path: root/doc/paper/postquantum_melt.tex

\documentclass{llncs}
%\usepackage[margin=1in,a4paper]{geometry}
\usepackage[T1]{fontenc}
\usepackage{palatino}
\usepackage{xspace}
\usepackage{microtype}
\usepackage{tikz,eurosym}
\usepackage{amsmath,amssymb}
\usepackage{enumitem}
\usetikzlibrary{shapes,arrows}
\usetikzlibrary{positioning}
\usetikzlibrary{calc}

% Relate to:
% http://fc14.ifca.ai/papers/fc14_submission_124.pdf

% Terminology:
% - SEPA-transfer -- avoid 'SEPA transaction' as we use
%       'transaction' already when we talk about taxable
%        transfers of Taler coins and database 'transactions'.
% - wallet = coins at customer
% - reserve = currency entrusted to exchange waiting for withdrawal
% - deposit = SEPA to exchange
% - withdrawal = exchange to customer
% - spending = customer to merchant
% - redeeming = merchant to exchange (and then exchange SEPA to merchant)
% - refreshing = customer-exchange-customer
% - dirty coin = coin with exposed public key
% - fresh coin = coin that was refreshed or is new
% - coin signing key = exchange's online key used to (blindly) sign coin
% - message signing key = exchange's online key to sign exchange messages
% - exchange master key = exchange's key used to sign other exchange keys
% - owner = entity that knows coin private key
% - transaction = coin ownership transfer that should be taxed
% - sharing = coin copying that should not be taxed


\title{Post-quantum anonymity in Taler}

\begin{document}
\mainmatter

\author{Jeffrey Burdges}
\institute{Intria / GNUnet / Taler}


\maketitle

\begin{abstract}
David Chaum's original RSA blind sgnatures provide information theoretic
anonymity for customers' purchases.  In practice, there are many schemes
that weaken this to provide properties.  We describe a refresh protocol
for Taler that provides customers with post-quantum anonymity.
It replaces an elliptic curve Diffe-Hellman operation with a unique
hash-based encryption scheme for the proof-of-trust via key knoledge
property that Taler requires to distinguish untaxable operations from
taxable purchases. 
\end{abstract}


\section{Introduction}

David Chaum's RSA blind sgnatures \cite{} can provide financial
security for the exchange, or traditionally mint,
 assuming RSA-CTI \cite{,}. 

A typical exchange deployment must record all spent coins to prevent
double spending.  It would therefore rotate ``denomination'' signing
keys every few weeks or months to keep this database from expanding
indefinitely \cite{Taler??}.  As a consequence, our exchange has
ample time to respond to advances in cryptgraphy by increasing their
key sizes, updating wallet software with new algorithms, or
even shutting down.

In particular, there is no chance that quantum computers will emerge
and become inexpensive within the lifetime of a demonination key.
Indeed, even a quantum computer that existed only in secret posses
little threat because the risk of exposing that secret probably exceeds
the exchange's value. 

\smallskip

We cannot make the same bold pronouncement for the customers' anonymity
however.  We must additionally ask if customers' transactions can be
deanonymized in the future by the nvention of quantum computes, or
mathematical advances. 

David Chaum's original RSA blind sgnatures provide even information
theoretic anonymity for customers, giving the desired negative answer.
There are however many related schemes that add desirable properties
at the expense of customers' anonymity.  In particular, any scheme
that supports offline merchants must add a deanonymization attack
when coins are double spent \cite{B??}.  

Importantly, there are reasons why exchanges must replace coins that
do not involve actual financial transactons, like to reissue a coin
before the exchange rotates the denomination key that signed it, or
protect users' anonymity after a merchant recieves a coin, but fails
to process it or deliver good.

In Taler, coins can be partially spent by signing with the coin's key
for only a portion of the value determined by the coin's denomination
key.  This allows precise payments but taints the coin with a
transaction,  which frequently entail user data like a shipng address.  
To correct this, a customer does a second transaction with the exchange
where they sign over the partially spent coin's risidual balance
in exchange for new freshly anonymized coins.  
Taler employs this {\em refresh} or {\em melt protocol} for
both for coins tainted through partial spending or merchant failures,
as well as for coin replacement due to denomination key roration.

If this protocol were simply a second transaction, then customers
would retain information theoreticaly secure anonymity.  
In Taler however, we require that the exchange learns acurate income
information for merchants.  If we use a regular transaction, then
a customer could conspire to help the merchant hide their income
\cite[]{Taler??}.
To prevent this, the refresh protocol requires that a customer prove
that they could learn the private key of the resulting new coins.

At this point, Taler employs an elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key
exchange between the coin's signing key and a new linking key 
\cite[??]{Taler??}.  As the public linking key is exposed,
an adversary with a quantum computer could trace any coins involved
in either partial spending operations or aborted transactions.
A refresh prompted by denomination key rotation incurs no anonymity
risks regardless.

\smallskip

We propose two variations on Taler's refresh protocol that offer
resistane to a quantum adversary.

First, we describe attaching contemporary post-quantum key exchanges,
based on either super-singular eliptic curve isogenies \cite{SIDH} or
ring learning with errors (Ring-LWE) \cite{Peikert14,NewHope}.
These provide strong post-quantum security so long as the underlying
scheme retain their post-quantum security.

Second, we propose a hash based scheme that 

Merkle tree based scheme that provides a
 query complexity bound suitable for current deployments, and
 depends only upon the strength of the hash function used.




much smaller 



but these all
incur significantly larger key sizes, requiring more badwidth and
storage space for the exchange, and take longer to run.
In addition, the established post-quantum key exchanges based on
Ring-LWE, like New Hope \cite{}, require that both keys be
ephemeral.  
Super-singular isogenies \cite{,} would work ``out of the box'',
if it were already packeged in said box.

Instead, we observe that 







In this paper, we describe a post-quantum 

It replaces an elliptic curve Diffe-Hellman operation with a unique
hash-based encryption scheme for the proof-of-trust via key knoledge
property that Taler requires to distinguish untaxable operations from
taxable purchases. 

...

\smallskip

We observe that several elliptic curve blind signature schemes provide
information theoreticly secure blinding as well, but 
 Schnorr sgnatures require an extra round trip \cite{??}, and
 pairing based schemes offer no advnatages over RSA \cite{??}.

There are several schemes like Anonize \cite{} in Brave \cite{}, 
or Zcash \cite{} used in similar situations to blind signatures. 
% https://github.com/brave/ledger/blob/master/documentation/Ledger-Principles.md
In these systems, anonymity is not post-quantum due to the zero-knowledge
proofs they employ.


\section{Taler's refresh protocol}

We first describe Taler's refresh protocol adding place holders
$\eta$, $\lambda$, $\Lambda$, $\mu$, and $\Mu$ for key material 
involved in post-quantum operations.  We view $\Lambda$ and $\Mu$
as public keys with respective private keys $\lambda$ and $\mu$,
and $\eta$ as the symetric key resulting from the key exchange
between them.  

We require there be effeciently computable
  $\CPK$, $\CSK$, $\LPK$, $\LSK$, $\KEX_2$ and $\KEX_3$  such that 
\begin{itemize}
\item  $\mu = \CSK(s)$ for a random bitstring $s$,
       $\Mu = \CPK(\mu)$,
\item  $\lambda = \LSK(t,\mu)$ and $\Lambda = \LPK(t,\mu)$
       for a random bitstring $t$, and
\item $\eta = \KEX_2(\lambda,\Mu) = \KEX_3(\Lambda,\mu)$.
\end{itemize}
In particular, if $\KEX_3(\Lambda,\mu)$ would fail
 then $\KEX_2(\lambda,\Mu)$ must fail too.

% Talk about assumption that if KEX_2 works then KEX_3 works?
If these are all read as empty, then our description below reduces
to Taler's existing refresh protocol. 

\smallskip

We let $\kappa$ denote the exchange's taxation security parameter,
meaning the highest marginal tax rate is $1/\kappa$.  Also, let 
$\theta$ denote the maximum number of coins returned by a refresh.

A coin $(C,\Mu,S)$ consists of 
  a Ed25519 public key $C = c G$,
  a post-quantum public key $\Mu$, and
  an RSA-FDH signature $S = S_d(C || \Mu)$ by a denomination key $d$.
A coin is spent by signing a contract with $C$.  The contract must
specify the recipiant merchant and what portion of the value denoted
by the denomination $d$ they recieve.
If $\Mu$ is large, we may replace it by $H(C || \Mu)$ to make signing
contracts more efficent.

There was of course a blinding factor $b$ used in the creation of
the coin's signature $S$.  In addition, there was a private seed $s$
used to generate $c$, $b$, and $\mu$, but we need not retain $s$
outside the refresh protocol.
$$ c = H(\textr{"Ed25519"} || s)
\qquad \mu = \CSK(s)
\qquad b = H(\textr{"Blind"} || s) $$

\smallskip

We begin refresh with a possibly tainted coin $(C,\Mu,S)$ that
we wish to refresh into $n \le \theta$ untainted coins.  

In the change sitaution, our coin $(C,M,S)$ was partially spent and 
retains only a part of the value determined by the denominaton $d$.
There is usually no denomination that matchets this risidual value
so we must refresh from one coin into $n \le \theta$.

For $x$ amongst the symbols $c$, $C$, $\mu$, $\Mu$, $b$, and $s$,
we let $x_{j,i}$ denote the value normally denoted $x$ of
 the $j$th cut of the $i$th new coin being created. 
% So $C_{j,i} = c_{j,i} G$, $\Mu_{j,i}$, $m_{j,i}$, and $b^{j,i}$
%  must be derived from $s^{j,i}$ as above.
We need only consider one such new coin at a time usually, 
so let $x'$ denote $x^{j,i}$ when $i$ and $j$ are clear from context.
So as above $c'$, $\mu'$, and $b_j$ are derived from $s_j$,
 and both $C' = c' G$ and $\Mu' = \CSK(s')$.

\paragraph{Wallet phase 1.}
\begin{itemize}
\item  For $j=1 \cdots \kappa$:
   \begin{itemize}
   \item  Create random $\zeta_j$ and $l_j$.
   \item  Also compute $L_j = l_j G$.
   \item  Generate $\lambda_j$, $\Lambda_j$, and
            $\eta_j = \KEX_2(\lambda,\Mu)$ as appropriate
            using $\mu$. % or possibly $\Mu$.
   \item  Set the linking commitment $\Gamma_{j,0} = (L_j,\Lambda_j)$. 
   \item  Set $k_j = H(l_j C || \eta_j)$.
\smallskip
   \item  For $i=1 \cdots n$:
      \begin{itemize}
      \item  Set $s' = H(\zeta_j || i)$.
      \item  Derive $c'$, $m'$, and $b'$ from $s'$ as above.
      \item  Compute $C' = c' G$ and $\Mu' = \CPK(m')$ too.
      \item  Compute $B_{j,i} = B_{b'}(C' || \Mu')$.
      \item  Encrypt $\Eta_{j,i} = E_{k_j}(s')$. 
      \item  Set the coin commitments $\Gamma_{j,i} = (\Eta_{j,i},B_{j,i})$
\end{itemize}
\smallskip
\end{itemize}
\item  Send $(C,\Mu,S)$ and the signed commitments
   $\Gamma_* = S_C( \Gamma_{j,i} \quad\textrm{for}\quad j=1\cdots\kappa, i=0 \cdots n )$.
\end{itemize}

\paragraph{Exchange phase 1.}
\begin{itemize}
\item  Verify the signature $S$ by $d$ on $(C || \Mu)$.
\item  Verify the signatures by $C$ on the $\Gamma_{j,i}$ in $\Gamma_*$.
\item  Pick random $\gamma \in \{1 \cdots \kappa\}$.
\item  Mark $C$ as spent by saving $(C,\gamma,\Gamma_*)$.
\item  Send $\gamma$ as $S(C,\gamma)$.
\end{itemize}

\paragraph{Wallet phase 2.}
\begin{itemize}
\item  Save $S(C,\gamma)$.
\item  For $j = 1 \cdots \kappa$ except $\gamma$:
   \begin{itemize}
   \item  Create a proof $\lambda_j^{\textrm{proof}}$ that
          $\lambda_j$ is compatable with $\Lambda_j$ and $\Mu$.
   \item  Set a responce tuple
          $R_j = (\zeta_j,l_j,\lambda_j,\lambda_j^{\textrm{proof}})$.
   \end{itemize}
\item  Send $S_C(R_j \quad\textrm{for}\quad j \ne \gamma )$.
\end{itemize}

\paragraph{Exchange phase 2.}
\begin{itemize}
\item  Verify the signature by $C$.
\item  For $j = 1 \cdots \kappa$ except $\gamma$:
   \begin{itemize}
   \item  Compute $\eta_j = \KEX_2(\lambda_j,\Mu)$.
   \item  Verify that $\Lambda_j = \LPK(???)$
   \item  Set $k_j = H(l_j C || \eta_j)$.
   \item  For $i=1 \cdots n$:
     \begin{itemize}
     \item  Decrypt $s' = D_{k_j}(\Eta_{j,i})$.
     \item  Compute $c'$, $m'$, and $b'$ from $s_j$.
     \item  Compute $C' = c' G$ too.
     \item  Verify $B' = B_{b'}(C' || \Mu')$.
     \end{itemize}
   \end{itemize}
\item  If verifications all pass then send $S_{d_i}(B_\gamma)$.
\end{itemize}

We could optionally save long-term storage space by
replacing $\Gamma_*$ with both $\Gamma_{\gamma,0}$ and
 $S_C(\Eta_{j,i} \quad\textrm{for}\quad j \ne \gamma )$.
It's clear this requires the wallet send that signature in some phase,
but also the wallet must accept a phase 2 responce to a phase 1 request.


\section{Post-quantum key exchanges}

In \cite{SIDH}, there is a Diffie-Helman like key exchange (SIDH)
based on computing super-singular eliptic curve isogenies which
functions as a drop in replacement, or more likely addition, for
Taler's refresh protocol.

In SIDH, private keys are the kernel of an isogeny in the 2-torsion
or the 3-torsion of the base curve.  Isogenies based on 2-torsion can
only be paired with isogenies based on 3-torsion, and visa versa.  
This rigidity makes constructing signature schemes with SIDH hard
\cite{}, but does not impact our use case.  

We let $\mu$ and $\Mu$ be the SIDH 2-torsion private and public keys,
repectively.  We simlarly let $\lambda_j$ and $\Lambda_j$ be the
SIDH 3-torsion private and public keys.  
% DO IT :
We define $\CPK$, $\CSK$, $\LPK$, $\LSK$, $\KEX_2$ and $\KEX_3$
 as appropriate from \cite{SIDH} too.  

\smallskip

Ring-LWE based key exchanges like \cite{Peikert14,NewHope} require
that both Alice and Bob's keys be ephemeral because the success or
failure of the key exchange leaks one bit about both keys\cite{}.
As a result, authentication with Ring-LWE based schemes remains
problematic\cite{}.

We observe however that the Taler wallet controls both sides during 
the refresh protocol, so the wallet can ensure that the key exchange 
always succeeds.  In fact, the Ring-LWE paramaters could be tunned to
make the probability of failure arbitrarily high, saving the exchange
bandwidth, storage, and verification time.


We let $\mu$ and $\Mu$ be Alice (initator) side the private and public
keys, repectively.  We simlarly let $\lambda_j$ and $\Lambda_j$ be the
Bob (respondent) private and public keys. 
% DO IT :
Again now, $\CPK$, $\CSK$, $\LPK$, $\LSK$, $\KEX_2$ and $\KEX_3$
can be defined from \cite{Peikert14,NewHope}.  % DO IT


\section{Hashed-based one-sided public keys}

We now define our hash-based encryption scheme.
Let $\delta$ denote our query security paramater and
 let $\mu$ be a bit string.
For $j \le \kappa$, we define a Merkle tree $T_j$ of height $\delta$
with leaves $\eta_{j,t} = H(\mu || "YeyCoins!" || t || j)$
 for $t \le 2^\delta$.
Let $\Lambda_j$ denote the root of $T_j$, making
 $\LPK(j,\mu)$ the Merkle tree root function.
Set $\Mu = H(\Lambda_1 || \cdots || \Lambda_\kappa)$,
 which defines $\CPK(\mu)$.

Now let $\lambda_{j,t}$ consist of $(j,t,\eta_{j,t})$ along with
both the Merkle tree path that proves $\eta_{j,i}$ is a leaf of $T_j$,
and $(\Lambda_1,\ldots,\Lambda_\kappa)$,
 making $\LSK(t,\mu)$ an embelished Merkle tree path function.

We define $\KEX_2(\lambda_{j,t},\Mu) = \eta_{j,t}$
 if $\lambda_{j,t}$ proves that $\eta_{j,t}$ is a leaf for $\Mu$,
or empty otherwise.


$\Mu = H(\Lambda_1 || \cdots || \Lambda_\kappa)$

$\KEX_3(\Lambda,\mu)$



$H(\eta_{j,i})$ along with a path 

$\eta$, $\lambda$, $\Lambda$, $\mu$, and $\Mu$ for key material 


We require there be effeciently computable
  $\CPK$, $\CSK$, $\LPK$, $\LSK$, $\KEX_2$ and $\KEX_3$  such that 
\begin{itemize}
\item  $\mu = \CSK(s)$ for a random bitstring $s$,
       $\Mu = \CPK(\mu)$,
\item  $\lambda = \LSK(t,\mu)$ and $\Lambda = \LPK(t,\mu)$
       for a random bitstring $t$, and
\item $\eta = \KEX_2(\lambda,\Mu) = \KEX_3(\Lambda,\mu)$.
\end{itemize}
In particular, if $\KEX_3(\Lambda,\mu)$ would fail
 then $\KEX_2(\lambda,\Mu)$ must fail too.

\begin{itemize}
\item 
\item 
\end{itemize}


\bibliographystyle{alpha}
\bibliography{taler,rfc}

% \newpage
% \appendix

% \section{}



\end{document}







Let $\kappa$ and $\theta$ denote
 the exchange's security parameter and
 the maximum number of coins returned by a refresh, respectively. 

We define a Merkle tree/sequence function 
  $\mlink(m,i,j) = H(m || "YeyCoins!" || i || j)$ 
        Actual linking key for jth cut of ith target coin
  $\mhide(m,i,j) = H( \mlink(m,i,j) )$
        Linking key hidden for Merkle
  $\mcoin(m,i) = H( \mhide(m,i,1) || \ldots || \mhide(m,i,\kappa) )$
        Merkle root for refresh into the ith coin
  $\mroot(m) = M( \m_coin(m,1), \ldots, \mcoin(m,\theta) )$
        Merkle root for refresh of the entire coin
  $mpath(m,i)$ is the nodes adjacent to Merkle path to $\mcoin(m,i)$
If $\theta$ is small then $M(x[1],\ldots,x[\theta])$ could be simply be
the concatenate and hash function $H( x[1] || ... || x[\theta] )$ like
in $\mcoin$, giving $O(n)$ time.  If $\theta$ is large, then $M$ should
be a hash tree to give $O(\log n)$ time.  We could use $M$ in $\mcoin$
too if $\kappa$ were large, but concatenate and hash wins for $\kappa=3$.
All these hash functions should have a purpose string.


A coin now consists of 
  a Ed25519 public key $C = c G$,
  a Merkle root $M = \mroot(m)$, and 
  an RSA signature $S = S_d(C || M)$ by a denomination key $d$.
There was a blinding factor $b$ used in the creation of the coin's signature $S$.
In addition, there was a value $s$ such that 
  $c = H(\textr{"Ed25519"} || s)$,
  $m = H(\textr{"Merkle"} || s)$, and
  $b = H(\textr{"Blind"} || s)$,
but we try not to retain $s$ if possible.



We have a tainted coin $(C,M,S)$ that we wish to
 refresh into $n \le \theta$ untained coins.  
For simplicity, we allow $x'$ to stand for the component
 normally denoted $x$ of the $i$th new coin being created.  
So $C' = c' G$, $M' = \mroot(m')$, and $b'$ must be derived from $s'$.
For $j=1\cdots\kappa$,
 we allow $x^j$ to denote the $j$th cut of the $i$th coin.  
So again
 $C^j = c^j G$, $M^j = \mroot(m^j)$, and $b^j$ must be derived from $s^j$.

Wallet phase 1.
  For $j=1 \cdots \kappa$:
    Create random $s^j$ and $l^j$.
    Compute $c^j$, $m^j$, and $b^j$ from $s^j$ as above.
    Compute $C^j = c^j G$ and $L^j = l^j G$ too.
    Compute $B^j = B_{b^j}(C^j || \mroot(m^j))$.
    Set $k = H(\mlink(m,i,j) || l^j C)$
    Encrypt $E^j = E_k(s^j,l^j)$.
  Send commitment $S' = S_C( (L^j,E^1,B^1), \ldots, (E^\kappa,B^\kappa) )$
%  Note : If $\mlink$ were a stream cypher then $E()$ could just be xor.

Exchange phase 1.
  Pick random $\gamma \in \{1 \cdots \kappa\}$.
  Mark $C$ as spent by saving $(C,gamma,S')$.
  Send gamma and $S(C,gamma,...)$

Wallet phase 2.
  Save ...
  Set $\Beta_gamma = \mhide(m,i,gamma) = H( \mlink(m,i,gamma) )$ and
      $\beta_i = \mlink(m,i,j)$ for $j=1\cdots\kappa$ not $\gamma$
  Prepare a responce tuple $R^j$ consisting of 
    $Beta_gamma$,  $(beta_j,l^j)$ for $j=1\cdots\kappa$ not $\gamma$,  
    and  $\mpath(m,i)$, including $\mcoin(m,i)$,
  Send $S_C(R^j)$.

Exchange phase 2.
  Set $Beta_j = H(beta_j)$ for $j=1\ldots\kappa$ except $\gamma$,
    keep $Beta_gamma$ untouched.
  Verify $M$ with $\mpath(m,i)$ including $\mcoin(m,i)$.
  Verify $\mcoin(m,i) = H( Beta_1 || .. || Beta_kappa )$.
  For $j=1 \cdots \kappa$ except $\gamma$:
    Decrypt $s^j$ from $E^i$ using $k = H(beta_j || l^j C)$
    Compute $c^j$, $m^j$, and $b^j$ from $s^j$.
    Compute $C^j = c^j G$ too.
    Verify $B^i = B_{b^j}(C^j || \mroot(m^j))$.
  If verifications pass then send $S_{d_i}(B^\gamma)$.


\section{Withdrawal}