diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c')
-rw-r--r-- | deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c | 1933 |
1 files changed, 1623 insertions, 310 deletions
diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c index eba4c6fb40..4324896f50 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ /* * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -7,94 +8,664 @@ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. - * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by - * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. - */ - #include <limits.h> #include <string.h> #include <stdio.h> #include "../ssl_locl.h" #include "statem_locl.h" +#include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include <openssl/buffer.h> #include <openssl/objects.h> #include <openssl/evp.h> #include <openssl/x509.h> /* + * Map error codes to TLS/SSL alart types. + */ +typedef struct x509err2alert_st { + int x509err; + int alert; +} X509ERR2ALERT; + +/* Fixed value used in the ServerHello random field to identify an HRR */ +const unsigned char hrrrandom[] = { + 0xcf, 0x21, 0xad, 0x74, 0xe5, 0x9a, 0x61, 0x11, 0xbe, 0x1d, 0x8c, 0x02, + 0x1e, 0x65, 0xb8, 0x91, 0xc2, 0xa2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7a, 0xbb, 0x8c, 0x5e, + 0x07, 0x9e, 0x09, 0xe2, 0xc8, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x9c +}; + +/* * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) */ int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type) { int ret; + size_t written = 0; ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], - s->init_num); + s->init_num, &written); if (ret < 0) - return (-1); + return -1; if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) /* * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll * ignore the result anyway + * TLS1.3 KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added */ - if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, - (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], - ret)) - return -1; - - if (ret == s->init_num) { + if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET + && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE + && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE)) + if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, + (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], + written)) + return -1; + if (written == s->init_num) { if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s, s->msg_callback_arg); - return (1); + return 1; } - s->init_off += ret; - s->init_num -= ret; - return (0); + s->init_off += written; + s->init_num -= written; + return 0; } -int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, const char *sender, int slen) +int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype) { - unsigned char *p; - int i; - unsigned long l; + size_t msglen; - p = ssl_handshake_start(s); + if ((htype != SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) + || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen) + || msglen > INT_MAX) + return 0; + s->init_num = (int)msglen; + s->init_off = 0; - i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, - sender, slen, - s->s3->tmp.finish_md); - if (i <= 0) + return 1; +} + +int tls_setup_handshake(SSL *s) +{ + if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ return 0; - s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = i; - memcpy(p, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i); - l = i; + } + + /* Reset any extension flags */ + memset(s->ext.extflags, 0, sizeof(s->ext.extflags)); + + if (s->server) { + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(s); + int i, ver_min, ver_max, ok = 0; + + /* + * Sanity check that the maximum version we accept has ciphers + * enabled. For clients we do this check during construction of the + * ClientHello. + */ + if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, NULL) != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { + const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); + + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { + if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(ver_max, c->min_dtls) && + DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max, c->max_dtls)) + ok = 1; + } else if (ver_max >= c->min_tls && ver_max <= c->max_tls) { + ok = 1; + } + if (ok) + break; + } + if (!ok) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE, + SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE); + ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported " + "SSL/TLS version"); + return 0; + } + if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { + /* N.B. s->session_ctx == s->ctx here */ + tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept); + } else { + /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */ + tsan_counter(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate); + + s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0; + } + } else { + if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) + tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect); + else + tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate); + + /* mark client_random uninitialized */ + memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3->client_random)); + s->hit = 0; + + s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0; + + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) + s->statem.use_timer = 1; + } + + return 1; +} + +/* + * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself: + * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator + */ +#define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64 +#define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1) + +static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL *s, unsigned char *tls13tbs, + void **hdata, size_t *hdatalen) +{ + static const char *servercontext = "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify"; + static const char *clientcontext = "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify"; + + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + size_t hashlen; + + /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */ + memset(tls13tbs, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE); + /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */ + if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY + || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY) + strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, servercontext); + else + strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, clientcontext); + + /* + * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake + * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because + * that includes the CertVerify itself. + */ + if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY + || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY) { + memcpy(tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, s->cert_verify_hash, + s->cert_verify_hash_len); + hashlen = s->cert_verify_hash_len; + } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + + *hdata = tls13tbs; + *hdatalen = TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + hashlen; + } else { + size_t retlen; + long retlen_l; + + retlen = retlen_l = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, hdata); + if (retlen_l <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_GET_CERT_VERIFY_TBS_DATA, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + *hdatalen = retlen; + } + + return 1; +} + +int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) +{ + EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + const EVP_MD *md = NULL; + EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL; + EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; + size_t hdatalen = 0, siglen = 0; + void *hdata; + unsigned char *sig = NULL; + unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg; + + if (lu == NULL || s->s3->tmp.cert == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey; + + if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + if (mctx == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + /* Get the data to be signed */ + if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + + if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); + sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen); + if (sig == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; + } + + if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) { + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 + || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, + RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; + } + } + if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { + if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0 + || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, + (int)s->session->master_key_length, + s->session->master_key) + || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, sig, &siglen) <= 0) { + + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; + } + } else if (EVP_DigestSign(mctx, sig, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; + } + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST + { + int pktype = lu->sig; + + if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 + || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 + || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) + BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, siglen); + } +#endif + + if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, siglen)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */ + if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + + OPENSSL_free(sig); + EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); + return 1; + err: + OPENSSL_free(sig); + EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); + return 0; +} + +MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) +{ + EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + const unsigned char *data; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST + unsigned char *gost_data = NULL; +#endif + MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + int j; + unsigned int len; + X509 *peer; + const EVP_MD *md = NULL; + size_t hdatalen = 0; + void *hdata; + unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; + + if (mctx == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + peer = s->session->peer; + pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer); + if (pkey == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, NULL) == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, + SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); + goto err; + } + + if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { + unsigned int sigalg; + + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, + SSL_R_BAD_PACKET); + goto err; + } + if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <= 0) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + +#ifdef SSL_DEBUG + if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) + fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); +#endif + + /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */ + /* + * If key is GOST and len is exactly 64 or 128, it is signature without + * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till TLS 1.2) + */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST + if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) + && ((PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64 + && (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 + || EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256)) + || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 128 + && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512))) { + len = PACKET_remaining(pkt); + } else +#endif + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + + j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); + if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j) + || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, + SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); + goto err; + } + if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + + if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + +#ifdef SSL_DEBUG + fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); +#endif + if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; + } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST + { + int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey); + if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 + || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 + || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) { + if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len); + data = gost_data; + } + } +#endif + + if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) { + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 + || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, + RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; + } + } + if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { + if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0 + || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, + (int)s->session->master_key_length, + s->session->master_key)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; + } + if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, data, len) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, + SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); + goto err; + } + } else { + j = EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, data, len, hdata, hdatalen); + if (j <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, + SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); + goto err; + } + } + + /* + * In TLSv1.3 on the client side we make sure we prepare the client + * certificate after the CertVerify instead of when we get the + * CertificateRequest. This is because in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest + * comes *before* the Certificate message. In TLSv1.2 it comes after. We + * want to make sure that SSL_get_peer_certificate() will return the actual + * server certificate from the client_cert_cb callback. + */ + if (!s->server && SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) + ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; + else + ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; + err: + BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer); + s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL; + EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST + OPENSSL_free(gost_data); +#endif + return ret; +} + +int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) +{ + size_t finish_md_len; + const char *sender; + size_t slen; + + /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */ + if (!s->server && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) + s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; + + /* + * We only change the keys if we didn't already do this when we sent the + * client certificate + */ + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) + && !s->server + && s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 0 + && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, + SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {; + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + + if (s->server) { + sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; + slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; + } else { + sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; + slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; + } + + finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, + sender, slen, + s->s3->tmp.finish_md); + if (finish_md_len == 0) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + + s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = finish_md_len; + + if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + /* + * Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. We don't log it for + * TLSv1.3: there's a different key schedule for that. + */ + if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl_log_secret(s, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL, + s->session->master_key, + s->session->master_key_length)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } /* * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks */ + if (!ossl_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } if (!s->server) { - OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); - memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i); - s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = i; + memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, + finish_md_len); + s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finish_md_len; } else { - OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); - memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i); - s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = i; + memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, + finish_md_len); + s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finish_md_len; } - if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_FINISHED, l)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 1; +} + +int tls_construct_key_update(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) +{ + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->key_update)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_KEY_UPDATE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } + s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE; return 1; } +MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_update(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) +{ + unsigned int updatetype; + + s->key_update_count++; + if (s->key_update_count > MAX_KEY_UPDATE_MESSAGES) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, + SSL_R_TOO_MANY_KEY_UPDATES); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + + /* + * A KeyUpdate message signals a key change so the end of the message must + * be on a record boundary. + */ + if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, + SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + + if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &updatetype) + || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, + SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + + /* + * There are only two defined key update types. Fail if we get a value we + * didn't recognise. + */ + if (updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED + && updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, + SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + + /* + * If we get a request for us to update our sending keys too then, we need + * to additionally send a KeyUpdate message. However that message should + * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop). We + * ignore a request for us to update our sending keys too if we already + * sent close_notify. + */ + if (updatetype == SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED + && (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) == 0) + s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED; + + if (!tls13_update_key(s, 0)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + + return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; +} + /* * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen * to far. @@ -102,7 +673,7 @@ int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, const char *sender, int slen) int ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s) { const char *sender; - int slen; + size_t slen; if (!s->server) { sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; @@ -117,7 +688,7 @@ int ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s) s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); if (s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len == 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_TAKE_MAC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + /* SSLfatal() already called */ return 0; } @@ -126,8 +697,7 @@ int ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s) MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { - int al; - long remain; + size_t remain; remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt); /* @@ -140,32 +710,32 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1) || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) { - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, - SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, + SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } } else { if (remain != 0) { - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, - SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, + SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } } /* Check we have a cipher to change to */ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1; if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { @@ -185,119 +755,324 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) } return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; - f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - ossl_statem_set_error(s); - return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { - int al, i; + size_t md_len; + + + /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */ + if (s->server) { + /* + * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We + * no longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This value is ignored if less + * than TLSv1.3 + */ + s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_VALID; + if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) + s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + } + + /* + * In TLSv1.3 a Finished message signals a key change so the end of the + * message must be on a record boundary. + */ + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, + SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */ - if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS); - goto f_err; + if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, + SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; - i = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len; + md_len = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len; - if ((unsigned long)i != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH); - goto f_err; + if (md_len != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, + SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } - if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i) != 0) { - al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED); - goto f_err; + if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, + md_len) != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, + SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } /* * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks */ + if (!ossl_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } if (s->server) { - OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); - memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i); - s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = i; + memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, + md_len); + s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = md_len; } else { - OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); - memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i); - s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = i; + memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, + md_len); + s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = md_len; + } + + /* + * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing + * of the initial server flight (if we are a client) + */ + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + if (s->server) { + if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED && + !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, + SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + } else { + if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, + s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0, + &s->session->master_key_length)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, + SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + } } return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; - f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - ossl_statem_set_error(s); - return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } -int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) +int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) { - unsigned char *p; - - p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; - *p = SSL3_MT_CCS; - s->init_num = 1; - s->init_off = 0; + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_MT_CCS)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } return 1; } -unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, CERT_PKEY *cpk) +/* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */ +static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, int chain) { - unsigned char *p; - unsigned long l = 3 + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s); + int len; + unsigned char *outbytes; - if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s, cpk, &l)) + len = i2d_X509(x, NULL); + if (len < 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, + ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return 0; + } + if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt, len, &outbytes) + || i2d_X509(x, &outbytes) != len) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } - l -= 3 + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s); - p = ssl_handshake_start(s); - l2n3(l, p); - l += 3; - - if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE, l)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) + && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, x, + chain)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ return 0; } - return l + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s); + + return 1; } -WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) +/* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */ +static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk) { - void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; + int i, chain_count; + X509 *x; + STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs; + STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL; + X509_STORE *chain_store; - /* clean a few things up */ - ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); + if (cpk == NULL || cpk->x509 == NULL) + return 1; + + x = cpk->x509; - if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { + /* + * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx. + */ + if (cpk->chain != NULL) + extra_certs = cpk->chain; + else + extra_certs = s->ctx->extra_certs; + + if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs) + chain_store = NULL; + else if (s->cert->chain_store) + chain_store = s->cert->chain_store; + else + chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store; + + if (chain_store != NULL) { + X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); + + if (xs_ctx == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } + if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) { + X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, + ERR_R_X509_LIB); + return 0; + } /* - * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf - * in case there are any unexpected retransmits + * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we + * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately + * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying + * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can */ - BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); - s->init_buf = NULL; + (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx); + /* Don't leave errors in the queue */ + ERR_clear_error(); + chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx); + i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0); + if (i != 1) { +#if 0 + /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK); +#endif + X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i); + return 0; + } + chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain); + for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) { + x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); + + if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); + return 0; + } + } + X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); + } else { + i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0); + if (i != 1) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i); + return 0; + } + if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, 0)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) { + x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i); + if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i + 1)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + } + } + return 1; +} + +unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk) +{ + if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) + return 0; + + if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; } - ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); + return 1; +} - s->init_num = 0; +/* + * Tidy up after the end of a handshake. In the case of SCTP this may result + * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is + * freed up as well. + */ +WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs, int stop) +{ + void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; - if (!s->server || s->renegotiate == 2) { + if (clearbufs) { + if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { + /* + * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf + * in case there are any unexpected retransmits + */ + BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); + s->init_buf = NULL; + } + if (!ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_FINISH_HANDSHAKE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return WORK_ERROR; + } + s->init_num = 0; + } + + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->server + && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) + s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT; + + /* + * Only set if there was a Finished message and this isn't after a TLSv1.3 + * post handshake exchange + */ + if (s->statem.cleanuphand) { /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ s->renegotiate = 0; s->new_session = 0; + s->statem.cleanuphand = 0; + s->ext.ticket_expected = 0; - if (s->server) { - ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); + ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); - s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++; + if (s->server) { + /* + * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of constructing the + * NewSessionTicket + */ + if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) + ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); + + /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */ + tsan_counter(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good); s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept; if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) { @@ -309,12 +1084,26 @@ WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) dtls1_start_timer(s); } } else { - ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + /* + * We encourage applications to only use TLSv1.3 tickets once, + * so we remove this one from the cache. + */ + if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode + & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0) + SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session); + } else { + /* + * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of processing the + * NewSessionTicket + */ + ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); + } if (s->hit) - s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++; + tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit); s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect; - s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++; + tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good); if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) { /* @@ -326,14 +1115,6 @@ WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) } } - if (s->info_callback != NULL) - cb = s->info_callback; - else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) - cb = s->ctx->info_callback; - - if (cb != NULL) - cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { /* done with handshaking */ s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0; @@ -343,15 +1124,32 @@ WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) } } + if (s->info_callback != NULL) + cb = s->info_callback; + else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) + cb = s->ctx->info_callback; + + /* The callback may expect us to not be in init at handshake done */ + ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); + + if (cb != NULL) + cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); + + if (!stop) { + /* If we've got more work to do we go back into init */ + ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1); + return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; + } + return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; } int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt) { /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ - int skip_message, i, recvd_type, al; + int skip_message, i, recvd_type; unsigned char *p; - unsigned long l; + size_t l, readbytes; p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; @@ -360,7 +1158,7 @@ int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt) i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type, &p[s->init_num], SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num, - 0); + 0, &readbytes); if (i <= 0) { s->rwstate = SSL_READING; return 0; @@ -370,28 +1168,41 @@ int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt) * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur * in the middle of a handshake message. */ - if (s->init_num != 0 || i != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) { - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, - SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); - goto f_err; + if (s->init_num != 0 || readbytes != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, + SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, + SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); + return 0; + } + if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_BEFORE + && (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) != 0) { + /* + * We are stateless and we received a CCS. Probably this is + * from a client between the first and second ClientHellos. + * We should ignore this, but return an error because we do + * not return success until we see the second ClientHello + * with a valid cookie. + */ + return 0; } s->s3->tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; - s->init_num = i - 1; + s->init_num = readbytes - 1; s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data; - s->s3->tmp.message_size = i; + s->s3->tmp.message_size = readbytes; return 1; } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, + SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, + SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); + return 0; } - s->init_num += i; + s->init_num += readbytes; } skip_message = 0; if (!s->server) - if (p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) + if (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_OK + && p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) /* * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if @@ -431,9 +1242,9 @@ int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt) n2l3(p, l); /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */ if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, + SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); + return 0; } s->s3->tmp.message_size = l; @@ -442,14 +1253,11 @@ int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt) } return 1; - f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - return 0; } -int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, unsigned long *len) +int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len) { - long n; + size_t n, readbytes; unsigned char *p; int i; @@ -463,14 +1271,14 @@ int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, unsigned long *len) n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num; while (n > 0) { i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL, - &p[s->init_num], n, 0); + &p[s->init_num], n, 0, &readbytes); if (i <= 0) { s->rwstate = SSL_READING; *len = 0; return 0; } - s->init_num += i; - n -= i; + s->init_num += readbytes; + n -= readbytes; } /* @@ -487,8 +1295,7 @@ int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, unsigned long *len) if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, s->init_num)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); + /* SSLfatal() already called */ *len = 0; return 0; } @@ -496,12 +1303,28 @@ int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, unsigned long *len) s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data, (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg); } else { - if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, - s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); - *len = 0; - return 0; + /* + * We defer feeding in the HRR until later. We'll do it as part of + * processing the message + * The TLsv1.3 handshake transcript stops at the ClientFinished + * message. + */ +#define SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2) + /* KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added */ + if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET + && s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE)) { + if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO + || s->init_num < SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + || memcmp(hrrrandom, + s->init_buf->data + SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET, + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) != 0) { + if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, + s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + *len = 0; + return 0; + } + } } if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, @@ -509,114 +1332,63 @@ int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, unsigned long *len) s->msg_callback_arg); } - /* - * init_num should never be negative...should probably be declared - * unsigned - */ - if (s->init_num < 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); - *len = 0; - return 0; - } - *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num; + *len = s->init_num; return 1; } -int ssl_cert_type(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *pk) -{ - if (pk == NULL && (pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x)) == NULL) - return -1; - - switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) { - default: - return -1; - case EVP_PKEY_RSA: - return SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC; - case EVP_PKEY_DSA: - return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - case EVP_PKEY_EC: - return SSL_PKEY_ECC; -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST - case NID_id_GostR3410_2001: - return SSL_PKEY_GOST01; - case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256: - return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256; - case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512: - return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; -#endif - } -} +static const X509ERR2ALERT x509table[] = { + {X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE}, + {X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, + {X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED}, + {X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED}, + {X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR}, + {X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED}, + {X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR}, + {X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, + {X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, + {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, + {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, + {X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, + {X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, + {X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, + {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, + {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, + {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, + {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, + {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, + {X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, + + /* Last entry; return this if we don't find the value above. */ + {X509_V_OK, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN} +}; -int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type) +int ssl_x509err2alert(int x509err) { - int al; + const X509ERR2ALERT *tp; - switch (type) { - case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT: - case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL: - case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER: - al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; - break; - case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE: - case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE: - case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY: - case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD: - case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD: - case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD: - case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD: - case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID: - case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID: - case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED: - case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED: - case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH: - case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH: - case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH: - case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH: - case X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL: - case X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL: - case X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK: - al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE; - break; - case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: - case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: - al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; - break; - case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED: - case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED: - al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED; - break; - case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED: - al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED; - break; - case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED: - case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: - case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL: - case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP: - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - break; - case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT: - case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN: - case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY: - case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE: - case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG: - case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED: - case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA: - al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; - break; - case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION: - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - break; - case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE: - al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; - break; - default: - al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN; - break; - } - return (al); + for (tp = x509table; tp->x509err != X509_V_OK; ++tp) + if (tp->x509err == x509err) + break; + return tp->alert; } int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s) @@ -643,11 +1415,17 @@ typedef struct { const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void); } version_info; -#if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_2_VERSION -# error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_2_VERSION. +#if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_3_VERSION +# error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION. #endif +/* Must be in order high to low */ static const version_info tls_version_table[] = { +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 + {TLS1_3_VERSION, tlsv1_3_client_method, tlsv1_3_server_method}, +#else + {TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, +#endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2 {TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method}, #else @@ -675,6 +1453,7 @@ static const version_info tls_version_table[] = { # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION. #endif +/* Must be in order high to low */ static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method}, @@ -716,8 +1495,62 @@ static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method) return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s)) return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE; - else if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_FIPS) != 0 && FIPS_mode()) - return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_0_NEEDED_IN_FIPS_MODE; + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Only called by servers. Returns 1 if the server has a TLSv1.3 capable + * certificate type, or has PSK or a certificate callback configured. Otherwise + * returns 0. + */ +static int is_tls13_capable(const SSL *s) +{ + int i; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC + int curve; + EC_KEY *eckey; +#endif + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK + if (s->psk_server_callback != NULL) + return 1; +#endif + + if (s->psk_find_session_cb != NULL || s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) + return 1; + + for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { + /* Skip over certs disallowed for TLSv1.3 */ + switch (i) { + case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN: + case SSL_PKEY_GOST01: + case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256: + case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512: + continue; + default: + break; + } + if (!ssl_has_cert(s, i)) + continue; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC + if (i != SSL_PKEY_ECC) + return 1; + /* + * Prior to TLSv1.3 sig algs allowed any curve to be used. TLSv1.3 is + * more restrictive so check that our sig algs are consistent with this + * EC cert. See section 4.2.3 of RFC8446. + */ + eckey = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey); + if (eckey == NULL) + continue; + curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)); + if (tls_check_sigalg_curve(s, curve)) + return 1; +#else + return 1; +#endif + } return 0; } @@ -731,7 +1564,7 @@ static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method) * * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0 */ -int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version) +int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version, const SSL_METHOD **meth) { const version_info *vent; const version_info *table; @@ -751,9 +1584,14 @@ int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version) for (vent = table; vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0; ++vent) { - if (vent->cmeth != NULL && - version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0 && - ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0) { + if (vent->cmeth != NULL + && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0 + && ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0 + && (!s->server + || version != TLS1_3_VERSION + || is_tls13_capable(s))) { + if (meth != NULL) + *meth = vent->cmeth(); return 1; } } @@ -859,6 +1697,27 @@ int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound) return 1; } +static void check_for_downgrade(SSL *s, int vers, DOWNGRADE *dgrd) +{ + if (vers == TLS1_2_VERSION + && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL)) { + *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2; + } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) + && vers < TLS1_2_VERSION + /* + * We need to ensure that a server that disables TLSv1.2 + * (creating a hole between TLSv1.3 and TLSv1.1) can still + * complete handshakes with clients that support TLSv1.2 and + * below. Therefore we do not enable the sentinel if TLSv1.3 is + * enabled and TLSv1.2 is not. + */ + && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL)) { + *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1; + } else { + *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE; + } +} + /* * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and @@ -868,7 +1727,7 @@ int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound) * * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. */ -int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s) +int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, DOWNGRADE *dgrd) { /*- * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with: @@ -880,23 +1739,34 @@ int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s) * handle version. */ int server_version = s->method->version; - int client_version = s->client_version; + int client_version = hello->legacy_version; const version_info *vent; const version_info *table; int disabled = 0; + RAW_EXTENSION *suppversions; + + s->client_version = client_version; switch (server_version) { default: - if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0) - return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; + if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0) + return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; + *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE; + /* + * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't + * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope + * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol + * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return + * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) + */ + return 0; + } /* - * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't - * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope - * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol - * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return - * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) + * Fall through if we are TLSv1.3 already (this means we must be after + * a HelloRetryRequest */ - return 0; + /* fall thru */ case TLS_ANY_VERSION: table = tls_version_table; break; @@ -905,6 +1775,77 @@ int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s) break; } + suppversions = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions]; + + /* If we did an HRR then supported versions is mandatory */ + if (!suppversions->present && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) + return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; + + if (suppversions->present && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { + unsigned int candidate_vers = 0; + unsigned int best_vers = 0; + const SSL_METHOD *best_method = NULL; + PACKET versionslist; + + suppversions->parsed = 1; + + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions->data, &versionslist)) { + /* Trailing or invalid data? */ + return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH; + } + + /* + * The TLSv1.3 spec says the client MUST set this to TLS1_2_VERSION. + * The spec only requires servers to check that it isn't SSLv3: + * "Any endpoint receiving a Hello message with + * ClientHello.legacy_version or ServerHello.legacy_version set to + * 0x0300 MUST abort the handshake with a "protocol_version" alert." + * We are slightly stricter and require that it isn't SSLv3 or lower. + * We tolerate TLSv1 and TLSv1.1. + */ + if (client_version <= SSL3_VERSION) + return SSL_R_BAD_LEGACY_VERSION; + + while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist, &candidate_vers)) { + if (version_cmp(s, candidate_vers, best_vers) <= 0) + continue; + if (ssl_version_supported(s, candidate_vers, &best_method)) + best_vers = candidate_vers; + } + if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist) != 0) { + /* Trailing data? */ + return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH; + } + + if (best_vers > 0) { + if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) { + /* + * This is after a HelloRetryRequest so we better check that we + * negotiated TLSv1.3 + */ + if (best_vers != TLS1_3_VERSION) + return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; + return 0; + } + check_for_downgrade(s, best_vers, dgrd); + s->version = best_vers; + s->method = best_method; + return 0; + } + return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; + } + + /* + * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest + * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2 + */ + if (version_cmp(s, client_version, TLS1_3_VERSION) >= 0) + client_version = TLS1_2_VERSION; + + /* + * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in + * the ClientHello. + */ for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { const SSL_METHOD *method; @@ -913,6 +1854,7 @@ int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s) continue; method = vent->smeth(); if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) { + check_for_downgrade(s, vent->version, dgrd); s->version = vent->version; s->method = method; return 0; @@ -929,18 +1871,45 @@ int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s) * * @s: client SSL handle. * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO. + * @extensions: The extensions received * - * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. + * Returns 1 on success or 0 on error. */ -int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version) +int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version, RAW_EXTENSION *extensions) { const version_info *vent; const version_info *table; + int ret, ver_min, ver_max, real_max, origv; + + origv = s->version; + s->version = version; + + /* This will overwrite s->version if the extension is present */ + if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions, + SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO + | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO, extensions, + NULL, 0)) { + s->version = origv; + return 0; + } + + if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE + && s->version != TLS1_3_VERSION) { + s->version = origv; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, + SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); + return 0; + } switch (s->method->version) { default: - if (version != s->version) - return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; + if (s->version != s->method->version) { + s->version = origv; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, + SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, + SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); + return 0; + } /* * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope @@ -948,7 +1917,7 @@ int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version) * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) */ - return 0; + return 1; case TLS_ANY_VERSION: table = tls_version_table; break; @@ -957,36 +1926,84 @@ int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version) break; } - for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { - const SSL_METHOD *method; - int err; + ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, &real_max); + if (ret != 0) { + s->version = origv; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, + SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, ret); + return 0; + } + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? DTLS_VERSION_LT(s->version, ver_min) + : s->version < ver_min) { + s->version = origv; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, + SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); + return 0; + } else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? DTLS_VERSION_GT(s->version, ver_max) + : s->version > ver_max) { + s->version = origv; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, + SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); + return 0; + } - if (version != vent->version) + if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) == 0) + real_max = ver_max; + + /* Check for downgrades */ + if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION && real_max > s->version) { + if (memcmp(tls12downgrade, + s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + - sizeof(tls12downgrade), + sizeof(tls12downgrade)) == 0) { + s->version = origv; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, + SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); + return 0; + } + } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) + && s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION + && real_max > s->version) { + if (memcmp(tls11downgrade, + s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + - sizeof(tls11downgrade), + sizeof(tls11downgrade)) == 0) { + s->version = origv; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, + SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); + return 0; + } + } + + for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { + if (vent->cmeth == NULL || s->version != vent->version) continue; - if (vent->cmeth == NULL) - break; - method = vent->cmeth(); - err = ssl_method_error(s, method); - if (err != 0) - return err; - s->method = method; - s->version = version; - return 0; + + s->method = vent->cmeth(); + return 1; } - return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; + s->version = origv; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, + SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); + return 0; } /* - * ssl_get_client_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum client version + * ssl_get_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum protocol version * @s: The SSL connection * @min_version: The minimum supported version * @max_version: The maximum supported version + * @real_max: The highest version below the lowest compile time version hole + * where that hole lies above at least one run-time enabled + * protocol. * * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B - * or FIPS_mode() constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here, + * constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here, * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later. * * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled, @@ -996,10 +2013,10 @@ int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version) * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0. */ -int ssl_get_client_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, - int *max_version) +int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, int *max_version, + int *real_max) { - int version; + int version, tmp_real_max; int hole; const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL; const SSL_METHOD *method; @@ -1016,6 +2033,12 @@ int ssl_get_client_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) */ *min_version = *max_version = s->version; + /* + * Providing a real_max only makes sense where we're using a version + * flexible method. + */ + if (!ossl_assert(real_max == NULL)) + return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; case TLS_ANY_VERSION: table = tls_version_table; @@ -1048,6 +2071,9 @@ int ssl_get_client_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, */ *min_version = version = 0; hole = 1; + if (real_max != NULL) + *real_max = 0; + tmp_real_max = 0; for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { /* * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the @@ -1055,15 +2081,22 @@ int ssl_get_client_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, */ if (vent->cmeth == NULL) { hole = 1; + tmp_real_max = 0; continue; } method = vent->cmeth(); + + if (hole == 1 && tmp_real_max == 0) + tmp_real_max = vent->version; + if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) { hole = 1; } else if (!hole) { single = NULL; *min_version = method->version; } else { + if (real_max != NULL && tmp_real_max != 0) + *real_max = tmp_real_max; version = (single = method)->version; *min_version = version; hole = 0; @@ -1081,7 +2114,7 @@ int ssl_get_client_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, /* * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for - * the initial ClientHello. + * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field. * * @s: client SSL handle. * @@ -1098,11 +2131,291 @@ int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s) if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) return 0; - ret = ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max); + ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, NULL); if (ret != 0) return ret; - s->client_version = s->version = ver_max; + s->version = ver_max; + + /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */ + if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ver_max > TLS1_2_VERSION) + ver_max = TLS1_2_VERSION; + + s->client_version = ver_max; + return 0; +} + +/* + * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is + * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be + * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is + * 1) or 0 otherwise. + */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC +int check_in_list(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, const uint16_t *groups, + size_t num_groups, int checkallow) +{ + size_t i; + + if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0) + return 0; + + for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) { + uint16_t group = groups[i]; + + if (group_id == group + && (!checkallow + || tls_curve_allowed(s, group, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) { + return 1; + } + } + + return 0; +} +#endif + +/* Replace ClientHello1 in the transcript hash with a synthetic message */ +int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL *s, const unsigned char *hashval, + size_t hashlen, const unsigned char *hrr, + size_t hrrlen) +{ + unsigned char hashvaltmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + unsigned char msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]; + + memset(msghdr, 0, sizeof(msghdr)); + + if (hashval == NULL) { + hashval = hashvaltmp; + hashlen = 0; + /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */ + if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0) + || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashvaltmp, sizeof(hashvaltmp), + &hashlen)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + } + + /* Reinitialise the transcript hash */ + if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + + /* Inject the synthetic message_hash message */ + msghdr[0] = SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH; + msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 1] = (unsigned char)hashlen; + if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, msghdr, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) + || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, hashval, hashlen)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + + /* + * Now re-inject the HRR and current message if appropriate (we just deleted + * it when we reinitialised the transcript hash above). Only necessary after + * receiving a ClientHello2 with a cookie. + */ + if (hrr != NULL + && (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, hrr, hrrlen) + || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, + s->s3->tmp.message_size + + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b) +{ + return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b); +} + +int parse_ca_names(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) +{ + STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp); + X509_NAME *xn = NULL; + PACKET cadns; + + if (ca_sk == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + /* get the CA RDNs */ + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cadns)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + + while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns)) { + const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes; + unsigned int name_len; + + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns, &name_len) + || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns, &namebytes, name_len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + + namestart = namebytes; + if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &namebytes, name_len)) == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, + ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); + goto err; + } + if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, + SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + + if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + xn = NULL; + } + + sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names, X509_NAME_free); + s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names = ca_sk; + + return 1; + + err: + sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free); + X509_NAME_free(xn); return 0; } + +const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *get_ca_names(SSL *s) +{ + const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;; + + if (s->server) { + ca_sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); + if (ca_sk != NULL && sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk) == 0) + ca_sk = NULL; + } + + if (ca_sk == NULL) + ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(s); + + return ca_sk; +} + +int construct_ca_names(SSL *s, const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk, WPACKET *pkt) +{ + /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */ + if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + if (ca_sk != NULL) { + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk); i++) { + unsigned char *namebytes; + X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_sk, i); + int namelen; + + if (name == NULL + || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0 + || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen, + &namebytes) + || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + } + } + + if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +/* Create a buffer containing data to be signed for server key exchange */ +size_t construct_key_exchange_tbs(SSL *s, unsigned char **ptbs, + const void *param, size_t paramlen) +{ + size_t tbslen = 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + paramlen; + unsigned char *tbs = OPENSSL_malloc(tbslen); + + if (tbs == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_KEY_EXCHANGE_TBS, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } + memcpy(tbs, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + + memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2, param, paramlen); + + *ptbs = tbs; + return tbslen; +} + +/* + * Saves the current handshake digest for Post-Handshake Auth, + * Done after ClientFinished is processed, done exactly once + */ +int tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL *s) +{ + if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) { + if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + + s->pha_dgst = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS13_SAVE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->pha_dgst, + s->s3->handshake_dgst)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS13_SAVE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + } + return 1; +} + +/* + * Restores the Post-Handshake Auth handshake digest + * Done just before sending/processing the Cert Request + */ +int tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL *s) +{ + if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS13_RESTORE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->s3->handshake_dgst, + s->pha_dgst)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS13_RESTORE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + return 1; +} |