diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c | 2041 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 2041 deletions
diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c deleted file mode 100644 index f5deddf770..0000000000 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,2041 +0,0 @@ -/* ssl/d1_pkt.c */ -/* - * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu - * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005. - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this - * software must display the following acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact - * openssl-core@openssl.org. - * - * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" - * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written - * permission of the OpenSSL Project. - * - * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY - * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR - * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR - * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT - * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; - * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, - * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) - * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED - * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * ==================================================================== - * - * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young - * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim - * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - */ -/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) - * All rights reserved. - * - * This package is an SSL implementation written - * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). - * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. - * - * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as - * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions - * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, - * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation - * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms - * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in - * the code are not to be removed. - * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution - * as the author of the parts of the library used. - * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or - * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software - * must display the following acknowledgement: - * "This product includes cryptographic software written by - * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" - * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library - * being used are not cryptographic related :-). - * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from - * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: - * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND - * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE - * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE - * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL - * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS - * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT - * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY - * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF - * SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or - * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be - * copied and put under another distribution licence - * [including the GNU Public Licence.] - */ - -#include <stdio.h> -#include <errno.h> -#define USE_SOCKETS -#include "ssl_locl.h" -#include <openssl/evp.h> -#include <openssl/buffer.h> -#include <openssl/pqueue.h> -#include <openssl/rand.h> - -/* mod 128 saturating subtract of two 64-bit values in big-endian order */ -static int satsub64be(const unsigned char *v1, const unsigned char *v2) -{ - int ret, i; - - if (sizeof(long) == 8) - do { - const union { - long one; - char little; - } is_endian = { - 1 - }; - long l; - - if (is_endian.little) - break; - /* not reached on little-endians */ - /* - * following test is redundant, because input is always aligned, - * but I take no chances... - */ - if (((size_t)v1 | (size_t)v2) & 0x7) - break; - - l = *((long *)v1); - l -= *((long *)v2); - if (l > 128) - return 128; - else if (l < -128) - return -128; - else - return (int)l; - } while (0); - - ret = 0; - for (i=0; i<7; i++) { - if (v1[i] > v2[i]) { - /* v1 is larger... but by how much? */ - if (v1[i] != v2[i] + 1) - return 128; - while (++i <= 6) { - if (v1[i] != 0x00 || v2[i] != 0xff) - return 128; /* too much */ - } - /* We checked all the way to the penultimate byte, - * so despite higher bytes changing we actually - * know that it only changed from (e.g.) - * ... (xx) ff ff ff ?? - * to ... (xx+1) 00 00 00 ?? - * so we add a 'bias' of 256 for the carry that - * happened, and will eventually return - * 256 + v1[7] - v2[7]. */ - ret = 256; - break; - } else if (v2[i] > v1[i]) { - /* v2 is larger... but by how much? */ - if (v2[i] != v1[i] + 1) - return -128; - while (++i <= 6) { - if (v2[i] != 0x00 || v1[i] != 0xff) - return -128; /* too much */ - } - /* Similar to the case above, we know it changed - * from ... (xx) 00 00 00 ?? - * to ... (xx-1) ff ff ff ?? - * so we add a 'bias' of -256 for the borrow, - * to return -256 + v1[7] - v2[7]. */ - ret = -256; - } - } - - ret += (int)v1[7] - (int)v2[7]; - - if (ret > 128) - return 128; - else if (ret < -128) - return -128; - else - return ret; -} - -static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, - int len, int peek); -static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap); -static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap); -static DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, - unsigned int *is_next_epoch); -#if 0 -static int dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, - unsigned short *priority, - unsigned long *offset); -#endif -static int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *q, - unsigned char *priority); -static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap); - -/* copy buffered record into SSL structure */ -static int dtls1_copy_record(SSL *s, pitem *item) -{ - DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata; - - rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data; - - if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL) - OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf); - - s->packet = rdata->packet; - s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length; - memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER)); - memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD)); - - /* Set proper sequence number for mac calculation */ - memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), &(rdata->packet[5]), 6); - - return (1); -} - -static int -dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority) -{ - DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata; - pitem *item; - - /* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */ - if (pqueue_size(queue->q) >= 100) - return 0; - - rdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DTLS1_RECORD_DATA)); - item = pitem_new(priority, rdata); - if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL) { - if (rdata != NULL) - OPENSSL_free(rdata); - if (item != NULL) - pitem_free(item); - - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return -1; - } - - rdata->packet = s->packet; - rdata->packet_length = s->packet_length; - memcpy(&(rdata->rbuf), &(s->s3->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER)); - memcpy(&(rdata->rrec), &(s->s3->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD)); - - item->data = rdata; - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP - /* Store bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */ - if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) && - (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A - || s->state == SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A)) { - BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_GET_RCVINFO, - sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo); - } -#endif - - s->packet = NULL; - s->packet_length = 0; - memset(&(s->s3->rbuf), 0, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER)); - memset(&(s->s3->rrec), 0, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD)); - - if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - if (rdata->rbuf.buf != NULL) - OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf); - OPENSSL_free(rdata); - pitem_free(item); - return (-1); - } - - /* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */ - if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - if (rdata->rbuf.buf != NULL) - OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf); - OPENSSL_free(rdata); - pitem_free(item); - return (-1); - } - - return (1); -} - -static int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue) -{ - pitem *item; - - item = pqueue_pop(queue->q); - if (item) { - dtls1_copy_record(s, item); - - OPENSSL_free(item->data); - pitem_free(item); - - return (1); - } - - return (0); -} - -/* - * retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the new epoch, i.e., not - * processed yet - */ -#define dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s) \ - dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \ - &((s)->d1->unprocessed_rcds)) - -/* - * retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, ie, - * processed - */ -#define dtls1_get_processed_record(s) \ - dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \ - &((s)->d1->processed_rcds)) - -static int dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s) -{ - pitem *item; - SSL3_BUFFER *rb; - SSL3_RECORD *rr; - DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap; - unsigned int is_next_epoch; - int replayok = 1; - - item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q); - if (item) { - /* Check if epoch is current. */ - if (s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->d1->r_epoch) - return 1; /* Nothing to do. */ - - rr = &s->s3->rrec; - rb = &s->s3->rbuf; - - if (rb->left > 0) { - /* - * We've still got data from the current packet to read. There could - * be a record from the new epoch in it - so don't overwrite it - * with the unprocessed records yet (we'll do it when we've - * finished reading the current packet). - */ - return 1; - } - - - /* Process all the records. */ - while (pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q)) { - dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s); - bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch); - if (bitmap == NULL) { - /* - * Should not happen. This will only ever be NULL when the - * current record is from a different epoch. But that cannot - * be the case because we already checked the epoch above - */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_BUFFERED_RECORDS, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; - } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP - /* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */ - if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) -#endif - { - /* - * Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record. We did this - * check once already when we first received the record - but - * we might have updated the window since then due to - * records we subsequently processed. - */ - replayok = dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap); - } - - if (!replayok || !dtls1_process_record(s, bitmap)) { - /* dump this record */ - rr->length = 0; - s->packet_length = 0; - continue; - } - - if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->processed_rcds), - s->s3->rrec.seq_num) < 0) - return 0; - } - } - - /* - * sync epoch numbers once all the unprocessed records have been - * processed - */ - s->d1->processed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch; - s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch + 1; - - return 1; -} - -#if 0 - -static int dtls1_get_buffered_record(SSL *s) -{ - pitem *item; - PQ_64BIT priority = - (((PQ_64BIT) s->d1->handshake_read_seq) << 32) | - ((PQ_64BIT) s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off); - - /* if we're not (re)negotiating, nothing buffered */ - if (!SSL_in_init(s)) - return 0; - - item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->rcvd_records); - if (item && item->priority == priority) { - /* - * Check if we've received the record of interest. It must be a - * handshake record, since data records as passed up without - * buffering - */ - DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata; - item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->rcvd_records); - rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data; - - if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL) - OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf); - - s->packet = rdata->packet; - s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length; - memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER)); - memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD)); - - OPENSSL_free(item->data); - pitem_free(item); - - /* s->d1->next_expected_seq_num++; */ - return (1); - } - - return 0; -} - -#endif - -static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap) -{ - int i, al; - int enc_err; - SSL_SESSION *sess; - SSL3_RECORD *rr; - unsigned int mac_size, orig_len; - unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; - - rr = &(s->s3->rrec); - sess = s->session; - - /* - * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length, - * and we have that many bytes in s->packet - */ - rr->input = &(s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); - - /* - * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' rr->input points - * at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by either - * the decryption or by the decompression When the data is 'copied' into - * the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer - */ - - /* - * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length - * bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. - */ - - /* check is not needed I believe */ - if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) { - al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - goto f_err; - } - - /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */ - rr->data = rr->input; - - enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 0); - /*- - * enc_err is: - * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid. - * 1: if the padding is valid - * -1: if the padding is invalid - */ - if (enc_err == 0) { - /* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */ - rr->length = 0; - s->packet_length = 0; - goto err; - } -#ifdef TLS_DEBUG - printf("dec %d\n", rr->length); - { - unsigned int z; - for (z = 0; z < rr->length; z++) - printf("%02X%c", rr->data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); - } - printf("\n"); -#endif - - /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */ - if ((sess != NULL) && - (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) { - /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */ - unsigned char *mac = NULL; - unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; - mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); - OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); - - /* - * kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type - */ - orig_len = rr->length + ((unsigned int)rr->type >> 8); - - /* - * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was - * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use, - * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount - * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC. - */ - if (orig_len < mac_size || - /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */ - (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && - orig_len < mac_size + 1)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); - goto f_err; - } - - if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { - /* - * We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be - * constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in - * constant time from within the record, without leaking the - * contents of the padding bytes. - */ - mac = mac_tmp; - ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len); - rr->length -= mac_size; - } else { - /* - * In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len| equals - * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for - * |mac_size| above. - */ - rr->length -= mac_size; - mac = &rr->data[rr->length]; - } - - i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, md, 0 /* not send */ ); - if (i < 0 || mac == NULL - || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) - enc_err = -1; - if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + mac_size) - enc_err = -1; - } - - if (enc_err < 0) { - /* decryption failed, silently discard message */ - rr->length = 0; - s->packet_length = 0; - goto err; - } - - /* r->length is now just compressed */ - if (s->expand != NULL) { - if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH) { - al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, - SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - goto f_err; - } - if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION); - goto f_err; - } - } - - if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) { - al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - goto f_err; - } - - rr->off = 0; - /*- - * So at this point the following is true - * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record - * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record - * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte - * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment - * after use :-). - */ - - /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */ - s->packet_length = 0; - - /* Mark receipt of record. */ - dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap); - - return (1); - - f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - err: - return (0); -} - -/*- - * Call this to get a new input record. - * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error - * or non-blocking IO. - * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in - * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record - * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data - * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes - */ -/* used only by dtls1_read_bytes */ -int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s) -{ - int ssl_major, ssl_minor; - int i, n; - SSL3_RECORD *rr; - unsigned char *p = NULL; - unsigned short version; - DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap; - unsigned int is_next_epoch; - - rr = &(s->s3->rrec); - - again: - /* - * The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the pending records. - * This is a non-blocking operation. - */ - if (!dtls1_process_buffered_records(s)) - return -1; - - /* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */ - if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s)) - return 1; - - /* get something from the wire */ - /* check if we have the header */ - if ((s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) || - (s->packet_length < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) { - n = ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0); - /* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */ - if (n <= 0) - return (n); /* error or non-blocking */ - - /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */ - if (s->packet_length != DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { - s->packet_length = 0; - goto again; - } - - s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_BODY; - - p = s->packet; - - if (s->msg_callback) - s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, - s, s->msg_callback_arg); - - /* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */ - rr->type = *(p++); - ssl_major = *(p++); - ssl_minor = *(p++); - version = (ssl_major << 8) | ssl_minor; - - /* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */ - n2s(p, rr->epoch); - - memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), p, 6); - p += 6; - - n2s(p, rr->length); - - /* - * Lets check the version. We tolerate alerts that don't have the exact - * version number (e.g. because of protocol version errors) - */ - if (!s->first_packet && rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT) { - if (version != s->version) { - /* unexpected version, silently discard */ - rr->length = 0; - s->packet_length = 0; - goto again; - } - } - - if ((version & 0xff00) != (s->version & 0xff00)) { - /* wrong version, silently discard record */ - rr->length = 0; - s->packet_length = 0; - goto again; - } - - if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) { - /* record too long, silently discard it */ - rr->length = 0; - s->packet_length = 0; - goto again; - } - - /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */ - } - - /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */ - - if (rr->length > s->packet_length - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { - /* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */ - i = rr->length; - n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1); - /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */ - if (n != i) { - rr->length = 0; - s->packet_length = 0; - goto again; - } - - /* - * now n == rr->length, and s->packet_length == - * DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length - */ - } - s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */ - - /* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */ - bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch); - if (bitmap == NULL) { - rr->length = 0; - s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */ - goto again; /* get another record */ - } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP - /* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */ - if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) { -#endif - /* - * Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record. Don't check if - * we're listening and this message is a ClientHello. They can look - * as if they're replayed, since they arrive from different - * connections and would be dropped unnecessarily. - */ - if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && - s->packet_length > DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH && - s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) && - !dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap)) { - rr->length = 0; - s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */ - goto again; /* get another record */ - } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP - } -#endif - - /* just read a 0 length packet */ - if (rr->length == 0) - goto again; - - /* - * If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT), and a - * handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it cannot be - * processed at this time. However, do not buffer anything while - * listening. - */ - if (is_next_epoch) { - if ((SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) && !s->d1->listen) { - if (dtls1_buffer_record - (s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds), rr->seq_num) < 0) - return -1; - } - rr->length = 0; - s->packet_length = 0; - goto again; - } - - if (!dtls1_process_record(s, bitmap)) { - rr->length = 0; - s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */ - goto again; /* get another record */ - } - - return (1); - -} - -/*- - * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records. - * 'type' is one of the following: - * - * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us) - * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us) - * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned) - * - * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first - * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return). - * - * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as - * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really - * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests. - * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store - * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol - * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving): - * Change cipher spec protocol - * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored - * Alert protocol - * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription) - * Handshake protocol - * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have - * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages - * here, anything else is handled by higher layers - * Application data protocol - * none of our business - */ -int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek) -{ - int al, i, j, ret; - unsigned int n; - SSL3_RECORD *rr; - void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL; - - if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */ - if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) - return (-1); - - /* XXX: check what the second '&& type' is about */ - if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && - (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) || - (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return -1; - } - - /* - * check whether there's a handshake message (client hello?) waiting - */ - if ((ret = have_handshake_fragment(s, type, buf, len, peek))) - return ret; - - /* - * Now s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. - */ - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP - /* - * Continue handshake if it had to be interrupted to read app data with - * SCTP. - */ - if ((!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) || - (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) && - (s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK - || s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK) - && s->s3->in_read_app_data != 2)) -#else - if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) -#endif - { - /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */ - i = s->handshake_func(s); - if (i < 0) - return (i); - if (i == 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return (-1); - } - } - - start: - s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; - - /*- - * s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record - * s->s3->rrec.data, - data - * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read - * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. - */ - rr = &(s->s3->rrec); - - /* - * We are not handshaking and have no data yet, so process data buffered - * during the last handshake in advance, if any. - */ - if (s->state == SSL_ST_OK && rr->length == 0) { - pitem *item; - item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q); - if (item) { -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP - /* Restore bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */ - if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) { - DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data; - BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_RCVINFO, - sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo); - } -#endif - - dtls1_copy_record(s, item); - - OPENSSL_free(item->data); - pitem_free(item); - } - } - - /* Check for timeout */ - if (dtls1_handle_timeout(s) > 0) - goto start; - - /* get new packet if necessary */ - if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) { - ret = dtls1_get_record(s); - if (ret <= 0) { - ret = dtls1_read_failed(s, ret); - /* anything other than a timeout is an error */ - if (ret <= 0) - return (ret); - else - goto start; - } - } - - if (s->d1->listen && rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { - rr->length = 0; - goto start; - } - - /* - * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty - * record that isn't an alert. - */ - if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT && rr->length != 0) - s->cert->alert_count = 0; - - /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */ - - if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec, - * reset by ssl3_get_finished */ - && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) { - /* - * We now have application data between CCS and Finished. Most likely - * the packets were reordered on their way, so buffer the application - * data for later processing rather than dropping the connection. - */ - if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->buffered_app_data), rr->seq_num) < - 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return -1; - } - rr->length = 0; - goto start; - } - - /* - * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in - * 'peek' mode) - */ - if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { - rr->length = 0; - s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; - return (0); - } - - if (type == rr->type) { /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or - * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */ - /* - * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are - * doing a handshake for the first time - */ - if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && - (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) { - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE); - goto f_err; - } - - if (len <= 0) - return (len); - - if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length) - n = rr->length; - else - n = (unsigned int)len; - - memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n); - if (!peek) { - rr->length -= n; - rr->off += n; - if (rr->length == 0) { - s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; - rr->off = 0; - } - } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP - /* - * We were about to renegotiate but had to read belated application - * data first, so retry. - */ - if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) && - rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && - (s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK - || s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK)) { - s->rwstate = SSL_READING; - BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s)); - BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)); - } - - /* - * We might had to delay a close_notify alert because of reordered - * app data. If there was an alert and there is no message to read - * anymore, finally set shutdown. - */ - if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) && - s->d1->shutdown_received - && !BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) { - s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; - return (0); - } -#endif - return (n); - } - - /* - * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message, - * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). - */ - - /* - * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill - * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place. - */ - { - unsigned int k, dest_maxlen = 0; - unsigned char *dest = NULL; - unsigned int *dest_len = NULL; - - if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { - dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->d1->handshake_fragment); - dest = s->d1->handshake_fragment; - dest_len = &s->d1->handshake_fragment_len; - } else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) { - dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->d1->alert_fragment); - dest = s->d1->alert_fragment; - dest_len = &s->d1->alert_fragment_len; - } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS - else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT) { - dtls1_process_heartbeat(s); - - /* Exit and notify application to read again */ - rr->length = 0; - s->rwstate = SSL_READING; - BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s)); - BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)); - return (-1); - } -#endif - /* else it's a CCS message, or application data or wrong */ - else if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { - /* - * Application data while renegotiating is allowed. Try again - * reading. - */ - if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) { - BIO *bio; - s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2; - bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); - s->rwstate = SSL_READING; - BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); - BIO_set_retry_read(bio); - return (-1); - } - - /* Not certain if this is the right error handling */ - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); - goto f_err; - } - - if (dest_maxlen > 0) { - /* - * XDTLS: In a pathalogical case, the Client Hello may be - * fragmented--don't always expect dest_maxlen bytes - */ - if (rr->length < dest_maxlen) { -#ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE - /* - * for normal alerts rr->length is 2, while - * dest_maxlen is 7 if we were to handle this - * non-existing alert... - */ - FIX ME -#endif - s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; - rr->length = 0; - goto start; - } - - /* now move 'n' bytes: */ - for (k = 0; k < dest_maxlen; k++) { - dest[k] = rr->data[rr->off++]; - rr->length--; - } - *dest_len = dest_maxlen; - } - } - - /*- - * s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 12 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; - * s->d1->alert_fragment_len == 7 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT. - * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) - */ - - /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */ - if ((!s->server) && - (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) && - (s->d1->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) && - (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) { - s->d1->handshake_fragment_len = 0; - - if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) || - (s->d1->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) || - (s->d1->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST); - goto f_err; - } - - /* - * no need to check sequence number on HELLO REQUEST messages - */ - - if (s->msg_callback) - s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, - s->d1->handshake_fragment, 4, s, - s->msg_callback_arg); - - if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) && - !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) && - !s->s3->renegotiate) { - s->d1->handshake_read_seq++; - s->new_session = 1; - ssl3_renegotiate(s); - if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) { - i = s->handshake_func(s); - if (i < 0) - return (i); - if (i == 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, - SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return (-1); - } - - if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) { - if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */ - BIO *bio; - /* - * In the case where we try to read application data, - * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with - * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may - * cause nasty problems in the blocking world - */ - s->rwstate = SSL_READING; - bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); - BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); - BIO_set_retry_read(bio); - return (-1); - } - } - } - } - /* - * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try - * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for - */ - goto start; - } - - /* - * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't - * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. - */ - if (s->server - && SSL_is_init_finished(s) - && !s->s3->send_connection_binding - && s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - && s->d1->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO - && s->s3->previous_client_finished_len != 0 - && (s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) == 0) { - s->d1->handshake_fragment_len = 0; - rr->length = 0; - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); - goto start; - } - - - if (s->d1->alert_fragment_len >= DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH) { - int alert_level = s->d1->alert_fragment[0]; - int alert_descr = s->d1->alert_fragment[1]; - - s->d1->alert_fragment_len = 0; - - if (s->msg_callback) - s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, - s->d1->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); - - if (s->info_callback != NULL) - cb = s->info_callback; - else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) - cb = s->ctx->info_callback; - - if (cb != NULL) { - j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr; - cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j); - } - - if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) { - s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr; - - s->cert->alert_count++; - if (s->cert->alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) { - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS); - goto f_err; - } - - if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) { -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP - /* - * With SCTP and streams the socket may deliver app data - * after a close_notify alert. We have to check this first so - * that nothing gets discarded. - */ - if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) && - BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) { - s->d1->shutdown_received = 1; - s->rwstate = SSL_READING; - BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s)); - BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)); - return -1; - } -#endif - s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; - return (0); - } -#if 0 - /* XXX: this is a possible improvement in the future */ - /* now check if it's a missing record */ - if (alert_descr == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE) { - unsigned short seq; - unsigned int frag_off; - unsigned char *p = &(s->d1->alert_fragment[2]); - - n2s(p, seq); - n2l3(p, frag_off); - - dtls1_retransmit_message(s, - dtls1_get_queue_priority - (frag->msg_header.seq, 0), frag_off, - &found); - if (!found && SSL_in_init(s)) { - /* - * fprintf( stderr,"in init = %d\n", SSL_in_init(s)); - */ - /* - * requested a message not yet sent, send an alert - * ourselves - */ - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, - DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE); - } - } -#endif - } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) { - char tmp[16]; - - s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; - s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr; - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, - SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr); - BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), "%d", alert_descr); - ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp); - s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; - SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session); - return (0); - } else { - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE); - goto f_err; - } - - goto start; - } - - if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a - * shutdown */ - s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; - rr->length = 0; - return (0); - } - - if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { - struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr; - unsigned int ccs_hdr_len = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH; - - dtls1_get_ccs_header(rr->data, &ccs_hdr); - - if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) - ccs_hdr_len = 3; - - /* - * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know exactly - * what the record payload has to look like - */ - /* XDTLS: check that epoch is consistent */ - if ((rr->length != ccs_hdr_len) || - (rr->off != 0) || (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS)) { - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); - goto f_err; - } - - rr->length = 0; - - if (s->msg_callback) - s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, - rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg); - - /* - * We can't process a CCS now, because previous handshake messages - * are still missing, so just drop it. - */ - if (!s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok) { - goto start; - } - - s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 0; - - s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1; - if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) - goto err; - - /* do this whenever CCS is processed */ - dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ); - - if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) - s->d1->handshake_read_seq++; - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP - /* - * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of - * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no - * SCTP is used - */ - BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL); -#endif - - goto start; - } - - /* - * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) - */ - if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) && - !s->in_handshake) { - struct hm_header_st msg_hdr; - - /* this may just be a stale retransmit */ - dtls1_get_message_header(rr->data, &msg_hdr); - if (rr->epoch != s->d1->r_epoch) { - rr->length = 0; - goto start; - } - - /* - * If we are server, we may have a repeated FINISHED of the client - * here, then retransmit our CCS and FINISHED. - */ - if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { - if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(s) < 0) - return -1; - - dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s); - rr->length = 0; - goto start; - } - - if (((s->state & SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) && - !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) { -#if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences - * are not as expected (and because this is - * not really needed for clients except for - * detecting protocol violations): */ - s->state = SSL_ST_BEFORE | (s->server) - ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT; -#else - s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT; -#endif - s->renegotiate = 1; - s->new_session = 1; - } - i = s->handshake_func(s); - if (i < 0) - return (i); - if (i == 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return (-1); - } - - if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) { - if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */ - BIO *bio; - /* - * In the case where we try to read application data, but we - * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry - * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty - * problems in the blocking world - */ - s->rwstate = SSL_READING; - bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); - BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); - BIO_set_retry_read(bio); - return (-1); - } - } - goto start; - } - - switch (rr->type) { - default: -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS - /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */ - if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION) { - rr->length = 0; - goto start; - } -#endif - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); - goto f_err; - case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: - case SSL3_RT_ALERT: - case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE: - /* - * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of - * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that should not - * happen when type != rr->type - */ - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto f_err; - case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA: - /* - * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have - * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read() - * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read - * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet - * started), we will indulge it. - */ - if (s->s3->in_read_app_data && - (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) && - (((s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) && - (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) && - (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A) - ) || ((s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) && - (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) && - (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) - ) - )) { - s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2; - return (-1); - } else { - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); - goto f_err; - } - } - /* not reached */ - - f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - err: - return (-1); -} - -int dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len) -{ - int i; - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP - /* - * Check if we have to continue an interrupted handshake for reading - * belated app data with SCTP. - */ - if ((SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) || - (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) && - (s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK - || s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK))) -#else - if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) -#endif - { - i = s->handshake_func(s); - if (i < 0) - return (i); - if (i == 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES, - SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return -1; - } - } - - if (len > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES, SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG); - return -1; - } - - i = dtls1_write_bytes(s, type, buf_, len); - return i; -} - - /* - * this only happens when a client hello is received and a handshake - * is started. - */ -static int -have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, - int len, int peek) -{ - - if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) - /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */ - { - unsigned char *src = s->d1->handshake_fragment; - unsigned char *dst = buf; - unsigned int k, n; - - /* peek == 0 */ - n = 0; - while ((len > 0) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) { - *dst++ = *src++; - len--; - s->d1->handshake_fragment_len--; - n++; - } - /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */ - for (k = 0; k < s->d1->handshake_fragment_len; k++) - s->d1->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++; - return n; - } - - return 0; -} - -/* - * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if - * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO. - */ -int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len) -{ - int i; - - OPENSSL_assert(len <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH); - s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; - i = do_dtls1_write(s, type, buf, len, 0); - return i; -} - -int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, - unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment) -{ - unsigned char *p, *pseq; - int i, mac_size, clear = 0; - int prefix_len = 0; - int eivlen; - SSL3_RECORD *wr; - SSL3_BUFFER *wb; - SSL_SESSION *sess; - - /* - * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This - * will happen with non blocking IO - */ - if (s->s3->wbuf.left != 0) { - OPENSSL_assert(0); /* XDTLS: want to see if we ever get here */ - return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len)); - } - - /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */ - if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) { - i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); - if (i <= 0) - return (i); - /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */ - } - - if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment) - return 0; - - wr = &(s->s3->wrec); - wb = &(s->s3->wbuf); - sess = s->session; - - if ((sess == NULL) || - (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) - clear = 1; - - if (clear) - mac_size = 0; - else { - mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash); - if (mac_size < 0) - goto err; - } - - /* DTLS implements explicit IV, so no need for empty fragments */ -#if 0 - /* - * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself - */ - if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done - && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER) - { - /* - * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see - * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) - */ - - if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) { - /* - * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this - * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these - * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual - * payload) - */ - prefix_len = s->method->do_ssl_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1); - if (prefix_len <= 0) - goto err; - - if (s->s3->wbuf.len < - (size_t)prefix_len + SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE) { - /* insufficient space */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - } - - s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1; - } -#endif - p = wb->buf + prefix_len; - - /* write the header */ - - *(p++) = type & 0xff; - wr->type = type; - /* - * Special case: for hello verify request, client version 1.0 and we - * haven't decided which version to use yet send back using version 1.0 - * header: otherwise some clients will ignore it. - */ - if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) { - *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION >> 8; - *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff; - } else { - *(p++) = s->version >> 8; - *(p++) = s->version & 0xff; - } - - /* field where we are to write out packet epoch, seq num and len */ - pseq = p; - p += 10; - - /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */ - if (s->enc_write_ctx) { - int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx); - if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { - eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx); - if (eivlen <= 1) - eivlen = 0; - } - /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */ - else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) - eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; - else - eivlen = 0; - } else - eivlen = 0; - - /* lets setup the record stuff. */ - wr->data = p + eivlen; /* make room for IV in case of CBC */ - wr->length = (int)len; - wr->input = (unsigned char *)buf; - - /* - * we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data - */ - - /* first we compress */ - if (s->compress != NULL) { - if (!ssl3_do_compress(s)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - } else { - memcpy(wr->data, wr->input, wr->length); - wr->input = wr->data; - } - - /* - * we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from - * wr->input. Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the - * wb->buf - */ - - if (mac_size != 0) { - if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &(p[wr->length + eivlen]), 1) < 0) - goto err; - wr->length += mac_size; - } - - /* this is true regardless of mac size */ - wr->input = p; - wr->data = p; - - if (eivlen) - wr->length += eivlen; - - if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 1) < 1) - goto err; - - /* record length after mac and block padding */ - /* - * if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA || (type == SSL3_RT_ALERT && ! - * SSL_in_init(s))) - */ - - /* there's only one epoch between handshake and app data */ - - s2n(s->d1->w_epoch, pseq); - - /* XDTLS: ?? */ - /* - * else s2n(s->d1->handshake_epoch, pseq); - */ - - memcpy(pseq, &(s->s3->write_sequence[2]), 6); - pseq += 6; - s2n(wr->length, pseq); - - if (s->msg_callback) - s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, pseq - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg); - - /* - * we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is - * wr->length long - */ - wr->type = type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */ - wr->length += DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; - -#if 0 /* this is now done at the message layer */ - /* buffer the record, making it easy to handle retransmits */ - if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) - dtls1_buffer_record(s, wr->data, wr->length, - *((PQ_64BIT *) & (s->s3->write_sequence[0]))); -#endif - - ssl3_record_sequence_update(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0])); - - if (create_empty_fragment) { - /* - * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write - * out anything here - */ - return wr->length; - } - - /* now let's set up wb */ - wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length; - wb->offset = 0; - - /* - * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write - * retries later - */ - s->s3->wpend_tot = len; - s->s3->wpend_buf = buf; - s->s3->wpend_type = type; - s->s3->wpend_ret = len; - - /* we now just need to write the buffer */ - return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len); - err: - return -1; -} - -static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap) -{ - int cmp; - unsigned int shift; - const unsigned char *seq = s->s3->read_sequence; - - cmp = satsub64be(seq, bitmap->max_seq_num); - if (cmp > 0) { - memcpy(s->s3->rrec.seq_num, seq, 8); - return 1; /* this record in new */ - } - shift = -cmp; - if (shift >= sizeof(bitmap->map) * 8) - return 0; /* stale, outside the window */ - else if (bitmap->map & (1UL << shift)) - return 0; /* record previously received */ - - memcpy(s->s3->rrec.seq_num, seq, 8); - return 1; -} - -static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap) -{ - int cmp; - unsigned int shift; - const unsigned char *seq = s->s3->read_sequence; - - cmp = satsub64be(seq, bitmap->max_seq_num); - if (cmp > 0) { - shift = cmp; - if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map) * 8) - bitmap->map <<= shift, bitmap->map |= 1UL; - else - bitmap->map = 1UL; - memcpy(bitmap->max_seq_num, seq, 8); - } else { - shift = -cmp; - if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map) * 8) - bitmap->map |= 1UL << shift; - } -} - -int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *s) -{ - int i, j; - void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; - unsigned char buf[DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH]; - unsigned char *ptr = &buf[0]; - - s->s3->alert_dispatch = 0; - - memset(buf, 0x00, sizeof(buf)); - *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[0]; - *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[1]; - -#ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE - if (s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE) { - s2n(s->d1->handshake_read_seq, ptr); -# if 0 - if (s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) - /* - * waiting for a new msg - */ - else - s2n(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq, ptr); /* partial msg read */ -# endif - -# if 0 - fprintf(stderr, - "s->d1->handshake_read_seq = %d, s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq = %d\n", - s->d1->handshake_read_seq, s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq); -# endif - l2n3(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off, ptr); - } -#endif - - i = do_dtls1_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &buf[0], sizeof(buf), 0); - if (i <= 0) { - s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1; - /* fprintf( stderr, "not done with alert\n" ); */ - } else { - if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL -#ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE - || s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE -#endif - ) - (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio); - - if (s->msg_callback) - s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, - 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); - - if (s->info_callback != NULL) - cb = s->info_callback; - else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) - cb = s->ctx->info_callback; - - if (cb != NULL) { - j = (s->s3->send_alert[0] << 8) | s->s3->send_alert[1]; - cb(s, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, j); - } - } - return (i); -} - -static DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, - unsigned int *is_next_epoch) -{ - - *is_next_epoch = 0; - - /* In current epoch, accept HM, CCS, DATA, & ALERT */ - if (rr->epoch == s->d1->r_epoch) - return &s->d1->bitmap; - - /* - * Only HM and ALERT messages can be from the next epoch and only if we - * have already processed all of the unprocessed records from the last - * epoch - */ - else if (rr->epoch == (unsigned long)(s->d1->r_epoch + 1) && - s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->d1->r_epoch && - (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)) { - *is_next_epoch = 1; - return &s->d1->next_bitmap; - } - - return NULL; -} - -#if 0 -static int -dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, - unsigned short *priority, unsigned long *offset) -{ - - /* alerts are passed up immediately */ - if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA || rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) - return 0; - - /* - * Only need to buffer if a handshake is underway. (this implies that - * Hello Request and Client Hello are passed up immediately) - */ - if (SSL_in_init(s)) { - unsigned char *data = rr->data; - /* need to extract the HM/CCS sequence number here */ - if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || - rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { - unsigned short seq_num; - struct hm_header_st msg_hdr; - struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr; - - if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { - dtls1_get_message_header(data, &msg_hdr); - seq_num = msg_hdr.seq; - *offset = msg_hdr.frag_off; - } else { - dtls1_get_ccs_header(data, &ccs_hdr); - seq_num = ccs_hdr.seq; - *offset = 0; - } - - /* - * this is either a record we're waiting for, or a retransmit of - * something we happened to previously receive (higher layers - * will drop the repeat silently - */ - if (seq_num < s->d1->handshake_read_seq) - return 0; - if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && - seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq && - msg_hdr.frag_off < s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off) - return 0; - else if (seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq && - (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC || - msg_hdr.frag_off == s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off)) - return 0; - else { - *priority = seq_num; - return 1; - } - } else /* unknown record type */ - return 0; - } - - return 0; -} -#endif - -void dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw) -{ - unsigned char *seq; - unsigned int seq_bytes = sizeof(s->s3->read_sequence); - - if (rw & SSL3_CC_READ) { - seq = s->s3->read_sequence; - s->d1->r_epoch++; - memcpy(&(s->d1->bitmap), &(s->d1->next_bitmap), sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP)); - memset(&(s->d1->next_bitmap), 0x00, sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP)); - - /* - * We must not use any buffered messages received from the previous - * epoch - */ - dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s); - } else { - seq = s->s3->write_sequence; - memcpy(s->d1->last_write_sequence, seq, - sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence)); - s->d1->w_epoch++; - } - - memset(seq, 0x00, seq_bytes); -} |