exchange

Base system with REST service to issue digital coins, run by the payment service provider
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commit de384cfd8207d2ef68ac2643b6f4726abd8154b5
parent c8eeea1245a509c4875c5a41fa6fd9b36efae4b2
Author: Christian Grothoff <christian@grothoff.org>
Date:   Mon, 28 Sep 2015 12:01:37 +0200

more clarifications

Diffstat:
Mdoc/paper/taler.tex | 9+++++----
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/doc/paper/taler.tex b/doc/paper/taler.tex @@ -222,7 +222,8 @@ the coin. Online fraud detection can create problems if the network fails during the initial steps of a transaction. For example, a law enforcement agency might try to entrap a customer by offering illicit goods and -then cancelling the transaction after learning the public key of the +then cancelling the transaction (i.e. by pretending that there is +a network failure) after learning the public key of the coin. This is equivalent to a benign merchant giving a dissatisfied (anonymous) customer a {\em refund} by sending a message affirming the cancellation. @@ -868,8 +869,8 @@ request $S_{C'}(\mathtt{link})$ with $(T^{(\gamma)}_p$, $B^{(\gamma)}, % This allows the owner of the melted coin to also obtain the private key of the new coin, even if the refreshing protocol was illicitly -executed with the help of another party who generated $C'_s$ and only -provided $\vec{C'_p}$ and other required information to the old owner. +executed with the help of another party who generated $C_s$ and only +provided $\vec{C_p}$ and other required information to the old owner. As a result, linking ensures that access to the new coins minted by the refresh protocol is always {\em shared} with the owner of the melted coins. This makes it impossible to abuse the refresh protocol @@ -1064,7 +1065,7 @@ computing base (TCB) is public and free software. %This work was supported by a grant from the Renewable Freedom Foundation. % FIXME: ARED? -%We thank Tanja Lange, Dan Bernstein and Fabian Kirsch for feedback on an earlier +%We thank Tanja Lange, Dan Bernstein, Luis Ressel and Fabian Kirsch for feedback on an earlier %version of this paper, Nicolas Fournier for implementing and running %some performance benchmarks, and Richard Stallman, Hellekin Wolf, %Jacob Appelbaum for productive discussions and support.