abstract, fix up bib

1 files changed, 0 insertions, 43 deletions

diff --git a/taler-fc19/ref.bib b/taler-fc19/ref.bib
index 5a5f9b2..4fda028 100644
--- a/taler-fc19/ref.bib
+++ b/taler-fc19/ref.bib
@@ -40,8 +40,6 @@
  isbn = {978-3-319-12279-3},
  pages = {127--142},
  numpages = {16},
- url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-12280-9_9},
- doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-12280-9_9},
  acmid = {2769431},
  publisher = {Springer-Verlag New York, Inc.},
  address = {New York, NY, USA},
@@ -380,8 +378,6 @@
   pages="33--47",
   abstract="It is now recognized that the Consensus problem is a fundamental problem when one has to design and implement reliable asynchronous distributed systems. This chapter is on the Consensus problem. It studies Consensus in two failure models, namely, the Crash/no Recovery model and the Crash/Recovery model. The assumptions related to the detection of failures that are required to solve Consensus in a given model are particularly emphasized.",
   isbn="978-3-540-46475-4",
-  doi="10.1007/3-540-46475-1_2",
-  url="https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-46475-1_2"
 }
 
 
@@ -497,8 +493,6 @@
   pages="300--316",
   abstract="Pedersen designed the first scheme for generating Discrete- Log keys without any trusted dealer in 1991. As this protocol is simple and efficient, it appeared to be very attractive. For a long time, this robust algorithm has been trusted as being secure. However, in 1999, Gennaro et al. proved that one of the requirements is not guaranteed : more precisely, the property that the key is uniformly distributed in the key space. Their main objective was to repair the security flaw without sacrificing on efficiency. As a result, the protocol became secure but somehow unpractical. In particular, the ``complaint phase'', in which cheaters are thrown out, makes the scheme overly complex and difficult to deal with in practical situations. In order to avoid this phase and other drawbacks such as the initialization phase where private channels have to be created, we present a one round scheme which generates a discrete-log key with public channels only. Finally, we show how to improve the efficiency of our algorithm when the number of servers increases.",
   isbn="978-3-540-44586-9",
-  doi="10.1007/3-540-44586-2_22",
-  url="https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44586-2_22"
 }
 
 
@@ -726,8 +720,6 @@
   pages="24--44",
   abstract="Secure multi-party computation (MPC) allows multiple parties to compute a known function over inputs held by each party, without any party having to reveal its private input. Unfortunately, traditional MPC algorithms do not scale well to large numbers of parties. In this paper, we describe several recent MPC algorithms that are designed to handle large networks. All of these algorithms rely on recent techniques from the Byzantine agreement literature on forming and using quorums. Informally, a quorum is a small set of parties, most of which are trustworthy. We describe the advantages and disadvantages of these scalable algorithms, and we propose new ideas for improving practicality of current techniques. Finally, we conduct simulations to measure bandwidth cost for several current MPC algorithms.",
   isbn="978-3-662-46078-8",
-  doi="10.1007/978-3-662-46078-8_3",
-  url="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-46078-8_3"
 }
 
 
@@ -835,8 +827,6 @@
   pages="281--310",
   abstract="Bitcoin is the first and most popular decentralized cryptocurrency to date. In this work, we extract and analyze the core of the Bitcoin protocol, which we term the Bitcoin backbone, and prove two of its fundamental properties which we call common prefix and chain quality in the static setting where the number of players remains fixed. Our proofs hinge on appropriate and novel assumptions on the ``hashing power'' of the adversary relative to network synchronicity; we show our results to be tight under high synchronization.",
   isbn="978-3-662-46803-6",
-  doi="10.1007/978-3-662-46803-6_10",
-  url="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-46803-6_10"
 }
 
 
@@ -1061,9 +1051,7 @@
   volume={7741},
   series={Lecture Notes in Computer Science},
   editor={van Emde Boas, Peter and Groen, FransC.A. and Italiano, GiuseppeF. and Nawrocki, Jerzy and Sack, Harald},
-  doi={10.1007/978-3-642-35843-2_31},
   title={Mixed Hypergraphs for Linear-Time Construction of Denser Hashing-Based Data Structures},
-  url={http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35843-2_31},
   publisher={Springer Berlin Heidelberg},
   author={Rink, Michael},
   pages={356-368},
@@ -1147,8 +1135,6 @@
  isbn = {978-3-642-03548-7},
  pages = {325--343},
  numpages = {19},
- url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03549-4_20},
- doi = {10.1007/978-3-642-03549-4_20},
  acmid = {1602018},
  publisher = {Springer-Verlag},
  address = {Berlin, Heidelberg},
@@ -1185,8 +1171,6 @@
  location = {Tenerife, Spain},
  pages = {336--342},
  numpages = {7},
- doi_url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14577-3_27},
- doi = {10.1007/978-3-642-14577-3_27},
  acmid = {2163598},
  publisher = {Springer-Verlag},
  address = {Berlin, Heidelberg},
@@ -1207,8 +1191,6 @@
   pages="314--332",
   abstract="Off-line e-cash systems are the digital analogue of regular cash. One of the main desirable properties is anonymity: spending a coin should not reveal the identity of the spender and, at the same time, users should not be able to double-spend coins without being detected. Compact e-cash systems make it possible to store a wallet of O(2                  L                ) coins using O(L{\thinspace}+{\thinspace}$\lambda$) bits, where $\lambda$ is the security parameter. They are called divisible whenever the user has the flexibility of spending an amount of 2ℓ, for some ℓ{\thinspace}≤{\thinspace}L, more efficiently than by repeatedly spending individual coins. This paper presents the first construction of divisible e-cash in the standard model (i.e., without the random oracle heuristic). The scheme allows a user to obtain a wallet of 2                  L                 coins by running a withdrawal protocol with the bank. Our construction is built on the traditional binary tree approach, where the wallet is organized in such a way that the monetary value of a coin depends on how deep the coin is in the tree.",
   isbn="978-3-642-36334-4",
-  doi="10.1007/978-3-642-36334-4_20",
-  url="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-36334-4_20"
 }
 
 
@@ -1272,8 +1254,6 @@ url="https://doi.org/10.1007/s00145-002-0120-1"
   pages="61--90",
   abstract="Divisible e-cash, proposed in 1991 by Okamoto and Ohta, addresses a practical concern of electronic money, the problem of paying the exact amount. Users of such systems can indeed withdraw coins of a large value N and then divide it into many pieces of any desired values                                                                                   {\$}{\$}V{\backslash}le N{\$}{\$}                  . Such a primitive therefore allows to avoid the use of several denominations or change issues. Since its introduction, many constructions have been proposed but all of them make use of the same framework: they associate each coin with a binary tree, which implies, at least, a logarithmic complexity for the spendings.",
   isbn="978-3-662-54365-8",
-  doi="10.1007/978-3-662-54365-8_4",
-  url="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-54365-8_4"
 }
 
 
@@ -1292,8 +1272,6 @@ url="https://doi.org/10.1007/s00145-002-0120-1"
   pages="77--100",
   abstract="Divisible E-cash systems allow users to withdraw a unique coin of value                                                                                   {\$}{\$}2^n{\$}{\$}                   from a bank, but then to spend it in several times to distinct merchants. In such a system, whereas users want anonymity of their transactions, the bank wants to prevent, or at least detect, double-spending, and trace the defrauders. While this primitive was introduced two decades ago, quite a few (really) anonymous constructions have been introduced. In addition, all but one were just proven secure in the random oracle model, but still with either weak security models or quite complex settings and thus costly constructions. The unique proposal, secure in the standard model, appeared recently and is unpractical. As evidence, the authors left the construction of an efficient scheme secure in this model as an open problem.",
   isbn="978-3-662-46447-2",
-  doi="10.1007/978-3-662-46447-2_4",
-  url="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-46447-2_4"
 }
 
 
@@ -1310,8 +1288,6 @@ url="https://doi.org/10.1007/s00145-002-0120-1"
   address="Berlin, Heidelberg",
   pages="302--321",
   isbn="978-3-540-32055-5",
-  doi="10.1007/11426639_18",
-  url="https://doi.org/10.1007/11426639_18"
 }
 
 
@@ -1340,8 +1316,6 @@ address="Cham",
 pages="287--306",
 abstract="Divisible E-cash has been introduced twenty years ago but no construction is both fully secure in the standard model and efficiently scalable. In this paper, we fill this gap by providing an anonymous divisible E-cash construction with constant-time withdrawal and spending protocols. Moreover, the deposit protocol is constant-time for the merchant, whatever the spent value is. It just has to compute and store                                                                                   {\$}{\$}2^l{\$}{\$}                   serial numbers when a value                                                                                   {\$}{\$}2^l{\$}{\$}                   is deposited, compared to                                                                                   {\$}{\$}2^n{\$}{\$}                   serial numbers whatever the spent amount (where                                                                                   {\$}{\$}2^n{\$}{\$}                   is the global value of the coin) in the recent state-of-the-art paper. This makes a very huge difference when coins are spent in several times.",
 isbn="978-3-319-28166-7",
-doi="10.1007/978-3-319-28166-7_14",
-url="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-28166-7_14"
 }
 
 
@@ -1358,15 +1332,12 @@ address="Berlin, Heidelberg",
 pages="438--451",
 abstract="Recently, several ``divisible'' untraceable off-line electronic cash schemes have been presented [8, 11, 19, 20]. This paper presents the first practical ``divisible'' untraceable1 off-line cash scheme that is ``single-term''2 in which every procedure can be executed in the order of log N, where N is the precision of divisibility, i.e., N = (the total coin value)/(minimum divisible unit value). Therefore, our ``divisible'' off-line cash scheme is more efficient and practical than the previous schemes. For example, when N = 217 (e.g., the total value is about {\$} 1000, and the minimum divisible unit is 1 cent), our scheme requires only about 1 Kbyte of data be transfered from a customer to a shop for one payment and about 20 modular exponentiations for one payment, while all previous divisible cash schemes require more than several Kbytes of transfered data and more than 200 modular exponentiations for one payment.",
 isbn="978-3-540-44750-4",
-doi="10.1007/3-540-44750-4_35",
-url="https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44750-4_35"
 }
 
 @techreport{brands1993efficient,
  author = {Brands, Stefan A.},
  title = {An Efficient Off-line Electronic Cash System Based On The Representation Problem.},
  year = {1993},
- source = {http://www.ncstrl.org:8900/ncstrl/servlet/search?formname=detail\&id=oai%3Ancstrlh%3Aercim_cwi%3Aercim.cwi%2F%2FCS-R9323},
  publisher = {CWI (Centre for Mathematics and Computer Science)},
  address = {Amsterdam, The Netherlands, The Netherlands},
 } 
@@ -1424,8 +1395,6 @@ url="https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44750-4_35"
   pages="199--203",
   abstract="Automation of the way we pay for goods and services is already underway, as can be seen by the variety and growth of electronic banking services available to consumers. The ultimate structure of the new electronic payments system may have a substantial impact on personal privacy as well as on the nature and extent of criminal use of payments. Ideally a new payments system should address both of these seemingly conflicting sets of concerns.",
   isbn="978-1-4757-0602-4",
-  doi="10.1007/978-1-4757-0602-4_18",
-  url="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-0602-4_18"
 }
 
 
@@ -1443,8 +1412,6 @@ url="https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44750-4_35"
   pages="319--327",
   abstract="The use of credit cards today is an act of faith on the part of all concerned. Each party is vulnerable to fraud by the others, and the cardholder in particular has no protection against surveillance.",
   isbn="978-0-387-34799-8",
-  doi="10.1007/0-387-34799-2_25",
-  url="https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-34799-2_25"
 }
 
 
@@ -1516,8 +1483,6 @@ url="https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44750-4_35"
   address="Berlin, Heidelberg",
   pages="319--338",
   isbn="978-3-540-46088-6",
-  doi="10.1007/3-540-46088-8_25",
-  url="https://www.di.ens.fr/~pointche/Documents/Papers/2001_fcA.pdf"
 }
 
 @misc{LightningNetwork,
@@ -1545,7 +1510,6 @@ url="https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44750-4_35"
   day = {5},
   year = {2015},
   note = {\url{https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/05/cryptocurrency-maker-ripple-labs-fined-700k-for-flouting-financial-regs/}},
-  url_coindesk = {http://www.coindesk.com/fincen-fines-ripple-labs-700000-bank-secrecy-act/}
 }
 
 @misc{RippleFined:CoinDesk,
@@ -1599,8 +1563,6 @@ url="https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44750-4_35"
   year = {2005},
   pages = {302--321},
   publisher = {Springer-Verlag},
-  url = {http://cs.brown.edu/~anna/papers/chl05-full.pdf},
-  url_citeseerx = {http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.136.4640}
 }
 
 
@@ -1714,11 +1676,6 @@ url="https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44750-4_35"
   booktitle = {Proceedings of the 13th USENIX Security Symposium},
   year = {2004},
   month = {8},
-  www_important = {1},
-  www_tags = {selected},
-  www_html_url = {https://www.torproject.org/svn/trunk/doc/design-paper/tor-design.html},
-  www_pdf_url = {https://www.torproject.org/svn/trunk/doc/design-paper/tor-design.pdf},
-  www_section = {Anonymous communication},
 }