diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rand/md_rand.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rand/md_rand.c | 665 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 665 deletions
diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rand/md_rand.c b/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rand/md_rand.c deleted file mode 100644 index eb6a14b14f..0000000000 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/rand/md_rand.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,665 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. - * - * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use - * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy - * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at - * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html - */ - -#include <stdio.h> -#include <string.h> - -#include "e_os.h" - -#if !(defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_DSPBIOS)) -# include <sys/time.h> -#endif -#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) -# include <time.h> -#endif - -#include <openssl/opensslconf.h> -#include <openssl/crypto.h> -#include <openssl/rand.h> -#include <openssl/async.h> -#include "rand_lcl.h" - -#include <openssl/err.h> - -#include <internal/thread_once.h> - -#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS -# include <openssl/fips.h> -#endif - -#ifdef BN_DEBUG -# define PREDICT -#endif - -/* #define PREDICT 1 */ - -#define STATE_SIZE 1023 -static size_t state_num = 0, state_index = 0; -static unsigned char state[STATE_SIZE + MD_DIGEST_LENGTH]; -static unsigned char md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH]; -static long md_count[2] = { 0, 0 }; - -static double entropy = 0; -static int initialized = 0; - -static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_lock = NULL; -static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_tmp_lock = NULL; -static CRYPTO_ONCE rand_lock_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; - -/* May be set only when a thread holds rand_lock (to prevent double locking) */ -static unsigned int crypto_lock_rand = 0; -/* access to locking_threadid is synchronized by rand_tmp_lock */ -/* valid iff crypto_lock_rand is set */ -static CRYPTO_THREAD_ID locking_threadid; - -#ifdef PREDICT -int rand_predictable = 0; -#endif - -static int rand_hw_seed(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); - -static void rand_cleanup(void); -static int rand_seed(const void *buf, int num); -static int rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy); -static int rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo); -static int rand_nopseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); -#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L -static int rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); -#endif -static int rand_status(void); - -static RAND_METHOD rand_meth = { - rand_seed, - rand_nopseudo_bytes, - rand_cleanup, - rand_add, -#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L - rand_pseudo_bytes, -#else - NULL, -#endif - rand_status -}; - -DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_lock_init) -{ - OPENSSL_init_crypto(0, NULL); - rand_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); - rand_tmp_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); - return rand_lock != NULL && rand_tmp_lock != NULL; -} - -RAND_METHOD *RAND_OpenSSL(void) -{ - return (&rand_meth); -} - -static void rand_cleanup(void) -{ - OPENSSL_cleanse(state, sizeof(state)); - state_num = 0; - state_index = 0; - OPENSSL_cleanse(md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH); - md_count[0] = 0; - md_count[1] = 0; - entropy = 0; - initialized = 0; - CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_lock); - CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_tmp_lock); -} - -static int rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add) -{ - int i, j, k, st_idx; - long md_c[2]; - unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH]; - EVP_MD_CTX *m; - int do_not_lock; - int rv = 0; - - if (!num) - return 1; - - /* - * (Based on the rand(3) manpage) - * - * The input is chopped up into units of 20 bytes (or less for - * the last block). Each of these blocks is run through the hash - * function as follows: The data passed to the hash function - * is the current 'md', the same number of bytes from the 'state' - * (the location determined by in incremented looping index) as - * the current 'block', the new key data 'block', and 'count' - * (which is incremented after each use). - * The result of this is kept in 'md' and also xored into the - * 'state' at the same locations that were used as input into the - * hash function. - */ - - m = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); - if (m == NULL) - goto err; - - if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_lock_init, do_rand_lock_init)) - goto err; - - /* check if we already have the lock */ - if (crypto_lock_rand) { - CRYPTO_THREAD_ID cur = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id(); - CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(rand_tmp_lock); - do_not_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_compare_id(locking_threadid, cur); - CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_tmp_lock); - } else - do_not_lock = 0; - - if (!do_not_lock) - CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_lock); - st_idx = state_index; - - /* - * use our own copies of the counters so that even if a concurrent thread - * seeds with exactly the same data and uses the same subarray there's - * _some_ difference - */ - md_c[0] = md_count[0]; - md_c[1] = md_count[1]; - - memcpy(local_md, md, sizeof(md)); - - /* state_index <= state_num <= STATE_SIZE */ - state_index += num; - if (state_index >= STATE_SIZE) { - state_index %= STATE_SIZE; - state_num = STATE_SIZE; - } else if (state_num < STATE_SIZE) { - if (state_index > state_num) - state_num = state_index; - } - /* state_index <= state_num <= STATE_SIZE */ - - /* - * state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num - 1) % STATE_SIZE] are what we - * will use now, but other threads may use them as well - */ - - md_count[1] += (num / MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) + (num % MD_DIGEST_LENGTH > 0); - - if (!do_not_lock) - CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock); - - for (i = 0; i < num; i += MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) { - j = (num - i); - j = (j > MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) ? MD_DIGEST_LENGTH : j; - - if (!MD_Init(m)) - goto err; - if (!MD_Update(m, local_md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH)) - goto err; - k = (st_idx + j) - STATE_SIZE; - if (k > 0) { - if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[st_idx]), j - k)) - goto err; - if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[0]), k)) - goto err; - } else if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[st_idx]), j)) - goto err; - - /* DO NOT REMOVE THE FOLLOWING CALL TO MD_Update()! */ - if (!MD_Update(m, buf, j)) - goto err; - /* - * We know that line may cause programs such as purify and valgrind - * to complain about use of uninitialized data. The problem is not, - * it's with the caller. Removing that line will make sure you get - * really bad randomness and thereby other problems such as very - * insecure keys. - */ - - if (!MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]), sizeof(md_c))) - goto err; - if (!MD_Final(m, local_md)) - goto err; - md_c[1]++; - - buf = (const char *)buf + j; - - for (k = 0; k < j; k++) { - /* - * Parallel threads may interfere with this, but always each byte - * of the new state is the XOR of some previous value of its and - * local_md (intermediate values may be lost). Alway using locking - * could hurt performance more than necessary given that - * conflicts occur only when the total seeding is longer than the - * random state. - */ - state[st_idx++] ^= local_md[k]; - if (st_idx >= STATE_SIZE) - st_idx = 0; - } - } - - if (!do_not_lock) - CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_lock); - /* - * Don't just copy back local_md into md -- this could mean that other - * thread's seeding remains without effect (except for the incremented - * counter). By XORing it we keep at least as much entropy as fits into - * md. - */ - for (k = 0; k < (int)sizeof(md); k++) { - md[k] ^= local_md[k]; - } - if (entropy < ENTROPY_NEEDED) /* stop counting when we have enough */ - entropy += add; - if (!do_not_lock) - CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock); - - rv = 1; - err: - EVP_MD_CTX_free(m); - return rv; -} - -static int rand_seed(const void *buf, int num) -{ - return rand_add(buf, num, (double)num); -} - -static int rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo) -{ - static volatile int stirred_pool = 0; - int i, j, k; - size_t num_ceil, st_idx, st_num; - long md_c[2]; - unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH]; - EVP_MD_CTX *m; -#ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS - pid_t curr_pid = getpid(); -#endif - time_t curr_time = time(NULL); - int do_stir_pool = 0; -/* time value for various platforms */ -#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 - FILETIME tv; -# ifdef _WIN32_WCE - SYSTEMTIME t; - GetSystemTime(&t); - SystemTimeToFileTime(&t, &tv); -# else - GetSystemTimeAsFileTime(&tv); -# endif -#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) - struct timespec tv; - clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &ts); -#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_DSPBIOS) - unsigned long long tv, OPENSSL_rdtsc(); - tv = OPENSSL_rdtsc(); -#else - struct timeval tv; - gettimeofday(&tv, NULL); -#endif - -#ifdef PREDICT - if (rand_predictable) { - static unsigned char val = 0; - - for (i = 0; i < num; i++) - buf[i] = val++; - return (1); - } -#endif - - if (num <= 0) - return 1; - - m = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); - if (m == NULL) - goto err_mem; - - /* round upwards to multiple of MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */ - num_ceil = - (1 + (num - 1) / (MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2)) * (MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2); - - /* - * (Based on the rand(3) manpage:) - * - * For each group of 10 bytes (or less), we do the following: - * - * Input into the hash function the local 'md' (which is initialized from - * the global 'md' before any bytes are generated), the bytes that are to - * be overwritten by the random bytes, and bytes from the 'state' - * (incrementing looping index). From this digest output (which is kept - * in 'md'), the top (up to) 10 bytes are returned to the caller and the - * bottom 10 bytes are xored into the 'state'. - * - * Finally, after we have finished 'num' random bytes for the - * caller, 'count' (which is incremented) and the local and global 'md' - * are fed into the hash function and the results are kept in the - * global 'md'. - */ - - if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_lock_init, do_rand_lock_init)) - goto err_mem; - - CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_lock); - /* - * We could end up in an async engine while holding this lock so ensure - * we don't pause and cause a deadlock - */ - ASYNC_block_pause(); - - /* prevent rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */ - CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_tmp_lock); - locking_threadid = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id(); - CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_tmp_lock); - crypto_lock_rand = 1; - - if (!initialized) { - RAND_poll(); - initialized = (entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED); - } - - if (!stirred_pool) - do_stir_pool = 1; - - if (!initialized) { - /* - * If the PRNG state is not yet unpredictable, then seeing the PRNG - * output may help attackers to determine the new state; thus we have - * to decrease the entropy estimate. Once we've had enough initial - * seeding we don't bother to adjust the entropy count, though, - * because we're not ambitious to provide *information-theoretic* - * randomness. NOTE: This approach fails if the program forks before - * we have enough entropy. Entropy should be collected in a separate - * input pool and be transferred to the output pool only when the - * entropy limit has been reached. - */ - entropy -= num; - if (entropy < 0) - entropy = 0; - } - - if (do_stir_pool) { - /* - * In the output function only half of 'md' remains secret, so we - * better make sure that the required entropy gets 'evenly - * distributed' through 'state', our randomness pool. The input - * function (rand_add) chains all of 'md', which makes it more - * suitable for this purpose. - */ - - int n = STATE_SIZE; /* so that the complete pool gets accessed */ - while (n > 0) { -#if MD_DIGEST_LENGTH > 20 -# error "Please adjust DUMMY_SEED." -#endif -#define DUMMY_SEED "...................." /* at least MD_DIGEST_LENGTH */ - /* - * Note that the seed does not matter, it's just that - * rand_add expects to have something to hash. - */ - rand_add(DUMMY_SEED, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0.0); - n -= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH; - } - if (initialized) - stirred_pool = 1; - } - - st_idx = state_index; - st_num = state_num; - md_c[0] = md_count[0]; - md_c[1] = md_count[1]; - memcpy(local_md, md, sizeof(md)); - - state_index += num_ceil; - if (state_index > state_num) - state_index %= state_num; - - /* - * state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num_ceil - 1) % st_num] are now - * ours (but other threads may use them too) - */ - - md_count[0] += 1; - - /* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */ - crypto_lock_rand = 0; - ASYNC_unblock_pause(); - CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock); - - while (num > 0) { - /* num_ceil -= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */ - j = (num >= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2) ? MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2 : num; - num -= j; - if (!MD_Init(m)) - goto err; -#ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS - if (curr_pid) { /* just in the first iteration to save time */ - if (!MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&curr_pid, sizeof(curr_pid))) - goto err; - curr_pid = 0; - } -#endif - if (curr_time) { /* just in the first iteration to save time */ - if (!MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&curr_time, sizeof(curr_time))) - goto err; - if (!MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&tv, sizeof(tv))) - goto err; - curr_time = 0; - if (!rand_hw_seed(m)) - goto err; - } - if (!MD_Update(m, local_md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH)) - goto err; - if (!MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]), sizeof(md_c))) - goto err; - - k = (st_idx + MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2) - st_num; - if (k > 0) { - if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[st_idx]), MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2 - k)) - goto err; - if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[0]), k)) - goto err; - } else if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[st_idx]), MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2)) - goto err; - if (!MD_Final(m, local_md)) - goto err; - - for (i = 0; i < MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2; i++) { - /* may compete with other threads */ - state[st_idx++] ^= local_md[i]; - if (st_idx >= st_num) - st_idx = 0; - if (i < j) - *(buf++) = local_md[i + MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2]; - } - } - - if (!MD_Init(m) - || !MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]), sizeof(md_c)) - || !MD_Update(m, local_md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH)) - goto err; - CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_lock); - /* - * Prevent deadlocks if we end up in an async engine - */ - ASYNC_block_pause(); - if (!MD_Update(m, md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) || !MD_Final(m, md)) { - ASYNC_unblock_pause(); - CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock); - goto err; - } - ASYNC_unblock_pause(); - CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock); - - EVP_MD_CTX_free(m); - if (initialized) - return (1); - else if (pseudo) - return 0; - else { - RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_BYTES, RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED); - ERR_add_error_data(1, "You need to read the OpenSSL FAQ, " - "https://www.openssl.org/docs/faq.html"); - return (0); - } - err: - RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_BYTES, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); - EVP_MD_CTX_free(m); - return 0; - err_mem: - RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_BYTES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - EVP_MD_CTX_free(m); - return 0; - -} - -static int rand_nopseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) -{ - return rand_bytes(buf, num, 0); -} - -#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L -/* - * pseudo-random bytes that are guaranteed to be unique but not unpredictable - */ -static int rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) -{ - return rand_bytes(buf, num, 1); -} -#endif - -static int rand_status(void) -{ - CRYPTO_THREAD_ID cur; - int ret; - int do_not_lock; - - if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_lock_init, do_rand_lock_init)) - return 0; - - cur = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id(); - /* - * check if we already have the lock (could happen if a RAND_poll() - * implementation calls RAND_status()) - */ - if (crypto_lock_rand) { - CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(rand_tmp_lock); - do_not_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_compare_id(locking_threadid, cur); - CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_tmp_lock); - } else - do_not_lock = 0; - - if (!do_not_lock) { - CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_lock); - /* - * Prevent deadlocks in case we end up in an async engine - */ - ASYNC_block_pause(); - - /* - * prevent rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again - */ - CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_tmp_lock); - locking_threadid = cur; - CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_tmp_lock); - crypto_lock_rand = 1; - } - - if (!initialized) { - RAND_poll(); - initialized = 1; - } - - ret = entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED; - - if (!do_not_lock) { - /* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */ - crypto_lock_rand = 0; - - ASYNC_unblock_pause(); - CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock); - } - - return ret; -} - -/* - * rand_hw_seed: get seed data from any available hardware RNG. only - * currently supports rdrand. - */ - -/* Adapted from eng_rdrand.c */ - -#if (defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || defined(_M_IX86) || \ - defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \ - defined(_M_AMD64) || defined (_M_X64)) && defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ) \ - && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RDRAND) - -# define RDRAND_CALLS 4 - -size_t OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand(void); -extern unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[]; - -static int rand_hw_seed(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) -{ - int i; - if (!(OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (62 - 32)))) - return 1; - for (i = 0; i < RDRAND_CALLS; i++) { - size_t rnd; - rnd = OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand(); - if (rnd == 0) - return 1; - if (!MD_Update(ctx, (unsigned char *)&rnd, sizeof(size_t))) - return 0; - } - return 1; -} - -/* XOR an existing buffer with random data */ - -void rand_hw_xor(unsigned char *buf, size_t num) -{ - size_t rnd; - if (!(OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (62 - 32)))) - return; - while (num >= sizeof(size_t)) { - rnd = OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand(); - if (rnd == 0) - return; - *((size_t *)buf) ^= rnd; - buf += sizeof(size_t); - num -= sizeof(size_t); - } - if (num) { - rnd = OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand(); - if (rnd == 0) - return; - while (num) { - *buf ^= rnd & 0xff; - rnd >>= 8; - buf++; - num--; - } - } -} - -#else - -static int rand_hw_seed(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) -{ - return 1; -} - -void rand_hw_xor(unsigned char *buf, size_t num) -{ - return; -} - -#endif |