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authorFlorian Dold <florian.dold@gmail.com>2019-05-26 11:34:38 +0200
committerFlorian Dold <florian.dold@gmail.com>2019-05-26 11:34:38 +0200
commit7d88d81e18f3f12e5b4e96e3ffd93607eeb59d61 (patch)
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rand is always lower case
Diffstat (limited to 'sa')
-rw-r--r--sa/sa.tex20
1 files changed, 10 insertions, 10 deletions
diff --git a/sa/sa.tex b/sa/sa.tex
index 2464be8..bd38b41 100644
--- a/sa/sa.tex
+++ b/sa/sa.tex
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ solutions lacked.
In summary, the overall system roughly operates as follows: The Taler wallet is filled via
wire-transfer to the Taler exchange's escrow account, where the subject
identifies the Taler wallet eligible to withdraw the CBDC. Regulators can
-limit the amount an entity is entitled to exchange from Rand into CBDC, like
+limit the amount an entity is entitled to exchange from rand into CBDC, like
ATM withdrawal limits. When withdrawing electronic coins, they are blindly signed by the
Taler exchange and stored in the consumer's wallet, which is value-based. The
consumer can then spend its coins at merchants using cryptographic signatures
@@ -159,8 +159,8 @@ forth in the SARB tender in Section~3.
electronic money issuer is allowed to issue coins of a particular
denomination. Usually the auditor would be tied to the
regulation of the respective central bank. Thus, if SARB
- only qualifies itself to issue CBDC for Rand, then only SARB
- can issue Taler CBDC for Rand.
+ only qualifies itself to issue CBDC for rand, then only SARB
+ can issue Taler CBDC for rand.
\item
{\bf A possible alternative scenario is for the SARB to back the CBDC and to set
regulatory standards and interoperability requirements, but with commercial banks
@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ acting as issuing authorities under the regulatory oversight of the SARB.}
banks moving existing funds into an escrow account when creating electronic
coins. Thus, the introduction of Taler does not impact monetary policy,
except that it might be easier for foreigners to obtain and hold electronic
- coins (compared to obtaining cash or Rand-denominated bank accounts).
+ coins (compared to obtaining cash or rand-denominated bank accounts).
\item
{\bf It must be possible to issue and distribute CBDC to commercial banks only, or to
commercial banks as well as licensed service providers. Such licensed service
@@ -265,16 +265,16 @@ store of value and a tokenised store of value. CBDC is expected to be interest-f
or attract zero interest. This must, however, be a variable attribute to cater for different
policy positions in future.}
Taler could theoretically support interest on CBDC by varying the exchange
- rate between CBDC and Rand. Taler can also theoretically support {\em negative}
+ rate between CBDC and rand. Taler can also theoretically support {\em negative}
interest on coins held long-term in wallets. However, these are optional
features and in general we fully agree that the most usable and practical design
- is to fix the exchange rate between CBDC and Rand and to not impose significant
+ is to fix the exchange rate between CBDC and rand and to not impose significant
fees on holding coins.
\subsection{Branding}
\item
{\bf CBDC must be branded and its ownership by the SARB as issuer must be evident.}
- Given that the CBDC is denominated in Rand, this should be trivial.
+ Given that the CBDC is denominated in rand, this should be trivial.
We can also create SARB-branded software if desired.
\item
{\bf CBDC must be unique in its design and its SARB ownership must be clear and
@@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ policy positions in future.}
a safe store of value, and as secure means to transfer value during transacting.}
The SARB would primarily hold the escrow account (or liability). It could also either
(1) run the operations of the exchange and guarantee the exchange of CBDC
- in Rand directly, or (2) else audit privately operated exchanges
+ in rand directly, or (2) else audit privately operated exchanges
similar to its regulatory oversight of conventional banks and payment processors.
This should assure the public about the safety of the CBDC.
We are not familiar with legal tender regulation in SA to determine what else would
@@ -688,7 +688,7 @@ from their traditional bank accounts, or they could be provided
CBDC directly (for example via social security) if they lack
a bank account. Electronic coins are blindly signed
by the issuing exchange, which is obliged to exchange CBDC
-back into Rand when they are deposited by merchants. An auditor
+back into rand when they are deposited by merchants. An auditor
supervises the operation of the exchange, unless the exchange
is fully operated within SARB's trusted infrastructure. In this
case, SARB may still want to run the auditing logic to provide
@@ -783,7 +783,7 @@ available on all relevant platforms. However, consumer systems are
much less diverse and hence this effort is significantly smaller.
Deploying Taler at scale should have no major impact on monetary
-policy because the issued CBDC would be 1:1 backed by Rand
+policy because the issued CBDC would be 1:1 backed by rand
in the escrow account at the SARB. However, if there is a
significant shift from the use of credit-cards to CBDC, there might
be a reduction in M2 from fractional reserve banking as CBDC is