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Diffstat (limited to 'deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/verify.pod')
| -rw-r--r-- | deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/verify.pod | 617 |
1 files changed, 442 insertions, 175 deletions
diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/verify.pod b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/verify.pod index 2516718979..38fa346f54 100644 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/verify.pod +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl/doc/apps/verify.pod @@ -3,49 +3,72 @@ =head1 NAME openssl-verify, -verify - Utility to verify certificates. +verify - Utility to verify certificates =head1 SYNOPSIS B<openssl> B<verify> -[B<-CApath directory>] +[B<-help>] [B<-CAfile file>] -[B<-purpose purpose>] -[B<-policy arg>] -[B<-ignore_critical>] +[B<-CApath directory>] +[B<-no-CAfile>] +[B<-no-CApath>] +[B<-allow_proxy_certs>] [B<-attime timestamp>] [B<-check_ss_sig>] [B<-CRLfile file>] [B<-crl_download>] [B<-crl_check>] [B<-crl_check_all>] -[B<-policy_check>] +[B<-engine id>] [B<-explicit_policy>] +[B<-extended_crl>] +[B<-ignore_critical>] [B<-inhibit_any>] [B<-inhibit_map>] -[B<-x509_strict>] -[B<-extended_crl>] -[B<-use_deltas>] +[B<-no_check_time>] +[B<-partial_chain>] +[B<-policy arg>] +[B<-policy_check>] [B<-policy_print>] +[B<-purpose purpose>] +[B<-suiteB_128>] +[B<-suiteB_128_only>] +[B<-suiteB_192>] +[B<-trusted_first>] [B<-no_alt_chains>] -[B<-allow_proxy_certs>] [B<-untrusted file>] -[B<-help>] -[B<-issuer_checks>] [B<-trusted file>] +[B<-use_deltas>] [B<-verbose>] +[B<-auth_level level>] +[B<-verify_depth num>] +[B<-verify_email email>] +[B<-verify_hostname hostname>] +[B<-verify_ip ip>] +[B<-verify_name name>] +[B<-x509_strict>] +[B<-show_chain>] [B<->] [certificates] - =head1 DESCRIPTION The B<verify> command verifies certificate chains. -=head1 COMMAND OPTIONS +=head1 OPTIONS =over 4 +=item B<-help> + +Print out a usage message. + +=item B<-CAfile file> + +A B<file> of trusted certificates. +The file should contain one or more certificates in PEM format. + =item B<-CApath directory> A directory of trusted certificates. The certificates should have names @@ -54,9 +77,17 @@ form ("hash" is the hashed certificate subject name: see the B<-hash> option of the B<x509> utility). Under Unix the B<c_rehash> script will automatically create symbolic links to a directory of certificates. -=item B<-CAfile file> -A file of trusted certificates. The file should contain multiple certificates -in PEM format concatenated together. +=item B<-no-CAfile> + +Do not load the trusted CA certificates from the default file location + +=item B<-no-CApath> + +Do not load the trusted CA certificates from the default directory location + +=item B<-allow_proxy_certs> + +Allow the verification of proxy certificates =item B<-attime timestamp> @@ -71,7 +102,9 @@ because it doesn't add any security. =item B<-CRLfile file> -File containing one or more CRL's (in PEM format) to load. +The B<file> should contain one or more CRLs in PEM format. +This option can be specified more than once to include CRLs from multiple +B<files>. =item B<-crl_download> @@ -82,34 +115,54 @@ Attempt to download CRL information for this certificate. Checks end entity certificate validity by attempting to look up a valid CRL. If a valid CRL cannot be found an error occurs. -=item B<-untrusted file> +=item B<-crl_check_all> -A file of untrusted certificates. The file should contain multiple certificates -in PEM format concatenated together. +Checks the validity of B<all> certificates in the chain by attempting +to look up valid CRLs. -=item B<-purpose purpose> +=item B<-engine id> -The intended use for the certificate. If this option is not specified, -B<verify> will not consider certificate purpose during chain verification. -Currently accepted uses are B<sslclient>, B<sslserver>, B<nssslserver>, -B<smimesign>, B<smimeencrypt>. See the B<VERIFY OPERATION> section for more -information. +Specifying an engine B<id> will cause L<verify(1)> to attempt to load the +specified engine. +The engine will then be set as the default for all its supported algorithms. +If you want to load certificates or CRLs that require engine support via any of +the B<-trusted>, B<-untrusted> or B<-CRLfile> options, the B<-engine> option +must be specified before those options. -=item B<-help> +=item B<-explicit_policy> -Print out a usage message. +Set policy variable require-explicit-policy (see RFC5280). -=item B<-verbose> +=item B<-extended_crl> -Print extra information about the operations being performed. +Enable extended CRL features such as indirect CRLs and alternate CRL +signing keys. + +=item B<-ignore_critical> + +Normally if an unhandled critical extension is present which is not +supported by OpenSSL the certificate is rejected (as required by RFC5280). +If this option is set critical extensions are ignored. -=item B<-issuer_checks> +=item B<-inhibit_any> + +Set policy variable inhibit-any-policy (see RFC5280). + +=item B<-inhibit_map> + +Set policy variable inhibit-policy-mapping (see RFC5280). + +=item B<-no_check_time> + +This option suppresses checking the validity period of certificates and CRLs +against the current time. If option B<-attime timestamp> is used to specify +a verification time, the check is not suppressed. -Print out diagnostics relating to searches for the issuer certificate of the -current certificate. This shows why each candidate issuer certificate was -rejected. The presence of rejection messages does not itself imply that -anything is wrong; during the normal verification process, several -rejections may take place. +=item B<-partial_chain> + +Allow verification to succeed even if a I<complete> chain cannot be built to a +self-signed trust-anchor, provided it is possible to construct a chain to a +trusted certificate that might not be self-signed. =item B<-policy arg> @@ -121,73 +174,139 @@ This argument can appear more than once. Enables certificate policy processing. -=item B<-explicit_policy> - -Set policy variable require-explicit-policy (see RFC5280). +=item B<-policy_print> -=item B<-inhibit_any> +Print out diagnostics related to policy processing. -Set policy variable inhibit-any-policy (see RFC5280). +=item B<-purpose purpose> -=item B<-inhibit_map> +The intended use for the certificate. If this option is not specified, +B<verify> will not consider certificate purpose during chain verification. +Currently accepted uses are B<sslclient>, B<sslserver>, B<nssslserver>, +B<smimesign>, B<smimeencrypt>. See the B<VERIFY OPERATION> section for more +information. -Set policy variable inhibit-policy-mapping (see RFC5280). +=item B<-suiteB_128_only>, B<-suiteB_128>, B<-suiteB_192> -=item B<-no_alt_chains> +enable the Suite B mode operation at 128 bit Level of Security, 128 bit or +192 bit, or only 192 bit Level of Security respectively. +See RFC6460 for details. In particular the supported signature algorithms are +reduced to support only ECDSA and SHA256 or SHA384 and only the elliptic curves +P-256 and P-384. -When building a certificate chain, if the first certificate chain found is not -trusted, then OpenSSL will continue to check to see if an alternative chain can -be found that is trusted. With this option that behaviour is suppressed so that -only the first chain found is ever used. Using this option will force the -behaviour to match that of previous OpenSSL versions. +=item B<-trusted_first> -=item B<-allow_proxy_certs> +When constructing the certificate chain, use the trusted certificates specified +via B<-CAfile>, B<-CApath> or B<-trusted> before any certificates specified via +B<-untrusted>. +This can be useful in environments with Bridge or Cross-Certified CAs. +As of OpenSSL 1.1.0 this option is on by default and cannot be disabled. -Allow the verification of proxy certificates. +=item B<-no_alt_chains> -=item B<-trusted file> +By default, unless B<-trusted_first> is specified, when building a certificate +chain, if the first certificate chain found is not trusted, then OpenSSL will +attempt to replace untrusted issuer certificates with certificates from the +trust store to see if an alternative chain can be found that is trusted. +As of OpenSSL 1.1.0, with B<-trusted_first> always on, this option has no +effect. -A file of additional trusted certificates. The file should contain multiple -certificates in PEM format concatenated together. +=item B<-untrusted file> -=item B<-policy_print> +A B<file> of additional untrusted certificates (intermediate issuer CAs) used +to construct a certificate chain from the subject certificate to a trust-anchor. +The B<file> should contain one or more certificates in PEM format. +This option can be specified more than once to include untrusted certificates +from multiple B<files>. -Print out diagnostics related to policy processing. +=item B<-trusted file> -=item B<-crl_check> +A B<file> of trusted certificates, which must be self-signed, unless the +B<-partial_chain> option is specified. +The B<file> contains one or more certificates in PEM format. +With this option, no additional (e.g., default) certificate lists are +consulted. +That is, the only trust-anchors are those listed in B<file>. +This option can be specified more than once to include trusted certificates +from multiple B<files>. +This option implies the B<-no-CAfile> and B<-no-CApath> options. +This option cannot be used in combination with either of the B<-CAfile> or +B<-CApath> options. -Checks end entity certificate validity by attempting to look up a valid CRL. -If a valid CRL cannot be found an error occurs. +=item B<-use_deltas> -=item B<-crl_check_all> +Enable support for delta CRLs. -Checks the validity of B<all> certificates in the chain by attempting -to look up valid CRLs. +=item B<-verbose> -=item B<-ignore_critical> +Print extra information about the operations being performed. -Normally if an unhandled critical extension is present which is not -supported by OpenSSL the certificate is rejected (as required by RFC5280). -If this option is set critical extensions are ignored. +=item B<-auth_level level> + +Set the certificate chain authentication security level to B<level>. +The authentication security level determines the acceptable signature and +public key strength when verifying certificate chains. +For a certificate chain to validate, the public keys of all the certificates +must meet the specified security B<level>. +The signature algorithm security level is enforced for all the certificates in +the chain except for the chain's I<trust anchor>, which is either directly +trusted or validated by means other than its signature. +See L<SSL_CTX_set_security_level(3)> for the definitions of the available +levels. +The default security level is -1, or "not set". +At security level 0 or lower all algorithms are acceptable. +Security level 1 requires at least 80-bit-equivalent security and is broadly +interoperable, though it will, for example, reject MD5 signatures or RSA keys +shorter than 1024 bits. + +=item B<-verify_depth num> + +Limit the certificate chain to B<num> intermediate CA certificates. +A maximal depth chain can have up to B<num+2> certificates, since neither the +end-entity certificate nor the trust-anchor certificate count against the +B<-verify_depth> limit. + +=item B<-verify_email email> + +Verify if the B<email> matches the email address in Subject Alternative Name or +the email in the subject Distinguished Name. + +=item B<-verify_hostname hostname> + +Verify if the B<hostname> matches DNS name in Subject Alternative Name or +Common Name in the subject certificate. + +=item B<-verify_ip ip> + +Verify if the B<ip> matches the IP address in Subject Alternative Name of +the subject certificate. + +=item B<-verify_name name> + +Use default verification policies like trust model and required certificate +policies identified by B<name>. +The trust model determines which auxiliary trust or reject OIDs are applicable +to verifying the given certificate chain. +See the B<-addtrust> and B<-addreject> options of the L<x509(1)> command-line +utility. +Supported policy names include: B<default>, B<pkcs7>, B<smime_sign>, +B<ssl_client>, B<ssl_server>. +These mimics the combinations of purpose and trust settings used in SSL, CMS +and S/MIME. +As of OpenSSL 1.1.0, the trust model is inferred from the purpose when not +specified, so the B<-verify_name> options are functionally equivalent to the +corresponding B<-purpose> settings. =item B<-x509_strict> For strict X.509 compliance, disable non-compliant workarounds for broken certificates. -=item B<-extended_crl> - -Enable extended CRL features such as indirect CRLs and alternate CRL -signing keys. - -=item B<-use_deltas> - -Enable support for delta CRLs. - -=item B<-check_ss_sig> +=item B<-show_chain> -Verify the signature on the self-signed root CA. This is disabled by default -because it doesn't add any security. +Display information about the certificate chain that has been built (if +successful). Certificates in the chain that came from the untrusted list will be +flagged as "untrusted". =item B<-> @@ -218,21 +337,21 @@ determined. The verify operation consists of a number of separate steps. Firstly a certificate chain is built up starting from the supplied certificate -and ending in the root CA. It is an error if the whole chain cannot be built -up. The chain is built up by looking up the issuers certificate of the current -certificate. If a certificate is found which is its own issuer it is assumed -to be the root CA. - -The process of 'looking up the issuers certificate' itself involves a number -of steps. In versions of OpenSSL before 0.9.5a the first certificate whose -subject name matched the issuer of the current certificate was assumed to be -the issuers certificate. In OpenSSL 0.9.6 and later all certificates -whose subject name matches the issuer name of the current certificate are -subject to further tests. The relevant authority key identifier components -of the current certificate (if present) must match the subject key identifier -(if present) and issuer and serial number of the candidate issuer, in addition -the keyUsage extension of the candidate issuer (if present) must permit -certificate signing. +and ending in the root CA. +It is an error if the whole chain cannot be built up. +The chain is built up by looking up the issuers certificate of the current +certificate. +If a certificate is found which is its own issuer it is assumed to be the root +CA. + +The process of 'looking up the issuers certificate' itself involves a number of +steps. +After all certificates whose subject name matches the issuer name of the current +certificate are subject to further tests. +The relevant authority key identifier components of the current certificate (if +present) must match the subject key identifier (if present) and issuer and +serial number of the candidate issuer, in addition the keyUsage extension of +the candidate issuer (if present) must permit certificate signing. The lookup first looks in the list of untrusted certificates and if no match is found the remaining lookups are from the trusted certificates. The root CA @@ -247,10 +366,10 @@ compatible with the supplied purpose and all other certificates must also be val CA certificates. The precise extensions required are described in more detail in the B<CERTIFICATE EXTENSIONS> section of the B<x509> utility. -The third operation is to check the trust settings on the root CA. The root -CA should be trusted for the supplied purpose. For compatibility with previous -versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL a certificate with no trust settings is considered -to be valid for all purposes. +The third operation is to check the trust settings on the root CA. The root CA +should be trusted for the supplied purpose. +For compatibility with previous versions of OpenSSL, a certificate with no +trust settings is considered to be valid for all purposes. The final operation is to check the validity of the certificate chain. The validity period is checked against the current system time and the notBefore and notAfter @@ -275,160 +394,296 @@ problem was detected starting with zero for the certificate being verified itsel then 1 for the CA that signed the certificate and so on. Finally a text version of the error number is presented. -An exhaustive list of the error codes and messages is shown below, this also +A partial list of the error codes and messages is shown below, this also includes the name of the error code as defined in the header file x509_vfy.h Some of the error codes are defined but never returned: these are described as "unused". =over 4 -=item B<0 X509_V_OK: ok> +=item B<X509_V_OK> + +The operation was successful. -the operation was successful. +=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED> -=item B<2 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT: unable to get issuer certificate> +Unspecified error; should not happen. -the issuer certificate of a looked up certificate could not be found. This +=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT> + +The issuer certificate of a looked up certificate could not be found. This normally means the list of trusted certificates is not complete. -=item B<3 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL: unable to get certificate CRL> +=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL> -the CRL of a certificate could not be found. +The CRL of a certificate could not be found. -=item B<4 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE: unable to decrypt certificate's signature> +=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE> -the certificate signature could not be decrypted. This means that the actual signature value +The certificate signature could not be decrypted. This means that the actual signature value could not be determined rather than it not matching the expected value, this is only meaningful for RSA keys. -=item B<5 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE: unable to decrypt CRL's signature> +=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE> -the CRL signature could not be decrypted: this means that the actual signature value +The CRL signature could not be decrypted: this means that the actual signature value could not be determined rather than it not matching the expected value. Unused. -=item B<6 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY: unable to decode issuer public key> +=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY> -the public key in the certificate SubjectPublicKeyInfo could not be read. +The public key in the certificate SubjectPublicKeyInfo could not be read. -=item B<7 X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: certificate signature failure> +=item B<X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE> -the signature of the certificate is invalid. +The signature of the certificate is invalid. -=item B<8 X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: CRL signature failure> +=item B<X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE> -the signature of the certificate is invalid. +The signature of the certificate is invalid. -=item B<9 X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID: certificate is not yet valid> +=item B<X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID> -the certificate is not yet valid: the notBefore date is after the current time. +The certificate is not yet valid: the notBefore date is after the current time. -=item B<10 X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED: certificate has expired> +=item B<X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED> -the certificate has expired: that is the notAfter date is before the current time. +The certificate has expired: that is the notAfter date is before the current time. -=item B<11 X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID: CRL is not yet valid> +=item B<X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID> -the CRL is not yet valid. +The CRL is not yet valid. -=item B<12 X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED: CRL has expired> +=item B<X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED> -the CRL has expired. +The CRL has expired. -=item B<13 X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD: format error in certificate's notBefore field> +=item B<X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD> -the certificate notBefore field contains an invalid time. +The certificate notBefore field contains an invalid time. -=item B<14 X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD: format error in certificate's notAfter field> +=item B<X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD> -the certificate notAfter field contains an invalid time. +The certificate notAfter field contains an invalid time. -=item B<15 X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD: format error in CRL's lastUpdate field> +=item B<X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD> -the CRL lastUpdate field contains an invalid time. +The CRL lastUpdate field contains an invalid time. -=item B<16 X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD: format error in CRL's nextUpdate field> +=item B<X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD> -the CRL nextUpdate field contains an invalid time. +The CRL nextUpdate field contains an invalid time. -=item B<17 X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: out of memory> +=item B<X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM> -an error occurred trying to allocate memory. This should never happen. +An error occurred trying to allocate memory. This should never happen. -=item B<18 X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT: self signed certificate> +=item B<X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT> -the passed certificate is self signed and the same certificate cannot be found in the list of +The passed certificate is self-signed and the same certificate cannot be found in the list of trusted certificates. -=item B<19 X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN: self signed certificate in certificate chain> +=item B<X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN> -the certificate chain could be built up using the untrusted certificates but the root could not +The certificate chain could be built up using the untrusted certificates but the root could not be found locally. -=item B<20 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY: unable to get local issuer certificate> +=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY> -the issuer certificate could not be found: this occurs if the issuer +The issuer certificate could not be found: this occurs if the issuer certificate of an untrusted certificate cannot be found. -=item B<21 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE: unable to verify the first certificate> +=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE> -no signatures could be verified because the chain contains only one certificate and it is not +No signatures could be verified because the chain contains only one certificate and it is not self signed. -=item B<22 X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG: certificate chain too long> +=item B<X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG> -the certificate chain length is greater than the supplied maximum depth. Unused. +The certificate chain length is greater than the supplied maximum depth. Unused. -=item B<23 X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED: certificate revoked> +=item B<X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED> -the certificate has been revoked. +The certificate has been revoked. -=item B<24 X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA: invalid CA certificate> +=item B<X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA> -a CA certificate is invalid. Either it is not a CA or its extensions are not consistent +A CA certificate is invalid. Either it is not a CA or its extensions are not consistent with the supplied purpose. -=item B<25 X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED: path length constraint exceeded> +=item B<X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED> -the basicConstraints pathlength parameter has been exceeded. +The basicConstraints pathlength parameter has been exceeded. -=item B<26 X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE: unsupported certificate purpose> +=item B<X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE> -the supplied certificate cannot be used for the specified purpose. +The supplied certificate cannot be used for the specified purpose. -=item B<27 X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED: certificate not trusted> +=item B<X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED> the root CA is not marked as trusted for the specified purpose. -=item B<28 X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED: certificate rejected> +=item B<X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED> + +The root CA is marked to reject the specified purpose. + +=item B<X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH> + +not used as of OpenSSL 1.1.0 as a result of the deprecation of the +B<-issuer_checks> option. + +=item B<X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH> + +Not used as of OpenSSL 1.1.0 as a result of the deprecation of the +B<-issuer_checks> option. + +=item B<X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH> + +Not used as of OpenSSL 1.1.0 as a result of the deprecation of the +B<-issuer_checks> option. + +=item B<X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN> + +Not used as of OpenSSL 1.1.0 as a result of the deprecation of the +B<-issuer_checks> option. + +=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER> + +Unable to get CRL issuer certificate. + +=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION> + +Unhandled critical extension. + +=item B<X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN> + +Key usage does not include CRL signing. + +=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION> + +Unhandled critical CRL extension. + +=item B<X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA> + +Invalid non-CA certificate has CA markings. + +=item B<X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED> + +Proxy path length constraint exceeded. + +=item B<X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_INVALID> + +Proxy certificate subject is invalid. It MUST be the same as the issuer +with a single CN component added. -the root CA is marked to reject the specified purpose. +=item B<X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE> -=item B<29 X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH: subject issuer mismatch> +Key usage does not include digital signature. -the current candidate issuer certificate was rejected because its subject name -did not match the issuer name of the current certificate. Only displayed when -the B<-issuer_checks> option is set. +=item B<X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED> -=item B<30 X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH: authority and subject key identifier mismatch> +Proxy certificates not allowed, please use B<-allow_proxy_certs>. -the current candidate issuer certificate was rejected because its subject key -identifier was present and did not match the authority key identifier current -certificate. Only displayed when the B<-issuer_checks> option is set. +=item B<X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION> -=item B<31 X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH: authority and issuer serial number mismatch> +Invalid or inconsistent certificate extension. -the current candidate issuer certificate was rejected because its issuer name -and serial number was present and did not match the authority key identifier -of the current certificate. Only displayed when the B<-issuer_checks> option is set. +=item B<X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION> -=item B<32 X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN:key usage does not include certificate signing> +Invalid or inconsistent certificate policy extension. -the current candidate issuer certificate was rejected because its keyUsage extension -does not permit certificate signing. +=item B<X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY> -=item B<50 X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION: application verification failure> +No explicit policy. -an application specific error. Unused. +=item B<X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE> + +Different CRL scope. + +=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION_FEATURE> + +Unsupported extension feature. + +=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNNESTED_RESOURCE> + +RFC 3779 resource not subset of parent's resources. + +=item B<X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION> + +Permitted subtree violation. + +=item B<X509_V_ERR_EXCLUDED_VIOLATION> + +Excluded subtree violation. + +=item B<X509_V_ERR_SUBTREE_MINMAX> + +Name constraints minimum and maximum not supported. + +=item B<X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION> + +Application verification failure. Unused. + +=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CONSTRAINT_TYPE> + +Unsupported name constraint type. + +=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CONSTRAINT_SYNTAX> + +Unsupported or invalid name constraint syntax. + +=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX> + +Unsupported or invalid name syntax. + +=item B<X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR> + +CRL path validation error. + +=item B<X509_V_ERR_PATH_LOOP> + +Path loop. + +=item B<X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION> + +Suite B: certificate version invalid. + +=item B<X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM> + +Suite B: invalid public key algorithm. + +=item B<X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE> + +Suite B: invalid ECC curve. + +=item B<X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM> + +Suite B: invalid signature algorithm. + +=item B<X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED> + +Suite B: curve not allowed for this LOS. + +=item B<X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256> + +Suite B: cannot sign P-384 with P-256. + +=item B<X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH> + +Hostname mismatch. + +=item B<X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH> + +Email address mismatch. + +=item B<X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH> + +IP address mismatch. + +=item B<X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH> + +DANE TLSA authentication is enabled, but no TLSA records matched the +certificate chain. +This error is only possible in L<s_client(1)>. =back @@ -437,7 +692,7 @@ an application specific error. Unused. Although the issuer checks are a considerable improvement over the old technique they still suffer from limitations in the underlying X509_LOOKUP API. One consequence of this is that trusted certificates with matching subject name must either appear in a file (as specified by the -B<-CAfile> option) or a directory (as specified by B<-CApath>. If they occur in both then only +B<-CAfile> option) or a directory (as specified by B<-CApath>). If they occur in both then only the certificates in the file will be recognised. Previous versions of OpenSSL assume certificates with matching subject name are identical and @@ -445,14 +700,26 @@ mishandled them. Previous versions of this documentation swapped the meaning of the B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT> and -B<20 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY> error codes. +B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY> error codes. =head1 SEE ALSO -L<x509(1)|x509(1)> +L<x509(1)> =head1 HISTORY -The -no_alt_chains options was first added to OpenSSL 1.0.2b. +The B<-show_chain> option was first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0. + +The B<-issuer_checks> option is deprecated as of OpenSSL 1.1.0 and +is silently ignored. + +=head1 COPYRIGHT + +Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + +Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use +this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy +in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at +L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>. =cut |