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Diffstat (limited to 'deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c')
-rw-r--r--deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c955
1 files changed, 856 insertions, 99 deletions
diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
index 03becbc109..e08088c57e 100644
--- a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -114,6 +114,7 @@
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
@@ -167,10 +168,11 @@ void tls1_free(SSL *s)
void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
{
ssl3_clear(s);
- s->version=TLS1_VERSION;
+ s->version = s->method->version;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+
static int nid_list[] =
{
NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
@@ -199,7 +201,36 @@ static int nid_list[] =
NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
};
-
+
+static int pref_list[] =
+ {
+ NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
+ NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
+ NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
+ NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
+ NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
+ NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
+ NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
+ NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
+ NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
+ NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
+ NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
+ NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
+ NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
+ NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
+ NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
+ NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
+ NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
+ NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
+ NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
+ NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
+ NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
+ NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
+ NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
+ NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
+ NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
+ };
+
int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
{
/* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
@@ -271,6 +302,64 @@ int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+
+/* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
+ * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
+ */
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+#define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
+#else
+#define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
+#endif
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+#define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
+#else
+#define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
+#endif
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+#define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
+#else
+#define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
+#endif
+
+#define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
+ tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
+ tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
+ tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
+
+static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
+ tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
+ tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
+ tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
+ tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
+ tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+ tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5)
+#endif
+};
+
+int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
+ {
+ size_t slen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ /* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */
+ if (FIPS_mode())
+ slen -= 2;
+#endif
+ if (p)
+ memcpy(p, tls12_sigalgs, slen);
+ return (int)slen;
+ }
+
unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
{
int extdatalen=0;
@@ -318,7 +407,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
}
/* Add RI if renegotiating */
- if (s->new_session)
+ if (s->renegotiate)
{
int el;
@@ -342,6 +431,34 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
ret += el;
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ /* Add SRP username if there is one */
+ if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
+ { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
+
+ int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
+ if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* check for enough space.
+ 4 for the srp type type and entension length
+ 1 for the srp user identity
+ + srp user identity length
+ */
+ if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
+
+ /* fill in the extension */
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
+ s2n(login_len+1,ret);
+ (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
+ memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
+ ret+=login_len;
+ }
+#endif
+
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
@@ -427,6 +544,17 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
}
skip_ext:
+ if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
+ {
+ if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 6)
+ return NULL;
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
+ s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 2, ret);
+ s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs), ret);
+ memcpy(ret, tls12_sigalgs, sizeof(tls12_sigalgs));
+ ret += sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
+ }
+
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
@@ -495,6 +623,20 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+ /* Add Heartbeat extension */
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
+ s2n(1,ret);
+ /* Set mode:
+ * 1: peer may send requests
+ * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
+ */
+ if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
+ *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
+ else
+ *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
+#endif
+
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
{
@@ -507,6 +649,27 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
}
#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+ if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
+ {
+ int el;
+
+ ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
+
+ if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
+
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
+ s2n(el,ret);
+
+ if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ ret += el;
+ }
+#endif
+
if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
return p;
@@ -619,6 +782,28 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
ret += sol;
}
#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+ if(s->srtp_profile)
+ {
+ int el;
+
+ ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
+
+ if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
+
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
+ s2n(el,ret);
+
+ if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ ret+=el;
+ }
+#endif
+
if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
&& (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
{ const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
@@ -634,6 +819,24 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+ /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
+ if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
+ {
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
+ s2n(1,ret);
+ /* Set mode:
+ * 1: peer may send requests
+ * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
+ */
+ if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
+ *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
+ else
+ *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
+
+ }
+#endif
+
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
@@ -670,9 +873,18 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
unsigned short len;
unsigned char *data = *p;
int renegotiate_seen = 0;
+ int sigalg_seen = 0;
s->servername_done = 0;
s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+ s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
+ SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
+#endif
if (data >= (d+n-2))
goto ri_check;
@@ -800,6 +1012,31 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
}
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
+ {
+ if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
+ {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
+ {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
+ s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
+
+ if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
+ {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
@@ -844,7 +1081,8 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
- if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2)
+ if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
+ ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
{
*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
@@ -920,6 +1158,28 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
return 0;
renegotiate_seen = 1;
}
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
+ {
+ int dsize;
+ if (sigalg_seen || size < 2)
+ {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ sigalg_seen = 1;
+ n2s(data,dsize);
+ size -= 2;
+ if (dsize != size || dsize & 1)
+ {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
+ {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
{
@@ -1032,9 +1292,26 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
else
s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
+ {
+ switch(data[0])
+ {
+ case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
+ s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
+ break;
+ case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
+ s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
+ s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
+ break;
+ default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
- s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
+ s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
{
/* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
* renegotiation.
@@ -1056,6 +1333,15 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
#endif
/* session ticket processed earlier */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
+ {
+ if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
+ al))
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif
+
data+=size;
}
@@ -1065,7 +1351,7 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
/* Need RI if renegotiating */
- if (!renegotiate_seen && s->new_session &&
+ if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
!(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
{
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
@@ -1081,7 +1367,7 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
/* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
* elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
* the length of the block. */
-static int ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
+static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
{
unsigned int off = 0;
@@ -1106,6 +1392,15 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
int tlsext_servername = 0;
int renegotiate_seen = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+ s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
+ SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
+#endif
+
if (data >= (d+n-2))
goto ri_check;
@@ -1145,7 +1440,8 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
unsigned char *sdata = data;
int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
- if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
+ if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
+ ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
{
*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
@@ -1232,13 +1528,14 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
+ s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
{
unsigned char *selected;
unsigned char selected_len;
/* We must have requested it. */
- if ((s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL))
+ if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
{
*al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
return 0;
@@ -1262,6 +1559,7 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
}
memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
+ s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
}
#endif
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
@@ -1270,6 +1568,32 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
return 0;
renegotiate_seen = 1;
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
+ {
+ switch(data[0])
+ {
+ case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
+ s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
+ break;
+ case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
+ s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
+ s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
+ break;
+ default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
+ {
+ if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
+ al))
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif
+
data+=size;
}
@@ -1349,7 +1673,7 @@ int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
break;
}
}
- using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version == TLS1_VERSION);
+ using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION);
if (using_ecc)
{
if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
@@ -1365,16 +1689,19 @@ int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
/* we support all named elliptic curves in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12 */
if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
- s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]) * 2;
+ s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]) * 2;
if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
{
s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return -1;
}
- for (i = 1, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i <=
- sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]); i++)
- s2n(i,j);
+ for (i = 0, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i <
+ sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]); i++)
+ {
+ int id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(pref_list[i]);
+ s2n(id,j);
+ }
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
@@ -1446,7 +1773,7 @@ int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
return 1;
}
-int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
+int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
{
int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
@@ -1465,42 +1792,12 @@ int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
- /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
- * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
- * the certificate has changed.
- */
- if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
- {
- int r;
- r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
- switch (r)
- {
- /* We don't want to send a status request response */
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
- s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
- break;
- /* status request response should be sent */
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
- if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
- s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
- else
- s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
- break;
- /* something bad happened */
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
- ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto err;
- }
- }
- else
- s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
-
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
{
/* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
* but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
- * so this has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(). */
+ * so this has to happen here in
+ * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
int r = 1;
@@ -1552,8 +1849,8 @@ int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
}
}
-#endif
err:
+#endif
switch (ret)
{
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
@@ -1571,6 +1868,71 @@ int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
}
}
+int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
+ {
+ int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+ int al;
+
+ /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
+ * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
+ * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
+ * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
+ */
+ if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
+ {
+ int r;
+ CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
+ certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
+ /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
+ if (certpkey == NULL)
+ {
+ s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
+ * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
+ */
+ s->cert->key = certpkey;
+ r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
+ switch (r)
+ {
+ /* We don't want to send a status request response */
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
+ s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
+ break;
+ /* status request response should be sent */
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
+ if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
+ s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
+ else
+ s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
+ break;
+ /* something bad happened */
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
+ ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
+
+ err:
+ switch (ret)
+ {
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
+ return -1;
+
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
+ return 1;
+
+ default:
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+
int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
{
int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
@@ -1683,26 +2045,56 @@ int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
}
}
-/* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of client
- * hello and other operations depend on the result we need to handle any TLS
- * session ticket extension at the same time.
+/* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
+ * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
+ * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
+ *
+ * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
+ * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
+ * extension, if any.
+ * len: the length of the session ID.
+ * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
+ * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
+ * point to the resulting session.
+ *
+ * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
+ * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
+ * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
+ * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
+ * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
+ * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
+ * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
+ * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
+ * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
+ *
+ * Side effects:
+ * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
+ * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
+ * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
+ * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
+ * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
+ * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
*/
-
int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
- const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
+ const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
{
/* Point after session ID in client hello */
const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
unsigned short i;
+ *ret = NULL;
+ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
+
/* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
- * to permit stateful resumption.
- */
+ * to permit stateful resumption.
+ */
if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
- return 1;
-
+ return 0;
if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
- return 1;
+ return 0;
if (p >= limit)
return -1;
/* Skip past DTLS cookie */
@@ -1725,7 +2117,7 @@ int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
return -1;
/* Now at start of extensions */
if ((p + 2) >= limit)
- return 1;
+ return 0;
n2s(p, i);
while ((p + 4) <= limit)
{
@@ -1733,39 +2125,61 @@ int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
n2s(p, type);
n2s(p, size);
if (p + size > limit)
- return 1;
+ return 0;
if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
{
- /* If tickets disabled indicate cache miss which will
- * trigger a full handshake
- */
- if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
- return 1;
- /* If zero length note client will accept a ticket
- * and indicate cache miss to trigger full handshake
- */
+ int r;
if (size == 0)
{
+ /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
+ * currently have one. */
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
- return 0; /* Cache miss */
+ return 1;
}
if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
{
- /* Indicate cache miss here and instead of
- * generating the session from ticket now,
- * trigger abbreviated handshake based on
- * external mechanism to calculate the master
- * secret later. */
- return 0;
+ /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
+ * decrypted rather than generating the session
+ * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
+ * handshake based on external mechanism to
+ * calculate the master secret later. */
+ return 2;
+ }
+ r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
+ switch (r)
+ {
+ case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
+ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
+ return 2;
+ case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
+ return r;
+ case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
+ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
+ return 3;
+ default: /* fatal error */
+ return -1;
}
- return tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len,
- ret);
}
p += size;
}
- return 1;
+ return 0;
}
+/* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
+ *
+ * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
+ * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
+ * sess_id: points at the session ID.
+ * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
+ * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
+ * point to the resulting session.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
+ * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
+ * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
+ * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
+ */
static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
SSL_SESSION **psess)
@@ -1780,7 +2194,7 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
/* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
if (eticklen < 48)
- goto tickerr;
+ return 2;
/* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
@@ -1792,7 +2206,7 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
if (rv < 0)
return -1;
if (rv == 0)
- goto tickerr;
+ return 2;
if (rv == 2)
renew_ticket = 1;
}
@@ -1800,15 +2214,15 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
{
/* Check key name matches */
if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
- goto tickerr;
+ return 2;
HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
}
/* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
- * integrity checks on ticket.
- */
+ * integrity checks on ticket.
+ */
mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
if (mlen < 0)
{
@@ -1820,8 +2234,8 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
- if (memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
- goto tickerr;
+ if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
+ return 2;
/* Attempt to decrypt session data */
/* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
@@ -1834,33 +2248,376 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
}
EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
- goto tickerr;
+ return 2;
slen += mlen;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
p = sdec;
-
+
sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
OPENSSL_free(sdec);
if (sess)
{
- /* The session ID if non-empty is used by some clients to
- * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
- * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
- * as required by standard.
- */
+ /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
+ * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
+ * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
+ * as required by standard.
+ */
if (sesslen)
memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
*psess = sess;
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = renew_ticket;
+ if (renew_ticket)
+ return 4;
+ else
+ return 3;
+ }
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
+ * ticket. */
+ return 2;
+ }
+
+/* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
+
+typedef struct
+ {
+ int nid;
+ int id;
+ } tls12_lookup;
+
+static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+ {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
+ {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
+ {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
+ {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
+ {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
+ {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
+#endif
+};
+
+static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+ {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
+#endif
+};
+
+static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
+ {
+ size_t i;
+ for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
+ {
+ if (table[i].nid == nid)
+ return table[i].id;
+ }
+ return -1;
+ }
+#if 0
+static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
+ {
+ size_t i;
+ for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
+ {
+ if (table[i].id == id)
+ return table[i].nid;
+ }
+ return -1;
+ }
+#endif
+
+int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
+ {
+ int sig_id, md_id;
+ if (!md)
+ return 0;
+ md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
+ sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
+ if (md_id == -1)
+ return 0;
+ sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
+ if (sig_id == -1)
+ return 0;
+ p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
+ p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
+ {
+ return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
+ sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
+ }
+
+const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
+ {
+ switch(hash_alg)
+ {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+ case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ if (FIPS_mode())
+ return NULL;
+#endif
+ return EVP_md5();
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
+ case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
+ return EVP_sha1();
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
+ case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
+ return EVP_sha224();
+
+ case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
+ return EVP_sha256();
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
+ case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
+ return EVP_sha384();
+
+ case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
+ return EVP_sha512();
+#endif
+ default:
+ return NULL;
+
+ }
+ }
+
+/* Set preferred digest for each key type */
+
+int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
+ {
+ int i, idx;
+ const EVP_MD *md;
+ CERT *c = s->cert;
+ /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */
+ if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
return 1;
+ /* Should never happen */
+ if (!c)
+ return 0;
+
+ c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
+ c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
+ c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = NULL;
+ c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = NULL;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < dsize; i += 2)
+ {
+ unsigned char hash_alg = data[i], sig_alg = data[i+1];
+
+ switch(sig_alg)
+ {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
+ idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
+ break;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
+ idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
+ break;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+ case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
+ idx = SSL_PKEY_ECC;
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
+ {
+ md = tls12_get_hash(hash_alg);
+ if (md)
+ {
+ c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
+ if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
+ c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
+ }
+ }
+
}
- /* If session decrypt failure indicate a cache miss and set state to
- * send a new ticket
- */
- tickerr:
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
+
+
+ /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
+ * supported it stays as NULL.
+ */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
+ c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
+ {
+ c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
+ c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+ if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
+ c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
+#endif
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+int
+tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
+ unsigned short hbtype;
+ unsigned int payload;
+ unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
+
+ /* Read type and payload length first */
+ hbtype = *p++;
+ n2s(p, payload);
+ pl = p;
+
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
+ &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
+ s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
+ {
+ unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
+ int r;
+
+ /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
+ * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
+ * payload, plus padding
+ */
+ buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
+ bp = buffer;
+
+ /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
+ *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
+ s2n(payload, bp);
+ memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
+ bp += payload;
+ /* Random padding */
+ RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
+
+ r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
+
+ if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
+ buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
+ s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ OPENSSL_free(buffer);
+
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ }
+ else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
+ {
+ unsigned int seq;
+
+ /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
+ * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
+ * sequence number */
+ n2s(pl, seq);
+
+ if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
+ {
+ s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
+ s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
+ }
+ }
+
return 0;
}
+int
+tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned char *buf, *p;
+ int ret;
+ unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
+ unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
+
+ /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
+ if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
+ s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
+ if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
+ if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
+ * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
+ */
+ OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
+
+ /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
+ * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
+ * some random stuff.
+ * - Message Type, 1 byte
+ * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
+ * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
+ * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
+ * - Padding
+ */
+ buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
+ p = buf;
+ /* Message Type */
+ *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
+ /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
+ s2n(payload, p);
+ /* Sequence number */
+ s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
+ /* 16 random bytes */
+ RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
+ p += 16;
+ /* Random padding */
+ RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
+
+ ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
+ if (ret >= 0)
+ {
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
+ buf, 3 + payload + padding,
+ s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
+
+ return ret;
+ }
#endif