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author | Sam Roberts <vieuxtech@gmail.com> | 2018-11-22 10:39:20 -0800 |
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committer | Sam Roberts <vieuxtech@gmail.com> | 2019-01-22 13:32:34 -0800 |
commit | 4231ad04f0b2aee5bda6be94715d4b70badaac8b (patch) | |
tree | 19f189fae6828708ebd37e466ce4a7716494b96a /deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c | |
parent | 5d80f9ea6091847176fa47fb1395fdffc4af9164 (diff) | |
download | android-node-v8-4231ad04f0b2aee5bda6be94715d4b70badaac8b.tar.gz android-node-v8-4231ad04f0b2aee5bda6be94715d4b70badaac8b.tar.bz2 android-node-v8-4231ad04f0b2aee5bda6be94715d4b70badaac8b.zip |
deps: upgrade openssl sources to 1.1.1a
This updates all sources in deps/openssl/openssl with openssl-1.1.1a.
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/25381
Reviewed-By: Daniel Bevenius <daniel.bevenius@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Shigeki Ohtsu <ohtsu@ohtsu.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c')
-rw-r--r-- | deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c | 312 |
1 files changed, 243 insertions, 69 deletions
diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c index 79f77e3eaf..7f0a256481 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ #include <openssl/bn.h> #include "rsa_locl.h" -static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, +static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes, BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb); /* @@ -31,29 +31,60 @@ static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, */ int RSA_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb) { - if (rsa->meth->rsa_keygen) + if (rsa->meth->rsa_keygen != NULL) return rsa->meth->rsa_keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb); - return rsa_builtin_keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb); + + return RSA_generate_multi_prime_key(rsa, bits, RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM, + e_value, cb); } -static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, +int RSA_generate_multi_prime_key(RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes, + BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb) +{ + /* multi-prime is only supported with the builtin key generation */ + if (rsa->meth->rsa_multi_prime_keygen != NULL) { + return rsa->meth->rsa_multi_prime_keygen(rsa, bits, primes, + e_value, cb); + } else if (rsa->meth->rsa_keygen != NULL) { + /* + * However, if rsa->meth implements only rsa_keygen, then we + * have to honour it in 2-prime case and assume that it wouldn't + * know what to do with multi-prime key generated by builtin + * subroutine... + */ + if (primes == 2) + return rsa->meth->rsa_keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb); + else + return 0; + } + + return rsa_builtin_keygen(rsa, bits, primes, e_value, cb); +} + +static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes, BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb) { - BIGNUM *r0 = NULL, *r1 = NULL, *r2 = NULL, *r3 = NULL, *tmp; - int bitsp, bitsq, ok = -1, n = 0; + BIGNUM *r0 = NULL, *r1 = NULL, *r2 = NULL, *tmp, *prime; + int ok = -1, n = 0, bitsr[RSA_MAX_PRIME_NUM], bitse = 0; + int i = 0, quo = 0, rmd = 0, adj = 0, retries = 0; + RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo = NULL; + STACK_OF(RSA_PRIME_INFO) *prime_infos = NULL; BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; + BN_ULONG bitst = 0; unsigned long error = 0; - /* - * When generating ridiculously small keys, we can get stuck - * continually regenerating the same prime values. - */ - if (bits < 16) { + if (bits < RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS) { ok = 0; /* we set our own err */ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL); goto err; } + if (primes < RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM || primes > rsa_multip_cap(bits)) { + ok = 0; /* we set our own err */ + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, RSA_R_KEY_PRIME_NUM_INVALID); + goto err; + } + ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) goto err; @@ -61,12 +92,15 @@ static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); r2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - r3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - if (r3 == NULL) + if (r2 == NULL) goto err; - bitsp = (bits + 1) / 2; - bitsq = bits - bitsp; + /* divide bits into 'primes' pieces evenly */ + quo = bits / primes; + rmd = bits % primes; + + for (i = 0; i < primes; i++) + bitsr[i] = (i < rmd) ? quo + 1 : quo; /* We need the RSA components non-NULL */ if (!rsa->n && ((rsa->n = BN_new()) == NULL)) @@ -86,83 +120,202 @@ static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, if (!rsa->iqmp && ((rsa->iqmp = BN_secure_new()) == NULL)) goto err; - if (BN_copy(rsa->e, e_value) == NULL) - goto err; - - BN_set_flags(rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - BN_set_flags(rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - BN_set_flags(r2, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - /* generate p and q */ - for (;;) { - if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(rsa->p, bitsp, 0, NULL, NULL, cb)) - goto err; - if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->p, BN_value_one())) + /* initialize multi-prime components */ + if (primes > RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM) { + rsa->version = RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI; + prime_infos = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_new_reserve(NULL, primes - 2); + if (prime_infos == NULL) goto err; - ERR_set_mark(); - if (BN_mod_inverse(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx) != NULL) { - /* GCD == 1 since inverse exists */ - break; + if (rsa->prime_infos != NULL) { + /* could this happen? */ + sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(rsa->prime_infos, rsa_multip_info_free); } - error = ERR_peek_last_error(); - if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) == ERR_LIB_BN - && ERR_GET_REASON(error) == BN_R_NO_INVERSE) { - /* GCD != 1 */ - ERR_pop_to_mark(); - } else { - goto err; + rsa->prime_infos = prime_infos; + + /* prime_info from 2 to |primes| -1 */ + for (i = 2; i < primes; i++) { + pinfo = rsa_multip_info_new(); + if (pinfo == NULL) + goto err; + (void)sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_push(prime_infos, pinfo); } - if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++)) - goto err; } - if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0)) + + if (BN_copy(rsa->e, e_value) == NULL) goto err; - for (;;) { - do { - if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(rsa->q, bitsq, 0, NULL, NULL, cb)) + + /* generate p, q and other primes (if any) */ + for (i = 0; i < primes; i++) { + adj = 0; + retries = 0; + + if (i == 0) { + prime = rsa->p; + } else if (i == 1) { + prime = rsa->q; + } else { + pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(prime_infos, i - 2); + prime = pinfo->r; + } + BN_set_flags(prime, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + + for (;;) { + redo: + if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(prime, bitsr[i] + adj, 0, NULL, NULL, cb)) + goto err; + /* + * prime should not be equal to p, q, r_3... + * (those primes prior to this one) + */ + { + int j; + + for (j = 0; j < i; j++) { + BIGNUM *prev_prime; + + if (j == 0) + prev_prime = rsa->p; + else if (j == 1) + prev_prime = rsa->q; + else + prev_prime = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(prime_infos, + j - 2)->r; + + if (!BN_cmp(prime, prev_prime)) { + goto redo; + } + } + } + if (!BN_sub(r2, prime, BN_value_one())) + goto err; + ERR_set_mark(); + BN_set_flags(r2, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + if (BN_mod_inverse(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx) != NULL) { + /* GCD == 1 since inverse exists */ + break; + } + error = ERR_peek_last_error(); + if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) == ERR_LIB_BN + && ERR_GET_REASON(error) == BN_R_NO_INVERSE) { + /* GCD != 1 */ + ERR_pop_to_mark(); + } else { + goto err; + } + if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++)) goto err; - } while (BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) == 0); - if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->q, BN_value_one())) - goto err; - ERR_set_mark(); - if (BN_mod_inverse(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx) != NULL) { - /* GCD == 1 since inverse exists */ - break; } - error = ERR_peek_last_error(); - if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) == ERR_LIB_BN - && ERR_GET_REASON(error) == BN_R_NO_INVERSE) { - /* GCD != 1 */ - ERR_pop_to_mark(); + + bitse += bitsr[i]; + + /* calculate n immediately to see if it's sufficient */ + if (i == 1) { + /* we get at least 2 primes */ + if (!BN_mul(r1, rsa->p, rsa->q, ctx)) + goto err; + } else if (i != 0) { + /* modulus n = p * q * r_3 * r_4 ... */ + if (!BN_mul(r1, rsa->n, prime, ctx)) + goto err; } else { + /* i == 0, do nothing */ + if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, i)) + goto err; + continue; + } + /* + * if |r1|, product of factors so far, is not as long as expected + * (by checking the first 4 bits are less than 0x9 or greater than + * 0xF). If so, re-generate the last prime. + * + * NOTE: This actually can't happen in two-prime case, because of + * the way factors are generated. + * + * Besides, another consideration is, for multi-prime case, even the + * length modulus is as long as expected, the modulus could start at + * 0x8, which could be utilized to distinguish a multi-prime private + * key by using the modulus in a certificate. This is also covered + * by checking the length should not be less than 0x9. + */ + if (!BN_rshift(r2, r1, bitse - 4)) goto err; + bitst = BN_get_word(r2); + + if (bitst < 0x9 || bitst > 0xF) { + /* + * For keys with more than 4 primes, we attempt longer factor to + * meet length requirement. + * + * Otherwise, we just re-generate the prime with the same length. + * + * This strategy has the following goals: + * + * 1. 1024-bit factors are effcient when using 3072 and 4096-bit key + * 2. stay the same logic with normal 2-prime key + */ + bitse -= bitsr[i]; + if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++)) + goto err; + if (primes > 4) { + if (bitst < 0x9) + adj++; + else + adj--; + } else if (retries == 4) { + /* + * re-generate all primes from scratch, mainly used + * in 4 prime case to avoid long loop. Max retry times + * is set to 4. + */ + i = -1; + bitse = 0; + continue; + } + retries++; + goto redo; } - if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++)) + /* save product of primes for further use, for multi-prime only */ + if (i > 1 && BN_copy(pinfo->pp, rsa->n) == NULL) + goto err; + if (BN_copy(rsa->n, r1) == NULL) + goto err; + if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, i)) goto err; } - if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 1)) - goto err; + if (BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) < 0) { tmp = rsa->p; rsa->p = rsa->q; rsa->q = tmp; } - /* calculate n */ - if (!BN_mul(rsa->n, rsa->p, rsa->q, ctx)) - goto err; - /* calculate d */ + + /* p - 1 */ if (!BN_sub(r1, rsa->p, BN_value_one())) - goto err; /* p-1 */ + goto err; + /* q - 1 */ if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->q, BN_value_one())) - goto err; /* q-1 */ + goto err; + /* (p - 1)(q - 1) */ if (!BN_mul(r0, r1, r2, ctx)) - goto err; /* (p-1)(q-1) */ + goto err; + /* multi-prime */ + for (i = 2; i < primes; i++) { + pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(prime_infos, i - 2); + /* save r_i - 1 to pinfo->d temporarily */ + if (!BN_sub(pinfo->d, pinfo->r, BN_value_one())) + goto err; + if (!BN_mul(r0, r0, pinfo->d, ctx)) + goto err; + } + { BIGNUM *pr0 = BN_new(); if (pr0 == NULL) goto err; + BN_with_flags(pr0, r0, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->d, rsa->e, pr0, ctx)) { BN_free(pr0); @@ -177,15 +330,26 @@ static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, if (d == NULL) goto err; + BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - if ( /* calculate d mod (p-1) */ - !BN_mod(rsa->dmp1, d, r1, ctx) - /* calculate d mod (q-1) */ + /* calculate d mod (p-1) and d mod (q - 1) */ + if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmp1, d, r1, ctx) || !BN_mod(rsa->dmq1, d, r2, ctx)) { BN_free(d); goto err; } + + /* calculate CRT exponents */ + for (i = 2; i < primes; i++) { + pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(prime_infos, i - 2); + /* pinfo->d == r_i - 1 */ + if (!BN_mod(pinfo->d, d, pinfo->d, ctx)) { + BN_free(d); + goto err; + } + } + /* We MUST free d before any further use of rsa->d */ BN_free(d); } @@ -202,6 +366,17 @@ static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, BN_free(p); goto err; } + + /* calculate CRT coefficient for other primes */ + for (i = 2; i < primes; i++) { + pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(prime_infos, i - 2); + BN_with_flags(p, pinfo->r, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + if (!BN_mod_inverse(pinfo->t, pinfo->pp, p, ctx)) { + BN_free(p); + goto err; + } + } + /* We MUST free p before any further use of rsa->p */ BN_free(p); } @@ -215,6 +390,5 @@ static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(ctx); - return ok; } |