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authorDaniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>2014-03-03 11:55:23 +0100
committerDaniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>2014-03-25 23:01:37 +0100
commit965690f67e190b5069cb0b16eef6917cb0d8ae18 (patch)
tree73a7801b3da7f7e70a640df43a085c652d26591f
parent5019c780958c3a8dbe64123aa90e6eaff1b84cfa (diff)
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Curl_cert_hostcheck: strip trailing dots in host name and wildcard
Reported-by: Richard Moore
-rw-r--r--lib/hostcheck.c50
1 files changed, 42 insertions, 8 deletions
diff --git a/lib/hostcheck.c b/lib/hostcheck.c
index d144f319a..162c52230 100644
--- a/lib/hostcheck.c
+++ b/lib/hostcheck.c
@@ -30,6 +30,10 @@
#include "rawstr.h"
#include "inet_pton.h"
+#include "curl_memory.h"
+/* The last #include file should be: */
+#include "memdebug.h"
+
/*
* Match a hostname against a wildcard pattern.
* E.g.
@@ -37,9 +41,20 @@
*
* We use the matching rule described in RFC6125, section 6.4.3.
* http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6125#section-6.4.3
+ *
+ * In addition: ignore trailing dots in the host names and wildcards, so that
+ * the names are used normalized. This is what the browsers do.
+ *
+ * Do not allow wildcard matching on IP numbers. There are apparently
+ * certificates being used with an IP address in the CN field, thus making no
+ * apparent distinction between a name and an IP. We need to detect the use of
+ * an IP address and not wildcard match on such names.
+ *
+ * NOTE: hostmatch() gets called with copied buffers so that it can modify the
+ * contents at will.
*/
-static int hostmatch(const char *hostname, const char *pattern)
+static int hostmatch(char *hostname, char *pattern)
{
const char *pattern_label_end, *pattern_wildcard, *hostname_label_end;
int wildcard_enabled;
@@ -48,6 +63,15 @@ static int hostmatch(const char *hostname, const char *pattern)
#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
struct sockaddr_in6 si6;
#endif
+
+ /* normalize pattern and hostname by stripping off trailing dots */
+ size_t len = strlen(hostname);
+ if(hostname[len-1]=='.')
+ hostname[len-1]=0;
+ len = strlen(pattern);
+ if(pattern[len-1]=='.')
+ pattern[len-1]=0;
+
pattern_wildcard = strchr(pattern, '*');
if(pattern_wildcard == NULL)
return Curl_raw_equal(pattern, hostname) ?
@@ -95,16 +119,26 @@ static int hostmatch(const char *hostname, const char *pattern)
int Curl_cert_hostcheck(const char *match_pattern, const char *hostname)
{
+ char *matchp;
+ char *hostp;
+ int res = 0;
if(!match_pattern || !*match_pattern ||
!hostname || !*hostname) /* sanity check */
- return 0;
-
- if(Curl_raw_equal(hostname, match_pattern)) /* trivial case */
- return 1;
+ ;
+ else {
+ matchp = strdup(match_pattern);
+ if(matchp) {
+ hostp = strdup(hostname);
+ if(hostp) {
+ if(hostmatch(hostp, matchp) == CURL_HOST_MATCH)
+ res= 1;
+ free(hostp);
+ }
+ free(matchp);
+ }
+ }
- if(hostmatch(hostname,match_pattern) == CURL_HOST_MATCH)
- return 1;
- return 0;
+ return res;
}
#endif /* SSLEAY or AXTLS or QSOSSL or GSKIT */