challenger

OAuth 2.0-based authentication service that validates user can receive messages at a certain address
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commit b6568fa0fd9590bf4812c2488950e49df5d098d5
parent c0aea528e2a7d470558792270564c0b0b80cfa95
Author: Christian Grothoff <grothoff@gnunet.org>
Date:   Thu, 16 Jul 2026 00:03:45 +0200

more robust test for upload data that also works for chunked encoding

Diffstat:
Msrc/challenger/challenger-httpd_setup.c | 15+++------------
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

diff --git a/src/challenger/challenger-httpd_setup.c b/src/challenger/challenger-httpd_setup.c @@ -89,7 +89,6 @@ CH_handler_setup (struct CH_HandlerContext *hc, struct SetupContext *sc = hc->ctx; unsigned long long client_id; const char *client_secret; - const char *cl; if (NULL == sc) { @@ -100,25 +99,17 @@ CH_handler_setup (struct CH_HandlerContext *hc, hc->ctx = sc; return MHD_YES; } - cl = MHD_lookup_connection_value (hc->connection, - MHD_HEADER_KIND, - MHD_HTTP_HEADER_CONTENT_LENGTH); - /* If we have a body (Content-length set and not zero) and we - are not yet done parsing it, try to parse it! */ if ( (NULL == sc->root) && - (NULL != cl) && - (0 != strcmp ("0", - cl)) ) + (0 != *upload_data_size) ) { /* parse byte stream upload into JSON */ enum GNUNET_GenericReturnValue res; #if DEBUG GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_INFO, - "Handling upload of `%.*s' (%s)\n", + "Handling upload of `%.*s'\n", (int) *upload_data_size, - upload_data, - cl); + upload_data); #endif res = TALER_MHD_parse_post_json (hc->connection, &sc->opaque_post_parsing_context,