commit c4ba3f16b5746f3c14e890df6ad68398c55c00d0
parent 0cc919b72d2419e90f321f16204a85542bb9b137
Author: Michiel Leenaars <michiel.ml@nlnet.nl>
Date: Sun, 19 Jan 2025 22:00:40 +0100
Slightly reword threats
Diffstat:
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/doc/usenix-security-2025/paper/threats.tex b/doc/usenix-security-2025/paper/threats.tex
@@ -19,9 +19,9 @@ The Donau protocol does not prove that the donor identification $\DI$
used in the $\UDI$s inside the BKPs is that of the actual donor, as
that is incompatible with the anonymity and confidentiality guarantees
of the system. In practice, we expect this threat to be largely
-theoretical: the hypothetical money launderer would need to take a
-significant loss (depending on the tax rate, but generally probably
-more than half, given that common effective tax rates are rarely above
-50\%). Thus, the costs of laundering money with this method would
-most likely substantially exceed the cost of other methods to launder
-criminal assets.
+theoretical: the hypothetical money launderer would need complex arrangements
+as well as be willing to take a significant loss (depending on the tax rate,
+but generally probably more than half, given that common effective tax rates
+are rarely above 50\%). Thus, the overhead of laundering money with this
+method would most likely substantially exceed the cost of other methods to
+launder criminal assets.
