commit 90ef5a001ffb75a57360af7fa0e28441c752d917
parent f6b44cf33a0af0eebc67c794cc2557acdde8f67c
Author: Michiel Leenaars <ml.software@leenaa.rs>
Date: Thu, 16 Jan 2025 15:25:44 +0100
Minor updates to intro and requirements
Signed-off-by: Michiel Leenaars <ml.software@leenaa.rs>
Diffstat:
2 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-)
diff --git a/doc/usenix-security-2025/paper/intro.tex b/doc/usenix-security-2025/paper/intro.tex
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ immediately give away to a recognized good cause is not income that
will be converted by you into private consumption. So conceptually it
deserves a different tax treatment.
-Donations have many causes, but quite often they are an obvious
+Donations can serve many causes, but quite often they are an obvious
expression of the human right towards the freedom of thought,
conscience and religion. Individual spending can be very intimate and
personal, and even aggregate spending habits can reveal a great deal
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ about people. This holds even more so for donating.
Protecting donation confidentiality is therefore important to protect
those freedoms. We have to recognize that in some situations the mere
-fact hat someone has -- in private -- donated to some cause at some
+fact that someone has -- in private -- donated to some cause at some
point in their life, can put them at risk in another context. The
right to privacy is another critical aspect of donating. International
human rights law provides a non-ambiguous responsibility to promote
@@ -77,27 +77,24 @@ even plates in a religious gathering) are vulnerable to group
pressure, and door to door fundraising is also confrontational and
puts people on the spot.
-When donations are devoid of such pressures and there is no need for,
-e.g., virtue signaling, donation confidentiality comes into
-play. Historically, people wanting to make an anonymous donation might
-have an envelope with cash or a box of goods delivered. Obviously,
-this was never compatible with providing tax benefits. Alternatively,
-they might arrange for an expensive intermediary like a notary
-(although that would not be fully anonymous, and depend on the
-discretion of the notary).
+Donations in their purest form should be devoid of such pressures and in cases
+where there is no need for, e.g., virtue signaling, donation confidentiality
+comes into play. Historically, people wanting to make an anonymous donation
+might have an envelope with cash or a box of goods delivered. Obviously, this
+was never compatible with providing tax benefits. Alternatively, they might
+arrange for an expensive intermediary like a notary (although that would not be
+fully anonymous, and depend on the discretion of the notary).
Technically guaranteed donation confidentiality is certainly
-non-trivial to implement in the digital payment era. What you donate
-to and why may be strictly personal, but due to the nature of the
-banking system along the financial pipeline there is an uncomfortable
-number of actors handling sensitive data that allows for profiling and
-targeted discrimination on grounds. And there are even more that later
-on may have access to it. Digital payments are logged and made
-accessible to many different actors, and reporting donations to tax
-authorities adds yet (at least) one more actor to the pipeline. It is
-the scope of this document to try and solve this issue and finally
-introduce donation confidentiality which adheres to ``privacy by
-design''.
+non-trivial to implement in the digital payment era. What you donate to and why
+may be strictly personal, but along the financial pipeline there is an
+uncomfortable number of actors handling sensitive data that allows for
+profiling and targeted discrimination on grounds. And there are even more that
+later on may get access to it. Digital payments are logged and made accessible
+to many different actors, and reporting donations to tax authorities adds yet
+(at least) one more actor to the pipeline. It is the scope of this document to
+try and solve this issue and finally introduce donation confidentiality which
+adheres to ``privacy by design''.
\subsection{Overview of the requirements analysis}
@@ -113,17 +110,24 @@ are rendered in return.
% NOTE[oec]: what types of donations are _not_ considered, and why?
In the design requirements we will mostly cover donations to charities
-that offer a tax benefit as that triggers the most complex
-requirements.
+which would be eligible for claiming tax benefits as that scenario triggers the
+most complex requirements.
As part of their regular operations as well as their recognition as
-public benefit organizations, registered charities are already subject
-to a variety of audits as well as strict regulatory and fiscal
-scrutiny. Good causes that do not adhere to these rules are stripped
-from any fiscal benefits. At least donations to recognized public
-benefit organizations may therefore be confidential: donors should be
-able to freely choose whichever of the approved philanthropies they
-donate to, without disclosing which.
+public benefit organizations, registered charities are already typically
+subject to a variety of audits as well as strict regulatory and fiscal
+scrutiny. Good causes that do not adhere to these rules are stripped from any
+fiscal benefits. At least donations to recognized public benefit organizations
+may therefore be confidential: donors should be able to freely choose whichever
+of the approved philanthropies they donate to, without disclosing which.
+
+We note that in some countries there are different tiers of philanthropies.
+Some countries like Italy and the Netherlands have for instance particular tax
+facilities for cultural philanthropies, offering more attractive rates of tax
+benefits than for regular philanthropies. Obviously, this needs to be taken
+into account when designing a system, but does not take away the fundamental
+premise that within those categories it is no concern of a government which
+particular recognised causes are supported.
In cases where donation confidentiality is not (yet) feasible, we will
try and provide fallbacks that best serve the interest of donors, give
@@ -132,6 +136,7 @@ system in place.
+
\subsection{Digital Cash}
Digital cash~\cite{Chaum89} implemented by tokens issued using blind
diff --git a/doc/usenix-security-2025/paper/requirements.tex b/doc/usenix-security-2025/paper/requirements.tex
@@ -10,30 +10,38 @@ complexity. We will therefore not claim to provide the definitive
overview, but to provide a good start for bootstrapping a donation
ecosystem in the full knowledge that this will need to be updated.
-In particular, this section should not be misunderstood as an overview
-of current {\em legal requirements} across the world on how taxation
-on donations work. Taxation is predictably unpopular despite its
-clear essential function in how modern societies work, and therefore a
-very political topic that is subject to frequent change. Whether it is
-taxation on labor and profits, on property, on inheritance, on income
-from investment or gambling, or on consumption of products or services
---- there is no global universally agreed standard on whether these
-should be taxed and how that is to be done. Ad hoc regulation as part
-of political shifts makes taxation very context-specific and
-temporal. We are unaware of any attempt at creating such an overview
-as a public resource, and the cost of creating and subsequently
-maintaining such an effort would likely be prohibitive.
+In particular, this section should not be misunderstood as an overview of
+current legal requirements across the world on how taxation on donations work.
+Taxation is predictably unpopular despite its clear essential function in how
+modern societies work, and therefore a very political topic that makes both
+fiscal legislation and the way it is interpreted subject to frequent change and
+much variation. Just like taxation on labor and profits, on property, on
+inheritance, on income from investment or gambling, or on consumption of
+products or services -- there is no global universally agreement on whether
+donations should be taxed, let alone on how that should be done. Ad hoc
+regulation as part of political shifts makes taxation very {/em
+context-specific} and {/em temporal}. We are unaware of any attempt even by
+large stakeholders at providing such an overview as an up-to-date public
+resource, and the cost of creating and subsequently maintaining such an effort
+is actually prohibitive due to the need to cover many different jurisdictions
+with in-depth fiscal expertise in an ongoing manner.
Instead the focus of this section is only on providing an overview of
generic requirements that {\em could} be made to a donation flow in
order to comply with regulation.
-One should note that, in many jurisdictions, recipients of donations
-do not necessarily have the same protections. Donations should be
-given without return consideration, but of course there are many
-financial transactions (such as gifts or donations from business or
-lobby groups to political parties) that are not as clean in this
-respect.
+One should note that, in many jurisdictions, the {\em receiving end} of
+donations does not necessarily have or need the same protections as the
+donating side has. This {\em asymmetry in treatment} makes common sense: money
+that has been parted with is no longer present at the side of the donor, and so
+doesn't easily become problematic. All the action is on the other end of the
+donation pipeline, as at some point after money arrives it will become active.
+'Follow the money' therefore makes a lot of sense: while Donations should be
+given without return consideration, but of course there are many financial
+transactions (such as gifts or donations from business or lobby groups to
+political parties) that are not as clean in this respect. This calls for
+transparency and professional scrutiny, and the fact that we are dealing with
+legal entities not private individuals makes this much less of a problem.
\subsection{Assumptions}
