1 files changed, 54 insertions, 66 deletions

diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c
index e3e9864dfa..0bf87be6d2 100644
--- a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c
+++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c
@@ -376,15 +376,11 @@ static int
 dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
 {
 	int i,al;
-	int clear=0;
 	int enc_err;
 	SSL_SESSION *sess;
 	SSL3_RECORD *rr;
-	unsigned int mac_size;
+	unsigned int mac_size, orig_len;
 	unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-	int decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 0;
-	unsigned char *mac = NULL;
-
 
 	rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
 	sess = s->session;
@@ -416,12 +412,16 @@ dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
 	rr->data=rr->input;
 
 	enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
-	if (enc_err <= 0)
+	/* enc_err is:
+	 *    0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
+	 *    1: if the padding is valid
+	 *    -1: if the padding is invalid */
+	if (enc_err == 0)
 		{
-		/* To minimize information leaked via timing, we will always
-		 * perform all computations before discarding the message.
-		 */
-		decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
+		/* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */
+		rr->length = 0;
+		s->packet_length = 0;
+		goto err;
 		}
 
 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
@@ -431,45 +431,62 @@ printf("\n");
 #endif
 
 	/* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
-	if (	(sess == NULL) ||
-		(s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) ||
-		(s->read_hash == NULL))
-		clear=1;
-
-	if (!clear)
+	if ((sess != NULL) &&
+	    (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) &&
+	    (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL))
 		{
-		/* !clear => s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
-		int t;
-		t=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
-		OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0);
-		mac_size=t;
-
-		if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+mac_size)
+		/* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
+		unsigned char *mac = NULL;
+		unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+		mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+		OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+
+		/* kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type */
+		orig_len = rr->length+((unsigned int)rr->type>>8);
+
+		/* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
+		 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
+		 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different
+		 * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
+		 */
+		if (orig_len < mac_size ||
+		    /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
+		    (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
+		     orig_len < mac_size+1))
 			{
-#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */
-			al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
 			goto f_err;
-#else
-			decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
-#endif			
 			}
-		/* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */
-		if (rr->length >= mac_size)
+
+		if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
 			{
+			/* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes
+			 * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract
+			 * the MAC in constant time from within the record,
+			 * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes.
+			 * */
+			mac = mac_tmp;
+			ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len);
 			rr->length -= mac_size;
-			mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
 			}
 		else
-			rr->length = 0;
-		i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0);
-		if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || memcmp(md, mac, mac_size) != 0)
 			{
-			decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
+			/* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len|
+			 * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's
+			 * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */
+			rr->length -= mac_size;
+			mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
 			}
+
+		i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */);
+		if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
+			enc_err = -1;
+		if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+mac_size)
+			enc_err = -1;
 		}
 
-	if (decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac)
+	if (enc_err < 0)
 		{
 		/* decryption failed, silently discard message */
 		rr->length = 0;
@@ -614,24 +631,6 @@ again:
 			goto again;
 			}
 
-		/* If we receive a valid record larger than the current buffer size,
-		 * allocate some memory for it.
-		 */
-		if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
-			{
-			unsigned char *pp;
-			unsigned int newlen = rr->length + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
-			if ((pp=OPENSSL_realloc(s->s3->rbuf.buf, newlen))==NULL)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_RECORD,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-				return(-1);
-				}
-			p = pp + (p - s->s3->rbuf.buf);
-			s->s3->rbuf.buf=pp;
-			s->s3->rbuf.len=newlen;
-			s->packet= &(s->s3->rbuf.buf[0]);
-			}
-
 		/* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
 		}
 
@@ -1470,7 +1469,6 @@ int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len,
 	SSL3_BUFFER *wb;
 	SSL_SESSION *sess;
 	int bs;
-	unsigned int len_with_overhead = len + SSL3_RT_DEFAULT_WRITE_OVERHEAD;
 
 	/* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
 	 * out.  This will happen with non blocking IO */
@@ -1480,16 +1478,6 @@ int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len,
 		return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
 		}
 
-	if (s->s3->wbuf.len < len_with_overhead)
-		{
-		if ((p=OPENSSL_realloc(s->s3->wbuf.buf, len_with_overhead)) == NULL) {
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-			goto err;
-		}
-		s->s3->wbuf.buf = p;
-		s->s3->wbuf.len = len_with_overhead;
-		}
-
 	/* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
 	if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
 		{