commit 4082fe32614db373674e3b0261641d6c33947917
parent 50947243b05119c1b0123e50e4081553c5f9c69f
Author: Martin Schanzenbach <schanzen@gnunet.org>
Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2022 23:15:05 +0100
tone down wording a bit
Diffstat:
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/2022-privacy/privacy.tex b/2022-privacy/privacy.tex
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ project to succeed.
Along the same lines, the French National Council for Digitalization published
a report on ``Notes and Tokens, The New Competition of
-Currencies''~\cite{french2021}. Here, the authors make similar false
+Currencies''~\cite{french2021}. Here, the authors make similar
assumptions about inevitable properties of Central Bank Digital Currencies
(CBDCs), going as far as stating that a CBDC is not possible without an eID
system. Our paper sets the record straight.
@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ European System of Central Banks (ECBS) itself and within Europe, it is clear
that the ECB's is caught in a dangerous self-delusion of central banks being
politically neutral and public-minded institutions.
-This delusion is dangerous because it leads to the ECB trusting itself with
+This assumption is a dangerous conjecture because it leads to the ECB trusting itself with
information and decisions that it must be entrusted with. In particular, the
authors write that the ECB ``may also prefer the (...) the ability to control
the privacy of payments data''. This is a fundamental misconception of the
@@ -176,9 +176,9 @@ if they themselves have control over their payment data. Privacy and the human
right of informational self-determination requires that each (legally capable)
citizen is in control of their personal data. The ECB asserting the ``ability
to control the privacy'' is thus an oxymoron: once anyone else has control,
-citizens have no privacy. As an institution that claims to act in the public
-interest, the ECB's report thus shows a fundamental lack of respect of its
-sovereign: the European citizens.
+citizens have no privacy.
+Any institution that strives to act in the public must acknowledge this or
+otherwise risk infantilizing its sovereign: the European citizens.
The French report~\cite{french2021} correctly states that a Digital Euro based
on accounts poses ``democratic risks''\footnote{risques démocratiques} and could allow ``state surveillance of
@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ ignore this danger and must reestablish the principles of personal
responsibility, personal independence and subsidiarity in the design processes
for critical infrastructure created by European institutions.
-Since this far-fetched assumption is taken as true while counterexamples
+Since this conjecture is taken as fact while counterexamples
exists, the conclusion of the first part of the French report follows a
logical fallacy. The authors assert that ``the new properties of CBDC raise
political questions''\footnote{``Dans un contexte où les nombreux projets d’émettre
@@ -240,7 +240,7 @@ CBDC.
\section{Harmful coupling with identity}
\label{sec:coupling}
-The arguably most dangerous idea of the ECB report is ``combining use of
+The arguably most dangerous idea emerging from the ECB report is ``combining use of
digital identity and CBDC''. The same idea is echoed in the French report
which quotes an unpublished report from Catenae (2020) to say that ``it is
difficult to envisage the creation of a retail CBDC, and more specifically a
@@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ Digital Euro without first creating a reliable, secure digital identity
offering the necessary guarantees''\footnote{il est difficile d'envisager la
création d'une monnaie numérique de banque centrale de détail, et plus
particulièrement d’un ``euro numérique'', sans création préalable d'une
-identité numérique fiable, s\'ecuris\'ee et offrant les garanties
+identité numérique fiable, s\'ecuris\'ee et offrant les garanties
nécessaires}. From a technical perspective, the statement is hard to
defend since current cryptocurrencies work perfectly well without depending on
a ``trusted digital identity''.
@@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ fixed low limit would strangle the utility of the CBDC, while a fixed high
limit may not be effective. They then propose a dynamic limit which they would
``calculate in accordance to (...) presumed cash needs''.
-Here, the ECB fails to learn the hard lessons from the introduction of $CO_2$
+Here, the authors fail to learn the hard lessons from the introduction of $CO_2$
emissions certificates, where initial allocations were calculated based on
``presumed emission needs'' of certain industries, resulting in windfalls for
shifty polluters that managed to rig the calculations, giving them excess
@@ -397,7 +397,7 @@ inspired by~\cite{dold2019}, given in order of priority:
% FIXME: I'd suggest a comma after 'possible',
% otherwise 'possible' might be understood as
% a adjective for 'privacy'.
- Where possible privacy should be guaranteed via technical measures as opposed to mere
+ Where possible, privacy should be guaranteed via technical measures as opposed to mere
organizational policies. Especially with micropayments for online content, a
disproportionate amount of rather private data about buyers would be revealed, if
the payment system does not have privacy protections.
