diff options
author | Rod Vagg <rod@vagg.org> | 2018-06-15 16:39:28 +1000 |
---|---|---|
committer | Anatoli Papirovski <apapirovski@mac.com> | 2018-06-24 23:27:12 -0700 |
commit | 831821bcf50e722072b0aeac93aacd2c09caae57 (patch) | |
tree | 8096175888219942bb744c8b06ac2470d0003c21 /doc/api/http2.md | |
parent | c7c52127ec993803f82e17d5631738c38fb1e1e0 (diff) | |
download | android-node-v8-831821bcf50e722072b0aeac93aacd2c09caae57.tar.gz android-node-v8-831821bcf50e722072b0aeac93aacd2c09caae57.tar.bz2 android-node-v8-831821bcf50e722072b0aeac93aacd2c09caae57.zip |
deps: float 0c27d793 from openssl (ECDSA blinding)
Pending OpenSSL 1.1.0i release.
Refs: https://www.nccgroup.trust/us/our-research/technical-advisory-return-of-the-hidden-number-problem/
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/21345
Reviewed-By: Ben Noordhuis <info@bnoordhuis.nl>
Reviewed-By: Shigeki Ohtsu <ohtsu@ohtsu.org>
Reviewed-By: James M Snell <jasnell@gmail.com>
Upstream: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/0c27d793
Original commit message:
Add blinding to an ECDSA signature
Keegan Ryan (NCC Group) has demonstrated a side channel attack on an
ECDSA signature operation. During signing the signer calculates:
s:= k^-1 * (m + r * priv_key) mod order
The addition operation above provides a sufficient signal for a
flush+reload attack to derive the private key given sufficient signature
operations.
As a mitigation (based on a suggestion from Keegan) we add blinding to
the operation so that:
s := k^-1 * blind^-1 (blind * m + blind * r * priv_key) mod order
Since this attack is a localhost side channel only no CVE is assigned.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'doc/api/http2.md')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions