commit 744d81b5acc5a9c729b6bef45499f97833e8b773
parent e53a736dcaccea4de2f5adcd5c332f0016c7d3a5
Author: Florian Dold <florian.dold@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 17 May 2017 17:02:32 +0200
more responses for fc17
Diffstat:
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff --git a/doc/paper/taler_FC2017.txt b/doc/paper/taler_FC2017.txt
@@ -144,6 +144,9 @@ Specific comments:
- Section 4.1, step 3, what is the key K used in FDH? Also is S_w(B) a standard
signature?
+> The "K" here means that the domain of the full domain hash is the
+> modulus of the public key K_v of the key pair K.
+
- Section 4.1, step 4, How can the exchange know that this was indeed a new
withdrawal request? If a new blinding factor b is used, then a customer can
create multiple “freshly” looking requests for the same C_p. (Also a minor
@@ -160,6 +163,9 @@ Specific comments:
the coin (i.e. cannot link with withdrawal) but this is still an anonymity
problem.
+> Yes, this is why the user has to refresh a partially spend coin
+> before reusing it, unless they don't care about their anonymity.
+
- Section 4.3, doesn’t seem very fair to compare with Zcash or at least it
should be highlighted that a quite weaker level of anonymity is achieved.
@@ -169,6 +175,11 @@ Specific comments:
denotes? Is that a commitment (as noted in the text) or a signature (as noted
in notation table?).
+> We multiply t_s^(i) with G, so the only reasonable domain is
+> [1,n] where n is the order of the elliptic curve we use.
+> S_{C’} is a signature made with private key C’_p, what we sign
+> over is the commitment.
+
- Section 4.3 In this protocol I would expect the customer to somehow “prove”
to the exchange what is the remaining value of the dirty coin. I do not see
this happening. How does this part of the protocol ensure that a user cannot
