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authorJeffrey Burdges <burdges@gnunet.org>2018-01-26 12:28:17 +0100
committerJeffrey Burdges <burdges@gnunet.org>2018-01-26 12:28:17 +0100
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Test around Fairness
Diffstat (limited to 'games')
-rw-r--r--games/games.tex19
1 files changed, 11 insertions, 8 deletions
diff --git a/games/games.tex b/games/games.tex
index dd731ec..d69a0b0 100644
--- a/games/games.tex
+++ b/games/games.tex
@@ -339,10 +339,16 @@ allowing them to talk to themselves does not make sense.
%at receipts and the coin doesn't even need to be valid directly.
\subsection{Fairness}
-Intuition: An adversarial merchant wins if a non-corrupted user can't obtain a proof-of-spending or unlinkable change.
-Let \oraSet{Fair} stand for access to the oracles \ora{AddClient}, \ora{WithdrawAsExchange}, \ora{Spend},
-\ora{RefreshAsExchange}, \ora{Share}, \ora{CorruptClient}
+Inuitively, an adversarial merchant wins if a non-corrupted user
+cannot obtain a proof-of-spending or unlinkable change, including
+if the deposit receipt from the exchange is forged by the merchant.
+We have auditors to address adversarial exchanges who attempt to defraud
+users, but only with weaker legal security assurances.
+
+Let \oraSet{Fair} stand for access to the oracles
+ \ora{AddClient}, \ora{WithdrawAsExchange}, \ora{Spend},
+ \ora{RefreshAsExchange}, \ora{Share}, \ora{CorruptClient}.
\bigskip
\noindent $\mathit{Exp}_{\cal A}^{fair}(1^\lambda, \kappa)$:
@@ -351,10 +357,9 @@ Let \oraSet{Fair} stand for access to the oracles \ora{AddClient}, \ora{Withdraw
\setlength\itemsep{0em}
\item $(skE, pkE) \leftarrow \mathrm{EKeygen}()$
\item $C_0 \leftarrow {\cal A}^{\oraSet{Fair}}(pkExchange)$
- \item If $C_0$ is not a coin public key, return 0. Let $U$ be the user that has $C_0$ in their wallet. If no such $U$ exists, return 0.
- \comment{Note however that $C_0$ is not required to be fresh or unspent.}
+ \item If $C_0$ is not a coin public key, return 0. Let $U$ be the user that has $C_0$ in their wallet. If no such $U$ exists, return 0. $C_0$ need not unspent or unrefreshed.
\item Let $C_0, \dots, C_n$ be the coins reachable via \algo{Link} from $C_0$.
- \comment{When $C_0$ was not refreshed, $n=0$ and $C_n = C_0$}
+ \footnote{In particular $n=0$ if $C_0$ is unrefreshed.}
\item If $U$ was corrupted or \ora{Share} was called with any of $C_0, \dots, C_n$, return 0.
\item $R \leftarrow \algo{Refresh}(\prt{B}(skE, pkE), \prt{U}(U, C_n))$
\item If $R$ indicates a successful refresh, return $0$.
@@ -362,8 +367,6 @@ Let \oraSet{Fair} stand for access to the oracles \ora{AddClient}, \ora{Withdraw
Otherwise return 1.
\end{enumerate}
-\paragraph{Note:} This also covers the case where the deposit receipt from the exchange is forged by the merchant.
-
\subsection{Unforgability} % Exculpability?