commit 4c8b0b891c424a049cc82447afc89503a18068fe
parent 5a4272207d3d4fc198187d33bacb0d10824e3f8d
Author: Christian Grothoff <christian@grothoff.org>
Date: Thu, 27 Jan 2022 20:01:45 +0100
auer
Diffstat:
3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/2022-privacy/bis948.pdf b/2022-privacy/bis948.pdf
Binary files differ.
diff --git a/2022-privacy/literature.bib b/2022-privacy/literature.bib
@@ -28,6 +28,18 @@
year={2017},
publisher={Springer}
}
+
+
+@TechReport{bis948,
+ author = {Raphael Auer and Rainer B\"ohme},
+ title = {Central bank digital currency: the quest for minimally invasive technology},
+ institution = {Bank of International Settlement},
+ year = {2021},
+ type = {BIS Working Papers},
+ number = {948},
+ month = {June},
+}
+
@article{lightening,
doi = {10.1088/1367-2630/aba062},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1088/1367-2630/aba062},
diff --git a/2022-privacy/privacy.tex b/2022-privacy/privacy.tex
@@ -608,7 +608,7 @@ merely delegating responsibility for privacy-sensitive data to commercial
banks. Such a delegation does not provide adequate protection against state
overreach, as commercial banks still could too easily be compelled to sanction
opposition against the ruling party. Nevertheless, Auer's
-proposal~\cite{bis2021auer} to delegate the technical operation of a CBDC to
+proposal~\cite{bis948} to delegate the technical operation of a CBDC to
tightly supervised commercial banks as an alternative to the central bank
acquiring the technological prowess to centrally operate such a system has
merit: such a delegation can eliminate a likely single point of failure, and
