diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c | 891 |
1 files changed, 695 insertions, 196 deletions
diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c index 95b5033d3d..55a81c34ba 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/d1_lib.c @@ -1,78 +1,35 @@ -/* ssl/d1_lib.c */ /* - * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu - * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005. - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1999-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this - * software must display the following acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" - * - * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact - * openssl-core@OpenSSL.org. - * - * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" - * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written - * permission of the OpenSSL Project. - * - * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY - * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR - * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR - * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT - * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; - * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, - * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) - * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED - * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * ==================================================================== - * - * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young - * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim - * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * + * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include <stdio.h> #define USE_SOCKETS #include <openssl/objects.h> +#include <openssl/rand.h> #include "ssl_locl.h" #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) # include <sys/timeb.h> +#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) +# include <sys/times.h> +#elif !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) +# include <sys/time.h> #endif static void get_current_time(struct timeval *t); -static void dtls1_set_handshake_header(SSL *s, int type, unsigned long len); +static int dtls1_set_handshake_header(SSL *s, int type, unsigned long len); static int dtls1_handshake_write(SSL *s); -const char dtls1_version_str[] = "DTLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; -int dtls1_listen(SSL *s, struct sockaddr *client); +static unsigned int dtls1_link_min_mtu(void); + +/* XDTLS: figure out the right values */ +static const unsigned int g_probable_mtu[] = { 1500, 512, 256 }; -SSL3_ENC_METHOD DTLSv1_enc_data = { +const SSL3_ENC_METHOD DTLSv1_enc_data = { tls1_enc, tls1_mac, tls1_setup_key_block, @@ -80,7 +37,6 @@ SSL3_ENC_METHOD DTLSv1_enc_data = { tls1_change_cipher_state, tls1_final_finish_mac, TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, - tls1_cert_verify_mac, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, tls1_alert_code, @@ -91,7 +47,7 @@ SSL3_ENC_METHOD DTLSv1_enc_data = { dtls1_handshake_write }; -SSL3_ENC_METHOD DTLSv1_2_enc_data = { +const SSL3_ENC_METHOD DTLSv1_2_enc_data = { tls1_enc, tls1_mac, tls1_setup_key_block, @@ -99,7 +55,6 @@ SSL3_ENC_METHOD DTLSv1_2_enc_data = { tls1_change_cipher_state, tls1_final_finish_mac, TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, - tls1_cert_verify_mac, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, tls1_alert_code, @@ -124,19 +79,19 @@ int dtls1_new(SSL *s) { DTLS1_STATE *d1; + if (!DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_new(&s->rlayer)) { + return 0; + } + if (!ssl3_new(s)) return (0); - if ((d1 = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*d1))) == NULL) + if ((d1 = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*d1))) == NULL) { + ssl3_free(s); return (0); - memset(d1, 0, sizeof(*d1)); - - /* d1->handshake_epoch=0; */ + } - d1->unprocessed_rcds.q = pqueue_new(); - d1->processed_rcds.q = pqueue_new(); d1->buffered_messages = pqueue_new(); d1->sent_messages = pqueue_new(); - d1->buffered_app_data.q = pqueue_new(); if (s->server) { d1->cookie_len = sizeof(s->d1->cookie); @@ -145,20 +100,11 @@ int dtls1_new(SSL *s) d1->link_mtu = 0; d1->mtu = 0; - if (!d1->unprocessed_rcds.q || !d1->processed_rcds.q - || !d1->buffered_messages || !d1->sent_messages - || !d1->buffered_app_data.q) { - if (d1->unprocessed_rcds.q) - pqueue_free(d1->unprocessed_rcds.q); - if (d1->processed_rcds.q) - pqueue_free(d1->processed_rcds.q); - if (d1->buffered_messages) - pqueue_free(d1->buffered_messages); - if (d1->sent_messages) - pqueue_free(d1->sent_messages); - if (d1->buffered_app_data.q) - pqueue_free(d1->buffered_app_data.q); + if (d1->buffered_messages == NULL || d1->sent_messages == NULL) { + pqueue_free(d1->buffered_messages); + pqueue_free(d1->sent_messages); OPENSSL_free(d1); + ssl3_free(s); return (0); } @@ -169,36 +115,6 @@ int dtls1_new(SSL *s) static void dtls1_clear_queues(SSL *s) { - pitem *item = NULL; - DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata; - - while ((item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q)) != NULL) { - rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data; - if (rdata->rbuf.buf) { - OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf); - } - OPENSSL_free(item->data); - pitem_free(item); - } - - while ((item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->processed_rcds.q)) != NULL) { - rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data; - if (rdata->rbuf.buf) { - OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf); - } - OPENSSL_free(item->data); - pitem_free(item); - } - - while ((item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q)) != NULL) { - rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data; - if (rdata->rbuf.buf) { - OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf); - } - OPENSSL_free(item->data); - pitem_free(item); - } - dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s); dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s); } @@ -230,15 +146,14 @@ void dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(SSL *s) void dtls1_free(SSL *s) { + DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_free(&s->rlayer); + ssl3_free(s); dtls1_clear_queues(s); - pqueue_free(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q); - pqueue_free(s->d1->processed_rcds.q); pqueue_free(s->d1->buffered_messages); pqueue_free(s->d1->sent_messages); - pqueue_free(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q); OPENSSL_free(s->d1); s->d1 = NULL; @@ -246,26 +161,22 @@ void dtls1_free(SSL *s) void dtls1_clear(SSL *s) { - pqueue unprocessed_rcds; - pqueue processed_rcds; - pqueue buffered_messages; - pqueue sent_messages; - pqueue buffered_app_data; + pqueue *buffered_messages; + pqueue *sent_messages; unsigned int mtu; unsigned int link_mtu; + DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(&s->rlayer); + if (s->d1) { - unprocessed_rcds = s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q; - processed_rcds = s->d1->processed_rcds.q; buffered_messages = s->d1->buffered_messages; sent_messages = s->d1->sent_messages; - buffered_app_data = s->d1->buffered_app_data.q; mtu = s->d1->mtu; link_mtu = s->d1->link_mtu; dtls1_clear_queues(s); - memset(s->d1, 0, sizeof(*(s->d1))); + memset(s->d1, 0, sizeof(*s->d1)); if (s->server) { s->d1->cookie_len = sizeof(s->d1->cookie); @@ -276,18 +187,18 @@ void dtls1_clear(SSL *s) s->d1->link_mtu = link_mtu; } - s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q = unprocessed_rcds; - s->d1->processed_rcds.q = processed_rcds; s->d1->buffered_messages = buffered_messages; s->d1->sent_messages = sent_messages; - s->d1->buffered_app_data.q = buffered_app_data; } ssl3_clear(s); - if (s->options & SSL_OP_CISCO_ANYCONNECT) + + if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) + s->version = DTLS_MAX_VERSION; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_METHOD + else if (s->options & SSL_OP_CISCO_ANYCONNECT) s->client_version = s->version = DTLS1_BAD_VER; - else if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) - s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION; +#endif else s->version = s->method->version; } @@ -305,31 +216,6 @@ long dtls1_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg) case DTLS_CTRL_HANDLE_TIMEOUT: ret = dtls1_handle_timeout(s); break; - case DTLS_CTRL_LISTEN: - ret = dtls1_listen(s, parg); - break; - case SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION: - /* - * For library-internal use; checks that the current protocol is the - * highest enabled version (according to s->ctx->method, as version - * negotiation may have changed s->method). - */ - if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version) - return 1; - /* - * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its - * highest protocol version). - */ - if (s->ctx->method->version == DTLS_method()->version) { -#if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION -# error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION. -#endif - if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)) - return s->version == DTLS1_2_VERSION; - if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)) - return s->version == DTLS1_VERSION; - } - return 0; /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */ case DTLS_CTRL_SET_LINK_MTU: if (larg < (long)dtls1_link_min_mtu()) return 0; @@ -353,31 +239,12 @@ long dtls1_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg) return (ret); } -/* - * As it's impossible to use stream ciphers in "datagram" mode, this - * simple filter is designed to disengage them in DTLS. Unfortunately - * there is no universal way to identify stream SSL_CIPHER, so we have - * to explicitly list their SSL_* codes. Currently RC4 is the only one - * available, but if new ones emerge, they will have to be added... - */ -const SSL_CIPHER *dtls1_get_cipher(unsigned int u) -{ - const SSL_CIPHER *ciph = ssl3_get_cipher(u); - - if (ciph != NULL) { - if (ciph->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4) - return NULL; - } - - return ciph; -} - void dtls1_start_timer(SSL *s) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP /* Disable timer for SCTP */ if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { - memset(&(s->d1->next_timeout), 0, sizeof(struct timeval)); + memset(&s->d1->next_timeout, 0, sizeof(s->d1->next_timeout)); return; } #endif @@ -412,7 +279,7 @@ struct timeval *dtls1_get_timeout(SSL *s, struct timeval *timeleft) if (s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec < timenow.tv_sec || (s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec == timenow.tv_sec && s->d1->next_timeout.tv_usec <= timenow.tv_usec)) { - memset(timeleft, 0, sizeof(struct timeval)); + memset(timeleft, 0, sizeof(*timeleft)); return timeleft; } @@ -427,10 +294,10 @@ struct timeval *dtls1_get_timeout(SSL *s, struct timeval *timeleft) /* * If remaining time is less than 15 ms, set it to 0 to prevent issues - * because of small devergences with socket timeouts. + * because of small divergences with socket timeouts. */ if (timeleft->tv_sec == 0 && timeleft->tv_usec < 15000) { - memset(timeleft, 0, sizeof(struct timeval)); + memset(timeleft, 0, sizeof(*timeleft)); } return timeleft; @@ -465,8 +332,8 @@ void dtls1_double_timeout(SSL *s) void dtls1_stop_timer(SSL *s) { /* Reset everything */ - memset(&(s->d1->timeout), 0, sizeof(struct dtls1_timeout_st)); - memset(&(s->d1->next_timeout), 0, sizeof(struct timeval)); + memset(&s->d1->timeout, 0, sizeof(s->d1->timeout)); + memset(&s->d1->next_timeout, 0, sizeof(s->d1->next_timeout)); s->d1->timeout_duration = 1; BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_NEXT_TIMEOUT, 0, &(s->d1->next_timeout)); @@ -484,8 +351,7 @@ int dtls1_check_timeout_num(SSL *s) if (s->d1->timeout.num_alerts > 2 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) { mtu = - BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_FALLBACK_MTU, 0, - NULL); + BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_FALLBACK_MTU, 0, NULL); if (mtu < s->d1->mtu) s->d1->mtu = mtu; } @@ -537,10 +403,13 @@ static void get_current_time(struct timeval *t) GetSystemTime(&st); SystemTimeToFileTime(&st, &now.ft); + /* re-bias to 1/1/1970 */ # ifdef __MINGW32__ now.ul -= 116444736000000000ULL; # else - now.ul -= 116444736000000000UI64; /* re-bias to 1/1/1970 */ + /* *INDENT-OFF* */ + now.ul -= 116444736000000000UI64; + /* *INDENT-ON* */ # endif t->tv_sec = (long)(now.ul / 10000000); t->tv_usec = ((int)(now.ul % 10000000)) / 10; @@ -554,35 +423,665 @@ static void get_current_time(struct timeval *t) #endif } -int dtls1_listen(SSL *s, struct sockaddr *client) +#define LISTEN_SUCCESS 2 +#define LISTEN_SEND_VERIFY_REQUEST 1 + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK +int DTLSv1_listen(SSL *s, BIO_ADDR *client) { - int ret; + int next, n, ret = 0, clearpkt = 0; + unsigned char cookie[DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH]; + unsigned char seq[SEQ_NUM_SIZE]; + const unsigned char *data; + unsigned char *p, *buf; + unsigned long reclen, fragoff, fraglen, msglen; + unsigned int rectype, versmajor, msgseq, msgtype, clientvers, cookielen; + BIO *rbio, *wbio; + BUF_MEM *bufm; + BIO_ADDR *tmpclient = NULL; + PACKET pkt, msgpkt, msgpayload, session, cookiepkt; + + if (s->handshake_func == NULL) { + /* Not properly initialized yet */ + SSL_set_accept_state(s); + } /* Ensure there is no state left over from a previous invocation */ - SSL_clear(s); + if (!SSL_clear(s)) + return -1; + ERR_clear_error(); + + rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s); + wbio = SSL_get_wbio(s); + + if (!rbio || !wbio) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET); + return -1; + } + + /* + * We only peek at incoming ClientHello's until we're sure we are going to + * to respond with a HelloVerifyRequest. If its a ClientHello with a valid + * cookie then we leave it in the BIO for accept to handle. + */ + BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEEK_MODE, 1, NULL); + + /* + * Note: This check deliberately excludes DTLS1_BAD_VER because that version + * requires the MAC to be calculated *including* the first ClientHello + * (without the cookie). Since DTLSv1_listen is stateless that cannot be + * supported. DTLS1_BAD_VER must use cookies in a stateful manner (e.g. via + * SSL_accept) + */ + if ((s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION); + return -1; + } + + if (s->init_buf == NULL) { + if ((bufm = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return -1; + } + + if (!BUF_MEM_grow(bufm, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) { + BUF_MEM_free(bufm); + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return -1; + } + s->init_buf = bufm; + } + buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; + + do { + /* Get a packet */ + + clear_sys_error(); + /* + * Technically a ClientHello could be SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH + * + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH bytes long. Normally init_buf does not store + * the record header as well, but we do here. We've set up init_buf to + * be the standard size for simplicity. In practice we shouldn't ever + * receive a ClientHello as long as this. If we do it will get dropped + * in the record length check below. + */ + n = BIO_read(rbio, buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH); + + if (n <= 0) { + if (BIO_should_retry(rbio)) { + /* Non-blocking IO */ + goto end; + } + return -1; + } + + /* If we hit any problems we need to clear this packet from the BIO */ + clearpkt = 1; + + if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, buf, n)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + } + + /* + * Parse the received record. If there are any problems with it we just + * dump it - with no alert. RFC6347 says this "Unlike TLS, DTLS is + * resilient in the face of invalid records (e.g., invalid formatting, + * length, MAC, etc.). In general, invalid records SHOULD be silently + * discarded, thus preserving the association; however, an error MAY be + * logged for diagnostic purposes." + */ + + /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */ + if (n < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL); + goto end; + } + + if (s->msg_callback) + s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, buf, + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg); + + /* Get the record header */ + if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &rectype) + || !PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &versmajor)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto end; + } + + if (rectype != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + goto end; + } + + /* + * Check record version number. We only check that the major version is + * the same. + */ + if (versmajor != DTLS1_VERSION_MAJOR) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); + goto end; + } + + if (!PACKET_forward(&pkt, 1) + /* Save the sequence number: 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */ + || !PACKET_copy_bytes(&pkt, seq, SEQ_NUM_SIZE) + || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &msgpkt)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto end; + } + /* + * We allow data remaining at the end of the packet because there could + * be a second record (but we ignore it) + */ + + /* This is an initial ClientHello so the epoch has to be 0 */ + if (seq[0] != 0 || seq[1] != 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + goto end; + } + + /* Get a pointer to the raw message for the later callback */ + data = PACKET_data(&msgpkt); + + /* Finished processing the record header, now process the message */ + if (!PACKET_get_1(&msgpkt, &msgtype) + || !PACKET_get_net_3(&msgpkt, &msglen) + || !PACKET_get_net_2(&msgpkt, &msgseq) + || !PACKET_get_net_3(&msgpkt, &fragoff) + || !PACKET_get_net_3(&msgpkt, &fraglen) + || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&msgpkt, &msgpayload, fraglen) + || PACKET_remaining(&msgpkt) != 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto end; + } + + if (msgtype != SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + goto end; + } + + /* Message sequence number can only be 0 or 1 */ + if (msgseq > 2) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_INVALID_SEQUENCE_NUMBER); + goto end; + } + + /* + * We don't support fragment reassembly for ClientHellos whilst + * listening because that would require server side state (which is + * against the whole point of the ClientHello/HelloVerifyRequest + * mechanism). Instead we only look at the first ClientHello fragment + * and require that the cookie must be contained within it. + */ + if (fragoff != 0 || fraglen > msglen) { + /* Non initial ClientHello fragment (or bad fragment) */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_FRAGMENTED_CLIENT_HELLO); + goto end; + } + + if (s->msg_callback) + s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, data, + fraglen + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, + s->msg_callback_arg); + + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&msgpayload, &clientvers)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto end; + } + + /* + * Verify client version is supported + */ + if (DTLS_VERSION_LT(clientvers, (unsigned int)s->method->version) && + s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); + goto end; + } + + if (!PACKET_forward(&msgpayload, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) + || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&msgpayload, &session) + || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&msgpayload, &cookiepkt)) { + /* + * Could be malformed or the cookie does not fit within the initial + * ClientHello fragment. Either way we can't handle it. + */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto end; + } + + /* + * Check if we have a cookie or not. If not we need to send a + * HelloVerifyRequest. + */ + if (PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt) == 0) { + next = LISTEN_SEND_VERIFY_REQUEST; + } else { + /* + * We have a cookie, so lets check it. + */ + if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_NO_VERIFY_COOKIE_CALLBACK); + /* This is fatal */ + return -1; + } + if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, PACKET_data(&cookiepkt), + PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt)) == + 0) { + /* + * We treat invalid cookies in the same was as no cookie as + * per RFC6347 + */ + next = LISTEN_SEND_VERIFY_REQUEST; + } else { + /* Cookie verification succeeded */ + next = LISTEN_SUCCESS; + } + } + + if (next == LISTEN_SEND_VERIFY_REQUEST) { + /* + * There was no cookie in the ClientHello so we need to send a + * HelloVerifyRequest. If this fails we do not worry about trying + * to resend, we just drop it. + */ + + /* + * Dump the read packet, we don't need it any more. Ignore return + * value + */ + BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEEK_MODE, 0, NULL); + BIO_read(rbio, buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH); + BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEEK_MODE, 1, NULL); + + /* Generate the cookie */ + if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL || + s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, cookie, &cookielen) == 0 || + cookielen > 255) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE); + /* This is fatal */ + return -1; + } + + p = &buf[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]; + msglen = dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(p + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, + cookie, cookielen); + + *p++ = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; + + /* Message length */ + l2n3(msglen, p); + + /* Message sequence number is always 0 for a HelloVerifyRequest */ + s2n(0, p); + + /* + * We never fragment a HelloVerifyRequest, so fragment offset is 0 + * and fragment length is message length + */ + l2n3(0, p); + l2n3(msglen, p); + + /* Set reclen equal to length of whole handshake message */ + reclen = msglen + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; + + /* Add the record header */ + p = buf; + + *(p++) = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; + /* + * Special case: for hello verify request, client version 1.0 and we + * haven't decided which version to use yet send back using version + * 1.0 header: otherwise some clients will ignore it. + */ + if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) { + *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION >> 8; + *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff; + } else { + *(p++) = s->version >> 8; + *(p++) = s->version & 0xff; + } + + /* + * Record sequence number is always the same as in the received + * ClientHello + */ + memcpy(p, seq, SEQ_NUM_SIZE); + p += SEQ_NUM_SIZE; + + /* Length */ + s2n(reclen, p); + + /* + * Set reclen equal to length of whole record including record + * header + */ + reclen += DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; + + if (s->msg_callback) + s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, buf, + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg); + + if ((tmpclient = BIO_ADDR_new()) == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto end; + } + + /* + * This is unnecessary if rbio and wbio are one and the same - but + * maybe they're not. We ignore errors here - some BIOs do not + * support this. + */ + if (BIO_dgram_get_peer(rbio, tmpclient) > 0) { + (void)BIO_dgram_set_peer(wbio, tmpclient); + } + BIO_ADDR_free(tmpclient); + tmpclient = NULL; + + if (BIO_write(wbio, buf, reclen) < (int)reclen) { + if (BIO_should_retry(wbio)) { + /* + * Non-blocking IO...but we're stateless, so we're just + * going to drop this packet. + */ + goto end; + } + return -1; + } + + if (BIO_flush(wbio) <= 0) { + if (BIO_should_retry(wbio)) { + /* + * Non-blocking IO...but we're stateless, so we're just + * going to drop this packet. + */ + goto end; + } + return -1; + } + } + } while (next != LISTEN_SUCCESS); + + /* + * Set expected sequence numbers to continue the handshake. + */ + s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 1; + s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 1; + s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 1; + DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_set_write_sequence(&s->rlayer, seq); + + /* + * We are doing cookie exchange, so make sure we set that option in the + * SSL object + */ SSL_set_options(s, SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE); - s->d1->listen = 1; - ret = SSL_accept(s); - if (ret <= 0) - return ret; + /* + * Tell the state machine that we've done the initial hello verify + * exchange + */ + ossl_statem_set_hello_verify_done(s); - (void)BIO_dgram_get_peer(SSL_get_rbio(s), client); - return 1; + /* + * Some BIOs may not support this. If we fail we clear the client address + */ + if (BIO_dgram_get_peer(rbio, client) <= 0) + BIO_ADDR_clear(client); + + ret = 1; + clearpkt = 0; + end: + BIO_ADDR_free(tmpclient); + BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEEK_MODE, 0, NULL); + if (clearpkt) { + /* Dump this packet. Ignore return value */ + BIO_read(rbio, buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH); + } + return ret; } +#endif -static void dtls1_set_handshake_header(SSL *s, int htype, unsigned long len) +static int dtls1_set_handshake_header(SSL *s, int htype, unsigned long len) { - unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; - dtls1_set_message_header(s, p, htype, len, 0, len); + dtls1_set_message_header(s, htype, len, 0, len); s->init_num = (int)len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; s->init_off = 0; /* Buffer the message to handle re-xmits */ - dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0); + + if (!dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0)) + return 0; + + return 1; } static int dtls1_handshake_write(SSL *s) { return dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE); } + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS + +# define HEARTBEAT_SIZE(payload, padding) ( \ + 1 /* heartbeat type */ + \ + 2 /* heartbeat length */ + \ + (payload) + (padding)) + +# define HEARTBEAT_SIZE_STD(payload) HEARTBEAT_SIZE(payload, 16) + +int dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned int length) +{ + unsigned char *pl; + unsigned short hbtype; + unsigned int payload; + unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ + + if (s->msg_callback) + s->msg_callback(0, s->version, DTLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, + p, length, s, s->msg_callback_arg); + + /* Read type and payload length */ + if (HEARTBEAT_SIZE_STD(0) > length) + return 0; /* silently discard */ + if (length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) + return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */ + + hbtype = *p++; + n2s(p, payload); + if (HEARTBEAT_SIZE_STD(payload) > length) + return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */ + pl = p; + + if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) { + unsigned char *buffer, *bp; + unsigned int write_length = HEARTBEAT_SIZE(payload, padding); + int r; + + if (write_length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) + return 0; + + /* Allocate memory for the response. */ + buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(write_length); + if (buffer == NULL) + return -1; + bp = buffer; + + /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */ + *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE; + s2n(payload, bp); + memcpy(bp, pl, payload); + bp += payload; + /* Random padding */ + if (RAND_bytes(bp, padding) <= 0) { + OPENSSL_free(buffer); + return -1; + } + + r = dtls1_write_bytes(s, DTLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, write_length); + + if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback) + s->msg_callback(1, s->version, DTLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, + buffer, write_length, s, s->msg_callback_arg); + + OPENSSL_free(buffer); + + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) { + unsigned int seq; + + /* + * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16 + * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number + */ + n2s(pl, seq); + + if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) { + dtls1_stop_timer(s); + s->tlsext_hb_seq++; + s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +int dtls1_heartbeat(SSL *s) +{ + unsigned char *buf, *p; + int ret = -1; + unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */ + unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ + unsigned int size; + + /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */ + if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) || + s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT); + return -1; + } + + /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */ + if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING); + return -1; + } + + /* ...and no handshake in progress. */ + if (SSL_in_init(s) || ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + return -1; + } + + /*- + * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number + * as payload to distinguish different messages and add + * some random stuff. + */ + size = HEARTBEAT_SIZE(payload, padding); + buf = OPENSSL_malloc(size); + if (buf == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return -1; + } + p = buf; + /* Message Type */ + *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST; + /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */ + s2n(payload, p); + /* Sequence number */ + s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p); + /* 16 random bytes */ + if (RAND_bytes(p, 16) <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + p += 16; + /* Random padding */ + if (RAND_bytes(p, padding) <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + ret = dtls1_write_bytes(s, DTLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, size); + if (ret >= 0) { + if (s->msg_callback) + s->msg_callback(1, s->version, DTLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, + buf, size, s, s->msg_callback_arg); + + dtls1_start_timer(s); + s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1; + } + + err: + OPENSSL_free(buf); + + return ret; +} +#endif + +int dtls1_shutdown(SSL *s) +{ + int ret; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP + BIO *wbio; + + wbio = SSL_get_wbio(s); + if (wbio != NULL && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(wbio) && + !(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN)) { + ret = BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(wbio); + if (ret < 0) + return -1; + + if (ret == 0) + BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SAVE_SHUTDOWN, 1, + NULL); + } +#endif + ret = ssl3_shutdown(s); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP + BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SAVE_SHUTDOWN, 0, NULL); +#endif + return ret; +} + +int dtls1_query_mtu(SSL *s) +{ + if (s->d1->link_mtu) { + s->d1->mtu = + s->d1->link_mtu - BIO_dgram_get_mtu_overhead(SSL_get_wbio(s)); + s->d1->link_mtu = 0; + } + + /* AHA! Figure out the MTU, and stick to the right size */ + if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu(s)) { + if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) { + s->d1->mtu = + BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL); + + /* + * I've seen the kernel return bogus numbers when it doesn't know + * (initial write), so just make sure we have a reasonable number + */ + if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu(s)) { + /* Set to min mtu */ + s->d1->mtu = dtls1_min_mtu(s); + BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU, + s->d1->mtu, NULL); + } + } else + return 0; + } + return 1; +} + +static unsigned int dtls1_link_min_mtu(void) +{ + return (g_probable_mtu[(sizeof(g_probable_mtu) / + sizeof(g_probable_mtu[0])) - 1]); +} + +unsigned int dtls1_min_mtu(SSL *s) +{ + return dtls1_link_min_mtu() - BIO_dgram_get_mtu_overhead(SSL_get_wbio(s)); +} |