diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c')
-rw-r--r-- | deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c | 3717 |
1 files changed, 2310 insertions, 1407 deletions
diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c index f81fa5e199..e7c11c4bea 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c @@ -1,5 +1,7 @@ /* * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved + * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -7,50 +9,11 @@ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. - * - * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by - * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. - * - * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source - * license provided above. - * - * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by - * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. - * - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. - * - * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by - * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source - * license. - * - * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of - * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites - * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. - * - * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in - * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received - * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. - * - * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not - * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third - * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights - * to make use of the Contribution. - * - * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN - * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA - * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY - * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR - * OTHERWISE. - */ - #include <stdio.h> #include "../ssl_locl.h" #include "statem_locl.h" #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h" +#include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include <openssl/buffer.h> #include <openssl/rand.h> #include <openssl/objects.h> @@ -61,28 +24,134 @@ #include <openssl/bn.h> #include <openssl/md5.h> -static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, - PACKET *cipher_suites, - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) - **skp, int sslv2format, - int *al); +#define TICKET_NONCE_SIZE 8 + +static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt); + +/* + * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed + * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from + * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. + * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|. + * + * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error + * (transition not allowed) + */ +static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) +{ + OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; + + /* + * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have + * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by + * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() + */ + switch (st->hand_state) { + default: + break; + + case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: + if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) { + if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO; + return 1; + } + break; + } else if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) { + if (mt == SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA; + return 1; + } + break; + } + /* Fall through */ + + case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: + case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: + if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { + if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT; + return 1; + } + } else { + if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; + return 1; + } + } + break; + + case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: + if (s->session->peer == NULL) { + if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; + return 1; + } + } else { + if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY; + return 1; + } + } + break; + + case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: + if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; + return 1; + } + break; + + case TLS_ST_OK: + /* + * Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of + * early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert) + */ + if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING) + break; + + if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE + && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT; + return 1; + } + + if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE; + return 1; + } + break; + } + + /* No valid transition found */ + return 0; +} /* - * server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed handshake - * state transitions when the server is reading messages from the client. The - * message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The current state - * is in |s->statem.hand_state|. + * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed + * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the + * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The + * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|. * - * Valid return values are: - * 1: Success (transition allowed) - * 0: Error (transition not allowed) + * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error + * (transition not allowed) */ int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt)) + goto err; + return 1; + } + switch (st->hand_state) { + default: + break; + case TLS_ST_BEFORE: + case TLS_ST_OK: case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO; @@ -111,10 +180,9 @@ int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) * not going to accept it because we require a client * cert. */ - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, - SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, - SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, + SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); return 0; } st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH; @@ -176,7 +244,7 @@ int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG - if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) { + if (s->s3->npn_seen) { if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO; return 1; @@ -207,11 +275,9 @@ int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) return 1; } break; - - default: - break; } + err: /* No valid transition found */ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { BIO *rbio; @@ -227,9 +293,9 @@ int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) BIO_set_retry_read(rbio); return 0; } - ossl_statem_set_error(s); - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); - SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, + SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, + SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); return 0; } @@ -282,16 +348,22 @@ static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) * 1: Yes * 0: No */ -static int send_certificate_request(SSL *s) +int send_certificate_request(SSL *s) { if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */ s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER /* + * don't request if post-handshake-only unless doing + * post-handshake in TLSv1.3: + */ + && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE) + || s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) + /* * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert - * during re-negotiation: + * a second time: */ - && (s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 || + && (s->certreqs_sent < 1 || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) /* * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see @@ -319,34 +391,197 @@ static int send_certificate_request(SSL *s) } /* - * server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next - * when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client. + * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to + * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the + * client. + */ +static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s) +{ + OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; + + /* + * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated + * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition() + */ + + switch (st->hand_state) { + default: + /* Shouldn't happen */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER13_WRITE_TRANSITION, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; + + case TLS_ST_OK: + if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + } + if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + } + /* Try to read from the client instead */ + return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; + + case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + + case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: + if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0 + && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE) + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; + else if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA; + else + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + + case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: + if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA; + else + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + + case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: + if (s->hit) + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED; + else if (send_certificate_request(s)) + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ; + else + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT; + + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + + case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ: + if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) { + s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED; + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; + } else { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT; + } + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + + case TLS_ST_SW_CERT: + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + + case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY: + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + + case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + + case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: + return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; + + case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: + /* + * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're + * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out any session tickets + * immediately. + */ + if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) { + s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED; + } else if (!s->ext.ticket_expected) { + /* + * If we're not going to renew the ticket then we just finish the + * handshake at this point. + */ + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + } + if (s->num_tickets > s->sent_tickets) + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET; + else + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + + case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE: + if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + } + /* Fall through */ + + case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE: + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + + case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: + /* In a resumption we only ever send a maximum of one new ticket. + * Following an initial handshake we send the number of tickets we have + * been configured for. + */ + if (s->hit || s->num_tickets <= s->sent_tickets) { + /* We've written enough tickets out. */ + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; + } + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + } +} + +/* + * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move + * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client. */ WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; + /* + * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going + * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later + */ + + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) + return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s); + switch (st->hand_state) { + default: + /* Shouldn't happen */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_WRITE_TRANSITION, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; + + case TLS_ST_OK: + if (st->request_state == TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ) { + /* We must be trying to renegotiate */ + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ; + st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + } + /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */ + if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; + } + /* Fall through */ + case TLS_ST_BEFORE: /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */ return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; - case TLS_ST_OK: - /* We must be trying to renegotiate */ - st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ; - return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; - case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; - ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified - && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) + && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) { st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; - else + } else if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { + /* We must have rejected the renegotiation */ + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + } else { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO; + } return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: @@ -354,7 +589,7 @@ WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s) case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: if (s->hit) { - if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) + if (s->ext.ticket_expected) st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET; else st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; @@ -375,7 +610,7 @@ WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s) return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; case TLS_ST_SW_CERT: - if (s->tlsext_status_expected) { + if (s->ext.status_expected) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; } @@ -405,9 +640,8 @@ WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s) case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: if (s->hit) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; - ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; - } else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) { + } else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET; } else { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; @@ -427,12 +661,7 @@ WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s) return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; } st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; - ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; - - default: - /* Shouldn't happen */ - return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; } } @@ -445,6 +674,10 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; switch (st->hand_state) { + default: + /* No pre work to be done */ + break; + case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: s->shutdown = 0; if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) @@ -472,13 +705,24 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { + /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */ return dtls_wait_for_dry(s); + } #endif return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->sent_tickets == 0) { + /* + * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going + * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off + * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active. + * + * Calls SSLfatal as required. + */ + return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 0); + } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { /* * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer @@ -488,9 +732,11 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) break; case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) + break; s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) { - ossl_statem_set_error(s); + /* SSLfatal() already called */ return WORK_ERROR; } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { @@ -504,17 +750,36 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) } return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; - case TLS_ST_OK: - return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst); + case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: + if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING + && (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0) + return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; + /* Fall through */ - default: - /* No pre work to be done */ - break; + case TLS_ST_OK: + /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */ + return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1); } return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; } +static ossl_inline int conn_is_closed(void) +{ + switch (get_last_sys_error()) { +#if defined(EPIPE) + case EPIPE: + return 1; +#endif +#if defined(ECONNRESET) + case ECONNRESET: + return 1; +#endif + default: + return 0; + } +} + /* * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the * server to the client. @@ -526,11 +791,15 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) s->init_num = 0; switch (st->hand_state) { + default: + /* No post work to be done */ + break; + case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: if (statem_flush(s) != 1) return WORK_MORE_A; if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { - ossl_statem_set_error(s); + /* SSLfatal() already called */ return WORK_ERROR; } break; @@ -540,7 +809,7 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) return WORK_MORE_A; /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */ if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { - ossl_statem_set_error(s); + /* SSLfatal() already called */ return WORK_ERROR; } /* @@ -551,6 +820,12 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) break; case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) { + if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0 + && statem_flush(s) != 1) + return WORK_MORE_A; + break; + } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) { unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; @@ -567,7 +842,9 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) { - ossl_statem_set_error(s); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_WORK, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return WORK_ERROR; } @@ -575,9 +852,42 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); } #endif - break; + if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) + || ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0 + && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE)) + break; + /* Fall through */ case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: + if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) { + if (!statem_flush(s)) + return WORK_MORE_A; + break; + } + + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s) + || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, + SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return WORK_ERROR; + } + + if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED + && !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, + SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return WORK_ERROR; + } + /* + * We don't yet know whether the next record we are going to receive + * is an unencrypted alert, an encrypted alert, or an encrypted + * handshake message. We temporarily tolerate unencrypted alerts. + */ + s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_ALLOW_PLAIN_ALERTS; + break; + } + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) { /* @@ -591,7 +901,7 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) { - ossl_statem_set_error(s); + /* SSLfatal() already called */ return WORK_ERROR; } @@ -617,10 +927,51 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) 0, NULL); } #endif + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, + s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0, + &s->session->master_key_length) + || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, + SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return WORK_ERROR; + } break; - default: - /* No post work to be done */ + case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ: + if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) { + if (statem_flush(s) != 1) + return WORK_MORE_A; + } + break; + + case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE: + if (statem_flush(s) != 1) + return WORK_MORE_A; + if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return WORK_ERROR; + } + break; + + case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: + clear_sys_error(); + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1) { + if (SSL_get_error(s, 0) == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL + && conn_is_closed()) { + /* + * We ignore connection closed errors in TLSv1.3 when sending a + * NewSessionTicket and behave as if we were successful. This is + * so that we are still able to read data sent to us by a client + * that closes soon after the end of the handshake without + * waiting to read our post-handshake NewSessionTickets. + */ + s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; + break; + } + + return WORK_MORE_A; + } break; } @@ -628,63 +979,108 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) } /* - * Construct a message to be sent from the server to the client. + * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the + * server * * Valid return values are: * 1: Success * 0: Error */ -int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s) +int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + confunc_f *confunc, int *mt) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; switch (st->hand_state) { + default: + /* Shouldn't happen */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE, + SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE); + return 0; + + case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) + *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec; + else + *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec; + *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; + break; + case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: - return dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(s); + *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request; + *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; + break; case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: - return tls_construct_hello_request(s); + /* No construction function needed */ + *confunc = NULL; + *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST; + break; case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: - return tls_construct_server_hello(s); + *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello; + *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO; + break; case TLS_ST_SW_CERT: - return tls_construct_server_certificate(s); + *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate; + *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE; + break; + + case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY: + *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify; + *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY; + break; + case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH: - return tls_construct_server_key_exchange(s); + *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange; + *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; + break; case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ: - return tls_construct_certificate_request(s); + *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request; + *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; + break; case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: - return tls_construct_server_done(s); + *confunc = tls_construct_server_done; + *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; + break; case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: - return tls_construct_new_session_ticket(s); + *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket; + *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET; + break; case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS: - return tls_construct_cert_status(s); - - case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) - return dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s); - else - return tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s); + *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status; + *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS; + break; case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: - return tls_construct_finished(s, - s->method-> - ssl3_enc->server_finished_label, - s->method-> - ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len); + *confunc = tls_construct_finished; + *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED; + break; - default: - /* Shouldn't happen */ + case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: + *confunc = NULL; + *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY; + break; + + case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: + *confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions; + *mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS; + break; + + case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE: + *confunc = tls_construct_key_update; + *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE; break; } - return 0; + return 1; } /* @@ -711,14 +1107,21 @@ int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s) * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are * reading. Excludes the message header. */ -unsigned long ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s) +size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; switch (st->hand_state) { + default: + /* Shouldn't happen */ + return 0; + case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH; + case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: + return END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH; + case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: return s->max_cert_list; @@ -739,12 +1142,9 @@ unsigned long ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s) case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH; - default: - /* Shouldn't happen */ - break; + case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE: + return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH; } - - return 0; } /* @@ -755,9 +1155,19 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; switch (st->hand_state) { + default: + /* Shouldn't happen */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_PROCESS_MESSAGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt); + case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: + return tls_process_end_of_early_data(s, pkt); + case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt); @@ -778,12 +1188,10 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: return tls_process_finished(s, pkt); - default: - /* Shouldn't happen */ - break; - } + case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE: + return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt); - return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } } /* @@ -795,26 +1203,27 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; switch (st->hand_state) { + default: + /* Shouldn't happen */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return WORK_ERROR; + case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst); case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst); - - default: - break; } - - /* Shouldn't happen */ - return WORK_ERROR; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP -static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al) +/* Returns 1 on success, 0 for retryable error, -1 for fatal error */ +static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s) { - int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE; - - *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; + int ret; + int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) && (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) { @@ -823,100 +1232,173 @@ static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al) * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp * login name */ - ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL; - *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY, + SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO, + SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); + return -1; } else { - ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al); + ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, &al); + if (ret < 0) + return 0; + if (ret == SSL3_AL_FATAL) { + SSLfatal(s, al, SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO, + al == SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY + ? SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND + : SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); + return -1; + } } } - return ret; + return 1; } #endif -int tls_construct_hello_request(SSL *s) +int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie, + size_t cookie_len) { - if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - ossl_statem_set_error(s); + /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */ + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION) + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len)) return 0; - } return 1; } -unsigned int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(unsigned char *buf, - unsigned char *cookie, - unsigned char cookie_len) +int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) { - unsigned int msg_len; - unsigned char *p; - - p = buf; - /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */ - *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION >> 8; - *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION & 0xFF; + unsigned int cookie_leni; + if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL || + s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie, + &cookie_leni) == 0 || + cookie_leni > 255) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, + SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE); + return 0; + } + s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni; - *(p++) = (unsigned char)cookie_len; - memcpy(p, cookie, cookie_len); - p += cookie_len; - msg_len = p - buf; + if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie, + s->d1->cookie_len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } - return msg_len; + return 1; } -int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s) +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC +/*- + * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X + * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|. + * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order: + * SNI, + * elliptic_curves + * ec_point_formats + * signature_algorithms (for TLSv1.2 only) + * + * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8, + * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them. + * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from + * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work). + */ +static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello) { - unsigned int len; - unsigned char *buf; - - buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; - - if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL || - s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie, - &(s->d1->cookie_len)) == 0 || - s->d1->cookie_len > 255) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, - SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE); - ossl_statem_set_error(s); - return 0; + static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = { + 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */ + 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */ + 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */ + 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */ + 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */ + 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */ + + 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */ + 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */ + 0x01, /* 1 point format */ + 0x00, /* uncompressed */ + /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */ + 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */ + 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */ + 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */ + 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */ + 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */ + 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */ + 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */ + 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */ + }; + /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */ + static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18; + unsigned int type; + PACKET sni, tmppkt; + size_t ext_len; + + tmppkt = hello->extensions; + + if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2) + || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type) + || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) { + return; } - len = dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(&buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH], - s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len); - - dtls1_set_message_header(s, DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, len, 0, len); - len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; + if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) + return; - /* number of bytes to write */ - s->init_num = len; - s->init_off = 0; + ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ? + sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength; - return 1; + s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock, + ext_len); } +#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { - int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - unsigned int j, complen = 0; - unsigned long id; - const SSL_CIPHER *c; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP - SSL_COMP *comp = NULL; -#endif - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL; - int protverr; /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */ - PACKET session_id, cipher_suites, compression, extensions, cookie; - int is_v2_record; + PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie; static const unsigned char null_compression = 0; + CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = NULL; - is_v2_record = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer); + /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */ + if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { + if (!ossl_assert(!SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION) != 0 + || (!s->s3->send_connection_binding + && (s->options + & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) == 0)) { + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); + return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; + } + s->renegotiate = 1; + s->new_session = 1; + } + clienthello = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello)); + if (clienthello == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + /* + * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure. + */ + clienthello->isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer); PACKET_null_init(&cookie); - /* First lets get s->client_version set correctly */ - if (is_v2_record) { - unsigned int version; + + if (clienthello->isv2) { unsigned int mt; + + if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) + || s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + goto err; + } + /*- * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS @@ -939,136 +1421,97 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record * in the first place */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - - if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &version)) { - /* No protocol version supplied! */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } - if (version == 0x0002) { - /* This is real SSLv2. We don't support it. */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL); - goto err; - } else if ((version & 0xff00) == (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) { - /* SSLv3/TLS */ - s->client_version = version; - } else { - /* No idea what protocol this is */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL); - goto err; - } - } else { - /* - * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may - * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) - */ - if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->client_version)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); - goto f_err; - } } - /* - * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check - * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later. - */ - if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { - protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s); - } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION && - DTLS_VERSION_LT(s->client_version, s->version)) { - protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; - } else { - protverr = 0; - } - - if (protverr) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr); - if ((!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)) { - /* - * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version - * number - */ - s->version = s->client_version; - } - al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; - goto f_err; + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello->legacy_version)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto err; } /* Parse the message and load client random. */ - if (is_v2_record) { + if (clienthello->isv2) { /* * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format. - * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected above. + * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below. */ - unsigned int cipher_len, session_id_len, challenge_len; + unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len; PACKET challenge; - if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &cipher_len) + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, - SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; } if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; } - if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &cipher_suites, cipher_len) - || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &session_id, session_id_len) + if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites, + ciphersuite_len) + || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->session_id, session_id_len) || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len) /* No extensions. */ || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, - SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; } + clienthello->session_id_len = session_id_len; - /* Load the client random and compression list. */ - challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : - challenge_len; - memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + * here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit + * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if + * sizeof(clienthello->random) does. + */ + challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len; + memset(clienthello->random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge, - s->s3->client_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - + clienthello->random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - challenge_len, challenge_len) /* Advertise only null compression. */ || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; } - PACKET_null_init(&extensions); + PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions); } else { /* Regular ClientHello. */ - if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) - || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - - if (PACKET_remaining(&session_id) > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; + if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) + || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id) + || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello->session_id, + SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH, + &clienthello->session_id_len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello->dtls_cookie, + DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH, + &clienthello->dtls_cookie_len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; } /* * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, @@ -1076,55 +1519,262 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) * So check cookie length... */ if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) { - if (PACKET_remaining(&cookie) == 0) - return 1; + if (clienthello->dtls_cookie_len == 0) { + OPENSSL_free(clienthello); + return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; + } } } - if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cipher_suites) - || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; } + /* Could be empty. */ - extensions = *pkt; + if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) { + PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions); + } else { + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->extensions) + || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + } + } + + if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello->compressions, + MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE, + &clienthello->compressions_len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */ + extensions = clienthello->extensions; + if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, + &clienthello->pre_proc_exts, + &clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len, 1)) { + /* SSLfatal already been called */ + goto err; + } + s->clienthello = clienthello; + + return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; + + err: + if (clienthello != NULL) + OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts); + OPENSSL_free(clienthello); + + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; +} + +static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s) +{ + unsigned int j; + int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + int protverr; + size_t loop; + unsigned long id; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP + SSL_COMP *comp = NULL; +#endif + const SSL_CIPHER *c; + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL; + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *scsvs = NULL; + CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = s->clienthello; + DOWNGRADE dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE; + + /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */ + /* Give the ClientHello callback a crack at things */ + if (s->ctx->client_hello_cb != NULL) { + /* A failure in the ClientHello callback terminates the connection. */ + switch (s->ctx->client_hello_cb(s, &al, s->ctx->client_hello_cb_arg)) { + case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS: + break; + case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_RETRY: + s->rwstate = SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_CB; + return -1; + case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_ERROR: + default: + SSLfatal(s, al, + SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED); + goto err; + } + } + + /* Set up the client_random */ + memcpy(s->s3->client_random, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + + /* Choose the version */ + + if (clienthello->isv2) { + if (clienthello->legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION + || (clienthello->legacy_version & 0xff00) + != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) { + /* + * This is real SSLv2 or something completely unknown. We don't + * support it. + */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, + SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL); + goto err; + } + /* SSLv3/TLS */ + s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version; + } + /* + * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check + * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later. + */ + if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { + protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd); + } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION && + DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello->legacy_version, s->version)) { + protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; + } else { + protverr = 0; + } + + if (protverr) { + if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { + /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */ + s->version = s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version; + } + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, + SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr); + goto err; + } + + /* TLSv1.3 specifies that a ClientHello must end on a record boundary */ + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, + SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); + goto err; } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */ if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) { if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) { - if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, PACKET_data(&cookie), - PACKET_remaining(&cookie)) == - 0) { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, - SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; + if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello->dtls_cookie, + clienthello->dtls_cookie_len) == 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); + goto err; /* else cookie verification succeeded */ } /* default verification */ - } else if (!PACKET_equal(&cookie, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len)) { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; + } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello->dtls_cookie_len + || memcmp(clienthello->dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie, + s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); + goto err; } s->d1->cookie_verified = 1; } if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) { - protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s); + protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd); if (protverr != 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr); s->version = s->client_version; - al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, + SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr); + goto err; } } } s->hit = 0; + if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, + clienthello->isv2) || + !bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, &ciphers, &scsvs, + clienthello->isv2, 1)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + + s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0; + /* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */ + if (scsvs != NULL) { + for(i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs); i++) { + c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs, i); + if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_SCSV) { + if (s->renegotiate) { + /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING); + goto err; + } + s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1; + } else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV && + !ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) { + /* + * This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried + * a higher version. We should fail if the current version + * is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first + * connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger + * an insecure downgrade. + */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK, + SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); + goto err; + } + } + } + + /* For TLSv1.3 we must select the ciphersuite *before* session resumption */ + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = + ssl3_choose_cipher(s, ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s)); + + if (cipher == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); + goto err; + } + if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING + && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL + || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != cipher->id)) { + /* + * A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we + * just selected. Something must have changed. + */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_BAD_CIPHER); + goto err; + } + s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher; + } + + /* We need to do this before getting the session */ + if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret, + SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, + clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + /* * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello. * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty. @@ -1141,41 +1791,41 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be * ignored. */ - if (is_v2_record || + if (clienthello->isv2 || (s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) { - if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) + if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; + } } else { - i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &extensions, &session_id); - /* - * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated - * version. - * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption - * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but - * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable. - * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and - * will abort the handshake with an error. - */ - if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) { + i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, clienthello); + if (i == 1) { /* previous session */ s->hit = 1; } else if (i == -1) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } else { /* i == 0 */ - if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) + if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; + } } } - if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &cipher_suites, &(ciphers), - is_v2_record, &al) == NULL) { - goto f_err; + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->clienthello->session_id, + s->clienthello->session_id_len); + s->tmp_session_id_len = s->clienthello->session_id_len; } - /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */ - if (s->hit) { + /* + * If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list. In TLSv1.3 we check + * ciphersuite compatibility with the session as part of resumption. + */ + if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hit) { j = 0; id = s->session->cipher->id; @@ -1198,32 +1848,36 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked * to reuse it */ - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, - SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING); + goto err; } } - complen = PACKET_remaining(&compression); - for (j = 0; j < complen; j++) { - if (PACKET_data(&compression)[j] == 0) + for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello->compressions_len; loop++) { + if (clienthello->compressions[loop] == 0) break; } - if (j >= complen) { + if (loop >= clienthello->compressions_len) { /* no compress */ - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED); + goto err; } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC + if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG) + ssl_check_for_safari(s, clienthello); +#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ + /* TLS extensions */ - if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) { - if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &extensions)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); - goto err; - } + if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, + clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, 1)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; } /* @@ -1235,19 +1889,33 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { unsigned char *pos; pos = s->s3->server_random; - if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) { - goto f_err; + if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, dgrd) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; } } - if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) { + if (!s->hit + && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION + && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s) + && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s) + && s->ext.session_secret_cb) { const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; + /* + * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for + * backwards compat reasons + */ + int master_key_length; - s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); - if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, - &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers, + master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); + if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, + &master_key_length, ciphers, &pref_cipher, - s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) { + s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg) + && master_key_length > 0) { + s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length; s->hit = 1; s->session->ciphers = ciphers; s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK; @@ -1255,16 +1923,14 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) ciphers = NULL; /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */ - pref_cipher = - pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, - s-> - session->ciphers, - SSL_get_ciphers - (s)); + if (pref_cipher == NULL) + pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, + SSL_get_ciphers(s)); if (pref_cipher == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); + goto err; } s->session->cipher = pref_cipher; @@ -1281,17 +1947,31 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */ s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL; + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + /* + * We already checked above that the NULL compression method appears in + * the list. Now we check there aren't any others (which is illegal in + * a TLSv1.3 ClientHello. + */ + if (clienthello->compressions_len != 1) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); + goto err; + } + } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */ - if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { + else if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth; unsigned int k; /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */ /* Can't disable compression */ if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, - SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); + goto err; } /* Look for resumed compression method */ for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) { @@ -1302,24 +1982,25 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) } } if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, - SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); + goto err; } /* Look for resumed method in compression list */ - for (k = 0; k < complen; k++) { - if (PACKET_data(&compression)[k] == comp_id) + for (k = 0; k < clienthello->compressions_len; k++) { + if (clienthello->compressions[k] == comp_id) break; } - if (k >= complen) { - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, - SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING); - goto f_err; + if (k >= clienthello->compressions_len) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING); + goto err; } - } else if (s->hit) + } else if (s->hit) { comp = NULL; - else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) { + } else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) { /* See if we have a match */ int m, nn, v, done = 0; unsigned int o; @@ -1328,8 +2009,8 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) { comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m); v = comp->id; - for (o = 0; o < complen; o++) { - if (v == PACKET_data(&compression)[o]) { + for (o = 0; o < clienthello->compressions_len; o++) { + if (v == clienthello->compressions[o]) { done = 1; break; } @@ -1348,8 +2029,10 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) * using compression. */ if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); + goto err; } #endif @@ -1357,88 +2040,245 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher */ + if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers); + s->session->ciphers = ciphers; + if (ciphers == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + ciphers = NULL; + } + if (!s->hit) { #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP s->session->compress_meth = 0; #else s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id; #endif - sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers); - s->session->ciphers = ciphers; - if (ciphers == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto f_err; - } - ciphers = NULL; - if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); - goto err; - } } sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); - return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; - f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); + sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs); + OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts); + OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello); + s->clienthello = NULL; + return 1; err: - ossl_statem_set_error(s); - sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); - return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs); + OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts); + OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello); + s->clienthello = NULL; + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1. + * Upon failure, returns 0. + */ +static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL *s) +{ + s->ext.status_expected = 0; + + /* + * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be + * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed, + * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may + * influence which certificate is sent + */ + if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && s->ctx != NULL + && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) { + int ret; + + /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */ + if (s->s3->tmp.cert != NULL) { + /* + * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate + * et al can pick it up. + */ + s->cert->key = s->s3->tmp.cert; + ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg); + switch (ret) { + /* We don't want to send a status request response */ + case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: + s->ext.status_expected = 0; + break; + /* status request response should be sent */ + case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK: + if (s->ext.ocsp.resp) + s->ext.status_expected = 1; + break; + /* something bad happened */ + case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: + default: + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_STATUS_REQUEST, + SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); + return 0; + } + } + } + + return 1; +} + +/* + * Call the alpn_select callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1. + * Upon failure, returns 0. + */ +int tls_handle_alpn(SSL *s) +{ + const unsigned char *selected = NULL; + unsigned char selected_len = 0; + + if (s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) { + int r = s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, + s->s3->alpn_proposed, + (unsigned int)s->s3->alpn_proposed_len, + s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb_arg); + + if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { + OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); + s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len); + if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG + /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */ + s->s3->npn_seen = 0; +#endif + + /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */ + if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL + || selected_len != s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len + || memcmp(selected, s->session->ext.alpn_selected, + selected_len) != 0) { + /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */ + s->ext.early_data_ok = 0; + + if (!s->hit) { + /* + * This is a new session and so alpn_selected should have + * been initialised to NULL. We should update it with the + * selected ALPN. + */ + if (!ossl_assert(s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + s->session->ext.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, + selected_len); + if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = selected_len; + } + } + + return 1; + } else if (r != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN, + SSL_R_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL); + return 0; + } + /* + * If r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK then behave as if no callback was + * present. + */ + } + + /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */ + if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) { + /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */ + s->ext.early_data_ok = 0; + } + return 1; } WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) { - int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; const SSL_CIPHER *cipher; if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) { - if (!s->hit) { + int rv = tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s); + if (rv == 0) { + /* SSLfatal() was already called */ + goto err; + } + if (rv < 0) + return WORK_MORE_A; + wst = WORK_MORE_B; + } + if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) { + if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */ - if (s->cert->cert_cb) { - int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg); - if (rv == 0) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, - SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR); - goto f_err; + if (!s->hit) { + if (s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) { + int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg); + if (rv == 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR); + goto err; + } + if (rv < 0) { + s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; + return WORK_MORE_B; + } + s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; } - if (rv < 0) { - s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; - return WORK_MORE_A; + if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) { + /* SSLfatal already called */ + goto err; } - s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; } - cipher = - ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s)); - if (cipher == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, - SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); - goto f_err; + /* In TLSv1.3 we selected the ciphersuite before resumption */ + if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + cipher = + ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s)); + + if (cipher == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); + goto err; + } + s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher; + } + if (!s->hit) { + if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 1)) { + /* SSLfatal already called */ + goto err; + } + /* check whether we should disable session resumption */ + if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL) + s->session->not_resumable = + s->not_resumable_session_cb(s, + ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey + & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0)); + if (s->session->not_resumable) + /* do not send a session ticket */ + s->ext.ticket_expected = 0; } - s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher; - /* check whether we should disable session resumption */ - if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL) - s->session->not_resumable = s->not_resumable_session_cb(s, - ((cipher->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0)); - if (s->session->not_resumable) - /* do not send a session ticket */ - s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; } else { /* Session-id reuse */ s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher; } - if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) { - if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } - } - /*- * we now have the following setup. * client_random @@ -1451,73 +2291,71 @@ WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use. */ - /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */ - if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) { - if (!ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s, &al)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, - SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); - goto f_err; - } + /* + * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the + * certificate callbacks etc above. + */ + if (!tls_handle_status_request(s)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + /* + * Call alpn_select callback if needed. Has to be done after SNI and + * cipher negotiation (HTTP/2 restricts permitted ciphers). In TLSv1.3 + * we already did this because cipher negotiation happens earlier, and + * we must handle ALPN before we decide whether to accept early_data. + */ + if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_handle_alpn(s)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; } - wst = WORK_MORE_B; + wst = WORK_MORE_C; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) { + if (wst == WORK_MORE_C) { int ret; - if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) { + if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s)) == 0) { /* * callback indicates further work to be done */ s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; - return WORK_MORE_B; + return WORK_MORE_C; } - if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) { - /* - * This is not really an error but the only means to for - * a client to detect whether srp is supported. - */ - if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY) - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, - SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); - else - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, - SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); - goto f_err; + if (ret < 0) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; } } #endif - s->renegotiate = 2; return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; - f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - ossl_statem_set_error(s); + err: return WORK_ERROR; } -int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s) +int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) { - unsigned char *buf; - unsigned char *p, *d; - int i, sl; - int al = 0; - unsigned long l; - - buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; - - /* Do the message type and length last */ - d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s); - - *(p++) = s->version >> 8; - *(p++) = s->version & 0xff; - - /* - * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in - * tls_process_client_hello() - */ - memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; + int compm; + size_t sl, len; + int version; + unsigned char *session_id; + int usetls13 = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING; + + version = usetls13 ? TLS1_2_VERSION : s->version; + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version) + /* + * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in + * tls_process_client_hello() + */ + || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, + s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING + ? hrrrandom : s->s3->server_random, + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } /*- * There are several cases for the session ID to send @@ -1531,6 +2369,8 @@ int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s) * session ID. * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use, * we send back a 0-length session ID. + * - In TLSv1.3 we echo back the session id sent to us by the client + * regardless * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse, * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed * to send back. @@ -1540,115 +2380,117 @@ int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s) && !s->hit)) s->session->session_id_length = 0; - sl = s->session->session_id_length; - if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - ossl_statem_set_error(s); - return 0; + if (usetls13) { + sl = s->tmp_session_id_len; + session_id = s->tmp_session_id; + } else { + sl = s->session->session_id_length; + session_id = s->session->session_id; } - *(p++) = sl; - memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl); - p += sl; - /* put the cipher */ - i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p); - p += i; + if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } - /* put the compression method */ + /* set up the compression method */ #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP - *(p++) = 0; + compm = 0; #else - if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) - *(p++) = 0; + if (usetls13 || s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) + compm = 0; else - *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; + compm = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; #endif - if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT); - ossl_statem_set_error(s); + if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, session_id, sl) + || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } - if ((p = - ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, - &al)) == NULL) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - ossl_statem_set_error(s); + + if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, + s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING + ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST + : (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) + ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO + : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO), + NULL, 0)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ return 0; } - /* do the header */ - l = (p - d); - if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - ossl_statem_set_error(s); + if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) { + /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */ + SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); + s->session = NULL; + s->hit = 0; + + /* + * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with + * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1. + */ + if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + } else if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) + && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */; return 0; } return 1; } -int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s) +int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) { - if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_DONE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - ossl_statem_set_error(s); - return 0; - } - if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { - ossl_statem_set_error(s); + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; } } - return 1; } -int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) +int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL; - int j; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; - int encodedlen = 0; + size_t encodedlen = 0; int curve_id = 0; #endif - EVP_PKEY *pkey; - const EVP_MD *md = NULL; - unsigned char *p, *d; - int al, i; + const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg; + int i; unsigned long type; - int n; const BIGNUM *r[4]; - int nr[4], kn; - BUF_MEM *buf; EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; + size_t paramlen, paramoffset; + + if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } if (md_ctx == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; } type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; - buf = s->init_buf; - r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL; - n = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK - if (type & SSL_PSK) { - /* - * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint - */ - n += 2; - if (s->cert->psk_identity_hint) - n += strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint); - } /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */ if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { } else @@ -1665,10 +2507,10 @@ int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new(); if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) { DH_free(dhp); - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; } EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp); pkdhp = pkdh; @@ -1679,44 +2521,44 @@ int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024); pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp); if (pkdh == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; } pkdhp = pkdh; } if (pkdhp == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); + goto err; } if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL); + goto err; } if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp); - if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey); if (dh == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } @@ -1729,46 +2571,39 @@ int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { - int nid; if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */ - nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2); - curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid); + curve_id = tls1_shared_group(s, -2); if (curve_id == 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); goto err; } - s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id); + s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id); /* Generate a new key for this curve */ if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); - goto f_err; + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; } /* Encode the public key. */ encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey, &encodedPoint); if (encodedlen == 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } /* - * We only support named (not generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key - * exchanges. In this situation, we need four additional bytes to - * encode the entire ServerECDHParams structure. - */ - n += 4 + encodedlen; - - /* * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we * can set these to NULLs */ @@ -1783,8 +2618,9 @@ int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM); goto err; } r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N; @@ -1794,85 +2630,59 @@ int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) } else #endif { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); - goto f_err; - } - for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) { - nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]); -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) - n += 1 + nr[i]; - else -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - /*- - * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS - * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length - * as the prime, so use the length of the prime here - */ - if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) - n += 2 + nr[0]; - else -#endif - n += 2 + nr[i]; - } - - if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) - && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) { - if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md)) - == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } - kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); - /* Allow space for signature algorithm */ - if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) - kn += 2; - /* Allow space for signature length */ - kn += 2; - } else { - pkey = NULL; - kn = 0; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); + goto err; } - if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + kn)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF); + if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) != 0) + || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) != 0) { + lu = NULL; + } else if (lu == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } - d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK if (type & SSL_PSK) { - /* copy PSK identity hint */ - if (s->cert->psk_identity_hint) { - size_t len = strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint); - if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { - /* - * Should not happen - we already checked this when we set - * the identity hint - */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - s2n(len, p); - memcpy(p, s->cert->psk_identity_hint, len); - p += len; - } else { - s2n(0, p); + size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL) + ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint); + + /* + * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already + * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case + */ + if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint, + len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; } } #endif for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) { + unsigned char *binval; + int res; + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) { - *p = nr[i]; - p++; + res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt); } else #endif + res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt); + + if (!res) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH /*- * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS @@ -1880,97 +2690,124 @@ int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) * as the prime */ if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) { - s2n(nr[0], p); - for (j = 0; j < (nr[0] - nr[2]); ++j) { - *p = 0; - ++p; + size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]); + + if (len > 0) { + if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + memset(binval, 0, len); } - } else + } #endif - s2n(nr[i], p); - BN_bn2bin(r[i], p); - p += nr[i]; + if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { /* - * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In - * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte - * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded - * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself + * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the + * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] + * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded + * point itself */ - *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE; - p += 1; - *p = 0; - p += 1; - *p = curve_id; - p += 1; - *p = encodedlen; - p += 1; - memcpy(p, encodedPoint, encodedlen); + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id) + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); encodedPoint = NULL; - p += encodedlen; } #endif /* not anonymous */ - if (pkey != NULL) { + if (lu != NULL) { + EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey; + const EVP_MD *md; + unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2, *tbs; + size_t siglen, tbslen; + int rv; + + if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) { + /* Should never happen */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */ + if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + /* send signature algorithm */ + if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } /* - * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p - * points to the space at the end. + * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig + * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it + * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET + * afterwards. */ - if (md) { - /* send signature algorithm */ - if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { - if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) { - /* Should never happen */ - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto f_err; - } - p += 2; - } -#ifdef SSL_DEBUG - fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); -#endif - if (EVP_SignInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0 - || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), - SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 - || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), - SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 - || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, d, n) <= 0 - || EVP_SignFinal(md_ctx, &(p[2]), - (unsigned int *)&i, pkey) <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP); - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto f_err; + siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); + if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1) + || EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) { + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 + || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; } - s2n(i, p); - n += i + 2; - if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) - n += 2; - } else { - /* Is this error check actually needed? */ - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE); - goto f_err; } - } - - if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n)) { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto f_err; + tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs, + s->init_buf->data + paramoffset, + paramlen); + if (tbslen == 0) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + rv = EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, tbs, tbslen); + OPENSSL_free(tbs); + if (rv <= 0 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2) + || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } } EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); return 1; - f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); err: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh); @@ -1979,96 +2816,82 @@ int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); #endif EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); - ossl_statem_set_error(s); return 0; } -int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s) +int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) { - unsigned char *p, *d; - int i, j, nl, off, n; - STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL; - X509_NAME *name; - BUF_MEM *buf; - - buf = s->init_buf; + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + /* Send random context when doing post-handshake auth */ + if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) { + OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context); + s->pha_context_len = 32; + if ((s->pha_context = OPENSSL_malloc(s->pha_context_len)) == NULL + || RAND_bytes(s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len) <= 0 + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + /* reset the handshake hash back to just after the ClientFinished */ + if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + } else { + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + } - d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s); + if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, + SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, NULL, + 0)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + goto done; + } /* get the list of acceptable cert types */ - p++; - n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p); - d[0] = n; - p += n; - n++; + if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt) + || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { - const unsigned char *psigs; - unsigned char *etmp = p; - nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs); - if (nl > SSL_MAX_2_BYTE_LEN) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, - SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - goto err; - } - /* Skip over length for now */ - p += 2; - nl = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, p, psigs, nl); - /* Now fill in length */ - s2n(nl, etmp); - p += nl; - n += nl + 2; - } - - off = n; - p += 2; - n += 2; - - sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); - nl = 0; - if (sk != NULL) { - for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) { - name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i); - j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL); - if (j > SSL_MAX_2_BYTE_LEN) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, - SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - goto err; - } - if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + n + j + 2)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); - goto err; - } - p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n; - s2n(j, p); - i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p); - n += 2 + j; - nl += 2 + j; - if (nl > SSL_MAX_2_BYTE_LEN) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, - SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - goto err; - } + const uint16_t *psigs; + size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs); + + if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH) + || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; } } - /* else no CA names */ - p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off; - s2n(nl, p); - if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; + if (!construct_ca_names(s, get_ca_names(s), pkt)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; } + done: + s->certreqs_sent++; s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1; - return 1; - err: - ossl_statem_set_error(s); - return 0; } -static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) +static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN]; @@ -2076,24 +2899,24 @@ static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) PACKET psk_identity; if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return 0; } if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, + SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); return 0; } if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, + SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB); return 0; } if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } @@ -2101,16 +2924,16 @@ static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) psk, sizeof(psk)); if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } else if (psklen == 0) { /* * PSK related to the given identity not found */ - *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, - SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, + SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); return 0; } @@ -2119,8 +2942,8 @@ static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen); if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } @@ -2129,13 +2952,13 @@ static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) return 1; #else /* Should never happen */ - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; #endif } -static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) +static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; @@ -2147,10 +2970,10 @@ static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL; int ret = 0; - rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey); + rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey); if (rsa == NULL) { - *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, + SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); return 0; } @@ -2160,8 +2983,8 @@ static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) } else { if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return 0; } } @@ -2173,15 +2996,15 @@ static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway. */ if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, + RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL); return 0; } rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa)); if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } @@ -2193,18 +3016,26 @@ static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 */ - if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) + if (RAND_priv_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, + sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; + } /* * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of * the timing-sensitive code below. */ - decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt(PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster), - PACKET_data(&enc_premaster), - rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING); - if (decrypt_len < 0) + /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */ + decrypt_len = (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster), + PACKET_data(&enc_premaster), + rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING); + if (decrypt_len < 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; + } /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */ @@ -2214,8 +3045,8 @@ static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) * PS is at least 8 bytes. */ if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, + SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); goto err; } @@ -2282,8 +3113,7 @@ static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } @@ -2293,13 +3123,13 @@ static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) return ret; #else /* Should never happen */ - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; #endif } -static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) +static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL; @@ -2311,46 +3141,46 @@ static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) int ret = 0; if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) { - *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); goto err; } skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey; if (skey == NULL) { - *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, + SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); goto err; } if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) { - *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, + SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); goto err; } if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) { /* We already checked we have enough data */ - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } ckey = EVP_PKEY_new(); if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_BN_LIB); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, + SSL_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey); pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL); if (pub_key == NULL || cdh == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); BN_free(pub_key); goto err; } - if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey) == 0) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } @@ -2362,13 +3192,13 @@ static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) return ret; #else /* Should never happen */ - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; #endif } -static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) +static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey; @@ -2377,8 +3207,8 @@ static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) { /* We don't support ECDH client auth */ - *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, + SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); goto err; } else { unsigned int i; @@ -2392,25 +3222,31 @@ static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) /* Get encoded point length */ if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + if (skey == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, + SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); goto err; } + ckey = EVP_PKEY_new(); if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, + ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) { - *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, + ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } } - if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey) == 0) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } @@ -2423,13 +3259,13 @@ static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) return ret; #else /* Should never happen */ - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; #endif } -static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) +static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP unsigned int i; @@ -2437,41 +3273,43 @@ static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, + SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH); return 0; } if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, + ERR_R_BN_LIB); return 0; } if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) { - *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, + SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS); return 0; } OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username); s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + /* SSLfatal() already called */ return 0; } return 1; #else /* Should never happen */ - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; #endif } -static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) +static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; @@ -2480,11 +3318,9 @@ static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) const unsigned char *start; size_t outlen = 32, inlen; unsigned long alg_a; - int Ttag, Tclass; - long Tlen; - long sess_key_len; - const unsigned char *data; + unsigned int asn1id, asn1len; int ret = 0; + PACKET encdata; /* Get our certificate private key */ alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; @@ -2505,13 +3341,13 @@ static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL); if (pkey_ctx == NULL) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } /* @@ -2526,37 +3362,57 @@ static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) ERR_clear_error(); } /* Decrypt session key */ - sess_key_len = PACKET_remaining(pkt); - if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, sess_key_len)) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &asn1id) + || asn1id != (V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED) + || !PACKET_peek_1(pkt, &asn1len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, + SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); goto err; } - if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag, - &Tclass, sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED - || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); + if (asn1len == 0x81) { + /* + * Long form length. Should only be one byte of length. Anything else + * isn't supported. + * We did a successful peek before so this shouldn't fail + */ + if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 1)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, + SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); + goto err; + } + } else if (asn1len >= 0x80) { + /* + * Indefinite length, or more than one long form length bytes. We don't + * support it + */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, + SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); + goto err; + } /* else short form length */ + + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encdata)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, + SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); goto err; } - start = data; - inlen = Tlen; - if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt - (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); + inlen = PACKET_remaining(&encdata); + start = PACKET_data(&encdata); + + if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, + inlen) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, + SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); goto err; } /* Generate master secret */ if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret, sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */ - if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl - (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, + NULL) > 0) s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1; ret = 1; @@ -2565,68 +3421,75 @@ static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) return ret; #else /* Should never happen */ - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; #endif } MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { - int al = -1; unsigned long alg_k; alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */ - if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al)) + if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; + } if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) { /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */ if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { - if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al)) + if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; + } } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { - if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al)) + if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; + } } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { - if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al)) + if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; + } } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { - if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al)) + if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; + } } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { - if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al)) + if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; + } } else { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); goto err; } return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; err: - if (al != -1) - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen); s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL; #endif - ossl_statem_set_error(s); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } @@ -2648,8 +3511,10 @@ WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) { - ossl_statem_set_error(s); - return WORK_ERROR;; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return WORK_ERROR; } BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, @@ -2664,15 +3529,15 @@ WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) * the handshake_buffer */ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { - ossl_statem_set_error(s); + /* SSLfatal() already called */ return WORK_ERROR; } return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; } else { if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - ossl_statem_set_error(s); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return WORK_ERROR; } /* @@ -2680,7 +3545,7 @@ WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op */ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) { - ossl_statem_set_error(s); + /* SSLfatal() already called */ return WORK_ERROR; } } @@ -2688,216 +3553,97 @@ WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; } -MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) -{ - EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; - const unsigned char *sig, *data; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST - unsigned char *gost_data = NULL; -#endif - int al, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; - int type = 0, j; - unsigned int len; - X509 *peer; - const EVP_MD *md = NULL; - long hdatalen = 0; - void *hdata; - - EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); - - if (mctx == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } - - peer = s->session->peer; - pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer); - if (pkey == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } - - type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey); - - if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, - SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - goto f_err; - } - - if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { - int rv; - - if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sig, 2)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } - rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sig, pkey); - if (rv == -1) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } else if (rv == 0) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } -#ifdef SSL_DEBUG - fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); -#endif - } else { - /* Use default digest for this key type */ - int idx = ssl_cert_type(NULL, pkey); - if (idx >= 0) - md = s->s3->tmp.md[idx]; - if (md == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } - } - - /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */ - /* - * If key is GOST and len is exactly 64 or 128, it is signature without - * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till TLS 1.2) - */ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST - if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) - && ((PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64 - && (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 - || EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256)) - || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 128 - && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512))) { - len = PACKET_remaining(pkt); - } else -#endif - if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } - - j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); - if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j) - || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } - if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } - - hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata); - if (hdatalen <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } -#ifdef SSL_DEBUG - fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); -#endif - if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL) - || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST - { - int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey); - if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 - || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 - || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) { - if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } - BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len); - data = gost_data; - } - } -#endif - - if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION - && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, - s->session->master_key_length, - s->session->master_key)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } - - if (EVP_VerifyFinal(mctx, data, len, pkey) <= 0) { - al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); - goto f_err; - } - - ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; - if (0) { - f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - ossl_statem_set_error(s); - } - BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer); - s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL; - EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST - OPENSSL_free(gost_data); -#endif - return ret; -} - MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { - int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + int i; + MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; X509 *x = NULL; - unsigned long l, llen; + unsigned long l; const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes; STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; - PACKET spkt; + PACKET spkt, context; + size_t chainidx; + SSL_SESSION *new_sess = NULL; + + /* + * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We no + * longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This value is ignored if less than + * TLSv1.3 + */ + s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_VALID; if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context) + || (s->pha_context == NULL && PACKET_remaining(&context) != 0) + || (s->pha_context != NULL && + !PACKET_equal(&context, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)))) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT); + goto err; } - if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen) - || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen) - || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(pkt, &spkt) + || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; } - while (PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0) { + for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) { if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l) || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, - SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; } certstart = certbytes; x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l); if (x == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); + goto err; } if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, - SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; } + + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL; + PACKET extensions; + + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); + goto err; + } + if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, + SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts, + NULL, chainidx == 0) + || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, + rawexts, x, chainidx, + PACKET_remaining(&spkt) == 0)) { + OPENSSL_free(rawexts); + goto err; + } + OPENSSL_free(rawexts); + } + if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; } x = NULL; } @@ -2905,103 +3651,189 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) { /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */ if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, - SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED); + goto err; } /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */ else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, - SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); + goto err; } /* No client certificate so digest cached records */ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { - goto f_err; + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; } } else { EVP_PKEY *pkey; i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk); if (i <= 0) { - al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, - SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result), + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); + goto err; } if (i > 1) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i); - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i); + goto err; } pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0)); if (pkey == NULL) { - al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, - SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); + goto err; } } + /* + * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise + * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions, + * we replace them with a duplicate. Here, we need to do this every time + * a new certificate is received via post-handshake authentication, as the + * session may have already gone into the session cache. + */ + + if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) { + if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); + s->session = new_sess; + } + X509_free(s->session->peer); s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk); s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free); s->session->peer_chain = sk; + + /* + * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE + * message + */ + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + /* * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c */ sk = NULL; + + /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */ + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash, + sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash), + &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + + /* Resend session tickets */ + s->sent_tickets = 0; + } + ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; - goto done; - f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - ossl_statem_set_error(s); - done: + err: X509_free(x); sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); return ret; } -int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s) +int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) { - CERT_PKEY *cpk; + CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3->tmp.cert; - cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s); if (cpk == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - ossl_statem_set_error(s); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + /* + * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context + * for the server Certificate message + */ + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +static int create_ticket_prequel(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add, + unsigned char *tick_nonce) +{ + /* + * Ticket lifetime hint: For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this + * unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity). + * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the + * timeout. + */ + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, + (s->hit && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) + ? 0 : s->session->timeout)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } - if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, cpk)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - ossl_statem_set_error(s); + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add) + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tick_nonce, TICKET_NONCE_SIZE)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + } + + /* Start the sub-packet for the actual ticket data */ + if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } return 1; } -int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s) +static int construct_stateless_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add, + unsigned char *tick_nonce) { unsigned char *senc = NULL; EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL; HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL; - unsigned char *p, *macstart; + unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2; const unsigned char *const_p; - int len, slen_full, slen; + int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal; SSL_SESSION *sess; unsigned int hlen; SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx; unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH]; - int iv_len; + int iv_len, ok = 0; + size_t macoffset, macendoffset; /* get session encoding length */ slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL); @@ -3010,190 +3842,357 @@ int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s) * long */ if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) { - ossl_statem_set_error(s); - return 0; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; } senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full); if (senc == NULL) { - ossl_statem_set_error(s); - return 0; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; } ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); hctx = HMAC_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } p = senc; - if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) + if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; + } /* * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */ const_p = senc; sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full); - if (sess == NULL) + if (sess == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; - sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */ + } slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL); - if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */ + if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { + /* shouldn't ever happen */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); SSL_SESSION_free(sess); goto err; } p = senc; if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); SSL_SESSION_free(sess); goto err; } SSL_SESSION_free(sess); - /*- - * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as - * follows handshake_header_length + - * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) + - * sizeof(keyname) + max_iv_len (iv length) + - * max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session * length) + - * max_md_size (HMAC) + session_length. - */ - if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, - SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 6 + sizeof(key_name) + - EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + - EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen)) - goto err; - - p = ssl_handshake_start(s); /* * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx. */ - if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) { + if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) { /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */ - int ret = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx, + int ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx, hctx, 1); if (ret == 0) { - l2n(0, p); /* timeout */ - s2n(0, p); /* length */ - if (!ssl_set_handshake_header - (s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, p - ssl_handshake_start(s))) + + /* Put timeout and length */ + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; + } OPENSSL_free(senc); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); return 1; } - if (ret < 0) + if (ret < 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, + SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED); goto err; + } iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx); } else { const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc(); iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher); - if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0) - goto err; - if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, - tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv)) - goto err; - if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, - sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key), - EVP_sha256(), NULL)) + if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0 + || !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, + tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key, iv) + || !HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key, + sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key), + EVP_sha256(), NULL)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; - memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, - sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)); + } + memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name, + sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name)); } - /* - * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified - * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for - * new sessions will live as long as their sessions. - */ - l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p); - - /* Skip ticket length for now */ - p += 2; - /* Output key name */ - macstart = p; - memcpy(p, key_name, sizeof(key_name)); - p += sizeof(key_name); - /* output IV */ - memcpy(p, iv, iv_len); - p += iv_len; - /* Encrypt session data */ - if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, p, &len, senc, slen)) - goto err; - p += len; - if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, p, &len)) + if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; - p += len; + } - if (!HMAC_Update(hctx, macstart, p - macstart)) - goto err; - if (!HMAC_Final(hctx, p, &hlen)) + if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset) + /* Output key name */ + || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name)) + /* output IV */ + || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len) + || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH, + &encdata1) + /* Encrypt session data */ + || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen) + || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2) + || encdata1 != encdata2 + || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal) + || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2) + || encdata1 + len != encdata2 + || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset) + || !HMAC_Update(hctx, + (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset, + macendoffset - macoffset) + || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1) + || !HMAC_Final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen) + || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2) + || macdata1 != macdata2) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; + } - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); - HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); - ctx = NULL; - hctx = NULL; - - p += hlen; - /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */ - /* Total length */ - len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s); - /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */ - p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4; - s2n(len - 6, p); - if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len)) + /* Close the sub-packet created by create_ticket_prequel() */ + if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; - OPENSSL_free(senc); + } - return 1; + ok = 1; err: OPENSSL_free(senc); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); - ossl_statem_set_error(s); - return 0; + return ok; } -int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s) +static int construct_stateful_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add, + unsigned char *tick_nonce) { - unsigned char *p; - size_t msglen; + if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } - /*- - * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as - * follows handshake_header_length + - * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length) - * + (ocsp response) - */ - msglen = 4 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen; - if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + msglen)) - goto err; + if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id, + s->session->session_id_length) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATEFUL_TICKET, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) +{ + SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx; + unsigned char tick_nonce[TICKET_NONCE_SIZE]; + union { + unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)]; + uint32_t age_add; + } age_add_u; + + age_add_u.age_add = 0; + + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + size_t i, hashlen; + uint64_t nonce; + static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption"; + const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s); + void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; + int hashleni = EVP_MD_size(md); + + /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */ + if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + hashlen = (size_t)hashleni; - p = ssl_handshake_start(s); + if (s->info_callback != NULL) + cb = s->info_callback; + else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) + cb = s->ctx->info_callback; - /* status type */ - *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type; - /* length of OCSP response */ - l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p); - /* actual response */ - memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen); + if (cb != NULL) { + /* + * We don't start and stop the handshake in between each ticket when + * sending more than one - but it should appear that way to the info + * callback. + */ + if (s->sent_tickets != 0) { + ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); + cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); + ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1); + } + cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1); + } + /* + * If we already sent one NewSessionTicket, or we resumed then + * s->session may already be in a cache and so we must not modify it. + * Instead we need to take a copy of it and modify that. + */ + if (s->sent_tickets != 0 || s->hit) { + SSL_SESSION *new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0); + + if (new_sess == NULL) { + /* SSLfatal already called */ + goto err; + } - if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS, msglen)) + SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); + s->session = new_sess; + } + + if (!ssl_generate_session_id(s, s->session)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + if (RAND_bytes(age_add_u.age_add_c, sizeof(age_add_u)) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add; + + nonce = s->next_ticket_nonce; + for (i = TICKET_NONCE_SIZE; i > 0; i--) { + tick_nonce[i - 1] = (unsigned char)(nonce & 0xff); + nonce >>= 8; + } + + if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret, + nonce_label, + sizeof(nonce_label) - 1, + tick_nonce, + TICKET_NONCE_SIZE, + s->session->master_key, + hashlen)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + s->session->master_key_length = hashlen; + + s->session->time = (long)time(NULL); + if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) { + OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.alpn_selected); + s->session->ext.alpn_selected = + OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3->alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected_len); + if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len; + } + s->session->ext.max_early_data = s->max_early_data; + } + + if (tctx->generate_ticket_cb != NULL && + tctx->generate_ticket_cb(s, tctx->ticket_cb_data) == 0) goto err; - return 1; + /* + * If we are using anti-replay protection then we behave as if + * SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set - we are caching tickets anyway so there + * is no point in using full stateless tickets. + */ + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) + && ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0 + || (s->max_early_data > 0 + && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0))) { + if (!construct_stateful_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add, tick_nonce)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + } else if (!construct_stateless_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add, + tick_nonce)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, + SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, + NULL, 0)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + /* + * Increment both |sent_tickets| and |next_ticket_nonce|. |sent_tickets| + * gets reset to 0 if we send more tickets following a post-handshake + * auth, but |next_ticket_nonce| does not. + */ + s->sent_tickets++; + s->next_ticket_nonce++; + ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); + } + + return 1; err: - ossl_statem_set_error(s); return 0; } +/* + * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to + * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. + */ +int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) +{ + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type) + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, + s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) +{ + if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG /* * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. @@ -3214,163 +4213,67 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto) || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } - if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->next_proto_negotiated, &next_proto_len)) { - s->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0; - goto err; + if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) { + s->ext.npn_len = 0; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } - s->next_proto_negotiated_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len; + s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len; return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; - err: - ossl_statem_set_error(s); - return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } #endif -#define SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN 3 - -STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, - PACKET *cipher_suites, - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp, - int sslv2format, int *al) +static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) { - const SSL_CIPHER *c; - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; - int n; - /* 3 = SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN > TLS_CIPHER_LEN = 2. */ - unsigned char cipher[SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN]; - - s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0; - - n = sslv2format ? SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN : TLS_CIPHER_LEN; - - if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) == 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED); - *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - return NULL; + if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, + NULL, 0)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; } - if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) % n != 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, - SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST); - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return NULL; - } + return 1; +} - sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); - if (sk == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return NULL; +MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) +{ + if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } - if (sslv2format) { - size_t numciphers = PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) / n; - PACKET sslv2ciphers = *cipher_suites; - unsigned int leadbyte; - unsigned char *raw; - - /* - * We store the raw ciphers list in SSLv3+ format so we need to do some - * preprocessing to convert the list first. If there are any SSLv2 only - * ciphersuites with a non-zero leading byte then we are going to - * slightly over allocate because we won't store those. But that isn't a - * problem. - */ - raw = OPENSSL_malloc(numciphers * TLS_CIPHER_LEN); - s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw = raw; - if (raw == NULL) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto err; - } - for (s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen = 0; - PACKET_remaining(&sslv2ciphers) > 0; - raw += TLS_CIPHER_LEN) { - if (!PACKET_get_1(&sslv2ciphers, &leadbyte) - || (leadbyte == 0 - && !PACKET_copy_bytes(&sslv2ciphers, raw, - TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) - || (leadbyte != 0 - && !PACKET_forward(&sslv2ciphers, TLS_CIPHER_LEN))) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw); - s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw = NULL; - s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen = 0; - goto err; - } - if (leadbyte == 0) - s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen += TLS_CIPHER_LEN; - } - } else if (!PACKET_memdup(cipher_suites, &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw, - &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen)) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto err; + if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING + && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } - while (PACKET_copy_bytes(cipher_suites, cipher, n)) { - /* - * SSLv3 ciphers wrapped in an SSLv2-compatible ClientHello have the - * first byte set to zero, while true SSLv2 ciphers have a non-zero - * first byte. We don't support any true SSLv2 ciphers, so skip them. - */ - if (sslv2format && cipher[0] != '\0') - continue; - - /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */ - if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) && - (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) { - /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */ - if (s->renegotiate) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, - SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING); - *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - goto err; - } - s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1; - continue; - } - - /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */ - if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) && - (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff))) { - /* - * The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher - * version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected - * downgrade. - */ - if (!ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, - SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); - *al = SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK; - goto err; - } - continue; - } - - /* For SSLv2-compat, ignore leading 0-byte. */ - c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, sslv2format ? &cipher[1] : cipher); - if (c != NULL) { - if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto err; - } - } + /* + * EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on + * a record boundary. + */ + if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, + SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } - if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) > 0) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; + + s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING; + if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, + SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } - *skp = sk; - return sk; - err: - sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk); - return NULL; + return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; } |