marketing

commit 930262d9cb5a0e3cbcfd478ea98175a574dd3907
parent 505deff48198cf7ae7d070f36729ea29ab47ad1f
Author: Christian Grothoff <christian@grothoff.org>
Date:   Mon, 25 Apr 2022 09:38:55 +0200

-apply correction from Martin

Diffstat:
M
2022-privacy/suref.tex
 | 
8
++++----

1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/2022-privacy/suref.tex b/2022-privacy/suref.tex
@@ -184,9 +184,9 @@ ces nouveaux attributs.''} which implies that the deployment of a CBDC would be
 impossible in the current state.  But adaptations of central bank missions to
 include ``absolute control over the rules and regulations of the use'' of
 money via the issuance of a CBDC (as envisioned by Agustín Carstens of the
-Bank for International Settlements\footnote{See speech given on October 19th 
-2020 on ``Cross-Border Payment -- A vision for the future'', 
-\url{https://meetings.imf.org/en/2020/Annual/Schedule/2020/10/19/imf-cross-border-payments-a-vision-for-the-future} 
+Bank for International Settlements\footnote{See speech given on October 19th
+2020 on ``Cross-Border Payment -- A vision for the future'',
+\url{https://meetings.imf.org/en/2020/Annual/Schedule/2020/10/19/imf-cross-border-payments-a-vision-for-the-future}
 at 00:24:30}) are dangerous
 if the central bank can choose to void privacy assurances. Carstens correctly states
 that with the proposed CBDC design the central bank would have the ability to know about every
@@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ displace cash.
 
 Consequently, the question should be if central banks should limit CBDC
 issuance within the scope of their current mission instead of modifying their
-rulebooks.  Wisely, the US Federal Reserve is currently barred from
+rulebooks.  The US Federal Reserve is currently barred from
 maintaining digital account balances for individuals~\cite{usfed2022}.  We
 consider this law wise, as we argue that tightly coupling payments with
 identity is harmful.  While the law prevents the Federal Reserve's from