commit 9a24e07adc0eb3259d1934dc42acc9f3f37bae37
parent 4ad793160b3ea049e091a8e6458cd41d26c954d9
Author: Christian Grothoff <christian@grothoff.org>
Date: Fri, 28 Jan 2022 07:54:52 +0100
Martin urges not to use the name
Diffstat:
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/2022-privacy/privacy.tex b/2022-privacy/privacy.tex
@@ -579,10 +579,10 @@ A cross-cutting concern here is that when achieving the security goals, the
CBDC must never rely on the central bank being trustworthy. Good security
designs always strive to avoid trusted parties. This implies that neither the
correctness nor the privacy assurances must rely on an honest central
-bank. Michael Hayden (the former head of the CIA and NSA) famously made the
+bank. The former director of the NSA famously made the
mistake of asserting that with respect to control over the toxic data assets
accumulated by the NSA ``nobody comes after us''~\cite[page 6f]{cwps}, suggesting
-that the (by Mr. Hayden presumed trustworthy) US government would never
+that the (by the DIRNSA clearly presumed trustworthy) US government would never
fall. This false assumption quickly turned deadly when the Taliban took over
personal profiles including biometric data of Afgahnis that had collaborated
with NATO forces after the retreat of NATO in 2021~\cite{afganistan2021}. We
@@ -672,7 +672,7 @@ control.
There are no trusted third parties. That does not prevent people from
designing and deploying systems that rely on the assumption that a trusted
-third party exists. Central banks must not follow Michael Hayden's
+third party exists. Central banks must not follow the NSA director's
hybris~\cite[page 6f]{cwps}
and assert that they are an eternally trusted third party.
