Income transperency game

1 files changed, 4 insertions, 4 deletions

diff --git a/games/games.tex b/games/games.tex
index 675d4e5..71c87b2 100644
--- a/games/games.tex
+++ b/games/games.tex
@@ -594,9 +594,9 @@ Assume Taler is polynomially-secure against
 Then Taler is polynomially-secure against profitable attacks on
 income transperency in the sense that
 any probabilistic polynomially time adversary $\cal A$ has at best
-$1\over\kappa \epsilon(k)$ odds of winning the income transparency
-game where $\epsilon(k)$ is $k$ is a security parameter distinct
-from $\kappa$.
+${1\over2} + \epsilon(k)$ odds of winning the income transparency
+game where $\epsilon(k)$ is sublinear and $k$ is a security parameter
+distinct from $\kappa$.
 \end{theorem}
 
 \begin{proof}
@@ -643,7 +643,7 @@ false planchet has a $1-{1\over\kappa}$ chance of contributing to
 $b$ instead of $|X|$.  So $E[{b \over f}] = 1-{1\over\kappa}$ where
 $f \le w'$ denotes the number of refreshes attempted with false planchets.
 It follows that 
- $P[{b \over w'} \ge (1-{1\over\kappa})] = 1/2 > {1\over\kappa}$.
+ $P[{b \over w'} \ge (1-{1\over\kappa})] = 1/2$.
 \end{proof}
 
 \begin{corollary}