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author | Shigeki Ohtsu <ohtsu@ohtsu.org> | 2017-11-03 00:22:35 +0900 |
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committer | Myles Borins <mylesborins@google.com> | 2017-11-03 12:22:29 -0500 |
commit | e7fff9c4435f9f5ef8069217d2a0093c81a8c78b (patch) | |
tree | 45fbbf4aae64902b831501231d16b7a0af2aeb53 /deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1.pod | |
parent | 3d4d5e0c60f00693947c940b09249f3952bb0cdc (diff) | |
download | android-node-v8-e7fff9c4435f9f5ef8069217d2a0093c81a8c78b.tar.gz android-node-v8-e7fff9c4435f9f5ef8069217d2a0093c81a8c78b.tar.bz2 android-node-v8-e7fff9c4435f9f5ef8069217d2a0093c81a8c78b.zip |
deps: upgrade openssl sources to 1.0.2m
This replaces all sources of openssl-1.0.2m.tar.gz into
deps/openssl/openssl
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/16691
Reviewed-By: Ben Noordhuis <info@bnoordhuis.nl>
Reviewed-By: Tobias Nießen <tniessen@tnie.de>
Reviewed-By: Michael Dawson <michael_dawson@ca.ibm.com>
Reviewed-By: Myles Borins <myles.borins@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Colin Ihrig <cjihrig@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Rod Vagg <rod@vagg.org>
Reviewed-By: Gireesh Punathil <gpunathi@in.ibm.com>
Reviewed-By: James M Snell <jasnell@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1.pod')
-rw-r--r-- | deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1.pod | 7 |
1 files changed, 7 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1.pod index b8f678fe72..f20f815d47 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1.pod +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/crypto/RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1.pod @@ -104,6 +104,13 @@ The RSA_padding_check_xxx() functions return the length of the recovered data, -1 on error. Error codes can be obtained by calling L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. +=head1 WARNING + +The RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2() padding check leaks timing +information which can potentially be used to mount a Bleichenbacher +padding oracle attack. This is an inherent weakness in the PKCS #1 +v1.5 padding design. Prefer PKCS1_OAEP padding. + =head1 SEE ALSO L<RSA_public_encrypt(3)|RSA_public_encrypt(3)>, |