diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c | 478 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 478 deletions
diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c deleted file mode 100644 index 16d4f59b9b..0000000000 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,478 +0,0 @@ -/* crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c */ -/* - * Written by Nils Larsch for the OpenSSL project - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1998-2004 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this - * software must display the following acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" - * - * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact - * openssl-core@OpenSSL.org. - * - * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" - * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written - * permission of the OpenSSL Project. - * - * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY - * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR - * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR - * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT - * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; - * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, - * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) - * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED - * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * ==================================================================== - * - * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young - * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim - * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - */ - -#include "ecs_locl.h" -#include <openssl/err.h> -#include <openssl/obj_mac.h> -#include <openssl/bn.h> - -static ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, - const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, - EC_KEY *eckey); -static int ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, - BIGNUM **rp); -static int ecdsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, - const ECDSA_SIG *sig, EC_KEY *eckey); - -static ECDSA_METHOD openssl_ecdsa_meth = { - "OpenSSL ECDSA method", - ecdsa_do_sign, - ecdsa_sign_setup, - ecdsa_do_verify, -#if 0 - NULL, /* init */ - NULL, /* finish */ -#endif - 0, /* flags */ - NULL /* app_data */ -}; - -const ECDSA_METHOD *ECDSA_OpenSSL(void) -{ - return &openssl_ecdsa_meth; -} - -static int ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, - BIGNUM **rp) -{ - BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; - BIGNUM *k = NULL, *r = NULL, *order = NULL, *X = NULL; - EC_POINT *tmp_point = NULL; - const EC_GROUP *group; - int ret = 0; - int order_bits; - - if (eckey == NULL || (group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)) == NULL) { - ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); - return 0; - } - - if (ctx_in == NULL) { - if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) { - ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return 0; - } - } else - ctx = ctx_in; - - k = BN_new(); /* this value is later returned in *kinvp */ - r = BN_new(); /* this value is later returned in *rp */ - order = BN_new(); - X = BN_new(); - if (!k || !r || !order || !X) { - ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - if ((tmp_point = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { - ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB); - goto err; - } - if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, ctx)) { - ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB); - goto err; - } - - /* Preallocate space */ - order_bits = BN_num_bits(order); - if (!BN_set_bit(k, order_bits) - || !BN_set_bit(r, order_bits) - || !BN_set_bit(X, order_bits)) - goto err; - - do { - /* get random k */ - do - if (!BN_rand_range(k, order)) { - ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, - ECDSA_R_RANDOM_NUMBER_GENERATION_FAILED); - goto err; - } - while (BN_is_zero(k)) ; - - /* - * We do not want timing information to leak the length of k, so we - * compute G*k using an equivalent scalar of fixed bit-length. - * - * We unconditionally perform both of these additions to prevent a - * small timing information leakage. We then choose the sum that is - * one bit longer than the order. This guarantees the code - * path used in the constant time implementations elsewhere. - * - * TODO: revisit the BN_copy aiming for a memory access agnostic - * conditional copy. - */ - if (!BN_add(r, k, order) - || !BN_add(X, r, order) - || !BN_copy(k, BN_num_bits(r) > order_bits ? r : X)) - goto err; - - /* compute r the x-coordinate of generator * k */ - if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, tmp_point, k, NULL, NULL, ctx)) { - ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB); - goto err; - } - if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) == - NID_X9_62_prime_field) { - if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp - (group, tmp_point, X, NULL, ctx)) { - ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB); - goto err; - } - } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M - else { /* NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field */ - - if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, - tmp_point, X, NULL, - ctx)) { - ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB); - goto err; - } - } -#endif - if (!BN_nnmod(r, X, order, ctx)) { - ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; - } - } - while (BN_is_zero(r)); - - /* compute the inverse of k */ - if (EC_GROUP_get_mont_data(group) != NULL) { - /* - * We want inverse in constant time, therefore we utilize the fact - * order must be prime and use Fermats Little Theorem instead. - */ - if (!BN_set_word(X, 2)) { - ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; - } - if (!BN_mod_sub(X, order, X, order, ctx)) { - ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; - } - BN_set_flags(X, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime - (k, k, X, order, ctx, EC_GROUP_get_mont_data(group))) { - ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; - } - } else { - if (!BN_mod_inverse(k, k, order, ctx)) { - ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; - } - } - - /* clear old values if necessary */ - if (*rp != NULL) - BN_clear_free(*rp); - if (*kinvp != NULL) - BN_clear_free(*kinvp); - /* save the pre-computed values */ - *rp = r; - *kinvp = k; - ret = 1; - err: - if (!ret) { - if (k != NULL) - BN_clear_free(k); - if (r != NULL) - BN_clear_free(r); - } - if (ctx_in == NULL) - BN_CTX_free(ctx); - if (order != NULL) - BN_free(order); - if (tmp_point != NULL) - EC_POINT_free(tmp_point); - if (X) - BN_clear_free(X); - return (ret); -} - -static ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, - const BIGNUM *in_kinv, const BIGNUM *in_r, - EC_KEY *eckey) -{ - int ok = 0, i; - BIGNUM *kinv = NULL, *s, *m = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *order = NULL; - const BIGNUM *ckinv; - BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; - const EC_GROUP *group; - ECDSA_SIG *ret; - ECDSA_DATA *ecdsa; - const BIGNUM *priv_key; - - ecdsa = ecdsa_check(eckey); - group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey); - priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(eckey); - - if (group == NULL || priv_key == NULL || ecdsa == NULL) { - ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); - return NULL; - } - - ret = ECDSA_SIG_new(); - if (!ret) { - ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return NULL; - } - s = ret->s; - - if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL || (order = BN_new()) == NULL || - (tmp = BN_new()) == NULL || (m = BN_new()) == NULL) { - ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, ctx)) { - ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_EC_LIB); - goto err; - } - i = BN_num_bits(order); - /* - * Need to truncate digest if it is too long: first truncate whole bytes. - */ - if (8 * dgst_len > i) - dgst_len = (i + 7) / 8; - if (!BN_bin2bn(dgst, dgst_len, m)) { - ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; - } - /* If still too long truncate remaining bits with a shift */ - if ((8 * dgst_len > i) && !BN_rshift(m, m, 8 - (i & 0x7))) { - ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; - } - do { - if (in_kinv == NULL || in_r == NULL) { - if (!ECDSA_sign_setup(eckey, ctx, &kinv, &ret->r)) { - ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB); - goto err; - } - ckinv = kinv; - } else { - ckinv = in_kinv; - if (BN_copy(ret->r, in_r) == NULL) { - ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - } - - if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp, priv_key, ret->r, order, ctx)) { - ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; - } - if (!BN_mod_add_quick(s, tmp, m, order)) { - ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; - } - if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, ckinv, order, ctx)) { - ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; - } - if (BN_is_zero(s)) { - /* - * if kinv and r have been supplied by the caller don't to - * generate new kinv and r values - */ - if (in_kinv != NULL && in_r != NULL) { - ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, - ECDSA_R_NEED_NEW_SETUP_VALUES); - goto err; - } - } else - /* s != 0 => we have a valid signature */ - break; - } - while (1); - - ok = 1; - err: - if (!ok) { - ECDSA_SIG_free(ret); - ret = NULL; - } - if (ctx) - BN_CTX_free(ctx); - if (m) - BN_clear_free(m); - if (tmp) - BN_clear_free(tmp); - if (order) - BN_free(order); - if (kinv) - BN_clear_free(kinv); - return ret; -} - -static int ecdsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, - const ECDSA_SIG *sig, EC_KEY *eckey) -{ - int ret = -1, i; - BN_CTX *ctx; - BIGNUM *order, *u1, *u2, *m, *X; - EC_POINT *point = NULL; - const EC_GROUP *group; - const EC_POINT *pub_key; - - /* check input values */ - if (eckey == NULL || (group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)) == NULL || - (pub_key = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(eckey)) == NULL || sig == NULL) { - ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ECDSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS); - return -1; - } - - ctx = BN_CTX_new(); - if (!ctx) { - ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return -1; - } - BN_CTX_start(ctx); - order = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - u1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - u2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - m = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - X = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - if (!X) { - ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; - } - - if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, ctx)) { - ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_EC_LIB); - goto err; - } - - if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || BN_is_negative(sig->r) || - BN_ucmp(sig->r, order) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(sig->s) || - BN_is_negative(sig->s) || BN_ucmp(sig->s, order) >= 0) { - ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ECDSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); - ret = 0; /* signature is invalid */ - goto err; - } - /* calculate tmp1 = inv(S) mod order */ - if (!BN_mod_inverse(u2, sig->s, order, ctx)) { - ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; - } - /* digest -> m */ - i = BN_num_bits(order); - /* - * Need to truncate digest if it is too long: first truncate whole bytes. - */ - if (8 * dgst_len > i) - dgst_len = (i + 7) / 8; - if (!BN_bin2bn(dgst, dgst_len, m)) { - ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; - } - /* If still too long truncate remaining bits with a shift */ - if ((8 * dgst_len > i) && !BN_rshift(m, m, 8 - (i & 0x7))) { - ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; - } - /* u1 = m * tmp mod order */ - if (!BN_mod_mul(u1, m, u2, order, ctx)) { - ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; - } - /* u2 = r * w mod q */ - if (!BN_mod_mul(u2, sig->r, u2, order, ctx)) { - ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; - } - - if ((point = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { - ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, point, u1, pub_key, u2, ctx)) { - ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_EC_LIB); - goto err; - } - if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) == - NID_X9_62_prime_field) { - if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, point, X, NULL, ctx)) { - ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_EC_LIB); - goto err; - } - } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M - else { /* NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field */ - - if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, point, X, NULL, ctx)) { - ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_EC_LIB); - goto err; - } - } -#endif - if (!BN_nnmod(u1, X, order, ctx)) { - ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; - } - /* if the signature is correct u1 is equal to sig->r */ - ret = (BN_ucmp(u1, sig->r) == 0); - err: - BN_CTX_end(ctx); - BN_CTX_free(ctx); - if (point) - EC_POINT_free(point); - return ret; -} |