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-rw-r--r--doc/paper/taler.tex6
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/doc/paper/taler.tex b/doc/paper/taler.tex
index 9d787bede..c32adc1b9 100644
--- a/doc/paper/taler.tex
+++ b/doc/paper/taler.tex
@@ -1455,7 +1455,7 @@ if given coin creation transcripts and possibly fewer
coin deposit transcripts for coins from the creation transcripts,
then produce a corresponding creation and deposit transcript.
-We say a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary $A$
+We say a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary
{\em links} coins if it has a non-negligible advantage in
solving the linking problem, when given the private keys
of the exchange.
@@ -1483,7 +1483,7 @@ adversary can recognize blinding factors then they link coins after
first computing $b_{i,j} = b_i m_i^d / m_j^d \mod n$ for all $i,j$.
\end{proof}
-We now know the following because Taler used SHA512 adopted to be
+We now know the following because Taler uses SHA512 adopted to be
a FDH to be the blinding factor.
\begin{corollary}
@@ -1535,7 +1535,7 @@ We may now conclude that Taler remains unlinkable even with the refresh protocol
\begin{theorem}
In the random oracle model, any PPT adversary with an advantage
in linking Taler coins has an advantage in breaking elliptic curve
-Diffie-Hellman key exchange on curve25519.
+Diffie-Hellman key exchange on Curve25519.
\end{theorem}
We do not distinguish between information known by the exchange and