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| author | Christian Grothoff <christian@grothoff.org> | 2017-05-18 15:05:28 +0200 |
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| committer | Christian Grothoff <christian@grothoff.org> | 2017-05-18 15:05:37 +0200 |
| commit | 57fef70492e9d6c0a88d025e8a716ab1db9ad202 (patch) | |
| tree | 80973e761854cb95b30def942935fa3caa0406a2 /doc/paper/taler_FC2017.txt | |
| parent | 998858bc8f95eb1966e3edacb6583c5af4dd46d2 (diff) | |
| download | exchange-57fef70492e9d6c0a88d025e8a716ab1db9ad202.tar.gz exchange-57fef70492e9d6c0a88d025e8a716ab1db9ad202.tar.bz2 exchange-57fef70492e9d6c0a88d025e8a716ab1db9ad202.zip | |
inline FC reviews/responses in main paper
Diffstat (limited to 'doc/paper/taler_FC2017.txt')
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/paper/taler_FC2017.txt | 2 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/doc/paper/taler_FC2017.txt b/doc/paper/taler_FC2017.txt index de1c64a30..66f8560ad 100644 --- a/doc/paper/taler_FC2017.txt +++ b/doc/paper/taler_FC2017.txt @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ be insecure. > We added a section with proofs I find two (possible) attacks against the refresh protocol. As the -exchange does not check the validity of the public key Cp′ , the attacker can +exchange does not check the validity of the public key Cp', the attacker can send an arbitrary public key to the exchange that will accept, and obtain a fresh coin. The attacker can spend partially a coin multiple times via refreshing the coin and obtaining a fresh coin in turn, as the refresh protocol |