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author | Christian Grothoff <christian@grothoff.org> | 2020-10-11 13:29:45 +0200 |
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committer | Christian Grothoff <christian@grothoff.org> | 2020-10-11 13:29:45 +0200 |
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diff --git a/talermerchantdemos/blog/articles/en/can-you-trust.html b/talermerchantdemos/blog/articles/en/can-you-trust.html new file mode 100644 index 0000000..51db680 --- /dev/null +++ b/talermerchantdemos/blog/articles/en/can-you-trust.html @@ -0,0 +1,316 @@ +<!--#include virtual="/server/header.html" --> +<!-- Parent-Version: 1.79 --> +<title>Can You Trust Your Computer? +- GNU Project - Free Software Foundation</title> +<!--#include virtual="/philosophy/po/can-you-trust.translist" --> +<!--#include virtual="/server/banner.html" --> +<h2>Can You Trust Your Computer?</h2> + +<p>by <a href="http://www.stallman.org/">Richard Stallman</a></p> + +<p> +Who should your computer take its orders from? Most people think +their computers should obey them, not obey someone else. With a plan +they call “trusted computing”, large media corporations +(including the movie companies and record companies), together with +computer companies such as Microsoft and Intel, are planning to make +your computer obey them instead of you. (Microsoft's version of this +scheme is called Palladium.) Proprietary programs have +included malicious features before, but this plan would make it +universal.</p> +<p> +Proprietary software means, fundamentally, that you don't control what +it does; you can't study the source code, or change it. It's not +surprising that clever businessmen find ways to use their control to +put you at a disadvantage. Microsoft has done this several times: one +version of Windows was designed to report to Microsoft all the +software on your hard disk; a recent “security” upgrade in +Windows Media Player required users to agree to new restrictions. But +Microsoft is not alone: the KaZaa music-sharing software is designed +so that KaZaa's business partner can rent out the use of your computer +to its clients. These malicious features are often secret, but even +once you know about them it is hard to remove them, since you don't +have the source code.</p> +<p> +In the past, these were isolated incidents. “Trusted +computing” would make the practice pervasive. “Treacherous +computing” is a more appropriate name, because the plan is +designed to make sure your computer will systematically disobey you. +In fact, it is designed to stop your computer from functioning as a +general-purpose computer. Every operation may require explicit +permission.</p> +<p> +The technical idea underlying treacherous computing is that the +computer includes a digital encryption and signature device, and the +keys are kept secret from you. Proprietary programs will use this +device to control which other programs you can run, which documents or +data you can access, and what programs you can pass them to. These +programs will continually download new authorization rules through the +Internet, and impose those rules automatically on your work. If you +don't allow your computer to obtain the new rules periodically from +the Internet, some capabilities will automatically cease to function.</p> +<p> +Of course, Hollywood and the record companies plan to use treacherous +computing for Digital Restrictions Management (DRM), so +that downloaded videos and music can be played only on one specified +computer. Sharing will be entirely impossible, at least using the +authorized files that you would get from those companies. You, the +public, ought to have both the freedom and the ability to share these +things. (I expect that someone will find a way to produce unencrypted +versions, and to upload and share them, so DRM will not entirely +succeed, but that is no excuse for the system.)</p> +<p> +Making sharing impossible is bad enough, but it gets worse. There are +plans to use the same facility for email and documents—resulting +in email that disappears in two weeks, or documents that can only be +read on the computers in one company.</p> +<p> +Imagine if you get an email from your boss telling you to do something +that you think is risky; a month later, when it backfires, you can't +use the email to show that the decision was not yours. “Getting +it in writing” doesn't protect you when the order is written in +disappearing ink.</p> +<p> +Imagine if you get an email from your boss stating a policy that is +illegal or morally outrageous, such as to shred your company's audit +documents, or to allow a dangerous threat to your country to move +forward unchecked. Today you can send this to a reporter and expose +the activity. With treacherous computing, the reporter won't be able +to read the document; her computer will refuse to obey her. +Treacherous computing becomes a paradise for corruption.</p> +<p> +Word processors such as Microsoft Word could use treacherous computing +when they save your documents, to make sure no competing word +processors can read them. Today we must figure out the secrets of +Word format by laborious experiments in order to make free word +processors read Word documents. If Word encrypts documents using +treacherous computing when saving them, the free software community +won't have a chance of developing software to read them—and if +we could, such programs might even be forbidden by the Digital +Millennium Copyright Act.</p> +<p> +Programs that use treacherous computing will continually download new +authorization rules through the Internet, and impose those rules +automatically on your work. If Microsoft, or the US government, does +not like what you said in a document you wrote, they could post new +instructions telling all computers to refuse to let anyone read that +document. Each computer would obey when it downloads the new +instructions. Your writing would be subject to 1984-style retroactive +erasure. You might be unable to read it yourself.</p> +<p> +You might think you can find out what nasty things a treacherous-computing +application does, study how painful they are, and decide +whether to accept them. Even if you can find this out, it would +be foolish to accept the deal, but you can't even expect the deal +to stand still. Once you come to depend on using the program, you are +hooked and they know it; then they can change the deal. Some +applications will automatically download upgrades that will do +something different—and they won't give you a choice about +whether to upgrade.</p> +<p> +Today you can avoid being restricted by proprietary software by not +using it. If you run GNU/Linux or another free operating system, and +if you avoid installing proprietary applications on it, then you are +in charge of what your computer does. If a free program has a +malicious feature, other developers in the community will take it out, +and you can use the corrected version. You can also run free +application programs and tools on nonfree operating systems; this +falls short of fully giving you freedom, but many users do it.</p> +<p> +Treacherous computing puts the existence of free operating systems and +free applications at risk, because you may not be able to run them at +all. Some versions of treacherous computing would require the +operating system to be specifically authorized by a particular +company. Free operating systems could not be installed. Some +versions of treacherous computing would require every program to be +specifically authorized by the operating system developer. You could +not run free applications on such a system. If you did figure out +how, and told someone, that could be a crime.</p> +<p> +There are proposals already for US laws that would require all computers to +support treacherous computing, and to prohibit connecting old computers to +the Internet. The CBDTPA (we call it the Consume But Don't Try Programming +Act) is one of them. But even if they don't legally force you to switch to +treacherous computing, the pressure to accept it may be enormous. Today +people often use Word format for communication, although this causes +several sorts of problems (see +<a href="/philosophy/no-word-attachments.html">“We Can Put an End to Word +Attachments”</a>). If only a treacherous-computing machine can read the +latest Word documents, many people will switch to it, if they view the +situation only in terms of individual action (take it or leave it). To +oppose treacherous computing, we must join together and confront the +situation as a collective choice.</p> +<p> +For further information about treacherous computing, see +<a href="http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/rja14/tcpa-faq.html">http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/rja14/tcpa-faq.html</a>.</p> +<p> +To block treacherous computing will require large numbers of citizens +to organize. We need your help! Please support +<a href="http://DefectiveByDesign.org">Defective by Design</a>, the +FSF's campaign against Digital Restrictions Management.</p> + +<h3>Postscripts</h3> + +<ol> +<li><p> +The computer security field uses the term “trusted +computing” in a different way—beware of confusion +between the two meanings.</p></li> + +<li><p> +The GNU Project distributes the GNU Privacy Guard, a program that +implements public-key encryption and digital signatures, which you can +use to send secure and private email. It is useful to explore how GPG +differs from treacherous computing, and see what makes one helpful and +the other so dangerous.</p> +<p> +When someone uses GPG to send you an encrypted document, and you use +GPG to decode it, the result is an unencrypted document that you can +read, forward, copy, and even reencrypt to send it securely to +someone else. A treacherous-computing application would let you read +the words on the screen, but would not let you produce an unencrypted +document that you could use in other ways. GPG, a free software +package, makes security features available to the users; <em>they</em> use <em>it</em>. +Treacherous computing is designed to impose restrictions on the users; +<em>it</em> uses <em>them</em>.</p></li> + +<li><p> +The supporters of treacherous computing focus their discourse on its +<a name="beneficial">beneficial uses</a>. What they say is often +correct, just not important.</p> +<p> +Like most hardware, treacherous-computing hardware can be used for +purposes which are not harmful. But these features can be implemented in +other ways, without treacherous-computing hardware. The principal +difference that treacherous computing makes for users is the nasty +consequence: rigging your computer to work against you.</p> +<p> +What they say is true, and what I say is true. Put them together and +what do you get? Treacherous computing is a plan to take away our +freedom, while offering minor benefits to distract us from what we +would lose.</p></li> + +<li><p> +Microsoft presents Palladium as a security measure, and claims that +it will protect against viruses, but this claim is evidently false. A +presentation by Microsoft Research in October 2002 stated that one of +the specifications of Palladium is that existing operating systems and +applications will continue to run; therefore, viruses will continue to +be able to do all the things that they can do today.</p> +<p> +When Microsoft employees speak of “security” in connection with +Palladium, they do not mean what we normally mean by that word: +protecting your machine from things you do not want. They mean +protecting your copies of data on your machine from access by you in +ways others do not want. A slide in the presentation listed several +types of secrets Palladium could be used to keep, including +“third party secrets” and “user +secrets”—but it put “user secrets” in +quotation marks, recognizing that this is somewhat of an absurdity in the +context of Palladium.</p> +<p> +The presentation made frequent use of other terms that we frequently +associate with the context of security, such as “attack”, +“malicious code”, “spoofing”, as well as +“trusted”. None of them means what it normally means. +“Attack” doesn't mean someone trying to hurt you, it means +you trying to copy music. “Malicious code” means code +installed by you to do what someone else doesn't want your machine to +do. “Spoofing” doesn't mean someone's fooling you, it means +you're fooling Palladium. And so on.</p></li> + +<li><p> +A previous statement by the Palladium developers stated the basic +premise that whoever developed or collected information should have +total control of how you use it. This would represent a revolutionary +overturn of past ideas of ethics and of the legal system, and create +an unprecedented system of control. The specific problems of these +systems are no accident; they result from the basic goal. It is the +goal we must reject.</p></li> +</ol> + +<hr /> + +<p>As of 2015, treacherous computing has been implemented for PCs in +the form of the “Trusted Platform Module”; however, for +practical reasons, the TPM has proved a total failure for the goal of +providing a platform for remote attestation to verify Digital +Restrictions Management. Thus, companies implement DRM using other +methods. At present, “Trusted Platform Modules” are not +being used for DRM at all, and there are reasons to think that it will +not be feasible to use them for DRM. Ironically, this means that the +only current uses of the “Trusted Platform Modules” are +the innocent secondary uses—for instance, to verify that no one +has surreptitiously changed the system in a computer.</p> + +<p>Therefore, we conclude that the “Trusted Platform +Modules” available for PCs are not dangerous, and there is no +reason not to include one in a computer or support it in system +software.</p> + +<p>This does not mean that everything is rosy. Other hardware systems +for blocking the owner of a computer from changing the software in it +are in use in some ARM PCs as well as processors in portable phones, +cars, TVs and other devices, and these are fully as bad as we +expected.</p> + +<p>This also does not mean that remote attestation is harmless. If +ever a device succeeds in implementing that, it will be a grave threat +to users' freedom. The current “Trusted Platform Module” +is harmless only because it failed in the attempt to make remote +attestation feasible. We must not presume that all future attempts +will fail too.</p> + +<hr /> + +<blockquote id="fsfs"><p class="big">This essay is published +in <a href="http://shop.fsf.org/product/free-software-free-society/"><cite>Free +Software, Free Society: The Selected Essays of Richard +M. Stallman</cite></a>.</p></blockquote> + +</div><!-- for id="content", starts in the include above --> +<!--#include virtual="/server/footer.html" --> +<div id="footer"> +<div class="unprintable"> + +<p>Please send general FSF & GNU inquiries to <a +href="mailto:gnu@gnu.org"><gnu@gnu.org></a>. There are also <a +href="/contact/">other ways to contact</a> the FSF. Broken links and other +corrections or suggestions can be sent to <a +href="mailto:webmasters@gnu.org"><webmasters@gnu.org></a>.</p> + +<p><!-- TRANSLATORS: Ignore the original text in this paragraph, + replace it with the translation of these two: + + We work hard and do our best to provide accurate, good quality + translations. However, we are not exempt from imperfection. + Please send your comments and general suggestions in this regard + to <a href="mailto:web-translators@gnu.org"> + <web-translators@gnu.org></a>.</p> + + <p>For information on coordinating and submitting translations of + our web pages, see <a + href="/server/standards/README.translations.html">Translations + README</a>. --> +Please see the <a +href="/server/standards/README.translations.html">Translations README</a> for +information on coordinating and submitting translations of this article.</p> +</div> + +<p>Copyright © 2002, 2007, 2014, 2015, 2016 Richard Stallman</p> + +<p>This page is licensed under a <a rel="license" +href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">Creative +Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License</a>.</p> + +<!--#include virtual="/server/bottom-notes.html" --> + +<p class="unprintable">Updated: +<!-- timestamp start --> +$Date: 2016/11/18 06:31:39 $ +<!-- timestamp end --> +</p> +</div> +</div> +</body> +</html> |