commit 9b4fdf0297974082665028bcf61a24f89472b6b7
parent b8560a315b355e4c6e7cf9835bc6737f44fc9999
Author: Martin Schanzenbach <schanzen@gnunet.org>
Date: Sat, 8 Jan 2022 14:22:04 +0100
-minor comments; text
Diffstat:
1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/2022-privacy/privacy.tex b/2022-privacy/privacy.tex
@@ -69,18 +69,19 @@ Because even if central banks were neutral custodians of citizens' privacy
As Bruce Schneier has concisely argued already in 2016: ``Data is a toxic asset.
We need to start thinking about it as such, and treat it as we would any other
source of toxicity. To do anything else is to risk our security and privacy.''~\cite{schneier2016toxic}
-And here, the ECB is basically proposing to link identities with payments which
+And here, the report is insunuating to link identities with payments which
consequently and inevitably produces highly sensitive metadata.
-Edward Snowden famously said at IETF 93 in 2019
-that \begin{quote}
+Referring to the toxicity of this metadata, Edward Snowden famously said at IETF 93
+in 2019 that \begin{quote}
``(...) we need to get away from true-name payments on the Internet.
The credit card payment system is one of the worst things that happened
for the user, in terms of being able to divorce their access from their
identity.''
\end{quote}
If the European Union wants to avoid a dystopia of the transparent citizen
-it must enable citizens to put a firewall between their identity and their
-payments. Tightly coupling them is thus probably the worst idea so far
+and catastrophic cases of personal data theft, it must enable citizens to put a
+firewall between their identity and their payments.
+Tightly coupling them is thus probably the worst idea so far
proposed in the design space for CBDCs.
The Swiss population recently rejected a proposal for a national
@@ -103,15 +104,26 @@ solutions. Another domain where this is inappropriately pursued is the
decades-old debate about age-verification for Websites. The common pattern
here is a security need (for example countering financing of terrorism (CFG),
anti-money laundering (AML) or protecting the children) which is ``addressed''
-by strong identification. Not only is this simplistic approach rarely
+by strong identification.
+% msc: Note this is a claim without a cite. Can we somehow show this? Maybe showing
+% that is is not effective (as opposed to cost effective) is easier.
+Not only is this simplistic approach rarely
cost-effective, but it contributes to the conversion of soverign citizens to
digital subjects.
\subsection{Privacy in payments can be done right}
+% msc: GNU Taler needs a cite. And I would even suggest to ONLY use a cite.
+% Also: The age verification plug is a stretch.
+% The example of age verification was given by this
+% paper above. How does it related to the ECB paper? Is this a strawman going
+% down here? Should this section come at the end and formulate requirements
+% that should be taken into account for a CDBC?
Token-based payments like GNU Taler offer an alternative, enabling the state
to ensure business is legal (and tax-paying) without infringing on the
-soverenity of private citizens. We recently extended this principle also into
-the domain of age-restrictions in e-commerce. Assuming that owners of
+soverenity of private citizens.
+We recently extended this principle also into
+the domain of age-restrictions in e-commerce. %citation needed
+Assuming that owners of
bank-accounts are mature adults, it allows them to withdraw age-restricted
coins for their wards. The wards can then anonymously spend the coins, but
transactions will fail at merchants that sell goods with an age-restriction
