commit ce9b8116957005b836d50733f3b6bb23bfdbb68b
parent c332747329195a2c0f26710438de352c392210e9
Author: Tanja Lange <tanja@hyperelliptic.org>
Date: Thu, 23 Jan 2025 10:11:48 +0100
bringing the agencies to the front here, spell-checking with US English
Diffstat:
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/doc/usenix-security-2025/paper/intro.tex b/doc/usenix-security-2025/paper/intro.tex
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ organizations but also how much they gave to which.
Individual spending quickly becomes very intimate and personal, as even
aggregate spending habits can reveal a great deal about people through
-behavioural analytics and
+behavioral analytics and
psychographic profiling.~\cite{purchase2018wen,purchasepsyco2019gladstone}
This holds even more for
acts of donating, which is typically highly revealing about e.g. belief systems
@@ -99,10 +99,10 @@ This happens in particular when such organizations
employ third party (often for-profit) agencies to help ``yield'' more donations
on a commission basis. For-profit fund
raising agencies often engage in privacy-invasive practices to identify and contact potential donors.
-One common scenario is that after a first donation, such bad actors % calling them "bad actors" might be unnecessarily opinionated. From a privacy perspective they are not good, but many organizations also rely on these services to not go bankrupt. -JL
+One common scenario is that after a first donation, such agencies % calling them "bad actors" might be unnecessarily opinionated. From a privacy perspective they are not good, but many organizations also rely on these services to not go bankrupt. -JL
start to aggressively pressure a particular donor for more --- with personalized
emails, letters, phone calls and even in-person visits.
-Donor information may also be shared between organizations,
+They also reuse donor information between charities,
leading to an avalanche of donation requests from organizations that the donor might not be interested in supporting.
In the era of data-driven donations and corporate social media
@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ facilities for cultural philanthropies, offering more attractive rates of tax
benefits than for regular philanthropies. Obviously, this needs to be taken
into account when designing a system, but does not take away the fundamental
premise that within those categories it is no concern of a government which
-particular recognised causes are supported.
+particular recognized causes are supported.
In this work we solve the issue of privacy-preserving donations with
tax deductions by adhering to ``privacy by design'': In cases where
@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ signatures has previously been
suggested~\cite{donations2003blind} as a foundation for donation systems that allow
donors to remain anonymous but easily identify donation recipients.
The untraceability of the underlying payment system for purchases easily provides untraceability in the donation context as well.
-The crucial difference is that the Donau sysem gives tax-deducatable donation
+The crucial difference is that the Donau system gives tax-deductible donation
receipts without revealing the charity donated to.
Our current implementation is designed to work in conjunction with the
