*mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { if (s->msg_callback) { @@ -354,7 +362,6 @@ int dtls_get_message(SSL *s, int *mt, unsigned long *len) /* * This isn't a real handshake message so skip the processing below. */ - *len = (unsigned long)tmplen; return 1; } @@ -391,7 +398,6 @@ int dtls_get_message(SSL *s, int *mt, unsigned long *len) s->d1->handshake_read_seq++; s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; - *len = s->init_num; return 1; } @@ -401,11 +407,10 @@ int dtls_get_message(SSL *s, int *mt, unsigned long *len) * permitted in a DTLS handshake message for |s|. The minimum is 16KB, but * may be greater if the maximum certificate list size requires it. */ -static unsigned long dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(const SSL *s) +static size_t dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(const SSL *s) { - unsigned long max_len = - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH; - if (max_len < (unsigned long)s->max_cert_list) + size_t max_len = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH; + if (max_len < s->max_cert_list) return s->max_cert_list; return max_len; } @@ -421,8 +426,9 @@ static int dtls1_preprocess_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr) /* sanity checking */ if ((frag_off + frag_len) > msg_len || msg_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); - return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT, + SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); + return 0; } if (s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) { /* first fragment */ @@ -431,8 +437,9 @@ static int dtls1_preprocess_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr) * dtls_max_handshake_message_len(s) above */ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, msg_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); - return SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT, + ERR_R_BUF_LIB); + return 0; } s->s3->tmp.message_size = msg_len; @@ -445,14 +452,19 @@ static int dtls1_preprocess_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr) * They must be playing with us! BTW, failure to enforce upper limit * would open possibility for buffer overrun. */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); - return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT, + SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); + return 0; } - return 0; /* no error */ + return 1; } -static int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, int *ok) +/* + * Returns 1 if there is a buffered fragment available, 0 if not, or -1 on a + * fatal error. + */ +static int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, size_t *len) { /*- * (0) check whether the desired fragment is available @@ -462,9 +474,7 @@ static int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, int *ok) */ pitem *item; hm_fragment *frag; - int al; - - *ok = 0; + int ret; do { item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->buffered_messages); @@ -488,13 +498,13 @@ static int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, int *ok) return 0; if (s->d1->handshake_read_seq == frag->msg_header.seq) { - unsigned long frag_len = frag->msg_header.frag_len; + size_t frag_len = frag->msg_header.frag_len; pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages); - al = dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s, &frag->msg_header); + /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */ + ret = dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s, &frag->msg_header); - /* al will be 0 if no alert */ - if (al == 0 && frag->msg_header.frag_len > 0) { + if (ret && frag->msg_header.frag_len > 0) { unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; memcpy(&p[frag->msg_header.frag_off], frag->fragment, @@ -504,34 +514,36 @@ static int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, int *ok) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag); pitem_free(item); - if (al == 0) { - *ok = 1; - return frag_len; + if (ret) { + *len = frag_len; + return 1; } - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); + /* Fatal error */ s->init_num = 0; - *ok = 0; return -1; - } else + } else { return 0; + } } static int -dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr, int *ok) +dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr) { hm_fragment *frag = NULL; pitem *item = NULL; int i = -1, is_complete; unsigned char seq64be[8]; - unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len; + size_t frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len; + size_t readbytes; if ((msg_hdr->frag_off + frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len || msg_hdr->msg_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s)) goto err; - if (frag_len == 0) + if (frag_len == 0) { return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY; + } /* Try to find item in queue */ memset(seq64be, 0, sizeof(seq64be)); @@ -568,10 +580,10 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr, int *ok) devnull, frag_len > sizeof(devnull) ? sizeof(devnull) : - frag_len, 0); + frag_len, 0, &readbytes); if (i <= 0) goto err; - frag_len -= i; + frag_len -= readbytes; } return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY; } @@ -579,8 +591,8 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr, int *ok) /* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */ i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL, frag->fragment + msg_hdr->frag_off, - frag_len, 0); - if ((unsigned long)i != frag_len) + frag_len, 0, &readbytes); + if (i <= 0 || readbytes != frag_len) i = -1; if (i <= 0) goto err; @@ -588,6 +600,8 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr, int *ok) RSMBLY_BITMASK_MARK(frag->reassembly, (long)msg_hdr->frag_off, (long)(msg_hdr->frag_off + frag_len)); + if (!ossl_assert(msg_hdr->msg_len > 0)) + goto err; RSMBLY_BITMASK_IS_COMPLETE(frag->reassembly, (long)msg_hdr->msg_len, is_complete); @@ -610,7 +624,8 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr, int *ok) * would have returned it and control would never have reached this * branch. */ - OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL); + if (!ossl_assert(item != NULL)) + goto err; } return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY; @@ -618,19 +633,18 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr, int *ok) err: if (item == NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag); - *ok = 0; - return i; + return -1; } static int -dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr, - int *ok) +dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr) { int i = -1; hm_fragment *frag = NULL; pitem *item = NULL; unsigned char seq64be[8]; - unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len; + size_t frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len; + size_t readbytes; if ((msg_hdr->frag_off + frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len) goto err; @@ -663,14 +677,15 @@ dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr, devnull, frag_len > sizeof(devnull) ? sizeof(devnull) : - frag_len, 0); + frag_len, 0, &readbytes); if (i <= 0) goto err; - frag_len -= i; + frag_len -= readbytes; } } else { - if (frag_len != msg_hdr->msg_len) - return dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, msg_hdr, ok); + if (frag_len != msg_hdr->msg_len) { + return dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, msg_hdr); + } if (frag_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s)) goto err; @@ -686,8 +701,9 @@ dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr, * read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */ i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL, - frag->fragment, frag_len, 0); - if ((unsigned long)i != frag_len) + frag->fragment, frag_len, 0, + &readbytes); + if (i<=0 || readbytes != frag_len) i = -1; if (i <= 0) goto err; @@ -706,7 +722,8 @@ dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr, * have been processed with |dtls1_reassemble_fragment|, above, or * the record will have been discarded. */ - OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL); + if (!ossl_assert(item != NULL)) + goto err; } return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY; @@ -714,56 +731,61 @@ dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr, err: if (item == NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag); - *ok = 0; - return i; + return 0; } -static int dtls_get_reassembled_message(SSL *s, long *len) +static int dtls_get_reassembled_message(SSL *s, int *errtype, size_t *len) { unsigned char wire[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]; - unsigned long mlen, frag_off, frag_len; - int i, al, recvd_type; + size_t mlen, frag_off, frag_len; + int i, ret, recvd_type; struct hm_header_st msg_hdr; - int ok; + size_t readbytes; + + *errtype = 0; redo: /* see if we have the required fragment already */ - if ((frag_len = dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(s, &ok)) || ok) { - if (ok) - s->init_num = frag_len; + ret = dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(s, &frag_len); + if (ret < 0) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + if (ret > 0) { + s->init_num = frag_len; *len = frag_len; - return ok; + return 1; } /* read handshake message header */ i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type, wire, - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, 0); + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, 0, &readbytes); if (i <= 0) { /* nbio, or an error */ s->rwstate = SSL_READING; - *len = i; + *len = 0; return 0; } if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { if (wire[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) { - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_GET_REASSEMBLED_MESSAGE, - SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, + SSL_F_DTLS_GET_REASSEMBLED_MESSAGE, + SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); goto f_err; } - memcpy(s->init_buf->data, wire, i); - s->init_num = i - 1; + memcpy(s->init_buf->data, wire, readbytes); + s->init_num = readbytes - 1; s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + 1; s->s3->tmp.message_type = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; - s->s3->tmp.message_size = i - 1; - *len = i - 1; + s->s3->tmp.message_size = readbytes - 1; + *len = readbytes - 1; return 1; } /* Handshake fails if message header is incomplete */ - if (i != DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_GET_REASSEMBLED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + if (readbytes != DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, + SSL_F_DTLS_GET_REASSEMBLED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); goto f_err; } @@ -779,8 +801,8 @@ static int dtls_get_reassembled_message(SSL *s, long *len) * Fragments must not span records. */ if (frag_len > RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s->rlayer)) { - al = SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_GET_REASSEMBLED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + SSL_F_DTLS_GET_REASSEMBLED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); goto f_err; } @@ -791,17 +813,19 @@ static int dtls_get_reassembled_message(SSL *s, long *len) * although we're still expecting seq 0 (ClientHello) */ if (msg_hdr.seq != s->d1->handshake_read_seq) { - *len = dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(s, &msg_hdr, &ok); - return ok; + *errtype = dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(s, &msg_hdr); + return 0; } if (frag_len && frag_len < mlen) { - *len = dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, &msg_hdr, &ok); - return ok; + *errtype = dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, &msg_hdr); + return 0; } - if (!s->server && s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0 && - wire[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) { + if (!s->server + && s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0 + && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_OK + && wire[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) { /* * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- we are * doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if their format is @@ -817,22 +841,24 @@ static int dtls_get_reassembled_message(SSL *s, long *len) goto redo; } else { /* Incorrectly formatted Hello request */ - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_GET_REASSEMBLED_MESSAGE, - SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, + SSL_F_DTLS_GET_REASSEMBLED_MESSAGE, + SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); goto f_err; } } - if ((al = dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s, &msg_hdr))) + if (!dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s, &msg_hdr)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto f_err; + } if (frag_len > 0) { unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL, - &p[frag_off], frag_len, 0); + &p[frag_off], frag_len, 0, &readbytes); /* * This shouldn't ever fail due to NBIO because we already checked @@ -840,19 +866,20 @@ static int dtls_get_reassembled_message(SSL *s, long *len) */ if (i <= 0) { s->rwstate = SSL_READING; - *len = i; + *len = 0; return 0; } - } else - i = 0; + } else { + readbytes = 0; + } /* * XDTLS: an incorrectly formatted fragment should cause the handshake * to fail */ - if (i != (int)frag_len) { - al = SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_GET_REASSEMBLED_MESSAGE, SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + if (readbytes != frag_len) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + SSL_F_DTLS_GET_REASSEMBLED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); goto f_err; } @@ -866,9 +893,8 @@ static int dtls_get_reassembled_message(SSL *s, long *len) return 1; f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); s->init_num = 0; - *len = -1; + *len = 0; return 0; } @@ -881,30 +907,17 @@ static int dtls_get_reassembled_message(SSL *s, long *len) * ssl->session->read_compression assign * ssl->session->read_hash assign */ -int dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) +int dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) { - unsigned char *p; - - p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; - *p++ = SSL3_MT_CCS; - s->d1->handshake_write_seq = s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq; - s->init_num = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH; - if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq++; - s2n(s->d1->handshake_write_seq, p); - s->init_num += 2; - } - s->init_off = 0; - - dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, SSL3_MT_CCS, 0, - s->d1->handshake_write_seq, 0, 0); - - /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */ - if (!dtls1_buffer_message(s, 1)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->d1->handshake_write_seq)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } } return 1; @@ -913,17 +926,20 @@ int dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP /* * Wait for a dry event. Should only be called at a point in the handshake - * where we are not expecting any data from the peer (except possibly an alert). + * where we are not expecting any data from the peer except an alert. */ WORK_STATE dtls_wait_for_dry(SSL *s) { - int ret; - long len; + int ret, errtype; + size_t len; /* read app data until dry event */ ret = BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(SSL_get_wbio(s)); - if (ret < 0) + if (ret < 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS_WAIT_FOR_DRY, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return WORK_ERROR; + } if (ret == 0) { /* @@ -932,11 +948,10 @@ WORK_STATE dtls_wait_for_dry(SSL *s) * return successfully. Therefore we attempt to read a message. This * should never succeed but will process any waiting alerts. */ - if (dtls_get_reassembled_message(s, &len)) { + if (dtls_get_reassembled_message(s, &errtype, &len)) { /* The call succeeded! This should never happen */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_WAIT_FOR_DRY, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); - ossl_statem_set_error(s); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_DTLS_WAIT_FOR_DRY, + SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); return WORK_ERROR; } @@ -953,24 +968,20 @@ WORK_STATE dtls_wait_for_dry(SSL *s) int dtls1_read_failed(SSL *s, int code) { if (code > 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_FAILED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 1; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_FAILED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; } - if (!dtls1_is_timer_expired(s)) { + if (!dtls1_is_timer_expired(s) || ossl_statem_in_error(s)) { /* * not a timeout, none of our business, let higher layers handle * this. in fact it's probably an error */ return code; } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS - /* done, no need to send a retransmit */ - if (!SSL_in_init(s) && !s->tlsext_hb_pending) -#else /* done, no need to send a retransmit */ if (!SSL_in_init(s)) -#endif { BIO_set_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_FLAGS_READ); return code; @@ -1026,7 +1037,8 @@ int dtls1_buffer_message(SSL *s, int is_ccs) * this function is called immediately after a message has been * serialized */ - OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off == 0); + if (!ossl_assert(s->init_off == 0)) + return 0; frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(s->init_num, 0); if (frag == NULL) @@ -1036,13 +1048,15 @@ int dtls1_buffer_message(SSL *s, int is_ccs) if (is_ccs) { /* For DTLS1_BAD_VER the header length is non-standard */ - OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + - ((s->version == - DTLS1_BAD_VER) ? 3 : DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH) - == (unsigned int)s->init_num); + if (!ossl_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + + ((s->version == + DTLS1_BAD_VER) ? 3 : DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH) + == (unsigned int)s->init_num)) + return 0; } else { - OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH == (unsigned int)s->init_num); + if (!ossl_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH == (unsigned int)s->init_num)) + return 0; } frag->msg_header.msg_len = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len; @@ -1090,11 +1104,6 @@ int dtls1_retransmit_message(SSL *s, unsigned short seq, int *found) unsigned char seq64be[8]; struct dtls1_retransmit_state saved_state; - /*- - OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num == 0); - OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off == 0); - */ - /* XDTLS: the requested message ought to be found, otherwise error */ memset(seq64be, 0, sizeof(seq64be)); seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(seq >> 8); @@ -1102,7 +1111,8 @@ int dtls1_retransmit_message(SSL *s, unsigned short seq, int *found) item = pqueue_find(s->d1->sent_messages, seq64be); if (item == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_RETRANSMIT_MESSAGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS1_RETRANSMIT_MESSAGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); *found = 0; return 0; } @@ -1159,8 +1169,8 @@ int dtls1_retransmit_message(SSL *s, unsigned short seq, int *found) } void dtls1_set_message_header(SSL *s, - unsigned char mt, unsigned long len, - unsigned long frag_off, unsigned long frag_len) + unsigned char mt, size_t len, + size_t frag_off, size_t frag_len) { if (frag_off == 0) { s->d1->handshake_write_seq = s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq; @@ -1174,8 +1184,8 @@ void dtls1_set_message_header(SSL *s, /* don't actually do the writing, wait till the MTU has been retrieved */ static void dtls1_set_message_header_int(SSL *s, unsigned char mt, - unsigned long len, unsigned short seq_num, - unsigned long frag_off, unsigned long frag_len) + size_t len, unsigned short seq_num, + size_t frag_off, size_t frag_len) { struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr; @@ -1187,7 +1197,7 @@ dtls1_set_message_header_int(SSL *s, unsigned char mt, } static void -dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned long frag_off, unsigned long frag_len) +dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL *s, size_t frag_off, size_t frag_len) { struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr; @@ -1219,3 +1229,53 @@ void dtls1_get_message_header(unsigned char *data, struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr) n2l3(data, msg_hdr->frag_off); n2l3(data, msg_hdr->frag_len); } + +int dtls1_set_handshake_header(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype) +{ + unsigned char *header; + + if (htype == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { + s->d1->handshake_write_seq = s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq; + dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, SSL3_MT_CCS, 0, + s->d1->handshake_write_seq, 0, 0); + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_MT_CCS)) + return 0; + } else { + dtls1_set_message_header(s, htype, 0, 0, 0); + /* + * We allocate space at the start for the message header. This gets + * filled in later + */ + if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, &header) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet(pkt)) + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +int dtls1_close_construct_packet(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype) +{ + size_t msglen; + + if ((htype != SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) + || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen) + || msglen > INT_MAX) + return 0; + + if (htype != SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { + s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len = msglen - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; + s->d1->w_msg_hdr.frag_len = msglen - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; + } + s->init_num = (int)msglen; + s->init_off = 0; + + if (htype != DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) { + /* Buffer the message to handle re-xmits */ + if (!dtls1_buffer_message(s, htype == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC + ? 1 : 0)) + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c index eba4c6fb40..4324896f50 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ /* * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -7,94 +8,664 @@ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. - * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by - * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. - */ - #include <limits.h> #include <string.h> #include <stdio.h> #include "../ssl_locl.h" #include "statem_locl.h" +#include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include <openssl/buffer.h> #include <openssl/objects.h> #include <openssl/evp.h> #include <openssl/x509.h> /* + * Map error codes to TLS/SSL alart types. + */ +typedef struct x509err2alert_st { + int x509err; + int alert; +} X509ERR2ALERT; + +/* Fixed value used in the ServerHello random field to identify an HRR */ +const unsigned char hrrrandom[] = { + 0xcf, 0x21, 0xad, 0x74, 0xe5, 0x9a, 0x61, 0x11, 0xbe, 0x1d, 0x8c, 0x02, + 0x1e, 0x65, 0xb8, 0x91, 0xc2, 0xa2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7a, 0xbb, 0x8c, 0x5e, + 0x07, 0x9e, 0x09, 0xe2, 0xc8, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x9c +}; + +/* * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) */ int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type) { int ret; + size_t written = 0; ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], - s->init_num); + s->init_num, &written); if (ret < 0) - return (-1); + return -1; if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) /* * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll * ignore the result anyway + * TLS1.3 KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added */ - if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, - (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], - ret)) - return -1; - - if (ret == s->init_num) { + if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET + && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE + && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE)) + if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, + (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], + written)) + return -1; + if (written == s->init_num) { if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s, s->msg_callback_arg); - return (1); + return 1; } - s->init_off += ret; - s->init_num -= ret; - return (0); + s->init_off += written; + s->init_num -= written; + return 0; } -int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, const char *sender, int slen) +int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype) { - unsigned char *p; - int i; - unsigned long l; + size_t msglen; - p = ssl_handshake_start(s); + if ((htype != SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) + || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen) + || msglen > INT_MAX) + return 0; + s->init_num = (int)msglen; + s->init_off = 0; - i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, - sender, slen, - s->s3->tmp.finish_md); - if (i <= 0) + return 1; +} + +int tls_setup_handshake(SSL *s) +{ + if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ return 0; - s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = i; - memcpy(p, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i); - l = i; + } + + /* Reset any extension flags */ + memset(s->ext.extflags, 0, sizeof(s->ext.extflags)); + + if (s->server) { + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(s); + int i, ver_min, ver_max, ok = 0; + + /* + * Sanity check that the maximum version we accept has ciphers + * enabled. For clients we do this check during construction of the + * ClientHello. + */ + if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, NULL) != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { + const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); + + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { + if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(ver_max, c->min_dtls) && + DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max, c->max_dtls)) + ok = 1; + } else if (ver_max >= c->min_tls && ver_max <= c->max_tls) { + ok = 1; + } + if (ok) + break; + } + if (!ok) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE, + SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE); + ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported " + "SSL/TLS version"); + return 0; + } + if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { + /* N.B. s->session_ctx == s->ctx here */ + tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept); + } else { + /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */ + tsan_counter(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate); + + s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0; + } + } else { + if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) + tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect); + else + tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate); + + /* mark client_random uninitialized */ + memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3->client_random)); + s->hit = 0; + + s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0; + + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) + s->statem.use_timer = 1; + } + + return 1; +} + +/* + * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself: + * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator + */ +#define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64 +#define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1) + +static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL *s, unsigned char *tls13tbs, + void **hdata, size_t *hdatalen) +{ + static const char *servercontext = "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify"; + static const char *clientcontext = "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify"; + + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + size_t hashlen; + + /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */ + memset(tls13tbs, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE); + /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */ + if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY + || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY) + strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, servercontext); + else + strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, clientcontext); + + /* + * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake + * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because + * that includes the CertVerify itself. + */ + if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY + || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY) { + memcpy(tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, s->cert_verify_hash, + s->cert_verify_hash_len); + hashlen = s->cert_verify_hash_len; + } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + + *hdata = tls13tbs; + *hdatalen = TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + hashlen; + } else { + size_t retlen; + long retlen_l; + + retlen = retlen_l = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, hdata); + if (retlen_l <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_GET_CERT_VERIFY_TBS_DATA, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + *hdatalen = retlen; + } + + return 1; +} + +int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) +{ + EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + const EVP_MD *md = NULL; + EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL; + EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; + size_t hdatalen = 0, siglen = 0; + void *hdata; + unsigned char *sig = NULL; + unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg; + + if (lu == NULL || s->s3->tmp.cert == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey; + + if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + if (mctx == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + /* Get the data to be signed */ + if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + + if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); + sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen); + if (sig == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; + } + + if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) { + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 + || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, + RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; + } + } + if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { + if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0 + || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, + (int)s->session->master_key_length, + s->session->master_key) + || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, sig, &siglen) <= 0) { + + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; + } + } else if (EVP_DigestSign(mctx, sig, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; + } + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST + { + int pktype = lu->sig; + + if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 + || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 + || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) + BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, siglen); + } +#endif + + if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, siglen)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */ + if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + + OPENSSL_free(sig); + EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); + return 1; + err: + OPENSSL_free(sig); + EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); + return 0; +} + +MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) +{ + EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + const unsigned char *data; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST + unsigned char *gost_data = NULL; +#endif + MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + int j; + unsigned int len; + X509 *peer; + const EVP_MD *md = NULL; + size_t hdatalen = 0; + void *hdata; + unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; + + if (mctx == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + peer = s->session->peer; + pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer); + if (pkey == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, NULL) == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, + SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); + goto err; + } + + if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { + unsigned int sigalg; + + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, + SSL_R_BAD_PACKET); + goto err; + } + if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <= 0) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + +#ifdef SSL_DEBUG + if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) + fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); +#endif + + /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */ + /* + * If key is GOST and len is exactly 64 or 128, it is signature without + * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till TLS 1.2) + */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST + if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) + && ((PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64 + && (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 + || EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256)) + || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 128 + && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512))) { + len = PACKET_remaining(pkt); + } else +#endif + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + + j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); + if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j) + || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, + SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); + goto err; + } + if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + + if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + +#ifdef SSL_DEBUG + fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); +#endif + if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; + } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST + { + int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey); + if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 + || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 + || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) { + if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len); + data = gost_data; + } + } +#endif + + if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) { + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 + || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, + RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; + } + } + if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { + if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0 + || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, + (int)s->session->master_key_length, + s->session->master_key)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; + } + if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, data, len) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, + SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); + goto err; + } + } else { + j = EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, data, len, hdata, hdatalen); + if (j <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, + SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); + goto err; + } + } + + /* + * In TLSv1.3 on the client side we make sure we prepare the client + * certificate after the CertVerify instead of when we get the + * CertificateRequest. This is because in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest + * comes *before* the Certificate message. In TLSv1.2 it comes after. We + * want to make sure that SSL_get_peer_certificate() will return the actual + * server certificate from the client_cert_cb callback. + */ + if (!s->server && SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) + ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; + else + ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; + err: + BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer); + s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL; + EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST + OPENSSL_free(gost_data); +#endif + return ret; +} + +int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) +{ + size_t finish_md_len; + const char *sender; + size_t slen; + + /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */ + if (!s->server && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) + s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; + + /* + * We only change the keys if we didn't already do this when we sent the + * client certificate + */ + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) + && !s->server + && s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 0 + && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, + SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {; + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + + if (s->server) { + sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; + slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; + } else { + sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; + slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; + } + + finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, + sender, slen, + s->s3->tmp.finish_md); + if (finish_md_len == 0) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + + s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = finish_md_len; + + if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + /* + * Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. We don't log it for + * TLSv1.3: there's a different key schedule for that. + */ + if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl_log_secret(s, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL, + s->session->master_key, + s->session->master_key_length)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } /* * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks */ + if (!ossl_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } if (!s->server) { - OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); - memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i); - s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = i; + memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, + finish_md_len); + s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finish_md_len; } else { - OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); - memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i); - s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = i; + memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, + finish_md_len); + s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finish_md_len; } - if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_FINISHED, l)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 1; +} + +int tls_construct_key_update(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) +{ + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->key_update)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_KEY_UPDATE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } + s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE; return 1; } +MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_update(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) +{ + unsigned int updatetype; + + s->key_update_count++; + if (s->key_update_count > MAX_KEY_UPDATE_MESSAGES) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, + SSL_R_TOO_MANY_KEY_UPDATES); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + + /* + * A KeyUpdate message signals a key change so the end of the message must + * be on a record boundary. + */ + if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, + SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + + if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &updatetype) + || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, + SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + + /* + * There are only two defined key update types. Fail if we get a value we + * didn't recognise. + */ + if (updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED + && updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, + SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + + /* + * If we get a request for us to update our sending keys too then, we need + * to additionally send a KeyUpdate message. However that message should + * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop). We + * ignore a request for us to update our sending keys too if we already + * sent close_notify. + */ + if (updatetype == SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED + && (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) == 0) + s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED; + + if (!tls13_update_key(s, 0)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + + return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; +} + /* * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen * to far. @@ -102,7 +673,7 @@ int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, const char *sender, int slen) int ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s) { const char *sender; - int slen; + size_t slen; if (!s->server) { sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; @@ -117,7 +688,7 @@ int ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s) s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); if (s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len == 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_TAKE_MAC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + /* SSLfatal() already called */ return 0; } @@ -126,8 +697,7 @@ int ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s) MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { - int al; - long remain; + size_t remain; remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt); /* @@ -140,32 +710,32 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1) || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) { - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, - SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, + SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } } else { if (remain != 0) { - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, - SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, + SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } } /* Check we have a cipher to change to */ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1; if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { @@ -185,119 +755,324 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) } return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; - f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - ossl_statem_set_error(s); - return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { - int al, i; + size_t md_len; + + + /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */ + if (s->server) { + /* + * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We + * no longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This value is ignored if less + * than TLSv1.3 + */ + s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_VALID; + if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) + s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + } + + /* + * In TLSv1.3 a Finished message signals a key change so the end of the + * message must be on a record boundary. + */ + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, + SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */ - if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS); - goto f_err; + if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, + SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; - i = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len; + md_len = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len; - if ((unsigned long)i != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH); - goto f_err; + if (md_len != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, + SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } - if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i) != 0) { - al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED); - goto f_err; + if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, + md_len) != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, + SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } /* * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks */ + if (!ossl_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } if (s->server) { - OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); - memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i); - s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = i; + memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, + md_len); + s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = md_len; } else { - OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); - memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i); - s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = i; + memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, + md_len); + s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = md_len; + } + + /* + * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing + * of the initial server flight (if we are a client) + */ + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + if (s->server) { + if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED && + !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, + SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + } else { + if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, + s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0, + &s->session->master_key_length)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, + SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + } } return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; - f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - ossl_statem_set_error(s); - return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } -int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) +int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) { - unsigned char *p; - - p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; - *p = SSL3_MT_CCS; - s->init_num = 1; - s->init_off = 0; + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_MT_CCS)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } return 1; } -unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, CERT_PKEY *cpk) +/* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */ +static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, int chain) { - unsigned char *p; - unsigned long l = 3 + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s); + int len; + unsigned char *outbytes; - if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s, cpk, &l)) + len = i2d_X509(x, NULL); + if (len < 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, + ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return 0; + } + if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt, len, &outbytes) + || i2d_X509(x, &outbytes) != len) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } - l -= 3 + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s); - p = ssl_handshake_start(s); - l2n3(l, p); - l += 3; - - if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE, l)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) + && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, x, + chain)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ return 0; } - return l + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s); + + return 1; } -WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) +/* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */ +static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk) { - void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; + int i, chain_count; + X509 *x; + STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs; + STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL; + X509_STORE *chain_store; - /* clean a few things up */ - ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); + if (cpk == NULL || cpk->x509 == NULL) + return 1; + + x = cpk->x509; - if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { + /* + * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx. + */ + if (cpk->chain != NULL) + extra_certs = cpk->chain; + else + extra_certs = s->ctx->extra_certs; + + if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs) + chain_store = NULL; + else if (s->cert->chain_store) + chain_store = s->cert->chain_store; + else + chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store; + + if (chain_store != NULL) { + X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); + + if (xs_ctx == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } + if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) { + X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, + ERR_R_X509_LIB); + return 0; + } /* - * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf - * in case there are any unexpected retransmits + * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we + * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately + * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying + * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can */ - BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); - s->init_buf = NULL; + (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx); + /* Don't leave errors in the queue */ + ERR_clear_error(); + chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx); + i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0); + if (i != 1) { +#if 0 + /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK); +#endif + X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i); + return 0; + } + chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain); + for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) { + x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); + + if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); + return 0; + } + } + X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); + } else { + i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0); + if (i != 1) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i); + return 0; + } + if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, 0)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) { + x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i); + if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i + 1)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + } + } + return 1; +} + +unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk) +{ + if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) + return 0; + + if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; } - ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); + return 1; +} - s->init_num = 0; +/* + * Tidy up after the end of a handshake. In the case of SCTP this may result + * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is + * freed up as well. + */ +WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs, int stop) +{ + void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; - if (!s->server || s->renegotiate == 2) { + if (clearbufs) { + if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { + /* + * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf + * in case there are any unexpected retransmits + */ + BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); + s->init_buf = NULL; + } + if (!ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_FINISH_HANDSHAKE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return WORK_ERROR; + } + s->init_num = 0; + } + + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->server + && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) + s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT; + + /* + * Only set if there was a Finished message and this isn't after a TLSv1.3 + * post handshake exchange + */ + if (s->statem.cleanuphand) { /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ s->renegotiate = 0; s->new_session = 0; + s->statem.cleanuphand = 0; + s->ext.ticket_expected = 0; - if (s->server) { - ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); + ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); - s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++; + if (s->server) { + /* + * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of constructing the + * NewSessionTicket + */ + if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) + ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); + + /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */ + tsan_counter(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good); s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept; if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) { @@ -309,12 +1084,26 @@ WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) dtls1_start_timer(s); } } else { - ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + /* + * We encourage applications to only use TLSv1.3 tickets once, + * so we remove this one from the cache. + */ + if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode + & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0) + SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session); + } else { + /* + * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of processing the + * NewSessionTicket + */ + ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); + } if (s->hit) - s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++; + tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit); s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect; - s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++; + tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good); if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) { /* @@ -326,14 +1115,6 @@ WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) } } - if (s->info_callback != NULL) - cb = s->info_callback; - else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) - cb = s->ctx->info_callback; - - if (cb != NULL) - cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { /* done with handshaking */ s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0; @@ -343,15 +1124,32 @@ WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) } } + if (s->info_callback != NULL) + cb = s->info_callback; + else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) + cb = s->ctx->info_callback; + + /* The callback may expect us to not be in init at handshake done */ + ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); + + if (cb != NULL) + cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); + + if (!stop) { + /* If we've got more work to do we go back into init */ + ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1); + return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; + } + return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; } int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt) { /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ - int skip_message, i, recvd_type, al; + int skip_message, i, recvd_type; unsigned char *p; - unsigned long l; + size_t l, readbytes; p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; @@ -360,7 +1158,7 @@ int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt) i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type, &p[s->init_num], SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num, - 0); + 0, &readbytes); if (i <= 0) { s->rwstate = SSL_READING; return 0; @@ -370,28 +1168,41 @@ int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt) * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur * in the middle of a handshake message. */ - if (s->init_num != 0 || i != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) { - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, - SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); - goto f_err; + if (s->init_num != 0 || readbytes != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, + SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, + SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); + return 0; + } + if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_BEFORE + && (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) != 0) { + /* + * We are stateless and we received a CCS. Probably this is + * from a client between the first and second ClientHellos. + * We should ignore this, but return an error because we do + * not return success until we see the second ClientHello + * with a valid cookie. + */ + return 0; } s->s3->tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; - s->init_num = i - 1; + s->init_num = readbytes - 1; s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data; - s->s3->tmp.message_size = i; + s->s3->tmp.message_size = readbytes; return 1; } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, + SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, + SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); + return 0; } - s->init_num += i; + s->init_num += readbytes; } skip_message = 0; if (!s->server) - if (p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) + if (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_OK + && p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) /* * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if @@ -431,9 +1242,9 @@ int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt) n2l3(p, l); /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */ if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, + SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); + return 0; } s->s3->tmp.message_size = l; @@ -442,14 +1253,11 @@ int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt) } return 1; - f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - return 0; } -int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, unsigned long *len) +int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len) { - long n; + size_t n, readbytes; unsigned char *p; int i; @@ -463,14 +1271,14 @@ int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, unsigned long *len) n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num; while (n > 0) { i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL, - &p[s->init_num], n, 0); + &p[s->init_num], n, 0, &readbytes); if (i <= 0) { s->rwstate = SSL_READING; *len = 0; return 0; } - s->init_num += i; - n -= i; + s->init_num += readbytes; + n -= readbytes; } /* @@ -487,8 +1295,7 @@ int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, unsigned long *len) if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, s->init_num)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); + /* SSLfatal() already called */ *len = 0; return 0; } @@ -496,12 +1303,28 @@ int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, unsigned long *len) s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data, (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg); } else { - if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, - s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); - *len = 0; - return 0; + /* + * We defer feeding in the HRR until later. We'll do it as part of + * processing the message + * The TLsv1.3 handshake transcript stops at the ClientFinished + * message. + */ +#define SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2) + /* KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added */ + if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET + && s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE)) { + if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO + || s->init_num < SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + || memcmp(hrrrandom, + s->init_buf->data + SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET, + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) != 0) { + if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, + s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + *len = 0; + return 0; + } + } } if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, @@ -509,114 +1332,63 @@ int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, unsigned long *len) s->msg_callback_arg); } - /* - * init_num should never be negative...should probably be declared - * unsigned - */ - if (s->init_num < 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); - *len = 0; - return 0; - } - *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num; + *len = s->init_num; return 1; } -int ssl_cert_type(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *pk) -{ - if (pk == NULL && (pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x)) == NULL) - return -1; - - switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) { - default: - return -1; - case EVP_PKEY_RSA: - return SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC; - case EVP_PKEY_DSA: - return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - case EVP_PKEY_EC: - return SSL_PKEY_ECC; -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST - case NID_id_GostR3410_2001: - return SSL_PKEY_GOST01; - case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256: - return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256; - case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512: - return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; -#endif - } -} +static const X509ERR2ALERT x509table[] = { + {X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE}, + {X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, + {X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED}, + {X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED}, + {X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR}, + {X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED}, + {X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR}, + {X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, + {X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, + {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, + {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, + {X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, + {X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, + {X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, + {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, + {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, + {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, + {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, + {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, + {X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, + + /* Last entry; return this if we don't find the value above. */ + {X509_V_OK, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN} +}; -int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type) +int ssl_x509err2alert(int x509err) { - int al; + const X509ERR2ALERT *tp; - switch (type) { - case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT: - case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL: - case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER: - al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; - break; - case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE: - case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE: - case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY: - case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD: - case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD: - case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD: - case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD: - case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID: - case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID: - case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED: - case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED: - case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH: - case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH: - case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH: - case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH: - case X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL: - case X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL: - case X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK: - al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE; - break; - case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: - case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: - al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; - break; - case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED: - case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED: - al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED; - break; - case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED: - al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED; - break; - case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED: - case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: - case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL: - case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP: - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - break; - case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT: - case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN: - case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY: - case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE: - case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG: - case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED: - case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA: - al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; - break; - case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION: - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - break; - case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE: - al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; - break; - default: - al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN; - break; - } - return (al); + for (tp = x509table; tp->x509err != X509_V_OK; ++tp) + if (tp->x509err == x509err) + break; + return tp->alert; } int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s) @@ -643,11 +1415,17 @@ typedef struct { const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void); } version_info; -#if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_2_VERSION -# error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_2_VERSION. +#if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_3_VERSION +# error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION. #endif +/* Must be in order high to low */ static const version_info tls_version_table[] = { +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 + {TLS1_3_VERSION, tlsv1_3_client_method, tlsv1_3_server_method}, +#else + {TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, +#endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2 {TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method}, #else @@ -675,6 +1453,7 @@ static const version_info tls_version_table[] = { # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION. #endif +/* Must be in order high to low */ static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method}, @@ -716,8 +1495,62 @@ static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method) return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s)) return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE; - else if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_FIPS) != 0 && FIPS_mode()) - return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_0_NEEDED_IN_FIPS_MODE; + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Only called by servers. Returns 1 if the server has a TLSv1.3 capable + * certificate type, or has PSK or a certificate callback configured. Otherwise + * returns 0. + */ +static int is_tls13_capable(const SSL *s) +{ + int i; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC + int curve; + EC_KEY *eckey; +#endif + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK + if (s->psk_server_callback != NULL) + return 1; +#endif + + if (s->psk_find_session_cb != NULL || s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) + return 1; + + for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { + /* Skip over certs disallowed for TLSv1.3 */ + switch (i) { + case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN: + case SSL_PKEY_GOST01: + case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256: + case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512: + continue; + default: + break; + } + if (!ssl_has_cert(s, i)) + continue; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC + if (i != SSL_PKEY_ECC) + return 1; + /* + * Prior to TLSv1.3 sig algs allowed any curve to be used. TLSv1.3 is + * more restrictive so check that our sig algs are consistent with this + * EC cert. See section 4.2.3 of RFC8446. + */ + eckey = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey); + if (eckey == NULL) + continue; + curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)); + if (tls_check_sigalg_curve(s, curve)) + return 1; +#else + return 1; +#endif + } return 0; } @@ -731,7 +1564,7 @@ static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method) * * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0 */ -int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version) +int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version, const SSL_METHOD **meth) { const version_info *vent; const version_info *table; @@ -751,9 +1584,14 @@ int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version) for (vent = table; vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0; ++vent) { - if (vent->cmeth != NULL && - version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0 && - ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0) { + if (vent->cmeth != NULL + && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0 + && ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0 + && (!s->server + || version != TLS1_3_VERSION + || is_tls13_capable(s))) { + if (meth != NULL) + *meth = vent->cmeth(); return 1; } } @@ -859,6 +1697,27 @@ int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound) return 1; } +static void check_for_downgrade(SSL *s, int vers, DOWNGRADE *dgrd) +{ + if (vers == TLS1_2_VERSION + && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL)) { + *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2; + } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) + && vers < TLS1_2_VERSION + /* + * We need to ensure that a server that disables TLSv1.2 + * (creating a hole between TLSv1.3 and TLSv1.1) can still + * complete handshakes with clients that support TLSv1.2 and + * below. Therefore we do not enable the sentinel if TLSv1.3 is + * enabled and TLSv1.2 is not. + */ + && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL)) { + *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1; + } else { + *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE; + } +} + /* * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and @@ -868,7 +1727,7 @@ int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound) * * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. */ -int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s) +int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, DOWNGRADE *dgrd) { /*- * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with: @@ -880,23 +1739,34 @@ int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s) * handle version. */ int server_version = s->method->version; - int client_version = s->client_version; + int client_version = hello->legacy_version; const version_info *vent; const version_info *table; int disabled = 0; + RAW_EXTENSION *suppversions; + + s->client_version = client_version; switch (server_version) { default: - if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0) - return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; + if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0) + return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; + *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE; + /* + * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't + * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope + * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol + * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return + * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) + */ + return 0; + } /* - * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't - * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope - * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol - * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return - * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) + * Fall through if we are TLSv1.3 already (this means we must be after + * a HelloRetryRequest */ - return 0; + /* fall thru */ case TLS_ANY_VERSION: table = tls_version_table; break; @@ -905,6 +1775,77 @@ int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s) break; } + suppversions = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions]; + + /* If we did an HRR then supported versions is mandatory */ + if (!suppversions->present && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) + return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; + + if (suppversions->present && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { + unsigned int candidate_vers = 0; + unsigned int best_vers = 0; + const SSL_METHOD *best_method = NULL; + PACKET versionslist; + + suppversions->parsed = 1; + + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions->data, &versionslist)) { + /* Trailing or invalid data? */ + return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH; + } + + /* + * The TLSv1.3 spec says the client MUST set this to TLS1_2_VERSION. + * The spec only requires servers to check that it isn't SSLv3: + * "Any endpoint receiving a Hello message with + * ClientHello.legacy_version or ServerHello.legacy_version set to + * 0x0300 MUST abort the handshake with a "protocol_version" alert." + * We are slightly stricter and require that it isn't SSLv3 or lower. + * We tolerate TLSv1 and TLSv1.1. + */ + if (client_version <= SSL3_VERSION) + return SSL_R_BAD_LEGACY_VERSION; + + while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist, &candidate_vers)) { + if (version_cmp(s, candidate_vers, best_vers) <= 0) + continue; + if (ssl_version_supported(s, candidate_vers, &best_method)) + best_vers = candidate_vers; + } + if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist) != 0) { + /* Trailing data? */ + return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH; + } + + if (best_vers > 0) { + if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) { + /* + * This is after a HelloRetryRequest so we better check that we + * negotiated TLSv1.3 + */ + if (best_vers != TLS1_3_VERSION) + return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; + return 0; + } + check_for_downgrade(s, best_vers, dgrd); + s->version = best_vers; + s->method = best_method; + return 0; + } + return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; + } + + /* + * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest + * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2 + */ + if (version_cmp(s, client_version, TLS1_3_VERSION) >= 0) + client_version = TLS1_2_VERSION; + + /* + * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in + * the ClientHello. + */ for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { const SSL_METHOD *method; @@ -913,6 +1854,7 @@ int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s) continue; method = vent->smeth(); if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) { + check_for_downgrade(s, vent->version, dgrd); s->version = vent->version; s->method = method; return 0; @@ -929,18 +1871,45 @@ int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s) * * @s: client SSL handle. * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO. + * @extensions: The extensions received * - * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. + * Returns 1 on success or 0 on error. */ -int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version) +int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version, RAW_EXTENSION *extensions) { const version_info *vent; const version_info *table; + int ret, ver_min, ver_max, real_max, origv; + + origv = s->version; + s->version = version; + + /* This will overwrite s->version if the extension is present */ + if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions, + SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO + | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO, extensions, + NULL, 0)) { + s->version = origv; + return 0; + } + + if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE + && s->version != TLS1_3_VERSION) { + s->version = origv; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, + SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); + return 0; + } switch (s->method->version) { default: - if (version != s->version) - return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; + if (s->version != s->method->version) { + s->version = origv; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, + SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, + SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); + return 0; + } /* * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope @@ -948,7 +1917,7 @@ int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version) * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) */ - return 0; + return 1; case TLS_ANY_VERSION: table = tls_version_table; break; @@ -957,36 +1926,84 @@ int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version) break; } - for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { - const SSL_METHOD *method; - int err; + ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, &real_max); + if (ret != 0) { + s->version = origv; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, + SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, ret); + return 0; + } + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? DTLS_VERSION_LT(s->version, ver_min) + : s->version < ver_min) { + s->version = origv; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, + SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); + return 0; + } else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? DTLS_VERSION_GT(s->version, ver_max) + : s->version > ver_max) { + s->version = origv; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, + SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); + return 0; + } - if (version != vent->version) + if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) == 0) + real_max = ver_max; + + /* Check for downgrades */ + if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION && real_max > s->version) { + if (memcmp(tls12downgrade, + s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + - sizeof(tls12downgrade), + sizeof(tls12downgrade)) == 0) { + s->version = origv; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, + SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); + return 0; + } + } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) + && s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION + && real_max > s->version) { + if (memcmp(tls11downgrade, + s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + - sizeof(tls11downgrade), + sizeof(tls11downgrade)) == 0) { + s->version = origv; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, + SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); + return 0; + } + } + + for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { + if (vent->cmeth == NULL || s->version != vent->version) continue; - if (vent->cmeth == NULL) - break; - method = vent->cmeth(); - err = ssl_method_error(s, method); - if (err != 0) - return err; - s->method = method; - s->version = version; - return 0; + + s->method = vent->cmeth(); + return 1; } - return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; + s->version = origv; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, + SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); + return 0; } /* - * ssl_get_client_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum client version + * ssl_get_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum protocol version * @s: The SSL connection * @min_version: The minimum supported version * @max_version: The maximum supported version + * @real_max: The highest version below the lowest compile time version hole + * where that hole lies above at least one run-time enabled + * protocol. * * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B - * or FIPS_mode() constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here, + * constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here, * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later. * * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled, @@ -996,10 +2013,10 @@ int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version) * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0. */ -int ssl_get_client_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, - int *max_version) +int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, int *max_version, + int *real_max) { - int version; + int version, tmp_real_max; int hole; const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL; const SSL_METHOD *method; @@ -1016,6 +2033,12 @@ int ssl_get_client_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) */ *min_version = *max_version = s->version; + /* + * Providing a real_max only makes sense where we're using a version + * flexible method. + */ + if (!ossl_assert(real_max == NULL)) + return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; case TLS_ANY_VERSION: table = tls_version_table; @@ -1048,6 +2071,9 @@ int ssl_get_client_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, */ *min_version = version = 0; hole = 1; + if (real_max != NULL) + *real_max = 0; + tmp_real_max = 0; for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { /* * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the @@ -1055,15 +2081,22 @@ int ssl_get_client_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, */ if (vent->cmeth == NULL) { hole = 1; + tmp_real_max = 0; continue; } method = vent->cmeth(); + + if (hole == 1 && tmp_real_max == 0) + tmp_real_max = vent->version; + if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) { hole = 1; } else if (!hole) { single = NULL; *min_version = method->version; } else { + if (real_max != NULL && tmp_real_max != 0) + *real_max = tmp_real_max; version = (single = method)->version; *min_version = version; hole = 0; @@ -1081,7 +2114,7 @@ int ssl_get_client_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, /* * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for - * the initial ClientHello. + * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field. * * @s: client SSL handle. * @@ -1098,11 +2131,291 @@ int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s) if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) return 0; - ret = ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max); + ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, NULL); if (ret != 0) return ret; - s->client_version = s->version = ver_max; + s->version = ver_max; + + /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */ + if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ver_max > TLS1_2_VERSION) + ver_max = TLS1_2_VERSION; + + s->client_version = ver_max; + return 0; +} + +/* + * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is + * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be + * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is + * 1) or 0 otherwise. + */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC +int check_in_list(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, const uint16_t *groups, + size_t num_groups, int checkallow) +{ + size_t i; + + if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0) + return 0; + + for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) { + uint16_t group = groups[i]; + + if (group_id == group + && (!checkallow + || tls_curve_allowed(s, group, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) { + return 1; + } + } + + return 0; +} +#endif + +/* Replace ClientHello1 in the transcript hash with a synthetic message */ +int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL *s, const unsigned char *hashval, + size_t hashlen, const unsigned char *hrr, + size_t hrrlen) +{ + unsigned char hashvaltmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + unsigned char msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]; + + memset(msghdr, 0, sizeof(msghdr)); + + if (hashval == NULL) { + hashval = hashvaltmp; + hashlen = 0; + /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */ + if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0) + || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashvaltmp, sizeof(hashvaltmp), + &hashlen)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + } + + /* Reinitialise the transcript hash */ + if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + + /* Inject the synthetic message_hash message */ + msghdr[0] = SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH; + msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 1] = (unsigned char)hashlen; + if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, msghdr, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) + || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, hashval, hashlen)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + + /* + * Now re-inject the HRR and current message if appropriate (we just deleted + * it when we reinitialised the transcript hash above). Only necessary after + * receiving a ClientHello2 with a cookie. + */ + if (hrr != NULL + && (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, hrr, hrrlen) + || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, + s->s3->tmp.message_size + + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b) +{ + return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b); +} + +int parse_ca_names(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) +{ + STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp); + X509_NAME *xn = NULL; + PACKET cadns; + + if (ca_sk == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + /* get the CA RDNs */ + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cadns)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + + while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns)) { + const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes; + unsigned int name_len; + + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns, &name_len) + || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns, &namebytes, name_len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + + namestart = namebytes; + if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &namebytes, name_len)) == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, + ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); + goto err; + } + if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, + SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + + if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + xn = NULL; + } + + sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names, X509_NAME_free); + s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names = ca_sk; + + return 1; + + err: + sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free); + X509_NAME_free(xn); return 0; } + +const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *get_ca_names(SSL *s) +{ + const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;; + + if (s->server) { + ca_sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); + if (ca_sk != NULL && sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk) == 0) + ca_sk = NULL; + } + + if (ca_sk == NULL) + ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(s); + + return ca_sk; +} + +int construct_ca_names(SSL *s, const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk, WPACKET *pkt) +{ + /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */ + if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + if (ca_sk != NULL) { + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk); i++) { + unsigned char *namebytes; + X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_sk, i); + int namelen; + + if (name == NULL + || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0 + || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen, + &namebytes) + || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + } + } + + if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +/* Create a buffer containing data to be signed for server key exchange */ +size_t construct_key_exchange_tbs(SSL *s, unsigned char **ptbs, + const void *param, size_t paramlen) +{ + size_t tbslen = 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + paramlen; + unsigned char *tbs = OPENSSL_malloc(tbslen); + + if (tbs == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_KEY_EXCHANGE_TBS, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } + memcpy(tbs, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + + memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2, param, paramlen); + + *ptbs = tbs; + return tbslen; +} + +/* + * Saves the current handshake digest for Post-Handshake Auth, + * Done after ClientFinished is processed, done exactly once + */ +int tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL *s) +{ + if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) { + if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + + s->pha_dgst = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS13_SAVE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->pha_dgst, + s->s3->handshake_dgst)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS13_SAVE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + } + return 1; +} + +/* + * Restores the Post-Handshake Auth handshake digest + * Done just before sending/processing the Cert Request + */ +int tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL *s) +{ + if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS13_RESTORE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->s3->handshake_dgst, + s->pha_dgst)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS13_RESTORE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + return 1; +} diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_locl.h b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_locl.h index 5dbc62b67f..6b8cf37faa 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_locl.h +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_locl.h @@ -18,13 +18,25 @@ /* The spec allows for a longer length than this, but we limit it */ #define HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH 258 +#define END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH 0 #define SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 20000 +#define HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH 20000 +#define ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH 20000 #define SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 102400 #define SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH 0 +#define KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH 1 #define CCS_MAX_LENGTH 1 /* Max should actually be 36 but we are generous */ #define FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH 64 +/* The maximum number of incoming KeyUpdate messages we will accept */ +#define MAX_KEY_UPDATE_MESSAGES 32 + +/* Dummy message type */ +#define SSL3_MT_DUMMY -1 + +extern const unsigned char hrrrandom[]; + /* Message processing return codes */ typedef enum { /* Something bad happened */ @@ -40,9 +52,19 @@ typedef enum { MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING } MSG_PROCESS_RETURN; -/* Flush the write BIO */ -int statem_flush(SSL *s); +typedef int (*confunc_f) (SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt); + int ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s); +int check_in_list(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, const uint16_t *groups, + size_t num_groups, int checkallow); +int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL *s, const unsigned char *hashval, + size_t hashlen, const unsigned char *hrr, + size_t hrrlen); +int parse_ca_names(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); +const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *get_ca_names(SSL *s); +int construct_ca_names(SSL *s, const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk, WPACKET *pkt); +size_t construct_key_exchange_tbs(SSL *s, unsigned char **ptbs, + const void *param, size_t paramlen); /* * TLS/DTLS client state machine functions @@ -51,8 +73,9 @@ int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt); WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s); WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst); WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst); -int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s); -unsigned long ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s); +int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + confunc_f *confunc, int *mt); +size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s); MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst); @@ -63,58 +86,66 @@ int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt); WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s); WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst); WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst); -int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s); -unsigned long ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s); +int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + confunc_f *confunc,int *mt); +size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s); MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst); /* Functions for getting new message data */ __owur int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt); -__owur int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, unsigned long *len); -__owur int dtls_get_message(SSL *s, int *mt, unsigned long *len); +__owur int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len); +__owur int dtls_get_message(SSL *s, int *mt, size_t *len); /* Message construction and processing functions */ +__owur int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s); __owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); __owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); -__owur int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s); -__owur int dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s); +__owur int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt); +__owur int dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt); -__owur int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, const char *sender, int slen); -__owur WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst); +__owur int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt); +__owur int tls_construct_key_update(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt); +__owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_update(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); +__owur WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs, + int stop); __owur WORK_STATE dtls_wait_for_dry(SSL *s); /* some client-only functions */ -__owur int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s); +__owur int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt); __owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); __owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); __owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); +__owur int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); __owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); __owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); -__owur int tls_construct_client_verify(SSL *s); +__owur int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt); __owur WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst); -__owur int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s); +__owur int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt); __owur int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey); -__owur int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s); +__owur int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt); __owur int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s); -__owur int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s); +__owur int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt); +__owur int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt); __owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); __owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); __owur int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -__owur int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s); +__owur int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt); #endif +__owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); __owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); +__owur int tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt); /* some server-only functions */ __owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); __owur WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst); -__owur int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s); -__owur int tls_construct_hello_request(SSL *s); -__owur int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s); -__owur int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s); -__owur int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s); -__owur int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s); -__owur int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s); +__owur int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt); +__owur int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt); +__owur int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt); +__owur int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt); +__owur int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt); +__owur int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt); __owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); __owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); __owur WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst); @@ -122,4 +153,271 @@ __owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG __owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); #endif -__owur int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s); +__owur int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt); +MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); + + +/* Extension processing */ + +typedef enum ext_return_en { + EXT_RETURN_FAIL, + EXT_RETURN_SENT, + EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT +} EXT_RETURN; + +__owur int tls_validate_all_contexts(SSL *s, unsigned int thisctx, + RAW_EXTENSION *exts); +__owur int extension_is_relevant(SSL *s, unsigned int extctx, + unsigned int thisctx); +__owur int tls_collect_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *packet, unsigned int context, + RAW_EXTENSION **res, size_t *len, int init); +__owur int tls_parse_extension(SSL *s, TLSEXT_INDEX idx, int context, + RAW_EXTENSION *exts, X509 *x, size_t chainidx); +__owur int tls_parse_all_extensions(SSL *s, int context, RAW_EXTENSION *exts, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int fin); +__owur int should_add_extension(SSL *s, unsigned int extctx, + unsigned int thisctx, int max_version); +__owur int tls_construct_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx); + +__owur int tls_psk_do_binder(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, + const unsigned char *msgstart, + size_t binderoffset, const unsigned char *binderin, + unsigned char *binderout, + SSL_SESSION *sess, int sign, int external); + +/* Server Extension processing */ +int tls_parse_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx); +int tls_parse_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx); +int tls_parse_ctos_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP +int tls_parse_ctos_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx); +#endif +int tls_parse_ctos_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC +int tls_parse_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx); +int tls_parse_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidxl); +#endif +int tls_parse_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx); +int tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs_cert(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx); +int tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP +int tls_parse_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx); +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG +int tls_parse_ctos_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx); +#endif +int tls_parse_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP +int tls_parse_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx); +#endif +int tls_parse_ctos_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx); +int tls_parse_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx); +int tls_parse_ctos_cookie(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx); +int tls_parse_ctos_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx); +int tls_parse_ctos_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx); +int tls_parse_ctos_psk(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx); +int tls_parse_ctos_post_handshake_auth(SSL *, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx); + +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx); +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx); +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx); +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx); +#endif +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_supported_groups(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx); +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx); +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_next_proto_neg(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx); +#endif +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx); +#endif +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx); +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx); +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_supported_versions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx); +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx); +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_cookie(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx); +/* + * Not in public headers as this is not an official extension. Only used when + * SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG is set. + */ +#define TLSEXT_TYPE_cryptopro_bug 0xfde8 +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_cryptopro_bug(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx); +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx); + +/* Client Extension processing */ +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx); +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx); +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx); +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx); +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx); +#endif +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx); +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx); +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx); +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_npn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx); +#endif +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx); +#endif +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_sct(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx); +#endif +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx); +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_supported_versions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx); +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx); +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx); +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_cookie(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx); +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_padding(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx); +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx); +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_post_handshake_auth(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx); + +int tls_parse_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx); +int tls_parse_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx); +int tls_parse_stoc_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx); +int tls_parse_stoc_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC +int tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx); +#endif +int tls_parse_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP +int tls_parse_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx); +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT +int tls_parse_stoc_sct(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx); +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG +int tls_parse_stoc_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx); +#endif +int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP +int tls_parse_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx); +#endif +int tls_parse_stoc_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx); +int tls_parse_stoc_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx); +int tls_parse_stoc_supported_versions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx); +int tls_parse_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx); +int tls_parse_stoc_cookie(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx); +int tls_parse_stoc_psk(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx); + +int tls_handle_alpn(SSL *s); + +int tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL *s); +int tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL *s); diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c index f81fa5e199..e7c11c4bea 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c @@ -1,5 +1,7 @@ /* * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved + * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -7,50 +9,11 @@ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. - * - * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by - * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. - * - * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source - * license provided above. - * - * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by - * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. - * - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. - * - * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by - * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source - * license. - * - * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of - * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites - * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. - * - * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in - * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received - * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. - * - * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not - * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third - * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights - * to make use of the Contribution. - * - * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN - * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA - * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY - * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR - * OTHERWISE. - */ - #include <stdio.h> #include "../ssl_locl.h" #include "statem_locl.h" #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h" +#include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include <openssl/buffer.h> #include <openssl/rand.h> #include <openssl/objects.h> @@ -61,28 +24,134 @@ #include <openssl/bn.h> #include <openssl/md5.h> -static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, - PACKET *cipher_suites, - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) - **skp, int sslv2format, - int *al); +#define TICKET_NONCE_SIZE 8 + +static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt); + +/* + * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed + * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from + * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. + * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|. + * + * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error + * (transition not allowed) + */ +static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) +{ + OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; + + /* + * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have + * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by + * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() + */ + switch (st->hand_state) { + default: + break; + + case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: + if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) { + if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO; + return 1; + } + break; + } else if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) { + if (mt == SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA; + return 1; + } + break; + } + /* Fall through */ + + case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: + case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: + if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { + if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT; + return 1; + } + } else { + if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; + return 1; + } + } + break; + + case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: + if (s->session->peer == NULL) { + if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; + return 1; + } + } else { + if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY; + return 1; + } + } + break; + + case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: + if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; + return 1; + } + break; + + case TLS_ST_OK: + /* + * Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of + * early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert) + */ + if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING) + break; + + if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE + && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT; + return 1; + } + + if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE; + return 1; + } + break; + } + + /* No valid transition found */ + return 0; +} /* - * server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed handshake - * state transitions when the server is reading messages from the client. The - * message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The current state - * is in |s->statem.hand_state|. + * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed + * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the + * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The + * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|. * - * Valid return values are: - * 1: Success (transition allowed) - * 0: Error (transition not allowed) + * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error + * (transition not allowed) */ int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt)) + goto err; + return 1; + } + switch (st->hand_state) { + default: + break; + case TLS_ST_BEFORE: + case TLS_ST_OK: case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO; @@ -111,10 +180,9 @@ int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) * not going to accept it because we require a client * cert. */ - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, - SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, - SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, + SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); return 0; } st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH; @@ -176,7 +244,7 @@ int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG - if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) { + if (s->s3->npn_seen) { if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO; return 1; @@ -207,11 +275,9 @@ int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) return 1; } break; - - default: - break; } + err: /* No valid transition found */ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { BIO *rbio; @@ -227,9 +293,9 @@ int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) BIO_set_retry_read(rbio); return 0; } - ossl_statem_set_error(s); - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); - SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, + SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, + SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); return 0; } @@ -282,16 +348,22 @@ static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) * 1: Yes * 0: No */ -static int send_certificate_request(SSL *s) +int send_certificate_request(SSL *s) { if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */ s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER /* + * don't request if post-handshake-only unless doing + * post-handshake in TLSv1.3: + */ + && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE) + || s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) + /* * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert - * during re-negotiation: + * a second time: */ - && (s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 || + && (s->certreqs_sent < 1 || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) /* * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see @@ -319,34 +391,197 @@ static int send_certificate_request(SSL *s) } /* - * server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next - * when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client. + * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to + * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the + * client. + */ +static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s) +{ + OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; + + /* + * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated + * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition() + */ + + switch (st->hand_state) { + default: + /* Shouldn't happen */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER13_WRITE_TRANSITION, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; + + case TLS_ST_OK: + if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + } + if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + } + /* Try to read from the client instead */ + return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; + + case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + + case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: + if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0 + && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE) + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; + else if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA; + else + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + + case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: + if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA; + else + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + + case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: + if (s->hit) + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED; + else if (send_certificate_request(s)) + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ; + else + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT; + + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + + case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ: + if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) { + s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED; + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; + } else { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT; + } + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + + case TLS_ST_SW_CERT: + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + + case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY: + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + + case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + + case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: + return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; + + case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: + /* + * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're + * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out any session tickets + * immediately. + */ + if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) { + s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED; + } else if (!s->ext.ticket_expected) { + /* + * If we're not going to renew the ticket then we just finish the + * handshake at this point. + */ + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + } + if (s->num_tickets > s->sent_tickets) + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET; + else + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + + case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE: + if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + } + /* Fall through */ + + case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE: + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + + case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: + /* In a resumption we only ever send a maximum of one new ticket. + * Following an initial handshake we send the number of tickets we have + * been configured for. + */ + if (s->hit || s->num_tickets <= s->sent_tickets) { + /* We've written enough tickets out. */ + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; + } + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + } +} + +/* + * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move + * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client. */ WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; + /* + * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going + * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later + */ + + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) + return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s); + switch (st->hand_state) { + default: + /* Shouldn't happen */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_WRITE_TRANSITION, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; + + case TLS_ST_OK: + if (st->request_state == TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ) { + /* We must be trying to renegotiate */ + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ; + st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + } + /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */ + if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; + } + /* Fall through */ + case TLS_ST_BEFORE: /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */ return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; - case TLS_ST_OK: - /* We must be trying to renegotiate */ - st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ; - return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; - case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; - ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified - && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) + && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) { st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; - else + } else if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { + /* We must have rejected the renegotiation */ + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + } else { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO; + } return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: @@ -354,7 +589,7 @@ WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s) case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: if (s->hit) { - if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) + if (s->ext.ticket_expected) st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET; else st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; @@ -375,7 +610,7 @@ WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s) return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; case TLS_ST_SW_CERT: - if (s->tlsext_status_expected) { + if (s->ext.status_expected) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; } @@ -405,9 +640,8 @@ WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s) case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: if (s->hit) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; - ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; - } else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) { + } else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET; } else { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; @@ -427,12 +661,7 @@ WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s) return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; } st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; - ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; - - default: - /* Shouldn't happen */ - return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; } } @@ -445,6 +674,10 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; switch (st->hand_state) { + default: + /* No pre work to be done */ + break; + case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: s->shutdown = 0; if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) @@ -472,13 +705,24 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { + /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */ return dtls_wait_for_dry(s); + } #endif return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->sent_tickets == 0) { + /* + * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going + * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off + * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active. + * + * Calls SSLfatal as required. + */ + return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 0); + } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { /* * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer @@ -488,9 +732,11 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) break; case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) + break; s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) { - ossl_statem_set_error(s); + /* SSLfatal() already called */ return WORK_ERROR; } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { @@ -504,17 +750,36 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) } return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; - case TLS_ST_OK: - return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst); + case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: + if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING + && (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0) + return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; + /* Fall through */ - default: - /* No pre work to be done */ - break; + case TLS_ST_OK: + /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */ + return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1); } return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; } +static ossl_inline int conn_is_closed(void) +{ + switch (get_last_sys_error()) { +#if defined(EPIPE) + case EPIPE: + return 1; +#endif +#if defined(ECONNRESET) + case ECONNRESET: + return 1; +#endif + default: + return 0; + } +} + /* * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the * server to the client. @@ -526,11 +791,15 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) s->init_num = 0; switch (st->hand_state) { + default: + /* No post work to be done */ + break; + case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: if (statem_flush(s) != 1) return WORK_MORE_A; if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { - ossl_statem_set_error(s); + /* SSLfatal() already called */ return WORK_ERROR; } break; @@ -540,7 +809,7 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) return WORK_MORE_A; /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */ if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { - ossl_statem_set_error(s); + /* SSLfatal() already called */ return WORK_ERROR; } /* @@ -551,6 +820,12 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) break; case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) { + if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0 + && statem_flush(s) != 1) + return WORK_MORE_A; + break; + } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) { unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; @@ -567,7 +842,9 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) { - ossl_statem_set_error(s); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_WORK, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return WORK_ERROR; } @@ -575,9 +852,42 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); } #endif - break; + if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) + || ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0 + && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE)) + break; + /* Fall through */ case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: + if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) { + if (!statem_flush(s)) + return WORK_MORE_A; + break; + } + + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s) + || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, + SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return WORK_ERROR; + } + + if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED + && !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, + SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return WORK_ERROR; + } + /* + * We don't yet know whether the next record we are going to receive + * is an unencrypted alert, an encrypted alert, or an encrypted + * handshake message. We temporarily tolerate unencrypted alerts. + */ + s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_ALLOW_PLAIN_ALERTS; + break; + } + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) { /* @@ -591,7 +901,7 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) { - ossl_statem_set_error(s); + /* SSLfatal() already called */ return WORK_ERROR; } @@ -617,10 +927,51 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) 0, NULL); } #endif + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, + s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0, + &s->session->master_key_length) + || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, + SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return WORK_ERROR; + } break; - default: - /* No post work to be done */ + case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ: + if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) { + if (statem_flush(s) != 1) + return WORK_MORE_A; + } + break; + + case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE: + if (statem_flush(s) != 1) + return WORK_MORE_A; + if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return WORK_ERROR; + } + break; + + case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: + clear_sys_error(); + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1) { + if (SSL_get_error(s, 0) == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL + && conn_is_closed()) { + /* + * We ignore connection closed errors in TLSv1.3 when sending a + * NewSessionTicket and behave as if we were successful. This is + * so that we are still able to read data sent to us by a client + * that closes soon after the end of the handshake without + * waiting to read our post-handshake NewSessionTickets. + */ + s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; + break; + } + + return WORK_MORE_A; + } break; } @@ -628,63 +979,108 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) } /* - * Construct a message to be sent from the server to the client. + * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the + * server * * Valid return values are: * 1: Success * 0: Error */ -int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s) +int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + confunc_f *confunc, int *mt) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; switch (st->hand_state) { + default: + /* Shouldn't happen */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE, + SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE); + return 0; + + case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) + *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec; + else + *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec; + *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; + break; + case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: - return dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(s); + *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request; + *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; + break; case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: - return tls_construct_hello_request(s); + /* No construction function needed */ + *confunc = NULL; + *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST; + break; case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: - return tls_construct_server_hello(s); + *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello; + *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO; + break; case TLS_ST_SW_CERT: - return tls_construct_server_certificate(s); + *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate; + *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE; + break; + + case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY: + *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify; + *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY; + break; + case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH: - return tls_construct_server_key_exchange(s); + *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange; + *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; + break; case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ: - return tls_construct_certificate_request(s); + *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request; + *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; + break; case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: - return tls_construct_server_done(s); + *confunc = tls_construct_server_done; + *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; + break; case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: - return tls_construct_new_session_ticket(s); + *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket; + *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET; + break; case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS: - return tls_construct_cert_status(s); - - case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) - return dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s); - else - return tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s); + *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status; + *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS; + break; case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: - return tls_construct_finished(s, - s->method-> - ssl3_enc->server_finished_label, - s->method-> - ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len); + *confunc = tls_construct_finished; + *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED; + break; - default: - /* Shouldn't happen */ + case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: + *confunc = NULL; + *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY; + break; + + case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: + *confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions; + *mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS; + break; + + case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE: + *confunc = tls_construct_key_update; + *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE; break; } - return 0; + return 1; } /* @@ -711,14 +1107,21 @@ int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s) * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are * reading. Excludes the message header. */ -unsigned long ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s) +size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; switch (st->hand_state) { + default: + /* Shouldn't happen */ + return 0; + case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH; + case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: + return END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH; + case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: return s->max_cert_list; @@ -739,12 +1142,9 @@ unsigned long ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s) case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH; - default: - /* Shouldn't happen */ - break; + case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE: + return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH; } - - return 0; } /* @@ -755,9 +1155,19 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; switch (st->hand_state) { + default: + /* Shouldn't happen */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_PROCESS_MESSAGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt); + case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: + return tls_process_end_of_early_data(s, pkt); + case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt); @@ -778,12 +1188,10 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: return tls_process_finished(s, pkt); - default: - /* Shouldn't happen */ - break; - } + case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE: + return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt); - return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } } /* @@ -795,26 +1203,27 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; switch (st->hand_state) { + default: + /* Shouldn't happen */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return WORK_ERROR; + case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst); case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst); - - default: - break; } - - /* Shouldn't happen */ - return WORK_ERROR; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP -static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al) +/* Returns 1 on success, 0 for retryable error, -1 for fatal error */ +static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s) { - int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE; - - *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; + int ret; + int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) && (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) { @@ -823,100 +1232,173 @@ static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al) * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp * login name */ - ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL; - *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY, + SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO, + SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); + return -1; } else { - ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al); + ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, &al); + if (ret < 0) + return 0; + if (ret == SSL3_AL_FATAL) { + SSLfatal(s, al, SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO, + al == SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY + ? SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND + : SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); + return -1; + } } } - return ret; + return 1; } #endif -int tls_construct_hello_request(SSL *s) +int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie, + size_t cookie_len) { - if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - ossl_statem_set_error(s); + /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */ + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION) + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len)) return 0; - } return 1; } -unsigned int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(unsigned char *buf, - unsigned char *cookie, - unsigned char cookie_len) +int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) { - unsigned int msg_len; - unsigned char *p; - - p = buf; - /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */ - *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION >> 8; - *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION & 0xFF; + unsigned int cookie_leni; + if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL || + s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie, + &cookie_leni) == 0 || + cookie_leni > 255) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, + SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE); + return 0; + } + s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni; - *(p++) = (unsigned char)cookie_len; - memcpy(p, cookie, cookie_len); - p += cookie_len; - msg_len = p - buf; + if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie, + s->d1->cookie_len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } - return msg_len; + return 1; } -int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s) +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC +/*- + * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X + * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|. + * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order: + * SNI, + * elliptic_curves + * ec_point_formats + * signature_algorithms (for TLSv1.2 only) + * + * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8, + * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them. + * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from + * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work). + */ +static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello) { - unsigned int len; - unsigned char *buf; - - buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; - - if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL || - s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie, - &(s->d1->cookie_len)) == 0 || - s->d1->cookie_len > 255) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, - SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE); - ossl_statem_set_error(s); - return 0; + static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = { + 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */ + 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */ + 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */ + 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */ + 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */ + 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */ + + 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */ + 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */ + 0x01, /* 1 point format */ + 0x00, /* uncompressed */ + /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */ + 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */ + 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */ + 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */ + 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */ + 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */ + 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */ + 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */ + 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */ + }; + /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */ + static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18; + unsigned int type; + PACKET sni, tmppkt; + size_t ext_len; + + tmppkt = hello->extensions; + + if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2) + || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type) + || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) { + return; } - len = dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(&buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH], - s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len); - - dtls1_set_message_header(s, DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, len, 0, len); - len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; + if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) + return; - /* number of bytes to write */ - s->init_num = len; - s->init_off = 0; + ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ? + sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength; - return 1; + s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock, + ext_len); } +#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { - int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - unsigned int j, complen = 0; - unsigned long id; - const SSL_CIPHER *c; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP - SSL_COMP *comp = NULL; -#endif - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL; - int protverr; /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */ - PACKET session_id, cipher_suites, compression, extensions, cookie; - int is_v2_record; + PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie; static const unsigned char null_compression = 0; + CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = NULL; - is_v2_record = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer); + /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */ + if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { + if (!ossl_assert(!SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION) != 0 + || (!s->s3->send_connection_binding + && (s->options + & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) == 0)) { + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); + return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; + } + s->renegotiate = 1; + s->new_session = 1; + } + clienthello = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello)); + if (clienthello == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + /* + * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure. + */ + clienthello->isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer); PACKET_null_init(&cookie); - /* First lets get s->client_version set correctly */ - if (is_v2_record) { - unsigned int version; + + if (clienthello->isv2) { unsigned int mt; + + if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) + || s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + goto err; + } + /*- * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS @@ -939,136 +1421,97 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record * in the first place */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - - if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &version)) { - /* No protocol version supplied! */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } - if (version == 0x0002) { - /* This is real SSLv2. We don't support it. */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL); - goto err; - } else if ((version & 0xff00) == (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) { - /* SSLv3/TLS */ - s->client_version = version; - } else { - /* No idea what protocol this is */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL); - goto err; - } - } else { - /* - * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may - * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) - */ - if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->client_version)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); - goto f_err; - } } - /* - * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check - * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later. - */ - if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { - protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s); - } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION && - DTLS_VERSION_LT(s->client_version, s->version)) { - protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; - } else { - protverr = 0; - } - - if (protverr) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr); - if ((!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)) { - /* - * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version - * number - */ - s->version = s->client_version; - } - al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; - goto f_err; + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello->legacy_version)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto err; } /* Parse the message and load client random. */ - if (is_v2_record) { + if (clienthello->isv2) { /* * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format. - * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected above. + * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below. */ - unsigned int cipher_len, session_id_len, challenge_len; + unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len; PACKET challenge; - if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &cipher_len) + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, - SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; } if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; } - if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &cipher_suites, cipher_len) - || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &session_id, session_id_len) + if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites, + ciphersuite_len) + || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->session_id, session_id_len) || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len) /* No extensions. */ || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, - SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; } + clienthello->session_id_len = session_id_len; - /* Load the client random and compression list. */ - challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : - challenge_len; - memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + * here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit + * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if + * sizeof(clienthello->random) does. + */ + challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len; + memset(clienthello->random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge, - s->s3->client_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - + clienthello->random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - challenge_len, challenge_len) /* Advertise only null compression. */ || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; } - PACKET_null_init(&extensions); + PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions); } else { /* Regular ClientHello. */ - if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) - || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - - if (PACKET_remaining(&session_id) > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; + if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) + || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id) + || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello->session_id, + SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH, + &clienthello->session_id_len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello->dtls_cookie, + DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH, + &clienthello->dtls_cookie_len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; } /* * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, @@ -1076,55 +1519,262 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) * So check cookie length... */ if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) { - if (PACKET_remaining(&cookie) == 0) - return 1; + if (clienthello->dtls_cookie_len == 0) { + OPENSSL_free(clienthello); + return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; + } } } - if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cipher_suites) - || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; } + /* Could be empty. */ - extensions = *pkt; + if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) { + PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions); + } else { + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->extensions) + || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + } + } + + if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello->compressions, + MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE, + &clienthello->compressions_len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */ + extensions = clienthello->extensions; + if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, + &clienthello->pre_proc_exts, + &clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len, 1)) { + /* SSLfatal already been called */ + goto err; + } + s->clienthello = clienthello; + + return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; + + err: + if (clienthello != NULL) + OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts); + OPENSSL_free(clienthello); + + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; +} + +static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s) +{ + unsigned int j; + int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + int protverr; + size_t loop; + unsigned long id; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP + SSL_COMP *comp = NULL; +#endif + const SSL_CIPHER *c; + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL; + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *scsvs = NULL; + CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = s->clienthello; + DOWNGRADE dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE; + + /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */ + /* Give the ClientHello callback a crack at things */ + if (s->ctx->client_hello_cb != NULL) { + /* A failure in the ClientHello callback terminates the connection. */ + switch (s->ctx->client_hello_cb(s, &al, s->ctx->client_hello_cb_arg)) { + case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS: + break; + case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_RETRY: + s->rwstate = SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_CB; + return -1; + case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_ERROR: + default: + SSLfatal(s, al, + SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED); + goto err; + } + } + + /* Set up the client_random */ + memcpy(s->s3->client_random, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + + /* Choose the version */ + + if (clienthello->isv2) { + if (clienthello->legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION + || (clienthello->legacy_version & 0xff00) + != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) { + /* + * This is real SSLv2 or something completely unknown. We don't + * support it. + */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, + SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL); + goto err; + } + /* SSLv3/TLS */ + s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version; + } + /* + * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check + * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later. + */ + if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { + protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd); + } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION && + DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello->legacy_version, s->version)) { + protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; + } else { + protverr = 0; + } + + if (protverr) { + if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { + /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */ + s->version = s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version; + } + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, + SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr); + goto err; + } + + /* TLSv1.3 specifies that a ClientHello must end on a record boundary */ + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, + SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); + goto err; } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */ if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) { if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) { - if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, PACKET_data(&cookie), - PACKET_remaining(&cookie)) == - 0) { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, - SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; + if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello->dtls_cookie, + clienthello->dtls_cookie_len) == 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); + goto err; /* else cookie verification succeeded */ } /* default verification */ - } else if (!PACKET_equal(&cookie, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len)) { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; + } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello->dtls_cookie_len + || memcmp(clienthello->dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie, + s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); + goto err; } s->d1->cookie_verified = 1; } if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) { - protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s); + protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd); if (protverr != 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr); s->version = s->client_version; - al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, + SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr); + goto err; } } } s->hit = 0; + if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, + clienthello->isv2) || + !bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, &ciphers, &scsvs, + clienthello->isv2, 1)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + + s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0; + /* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */ + if (scsvs != NULL) { + for(i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs); i++) { + c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs, i); + if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_SCSV) { + if (s->renegotiate) { + /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING); + goto err; + } + s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1; + } else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV && + !ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) { + /* + * This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried + * a higher version. We should fail if the current version + * is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first + * connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger + * an insecure downgrade. + */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK, + SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); + goto err; + } + } + } + + /* For TLSv1.3 we must select the ciphersuite *before* session resumption */ + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = + ssl3_choose_cipher(s, ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s)); + + if (cipher == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); + goto err; + } + if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING + && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL + || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != cipher->id)) { + /* + * A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we + * just selected. Something must have changed. + */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_BAD_CIPHER); + goto err; + } + s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher; + } + + /* We need to do this before getting the session */ + if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret, + SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, + clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + /* * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello. * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty. @@ -1141,41 +1791,41 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be * ignored. */ - if (is_v2_record || + if (clienthello->isv2 || (s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) { - if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) + if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; + } } else { - i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &extensions, &session_id); - /* - * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated - * version. - * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption - * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but - * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable. - * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and - * will abort the handshake with an error. - */ - if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) { + i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, clienthello); + if (i == 1) { /* previous session */ s->hit = 1; } else if (i == -1) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } else { /* i == 0 */ - if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) + if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; + } } } - if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &cipher_suites, &(ciphers), - is_v2_record, &al) == NULL) { - goto f_err; + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->clienthello->session_id, + s->clienthello->session_id_len); + s->tmp_session_id_len = s->clienthello->session_id_len; } - /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */ - if (s->hit) { + /* + * If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list. In TLSv1.3 we check + * ciphersuite compatibility with the session as part of resumption. + */ + if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hit) { j = 0; id = s->session->cipher->id; @@ -1198,32 +1848,36 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked * to reuse it */ - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, - SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING); + goto err; } } - complen = PACKET_remaining(&compression); - for (j = 0; j < complen; j++) { - if (PACKET_data(&compression)[j] == 0) + for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello->compressions_len; loop++) { + if (clienthello->compressions[loop] == 0) break; } - if (j >= complen) { + if (loop >= clienthello->compressions_len) { /* no compress */ - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED); + goto err; } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC + if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG) + ssl_check_for_safari(s, clienthello); +#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ + /* TLS extensions */ - if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) { - if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &extensions)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); - goto err; - } + if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, + clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, 1)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; } /* @@ -1235,19 +1889,33 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { unsigned char *pos; pos = s->s3->server_random; - if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) { - goto f_err; + if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, dgrd) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; } } - if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) { + if (!s->hit + && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION + && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s) + && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s) + && s->ext.session_secret_cb) { const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; + /* + * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for + * backwards compat reasons + */ + int master_key_length; - s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); - if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, - &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers, + master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); + if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, + &master_key_length, ciphers, &pref_cipher, - s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) { + s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg) + && master_key_length > 0) { + s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length; s->hit = 1; s->session->ciphers = ciphers; s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK; @@ -1255,16 +1923,14 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) ciphers = NULL; /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */ - pref_cipher = - pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, - s-> - session->ciphers, - SSL_get_ciphers - (s)); + if (pref_cipher == NULL) + pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, + SSL_get_ciphers(s)); if (pref_cipher == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); + goto err; } s->session->cipher = pref_cipher; @@ -1281,17 +1947,31 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */ s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL; + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + /* + * We already checked above that the NULL compression method appears in + * the list. Now we check there aren't any others (which is illegal in + * a TLSv1.3 ClientHello. + */ + if (clienthello->compressions_len != 1) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); + goto err; + } + } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */ - if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { + else if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth; unsigned int k; /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */ /* Can't disable compression */ if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, - SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); + goto err; } /* Look for resumed compression method */ for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) { @@ -1302,24 +1982,25 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) } } if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, - SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); + goto err; } /* Look for resumed method in compression list */ - for (k = 0; k < complen; k++) { - if (PACKET_data(&compression)[k] == comp_id) + for (k = 0; k < clienthello->compressions_len; k++) { + if (clienthello->compressions[k] == comp_id) break; } - if (k >= complen) { - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, - SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING); - goto f_err; + if (k >= clienthello->compressions_len) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING); + goto err; } - } else if (s->hit) + } else if (s->hit) { comp = NULL; - else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) { + } else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) { /* See if we have a match */ int m, nn, v, done = 0; unsigned int o; @@ -1328,8 +2009,8 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) { comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m); v = comp->id; - for (o = 0; o < complen; o++) { - if (v == PACKET_data(&compression)[o]) { + for (o = 0; o < clienthello->compressions_len; o++) { + if (v == clienthello->compressions[o]) { done = 1; break; } @@ -1348,8 +2029,10 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) * using compression. */ if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); + goto err; } #endif @@ -1357,88 +2040,245 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher */ + if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers); + s->session->ciphers = ciphers; + if (ciphers == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + ciphers = NULL; + } + if (!s->hit) { #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP s->session->compress_meth = 0; #else s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id; #endif - sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers); - s->session->ciphers = ciphers; - if (ciphers == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto f_err; - } - ciphers = NULL; - if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); - goto err; - } } sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); - return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; - f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); + sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs); + OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts); + OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello); + s->clienthello = NULL; + return 1; err: - ossl_statem_set_error(s); - sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); - return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs); + OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts); + OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello); + s->clienthello = NULL; + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1. + * Upon failure, returns 0. + */ +static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL *s) +{ + s->ext.status_expected = 0; + + /* + * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be + * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed, + * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may + * influence which certificate is sent + */ + if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && s->ctx != NULL + && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) { + int ret; + + /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */ + if (s->s3->tmp.cert != NULL) { + /* + * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate + * et al can pick it up. + */ + s->cert->key = s->s3->tmp.cert; + ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg); + switch (ret) { + /* We don't want to send a status request response */ + case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: + s->ext.status_expected = 0; + break; + /* status request response should be sent */ + case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK: + if (s->ext.ocsp.resp) + s->ext.status_expected = 1; + break; + /* something bad happened */ + case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: + default: + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_STATUS_REQUEST, + SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); + return 0; + } + } + } + + return 1; +} + +/* + * Call the alpn_select callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1. + * Upon failure, returns 0. + */ +int tls_handle_alpn(SSL *s) +{ + const unsigned char *selected = NULL; + unsigned char selected_len = 0; + + if (s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) { + int r = s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, + s->s3->alpn_proposed, + (unsigned int)s->s3->alpn_proposed_len, + s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb_arg); + + if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { + OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); + s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len); + if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG + /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */ + s->s3->npn_seen = 0; +#endif + + /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */ + if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL + || selected_len != s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len + || memcmp(selected, s->session->ext.alpn_selected, + selected_len) != 0) { + /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */ + s->ext.early_data_ok = 0; + + if (!s->hit) { + /* + * This is a new session and so alpn_selected should have + * been initialised to NULL. We should update it with the + * selected ALPN. + */ + if (!ossl_assert(s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + s->session->ext.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, + selected_len); + if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = selected_len; + } + } + + return 1; + } else if (r != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN, + SSL_R_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL); + return 0; + } + /* + * If r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK then behave as if no callback was + * present. + */ + } + + /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */ + if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) { + /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */ + s->ext.early_data_ok = 0; + } + return 1; } WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) { - int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; const SSL_CIPHER *cipher; if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) { - if (!s->hit) { + int rv = tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s); + if (rv == 0) { + /* SSLfatal() was already called */ + goto err; + } + if (rv < 0) + return WORK_MORE_A; + wst = WORK_MORE_B; + } + if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) { + if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */ - if (s->cert->cert_cb) { - int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg); - if (rv == 0) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, - SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR); - goto f_err; + if (!s->hit) { + if (s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) { + int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg); + if (rv == 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR); + goto err; + } + if (rv < 0) { + s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; + return WORK_MORE_B; + } + s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; } - if (rv < 0) { - s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; - return WORK_MORE_A; + if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) { + /* SSLfatal already called */ + goto err; } - s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; } - cipher = - ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s)); - if (cipher == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, - SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); - goto f_err; + /* In TLSv1.3 we selected the ciphersuite before resumption */ + if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + cipher = + ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s)); + + if (cipher == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); + goto err; + } + s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher; + } + if (!s->hit) { + if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 1)) { + /* SSLfatal already called */ + goto err; + } + /* check whether we should disable session resumption */ + if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL) + s->session->not_resumable = + s->not_resumable_session_cb(s, + ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey + & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0)); + if (s->session->not_resumable) + /* do not send a session ticket */ + s->ext.ticket_expected = 0; } - s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher; - /* check whether we should disable session resumption */ - if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL) - s->session->not_resumable = s->not_resumable_session_cb(s, - ((cipher->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0)); - if (s->session->not_resumable) - /* do not send a session ticket */ - s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; } else { /* Session-id reuse */ s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher; } - if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) { - if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } - } - /*- * we now have the following setup. * client_random @@ -1451,73 +2291,71 @@ WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use. */ - /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */ - if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) { - if (!ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s, &al)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, - SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); - goto f_err; - } + /* + * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the + * certificate callbacks etc above. + */ + if (!tls_handle_status_request(s)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + /* + * Call alpn_select callback if needed. Has to be done after SNI and + * cipher negotiation (HTTP/2 restricts permitted ciphers). In TLSv1.3 + * we already did this because cipher negotiation happens earlier, and + * we must handle ALPN before we decide whether to accept early_data. + */ + if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_handle_alpn(s)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; } - wst = WORK_MORE_B; + wst = WORK_MORE_C; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) { + if (wst == WORK_MORE_C) { int ret; - if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) { + if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s)) == 0) { /* * callback indicates further work to be done */ s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; - return WORK_MORE_B; + return WORK_MORE_C; } - if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) { - /* - * This is not really an error but the only means to for - * a client to detect whether srp is supported. - */ - if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY) - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, - SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); - else - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, - SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); - goto f_err; + if (ret < 0) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; } } #endif - s->renegotiate = 2; return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; - f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - ossl_statem_set_error(s); + err: return WORK_ERROR; } -int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s) +int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) { - unsigned char *buf; - unsigned char *p, *d; - int i, sl; - int al = 0; - unsigned long l; - - buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; - - /* Do the message type and length last */ - d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s); - - *(p++) = s->version >> 8; - *(p++) = s->version & 0xff; - - /* - * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in - * tls_process_client_hello() - */ - memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; + int compm; + size_t sl, len; + int version; + unsigned char *session_id; + int usetls13 = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING; + + version = usetls13 ? TLS1_2_VERSION : s->version; + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version) + /* + * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in + * tls_process_client_hello() + */ + || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, + s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING + ? hrrrandom : s->s3->server_random, + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } /*- * There are several cases for the session ID to send @@ -1531,6 +2369,8 @@ int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s) * session ID. * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use, * we send back a 0-length session ID. + * - In TLSv1.3 we echo back the session id sent to us by the client + * regardless * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse, * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed * to send back. @@ -1540,115 +2380,117 @@ int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s) && !s->hit)) s->session->session_id_length = 0; - sl = s->session->session_id_length; - if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - ossl_statem_set_error(s); - return 0; + if (usetls13) { + sl = s->tmp_session_id_len; + session_id = s->tmp_session_id; + } else { + sl = s->session->session_id_length; + session_id = s->session->session_id; } - *(p++) = sl; - memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl); - p += sl; - /* put the cipher */ - i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p); - p += i; + if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } - /* put the compression method */ + /* set up the compression method */ #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP - *(p++) = 0; + compm = 0; #else - if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) - *(p++) = 0; + if (usetls13 || s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) + compm = 0; else - *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; + compm = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; #endif - if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT); - ossl_statem_set_error(s); + if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, session_id, sl) + || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } - if ((p = - ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, - &al)) == NULL) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - ossl_statem_set_error(s); + + if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, + s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING + ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST + : (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) + ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO + : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO), + NULL, 0)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ return 0; } - /* do the header */ - l = (p - d); - if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - ossl_statem_set_error(s); + if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) { + /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */ + SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); + s->session = NULL; + s->hit = 0; + + /* + * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with + * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1. + */ + if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + } else if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) + && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */; return 0; } return 1; } -int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s) +int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) { - if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_DONE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - ossl_statem_set_error(s); - return 0; - } - if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { - ossl_statem_set_error(s); + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; } } - return 1; } -int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) +int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL; - int j; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; - int encodedlen = 0; + size_t encodedlen = 0; int curve_id = 0; #endif - EVP_PKEY *pkey; - const EVP_MD *md = NULL; - unsigned char *p, *d; - int al, i; + const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg; + int i; unsigned long type; - int n; const BIGNUM *r[4]; - int nr[4], kn; - BUF_MEM *buf; EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; + size_t paramlen, paramoffset; + + if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } if (md_ctx == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; } type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; - buf = s->init_buf; - r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL; - n = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK - if (type & SSL_PSK) { - /* - * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint - */ - n += 2; - if (s->cert->psk_identity_hint) - n += strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint); - } /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */ if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { } else @@ -1665,10 +2507,10 @@ int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new(); if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) { DH_free(dhp); - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; } EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp); pkdhp = pkdh; @@ -1679,44 +2521,44 @@ int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024); pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp); if (pkdh == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; } pkdhp = pkdh; } if (pkdhp == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); + goto err; } if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL); + goto err; } if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp); - if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey); if (dh == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } @@ -1729,46 +2571,39 @@ int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { - int nid; if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */ - nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2); - curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid); + curve_id = tls1_shared_group(s, -2); if (curve_id == 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); goto err; } - s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id); + s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id); /* Generate a new key for this curve */ if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); - goto f_err; + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; } /* Encode the public key. */ encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey, &encodedPoint); if (encodedlen == 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } /* - * We only support named (not generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key - * exchanges. In this situation, we need four additional bytes to - * encode the entire ServerECDHParams structure. - */ - n += 4 + encodedlen; - - /* * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we * can set these to NULLs */ @@ -1783,8 +2618,9 @@ int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM); goto err; } r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N; @@ -1794,85 +2630,59 @@ int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) } else #endif { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); - goto f_err; - } - for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) { - nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]); -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) - n += 1 + nr[i]; - else -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - /*- - * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS - * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length - * as the prime, so use the length of the prime here - */ - if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) - n += 2 + nr[0]; - else -#endif - n += 2 + nr[i]; - } - - if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) - && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) { - if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md)) - == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } - kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); - /* Allow space for signature algorithm */ - if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) - kn += 2; - /* Allow space for signature length */ - kn += 2; - } else { - pkey = NULL; - kn = 0; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); + goto err; } - if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + kn)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF); + if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) != 0) + || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) != 0) { + lu = NULL; + } else if (lu == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } - d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK if (type & SSL_PSK) { - /* copy PSK identity hint */ - if (s->cert->psk_identity_hint) { - size_t len = strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint); - if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { - /* - * Should not happen - we already checked this when we set - * the identity hint - */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - s2n(len, p); - memcpy(p, s->cert->psk_identity_hint, len); - p += len; - } else { - s2n(0, p); + size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL) + ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint); + + /* + * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already + * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case + */ + if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint, + len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; } } #endif for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) { + unsigned char *binval; + int res; + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) { - *p = nr[i]; - p++; + res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt); } else #endif + res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt); + + if (!res) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH /*- * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS @@ -1880,97 +2690,124 @@ int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) * as the prime */ if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) { - s2n(nr[0], p); - for (j = 0; j < (nr[0] - nr[2]); ++j) { - *p = 0; - ++p; + size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]); + + if (len > 0) { + if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + memset(binval, 0, len); } - } else + } #endif - s2n(nr[i], p); - BN_bn2bin(r[i], p); - p += nr[i]; + if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { /* - * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In - * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte - * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded - * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself + * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the + * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] + * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded + * point itself */ - *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE; - p += 1; - *p = 0; - p += 1; - *p = curve_id; - p += 1; - *p = encodedlen; - p += 1; - memcpy(p, encodedPoint, encodedlen); + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id) + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); encodedPoint = NULL; - p += encodedlen; } #endif /* not anonymous */ - if (pkey != NULL) { + if (lu != NULL) { + EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey; + const EVP_MD *md; + unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2, *tbs; + size_t siglen, tbslen; + int rv; + + if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) { + /* Should never happen */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */ + if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + /* send signature algorithm */ + if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } /* - * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p - * points to the space at the end. + * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig + * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it + * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET + * afterwards. */ - if (md) { - /* send signature algorithm */ - if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { - if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) { - /* Should never happen */ - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto f_err; - } - p += 2; - } -#ifdef SSL_DEBUG - fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); -#endif - if (EVP_SignInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0 - || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), - SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 - || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), - SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 - || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, d, n) <= 0 - || EVP_SignFinal(md_ctx, &(p[2]), - (unsigned int *)&i, pkey) <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP); - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto f_err; + siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); + if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1) + || EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) { + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 + || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; } - s2n(i, p); - n += i + 2; - if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) - n += 2; - } else { - /* Is this error check actually needed? */ - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE); - goto f_err; } - } - - if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n)) { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto f_err; + tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs, + s->init_buf->data + paramoffset, + paramlen); + if (tbslen == 0) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + rv = EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, tbs, tbslen); + OPENSSL_free(tbs); + if (rv <= 0 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2) + || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } } EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); return 1; - f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); err: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh); @@ -1979,96 +2816,82 @@ int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); #endif EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); - ossl_statem_set_error(s); return 0; } -int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s) +int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) { - unsigned char *p, *d; - int i, j, nl, off, n; - STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL; - X509_NAME *name; - BUF_MEM *buf; - - buf = s->init_buf; + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + /* Send random context when doing post-handshake auth */ + if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) { + OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context); + s->pha_context_len = 32; + if ((s->pha_context = OPENSSL_malloc(s->pha_context_len)) == NULL + || RAND_bytes(s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len) <= 0 + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + /* reset the handshake hash back to just after the ClientFinished */ + if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + } else { + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + } - d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s); + if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, + SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, NULL, + 0)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + goto done; + } /* get the list of acceptable cert types */ - p++; - n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p); - d[0] = n; - p += n; - n++; + if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt) + || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { - const unsigned char *psigs; - unsigned char *etmp = p; - nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs); - if (nl > SSL_MAX_2_BYTE_LEN) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, - SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - goto err; - } - /* Skip over length for now */ - p += 2; - nl = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, p, psigs, nl); - /* Now fill in length */ - s2n(nl, etmp); - p += nl; - n += nl + 2; - } - - off = n; - p += 2; - n += 2; - - sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); - nl = 0; - if (sk != NULL) { - for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) { - name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i); - j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL); - if (j > SSL_MAX_2_BYTE_LEN) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, - SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - goto err; - } - if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + n + j + 2)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); - goto err; - } - p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n; - s2n(j, p); - i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p); - n += 2 + j; - nl += 2 + j; - if (nl > SSL_MAX_2_BYTE_LEN) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, - SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - goto err; - } + const uint16_t *psigs; + size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs); + + if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH) + || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; } } - /* else no CA names */ - p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off; - s2n(nl, p); - if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; + if (!construct_ca_names(s, get_ca_names(s), pkt)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; } + done: + s->certreqs_sent++; s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1; - return 1; - err: - ossl_statem_set_error(s); - return 0; } -static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) +static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN]; @@ -2076,24 +2899,24 @@ static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) PACKET psk_identity; if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return 0; } if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, + SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); return 0; } if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, + SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB); return 0; } if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } @@ -2101,16 +2924,16 @@ static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) psk, sizeof(psk)); if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } else if (psklen == 0) { /* * PSK related to the given identity not found */ - *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, - SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, + SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); return 0; } @@ -2119,8 +2942,8 @@ static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen); if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } @@ -2129,13 +2952,13 @@ static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) return 1; #else /* Should never happen */ - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; #endif } -static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) +static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; @@ -2147,10 +2970,10 @@ static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL; int ret = 0; - rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey); + rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey); if (rsa == NULL) { - *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, + SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); return 0; } @@ -2160,8 +2983,8 @@ static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) } else { if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return 0; } } @@ -2173,15 +2996,15 @@ static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway. */ if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, + RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL); return 0; } rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa)); if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } @@ -2193,18 +3016,26 @@ static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 */ - if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) + if (RAND_priv_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, + sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; + } /* * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of * the timing-sensitive code below. */ - decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt(PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster), - PACKET_data(&enc_premaster), - rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING); - if (decrypt_len < 0) + /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */ + decrypt_len = (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster), + PACKET_data(&enc_premaster), + rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING); + if (decrypt_len < 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; + } /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */ @@ -2214,8 +3045,8 @@ static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) * PS is at least 8 bytes. */ if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, + SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); goto err; } @@ -2282,8 +3113,7 @@ static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } @@ -2293,13 +3123,13 @@ static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) return ret; #else /* Should never happen */ - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; #endif } -static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) +static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL; @@ -2311,46 +3141,46 @@ static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) int ret = 0; if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) { - *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); goto err; } skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey; if (skey == NULL) { - *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, + SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); goto err; } if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) { - *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, + SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); goto err; } if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) { /* We already checked we have enough data */ - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } ckey = EVP_PKEY_new(); if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_BN_LIB); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, + SSL_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey); pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL); if (pub_key == NULL || cdh == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); BN_free(pub_key); goto err; } - if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey) == 0) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } @@ -2362,13 +3192,13 @@ static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) return ret; #else /* Should never happen */ - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; #endif } -static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) +static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey; @@ -2377,8 +3207,8 @@ static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) { /* We don't support ECDH client auth */ - *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, + SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); goto err; } else { unsigned int i; @@ -2392,25 +3222,31 @@ static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) /* Get encoded point length */ if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + if (skey == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, + SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); goto err; } + ckey = EVP_PKEY_new(); if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, + ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) { - *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, + ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } } - if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey) == 0) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } @@ -2423,13 +3259,13 @@ static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) return ret; #else /* Should never happen */ - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; #endif } -static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) +static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP unsigned int i; @@ -2437,41 +3273,43 @@ static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, + SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH); return 0; } if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, + ERR_R_BN_LIB); return 0; } if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) { - *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, + SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS); return 0; } OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username); s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + /* SSLfatal() already called */ return 0; } return 1; #else /* Should never happen */ - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; #endif } -static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) +static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; @@ -2480,11 +3318,9 @@ static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) const unsigned char *start; size_t outlen = 32, inlen; unsigned long alg_a; - int Ttag, Tclass; - long Tlen; - long sess_key_len; - const unsigned char *data; + unsigned int asn1id, asn1len; int ret = 0; + PACKET encdata; /* Get our certificate private key */ alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; @@ -2505,13 +3341,13 @@ static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL); if (pkey_ctx == NULL) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } /* @@ -2526,37 +3362,57 @@ static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) ERR_clear_error(); } /* Decrypt session key */ - sess_key_len = PACKET_remaining(pkt); - if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, sess_key_len)) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &asn1id) + || asn1id != (V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED) + || !PACKET_peek_1(pkt, &asn1len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, + SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); goto err; } - if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag, - &Tclass, sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED - || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); + if (asn1len == 0x81) { + /* + * Long form length. Should only be one byte of length. Anything else + * isn't supported. + * We did a successful peek before so this shouldn't fail + */ + if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 1)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, + SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); + goto err; + } + } else if (asn1len >= 0x80) { + /* + * Indefinite length, or more than one long form length bytes. We don't + * support it + */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, + SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); + goto err; + } /* else short form length */ + + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encdata)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, + SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); goto err; } - start = data; - inlen = Tlen; - if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt - (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); + inlen = PACKET_remaining(&encdata); + start = PACKET_data(&encdata); + + if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, + inlen) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, + SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); goto err; } /* Generate master secret */ if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret, sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */ - if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl - (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, + NULL) > 0) s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1; ret = 1; @@ -2565,68 +3421,75 @@ static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) return ret; #else /* Should never happen */ - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; #endif } MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { - int al = -1; unsigned long alg_k; alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */ - if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al)) + if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; + } if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) { /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */ if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { - if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al)) + if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; + } } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { - if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al)) + if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; + } } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { - if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al)) + if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; + } } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { - if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al)) + if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; + } } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { - if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al)) + if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; + } } else { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); goto err; } return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; err: - if (al != -1) - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen); s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL; #endif - ossl_statem_set_error(s); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } @@ -2648,8 +3511,10 @@ WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) { - ossl_statem_set_error(s); - return WORK_ERROR;; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return WORK_ERROR; } BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, @@ -2664,15 +3529,15 @@ WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) * the handshake_buffer */ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { - ossl_statem_set_error(s); + /* SSLfatal() already called */ return WORK_ERROR; } return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; } else { if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - ossl_statem_set_error(s); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return WORK_ERROR; } /* @@ -2680,7 +3545,7 @@ WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op */ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) { - ossl_statem_set_error(s); + /* SSLfatal() already called */ return WORK_ERROR; } } @@ -2688,216 +3553,97 @@ WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; } -MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) -{ - EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; - const unsigned char *sig, *data; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST - unsigned char *gost_data = NULL; -#endif - int al, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; - int type = 0, j; - unsigned int len; - X509 *peer; - const EVP_MD *md = NULL; - long hdatalen = 0; - void *hdata; - - EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); - - if (mctx == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } - - peer = s->session->peer; - pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer); - if (pkey == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } - - type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey); - - if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, - SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - goto f_err; - } - - if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { - int rv; - - if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sig, 2)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } - rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sig, pkey); - if (rv == -1) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } else if (rv == 0) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } -#ifdef SSL_DEBUG - fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); -#endif - } else { - /* Use default digest for this key type */ - int idx = ssl_cert_type(NULL, pkey); - if (idx >= 0) - md = s->s3->tmp.md[idx]; - if (md == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } - } - - /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */ - /* - * If key is GOST and len is exactly 64 or 128, it is signature without - * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till TLS 1.2) - */ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST - if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) - && ((PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64 - && (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 - || EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256)) - || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 128 - && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512))) { - len = PACKET_remaining(pkt); - } else -#endif - if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } - - j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); - if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j) - || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } - if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } - - hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata); - if (hdatalen <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } -#ifdef SSL_DEBUG - fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); -#endif - if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL) - || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST - { - int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey); - if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 - || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 - || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) { - if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } - BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len); - data = gost_data; - } - } -#endif - - if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION - && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, - s->session->master_key_length, - s->session->master_key)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } - - if (EVP_VerifyFinal(mctx, data, len, pkey) <= 0) { - al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); - goto f_err; - } - - ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; - if (0) { - f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - ossl_statem_set_error(s); - } - BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer); - s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL; - EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST - OPENSSL_free(gost_data); -#endif - return ret; -} - MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { - int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + int i; + MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; X509 *x = NULL; - unsigned long l, llen; + unsigned long l; const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes; STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; - PACKET spkt; + PACKET spkt, context; + size_t chainidx; + SSL_SESSION *new_sess = NULL; + + /* + * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We no + * longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This value is ignored if less than + * TLSv1.3 + */ + s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_VALID; if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context) + || (s->pha_context == NULL && PACKET_remaining(&context) != 0) + || (s->pha_context != NULL && + !PACKET_equal(&context, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)))) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT); + goto err; } - if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen) - || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen) - || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(pkt, &spkt) + || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; } - while (PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0) { + for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) { if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l) || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, - SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; } certstart = certbytes; x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l); if (x == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); + goto err; } if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, - SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; } + + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL; + PACKET extensions; + + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); + goto err; + } + if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, + SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts, + NULL, chainidx == 0) + || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, + rawexts, x, chainidx, + PACKET_remaining(&spkt) == 0)) { + OPENSSL_free(rawexts); + goto err; + } + OPENSSL_free(rawexts); + } + if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; } x = NULL; } @@ -2905,103 +3651,189 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) { /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */ if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, - SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED); + goto err; } /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */ else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, - SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); + goto err; } /* No client certificate so digest cached records */ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { - goto f_err; + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; } } else { EVP_PKEY *pkey; i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk); if (i <= 0) { - al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, - SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result), + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); + goto err; } if (i > 1) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i); - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i); + goto err; } pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0)); if (pkey == NULL) { - al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, - SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); + goto err; } } + /* + * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise + * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions, + * we replace them with a duplicate. Here, we need to do this every time + * a new certificate is received via post-handshake authentication, as the + * session may have already gone into the session cache. + */ + + if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) { + if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); + s->session = new_sess; + } + X509_free(s->session->peer); s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk); s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free); s->session->peer_chain = sk; + + /* + * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE + * message + */ + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + /* * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c */ sk = NULL; + + /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */ + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash, + sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash), + &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + + /* Resend session tickets */ + s->sent_tickets = 0; + } + ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; - goto done; - f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - ossl_statem_set_error(s); - done: + err: X509_free(x); sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); return ret; } -int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s) +int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) { - CERT_PKEY *cpk; + CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3->tmp.cert; - cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s); if (cpk == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - ossl_statem_set_error(s); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + /* + * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context + * for the server Certificate message + */ + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +static int create_ticket_prequel(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add, + unsigned char *tick_nonce) +{ + /* + * Ticket lifetime hint: For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this + * unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity). + * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the + * timeout. + */ + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, + (s->hit && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) + ? 0 : s->session->timeout)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } - if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, cpk)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - ossl_statem_set_error(s); + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add) + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tick_nonce, TICKET_NONCE_SIZE)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + } + + /* Start the sub-packet for the actual ticket data */ + if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } return 1; } -int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s) +static int construct_stateless_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add, + unsigned char *tick_nonce) { unsigned char *senc = NULL; EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL; HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL; - unsigned char *p, *macstart; + unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2; const unsigned char *const_p; - int len, slen_full, slen; + int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal; SSL_SESSION *sess; unsigned int hlen; SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx; unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH]; - int iv_len; + int iv_len, ok = 0; + size_t macoffset, macendoffset; /* get session encoding length */ slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL); @@ -3010,190 +3842,357 @@ int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s) * long */ if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) { - ossl_statem_set_error(s); - return 0; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; } senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full); if (senc == NULL) { - ossl_statem_set_error(s); - return 0; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; } ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); hctx = HMAC_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } p = senc; - if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) + if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; + } /* * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */ const_p = senc; sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full); - if (sess == NULL) + if (sess == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; - sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */ + } slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL); - if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */ + if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { + /* shouldn't ever happen */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); SSL_SESSION_free(sess); goto err; } p = senc; if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); SSL_SESSION_free(sess); goto err; } SSL_SESSION_free(sess); - /*- - * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as - * follows handshake_header_length + - * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) + - * sizeof(keyname) + max_iv_len (iv length) + - * max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session * length) + - * max_md_size (HMAC) + session_length. - */ - if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, - SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 6 + sizeof(key_name) + - EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + - EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen)) - goto err; - - p = ssl_handshake_start(s); /* * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx. */ - if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) { + if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) { /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */ - int ret = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx, + int ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx, hctx, 1); if (ret == 0) { - l2n(0, p); /* timeout */ - s2n(0, p); /* length */ - if (!ssl_set_handshake_header - (s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, p - ssl_handshake_start(s))) + + /* Put timeout and length */ + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; + } OPENSSL_free(senc); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); return 1; } - if (ret < 0) + if (ret < 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, + SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED); goto err; + } iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx); } else { const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc(); iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher); - if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0) - goto err; - if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, - tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv)) - goto err; - if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, - sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key), - EVP_sha256(), NULL)) + if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0 + || !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, + tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key, iv) + || !HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key, + sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key), + EVP_sha256(), NULL)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; - memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, - sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)); + } + memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name, + sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name)); } - /* - * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified - * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for - * new sessions will live as long as their sessions. - */ - l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p); - - /* Skip ticket length for now */ - p += 2; - /* Output key name */ - macstart = p; - memcpy(p, key_name, sizeof(key_name)); - p += sizeof(key_name); - /* output IV */ - memcpy(p, iv, iv_len); - p += iv_len; - /* Encrypt session data */ - if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, p, &len, senc, slen)) - goto err; - p += len; - if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, p, &len)) + if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; - p += len; + } - if (!HMAC_Update(hctx, macstart, p - macstart)) - goto err; - if (!HMAC_Final(hctx, p, &hlen)) + if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset) + /* Output key name */ + || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name)) + /* output IV */ + || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len) + || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH, + &encdata1) + /* Encrypt session data */ + || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen) + || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2) + || encdata1 != encdata2 + || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal) + || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2) + || encdata1 + len != encdata2 + || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset) + || !HMAC_Update(hctx, + (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset, + macendoffset - macoffset) + || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1) + || !HMAC_Final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen) + || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2) + || macdata1 != macdata2) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; + } - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); - HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); - ctx = NULL; - hctx = NULL; - - p += hlen; - /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */ - /* Total length */ - len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s); - /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */ - p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4; - s2n(len - 6, p); - if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len)) + /* Close the sub-packet created by create_ticket_prequel() */ + if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; - OPENSSL_free(senc); + } - return 1; + ok = 1; err: OPENSSL_free(senc); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); - ossl_statem_set_error(s); - return 0; + return ok; } -int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s) +static int construct_stateful_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add, + unsigned char *tick_nonce) { - unsigned char *p; - size_t msglen; + if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } - /*- - * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as - * follows handshake_header_length + - * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length) - * + (ocsp response) - */ - msglen = 4 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen; - if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + msglen)) - goto err; + if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id, + s->session->session_id_length) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATEFUL_TICKET, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) +{ + SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx; + unsigned char tick_nonce[TICKET_NONCE_SIZE]; + union { + unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)]; + uint32_t age_add; + } age_add_u; + + age_add_u.age_add = 0; + + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + size_t i, hashlen; + uint64_t nonce; + static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption"; + const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s); + void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; + int hashleni = EVP_MD_size(md); + + /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */ + if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + hashlen = (size_t)hashleni; - p = ssl_handshake_start(s); + if (s->info_callback != NULL) + cb = s->info_callback; + else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) + cb = s->ctx->info_callback; - /* status type */ - *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type; - /* length of OCSP response */ - l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p); - /* actual response */ - memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen); + if (cb != NULL) { + /* + * We don't start and stop the handshake in between each ticket when + * sending more than one - but it should appear that way to the info + * callback. + */ + if (s->sent_tickets != 0) { + ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); + cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); + ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1); + } + cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1); + } + /* + * If we already sent one NewSessionTicket, or we resumed then + * s->session may already be in a cache and so we must not modify it. + * Instead we need to take a copy of it and modify that. + */ + if (s->sent_tickets != 0 || s->hit) { + SSL_SESSION *new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0); + + if (new_sess == NULL) { + /* SSLfatal already called */ + goto err; + } - if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS, msglen)) + SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); + s->session = new_sess; + } + + if (!ssl_generate_session_id(s, s->session)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + if (RAND_bytes(age_add_u.age_add_c, sizeof(age_add_u)) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add; + + nonce = s->next_ticket_nonce; + for (i = TICKET_NONCE_SIZE; i > 0; i--) { + tick_nonce[i - 1] = (unsigned char)(nonce & 0xff); + nonce >>= 8; + } + + if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret, + nonce_label, + sizeof(nonce_label) - 1, + tick_nonce, + TICKET_NONCE_SIZE, + s->session->master_key, + hashlen)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + s->session->master_key_length = hashlen; + + s->session->time = (long)time(NULL); + if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) { + OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.alpn_selected); + s->session->ext.alpn_selected = + OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3->alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected_len); + if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len; + } + s->session->ext.max_early_data = s->max_early_data; + } + + if (tctx->generate_ticket_cb != NULL && + tctx->generate_ticket_cb(s, tctx->ticket_cb_data) == 0) goto err; - return 1; + /* + * If we are using anti-replay protection then we behave as if + * SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set - we are caching tickets anyway so there + * is no point in using full stateless tickets. + */ + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) + && ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0 + || (s->max_early_data > 0 + && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0))) { + if (!construct_stateful_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add, tick_nonce)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + } else if (!construct_stateless_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add, + tick_nonce)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, + SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, + NULL, 0)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + /* + * Increment both |sent_tickets| and |next_ticket_nonce|. |sent_tickets| + * gets reset to 0 if we send more tickets following a post-handshake + * auth, but |next_ticket_nonce| does not. + */ + s->sent_tickets++; + s->next_ticket_nonce++; + ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); + } + + return 1; err: - ossl_statem_set_error(s); return 0; } +/* + * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to + * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. + */ +int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) +{ + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type) + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, + s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) +{ + if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG /* * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. @@ -3214,163 +4213,67 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto) || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } - if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->next_proto_negotiated, &next_proto_len)) { - s->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0; - goto err; + if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) { + s->ext.npn_len = 0; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } - s->next_proto_negotiated_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len; + s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len; return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; - err: - ossl_statem_set_error(s); - return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } #endif -#define SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN 3 - -STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, - PACKET *cipher_suites, - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp, - int sslv2format, int *al) +static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) { - const SSL_CIPHER *c; - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; - int n; - /* 3 = SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN > TLS_CIPHER_LEN = 2. */ - unsigned char cipher[SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN]; - - s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0; - - n = sslv2format ? SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN : TLS_CIPHER_LEN; - - if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) == 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED); - *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - return NULL; + if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, + NULL, 0)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; } - if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) % n != 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, - SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST); - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return NULL; - } + return 1; +} - sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); - if (sk == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return NULL; +MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) +{ + if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } - if (sslv2format) { - size_t numciphers = PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) / n; - PACKET sslv2ciphers = *cipher_suites; - unsigned int leadbyte; - unsigned char *raw; - - /* - * We store the raw ciphers list in SSLv3+ format so we need to do some - * preprocessing to convert the list first. If there are any SSLv2 only - * ciphersuites with a non-zero leading byte then we are going to - * slightly over allocate because we won't store those. But that isn't a - * problem. - */ - raw = OPENSSL_malloc(numciphers * TLS_CIPHER_LEN); - s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw = raw; - if (raw == NULL) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto err; - } - for (s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen = 0; - PACKET_remaining(&sslv2ciphers) > 0; - raw += TLS_CIPHER_LEN) { - if (!PACKET_get_1(&sslv2ciphers, &leadbyte) - || (leadbyte == 0 - && !PACKET_copy_bytes(&sslv2ciphers, raw, - TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) - || (leadbyte != 0 - && !PACKET_forward(&sslv2ciphers, TLS_CIPHER_LEN))) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw); - s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw = NULL; - s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen = 0; - goto err; - } - if (leadbyte == 0) - s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen += TLS_CIPHER_LEN; - } - } else if (!PACKET_memdup(cipher_suites, &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw, - &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen)) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto err; + if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING + && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } - while (PACKET_copy_bytes(cipher_suites, cipher, n)) { - /* - * SSLv3 ciphers wrapped in an SSLv2-compatible ClientHello have the - * first byte set to zero, while true SSLv2 ciphers have a non-zero - * first byte. We don't support any true SSLv2 ciphers, so skip them. - */ - if (sslv2format && cipher[0] != '\0') - continue; - - /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */ - if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) && - (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) { - /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */ - if (s->renegotiate) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, - SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING); - *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - goto err; - } - s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1; - continue; - } - - /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */ - if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) && - (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff))) { - /* - * The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher - * version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected - * downgrade. - */ - if (!ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, - SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); - *al = SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK; - goto err; - } - continue; - } - - /* For SSLv2-compat, ignore leading 0-byte. */ - c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, sslv2format ? &cipher[1] : cipher); - if (c != NULL) { - if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto err; - } - } + /* + * EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on + * a record boundary. + */ + if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, + SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } - if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) > 0) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; + + s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING; + if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, + SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } - *skp = sk; - return sk; - err: - sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk); - return NULL; + return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; } |