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      1 {% extends "common/news.j2" %}
      2 {% block body_content %}
      3   <h1>2021-3: &quot;Why a Digital Euro should be Online-first and Bearer-based
      4     &quot; published</h1>
      5   <p>
      6     We are happy to announce the publication of our paper on &quot;Why a Digital Euro should be Online-first and Bearer-based&quot;.
      7   </p>
      8   <p>
      9     The European Central Bank’s “Report on a Digital Euro” considers
     10     two distinct types of designs for a digital euro. It argues that all functional
     11     requirements laid out in the report can be fulfilled by operating the two systems
     12     in parallel:
     13     <ul>
     14       <li>A bearer-based digital euro based on trusted hardware that can be used
     15         offline, anonymously, and without third-party intervention.
     16       <li>An account-based digital euro that can be used online, is fully software-
     17         based and excludes the possibility of anonymity.
     18     </ul>
     19     The report does not discuss other choices of hybrid systems. However, the
     20     choice is more arbitrary than it might seem at first sight: bearer-based systems
     21     are not necessarily offline payment systems, and online payment systems do not
     22     need to exclude anonymity.
     23   </p>
     24   <p>
     25     We argue that operating a bearer-based payment system to complement an
     26     account-based CBDC in order to gain offline and privacy features is not a good
     27     trade-off. Adding permanent, regular offline capabilities via the bearer-based
     28     payment instrument constantly exposes the CBDC to the severe issues inherent
     29     in offline-capable payment systems. Instead, the offline mode of operation
     30     should be restricted to scenarios where it is actually required, which mitigates
     31     the risks.
     32   </p>
     33   <h4>Download links</h4>
     34   <ul>
     35     <li><a href="/papers/euro-bearer-online-2021.pdf">PDF (English)</a></li>
     36   </ul>
     37   <h4>Related exploits published after our article</h4>
     38   <ul>
     39     <li><a href="https://kb.cert.org/vuls/id/782720">TCG TPM 2.0 (2023)</a></li>
     40     <li><a href="https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-00767.html">Intel SGX (2023)</a></li>
     41     <li><a href="https://developer.arm.com/documentation/ka005159/1-0">AMD Trust Zone (2022)</a></li>
     42     <li><a href="https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9933270">ATECC608B (2022)</a></li>
     43     <li><a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2304.14717">AMD Platform Security Processor (2023)</a></li>
     44     <li><a href="https://downfall.page/">Intel SGX (2023)</a></li>
     45     <li><a href="https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2023/06/hackers-can-steal-cryptographic-keys-by-video-recording-connected-power-leds-60-feet-away/">Smart cards from 60 feet distance</a></li>
     46     <li><a href="https://mkukri.xyz/2024/06/01/tpm-gpio-fail.html">Intel TPM (2024)</a></li>
     47     <li><a href="https://x.com/_markel___/status/1828112469010596347">Intel SGX root of trust private key extraction (2024)</a></li>
     48     <li><a href="https://ninjalab.io/eucleak/">Yubikey, Infineon SLE78 / Infineon Optiga Trust M / Infineon Optiga TPM (2024)</a></li>
     49     <li><a href="https://www.heise.de/news/Forscher-entdecken-Schwachstellen-in-Intels-Trust-Domain-Extensions-9974224.html">Intel TDX (2024)</a></li>
     50     <li><a href="https://github.com/google/security-research/security/advisories/GHSA-4xq7-4mgh-gp6w">AMD SEV-SNP</a></li>
     51     <li><a href="https://wiretap.fail/">Intel SGX (2025)</a></li>
     52   </ul>
     53 
     54 {% endblock body_content %}