commit 1913c921414610578c2e8653b5b2979e2c58018a
parent 338d21c3716c6e7d1b1e99b163feec5b53f8c13f
Author: Stefan Kügel <skuegel@web.de>
Date: Wed, 6 Apr 2022 17:18:44 +0200
Slight corrections (Agustín Carstens, Bank for International Settlements), inserted citation in footnote.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Kügel <skuegel@web.de>
Diffstat:
2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/2022-privacy/privacy.tex b/2022-privacy/privacy.tex
@@ -223,13 +223,15 @@ centrales se pose la question des enjeux démocratiques et politiques de
ces nouveaux attributs.''} which implies that the deployment of a CBDC would be
impossible in the current state. But adaptations of central bank missions to
include ``absolute control over the rules and regulations of the use'' of
-money via the issuance of a CBDC (as envisioned by Agustin Carstens of the
-Bank of International Settlement\footnote{See speech given on October 19th
- 2020 on ``Cross-Border Payment -- A vision for the future''}) are dangerous
-if the central bank can choose to void privacy assurances. Carsten's reasons
-include that the central bank should have the ability to know about every
-payment. As he states that the central bank would be able to strictly enforce
-its rules and regulations, this implies the bank could arbitrarily block
+money via the issuance of a CBDC (as envisioned by Agustín Carstens of the
+Bank for International Settlements\footnote{See speech given on October 19th
+2020 on ``Cross-Border Payment -- A vision for the future'',
+\url{https://meetings.imf.org/en/2020/Annual/Schedule/2020/10/19/imf-cross-border-payments-a-vision-for-the-future}
+at 00:24:30}) are dangerous
+if the central bank can choose to void privacy assurances. Carstens correctly states
+that with the proposed CBDC design the central bank would have the ability to know about every
+payment. Consequently, the central bank would be able to strictly enforce
+its rules and regulations, which implies the bank could arbitrarily block
payments by private citizens. The repressive potential of a government with
such a capability is so large that it must be firmly rejected.
diff --git a/2022-privacy/suref.tex b/2022-privacy/suref.tex
@@ -183,10 +183,12 @@ centrales se pose la question des enjeux démocratiques et politiques de
ces nouveaux attributs.''} which implies that the deployment of a CBDC would be
impossible in the current state. But adaptations of central bank missions to
include ``absolute control over the rules and regulations of the use'' of
-money via the issuance of a CBDC (as envisioned by Agustin Carstens of the
-Bank of International Settlement\footnote{See speech given on October 19th
- 2020 on ``Cross-Border Payment -- A vision for the future''}) are dangerous
-if the central bank can choose to void privacy assurances. Carsten's correctly states
+money via the issuance of a CBDC (as envisioned by Agustín Carstens of the
+Bank for International Settlements\footnote{See speech given on October 19th
+2020 on ``Cross-Border Payment -- A vision for the future'',
+\url{https://meetings.imf.org/en/2020/Annual/Schedule/2020/10/19/imf-cross-border-payments-a-vision-for-the-future}
+at 00:24:30}) are dangerous
+if the central bank can choose to void privacy assurances. Carstens correctly states
that with the proposed CBDC design the central bank would have the ability to know about every
payment. Consequently, the central bank would be able to strictly enforce
its rules and regulations, which implies the bank could arbitrarily block
