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/*
This file is part of TALER
Copyright (C) 2022 Taler Systems SA
TALER is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the
terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by the Free Software
Foundation; either version 3, or (at your option) any later version.
TALER is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY
WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR
A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License along with
TALER; see the file COPYING. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>
*/
use btc_wire::rpc::{ChainTipsStatus, Rpc};
use common::log::log::warn;
use super::LoopResult;
/// Analyse blockchain behavior and return the new confirmation delay
pub fn analysis(rpc: &mut Rpc, current: u32, max: u32) -> LoopResult<u32> {
// Get biggest known valid fork
let fork = rpc
.get_chain_tips()?
.into_iter()
.filter_map(|t| (t.status == ChainTipsStatus::ValidFork).then(|| t.length))
.max()
.unwrap_or(0) as u32;
// If new fork is bigger than what current confirmation delay protect against
if fork >= current {
// Limit confirmation growth
let new_conf = fork.saturating_add(1).min(max);
warn!(
"analysis: found dangerous fork of {} blocks, adapt confirmation to {} blocks capped at {}, you should update taler.conf",
fork, new_conf, max
);
return Ok(new_conf);
}
// TODO smarter analysis: suspicious transaction value, limit wire bitcoin throughput
Ok(current)
}
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