pqc.tex (3595B)
1 \documentclass[aspectratio=169,t]{beamer} 2 \input taler-macros 3 \usepackage{msc,eurosym} 4 5 6 \newcommand{\TITLE}{Post-Quantum Cryptography in GNU Taler} 7 \newcommand{\SUB}{} 8 \newcommand{\AUTHOR}{Christian Grothoff \& Tanja Lange} 9 \newcommand{\SPEAKER}{Leon Schumacher \& Florian Dold} 10 \newcommand{\INST}{BFH \& TU/e \& Taler Systems SA} 11 \newcommand{\DATE}{\\ \ \vspace{0.5cm} \\ October 28\textsuperscript{th} 2026} 12 13 % Do not edit this part 14 \title{\TITLE} 15 \subtitle{\SUB} 16 \date{\DATE} 17 \author[\SPEAKER]{\AUTHOR} 18 \institute{\INST} 19 20 \begin{document} 21 22 \begin{frame}[plain] 23 \maketitle 24 \end{frame} 25 26 27 \begin{frame}{Pre NGI TALER} 28 29 \textbf{GNU Taler protocol provides asymetric privacy.} 30 \begin{center} 31 \includegraphics[width=0.8\textwidth]{operations.png} 32 \end{center} 33 \textbf{Problem 1: Many constructions used in the protocol are not PQ-safe.} 34 \textbf{Problem 2: For the ``refresh'' step, no suitable construction is known.} 35 \end{frame} 36 37 38 \begin{frame}{NGI TALER objectives} 39 40 \begin{enumerate} 41 \item Complete inventory of constructions and PQ impact (DONE) 42 \item Alternative protocol formulation for ``refresh'' step 43 where suitable constructions exist (DONE) {\bf (*)} 44 \item Recommendation of good primitives for each procol step (WiP) 45 \end{enumerate} 46 {\bf (*)}: For the new $k$-unique signature design suitable constructions exist, 47 but currently available primitives introduce additional limitations implementations have 48 to work around. 49 \end{frame} 50 51 52 \begin{frame}{Next steps} 53 \begin{enumerate} 54 \item Implement recommended new primitives (especially for blinding and $k$-unique signatures, 55 for both of which no standard implementations exist) 56 \item Integrate cipher-agility into the existing implementation 57 \item Ensure $k$-unique signature limitations are reasonably mitigated 58 \item Test, benchmark, optimize, ship 59 \end{enumerate} 60 {\bf Open issue: How to achieve {\em additive}\footnote{Additive hear means 61 that we get the security of the stronger of the blind signature primitives used; in 62 all other cases we can just enable multiple primitives and get the maximum security 63 of any of the primitives.} PQC-security for blind sigs.} 64 \end{frame} 65 66 67 \begin{frame}{Cost estimates} 68 \begin{itemize} 69 \item[24 PM] Implement recommended new primitives, including on server backends and clients (iOS, Android) 70 \item[36 PM] Integrate new primitives into the existing implementation (cipher-agility) 71 \item[6 PM] Address $k$-unique signature limitations at the application layer 72 \item[6 PM] Test, benchmark, optimize, ship 73 \end{itemize} 74 The first two can in theory be done by two people in parallel. 75 \begin{center} 76 $\Rightarrow$ Needs at least 18--24 months 77 \end{center} 78 Budget: $\approx$ \EUR{750k}. 79 \end{frame} 80 81 82 83 % This should be last... 84 \begin{frame}{Acknowledgments} 85 86 \begin{minipage}{0.45\textwidth} \ \\ 87 {\tiny Funded by the European Union (Project 101135475).} 88 89 \begin{center} 90 \includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{images/bandera.jpg} 91 \end{center} 92 \end{minipage} 93 \hfill 94 \begin{minipage}{0.45\textwidth} 95 {\tiny Funded by SERI (HEU-Projekt 101135475-TALER).} 96 97 \begin{center} 98 \includegraphics[width=0.65\textwidth]{images/sbfi.jpg} 99 \end{center} 100 \end{minipage} 101 102 \vfill 103 104 {\tiny 105 106 Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author(s) only 107 and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union. Neither the 108 European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for 109 them. 110 111 } 112 \end{frame} 113 114 \end{document}