commit 442dcb40ad929f0b5e6326f40f8cd937c4c3307e
parent 7d52babd8e789360abbceaa556b85d040c960f14
Author: Christian Grothoff <christian@grothoff.org>
Date: Mon, 29 Mar 2021 13:33:25 +0200
clarify
Diffstat:
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/2021-offline/offline.tex b/2021-offline/offline.tex
@@ -157,14 +157,18 @@ weakened and becomes brittle.
A hardware-based solution not only limits availability to those users that can
afford the device, but also limits user's ability to make backups of their
digital cash. Thus, loosing the hardware will result in citizens loosing their
-digital cash, something a software-based solution can avoid. This drawback can
-only be offset by revealing the user's identity to reveal a double spending
-fraud without using trusted hardware, which means the solution would not offer
-good privacy protections.
-
-Similarly, in systems where double-spending is detected and later
-penalized, the resulting financial risks will create pressures
-to deny citizens with insufficient reputation or credit score
+digital cash, something a software-based solution can avoid.
+
+If a hardware-based solution were to enable users making arbitrary backups of
+their digital cash, it would have to again include a mechanism to reveal the
+user's identity if double spending is detected. In this case, the solution
+would fail to offer good privacy protections.
+
+Regardless of hardware or software solutions for offline payments, all such
+systems where double-spending is detected and the double-spender is
+retroactively identified and later penalized, the resulting financial risks
+will create pressures to deny access to the payment system to citizens with
+insufficient reputation or credit score.
One argument for offline CBDC is the objective to improve availability
in situations where network access is unreliable. However, today
