about.rst (28099B)
1 ************ 2 About GNUnet 3 ************ 4 5 GNUnet in its current version is the result of over 20 years of work 6 from many contributors. So far, most contributions were made by 7 volunteers or people paid to do fundamental research. At this stage, 8 GNUnet remains an experimental system where significant parts of the 9 software lack a reasonable degree of professionalism in its 10 implementation. Furthermore, we are aware of a significant number of 11 existing bugs and critical design flaws, as some unfortunate early 12 design decisions remain to be rectified. There are still known open 13 problems; GNUnet remains an active research project. 14 15 The project was started in 2001 when some initial ideas for improving 16 Freenet’s file-sharing turned out to be too radical to be easily 17 realized within the scope of the existing Freenet project. We lost our 18 first contributor on 11.9.2001 as the contributor realized that privacy 19 may help terrorists. The rest of the team concluded that it was now even 20 more important to fight for civil liberties. The first release was 21 called “GNet” – already with the name GNUnet in mind, but without the 22 blessing of GNU we did not dare to call it GNUnet immediately. A few 23 months after the first release we contacted the GNU project, happily 24 agreed to their governance model and became an official GNU package. 25 26 Within the first year, we created GNU libextractor, a helper library for 27 meta data extraction which has been used by a few other projects as 28 well. 2003 saw the emergence of pluggable transports, the ability for 29 GNUnet to use different mechanisms for communication, starting with TCP, 30 UDP and SMTP (support for the latter was later dropped due to a lack of 31 maintenance). In 2005, the project first started to evolve beyond the 32 original file-sharing application with a first simple P2P chat. In 2007, 33 we created GNU libmicrohttpd to support a pluggable transport based on 34 HTTP. In 2009, the architecture was radically modularized into the 35 multi-process system that exists today. Coincidentally, the first 36 version of the ARM service (ARM: Automatic Restart Manager) was 37 implemented a day before systemd was announced. From 2009 to 2014 work 38 progressed rapidly thanks to a significant research grant from the 39 Deutsche Forschungsgesellschaft. This resulted in particular in the 40 creation of the R5N DHT, CADET, ATS and the GNU Name System. In 2010, 41 GNUnet was selected as the basis for the secushare online social 42 network, resulting in a significant growth of the core team. In 2013, we 43 launched GNU Taler to address the challenge of convenient and 44 privacy-preserving online payments. In 2015, the pretty Easy privacy 45 (pEp) project announced that they will use GNUnet as the technology for 46 their meta-data protection layer, ultimately resulting in GNUnet e.V. 47 entering into a formal long-term collaboration with the pEp Foundation. 48 In 2016, Taler Systems SA, a first startup using GNUnet technology, was 49 founded with support from the community. 50 51 GNUnet is not merely a technical project, but also a political mission: 52 like the GNU project as a whole, we are writing software to achieve 53 political goals with a focus on the human right of informational 54 self-determination. Putting users in control of their computing has been 55 the core driver of the GNU project. With GNUnet we are focusing on 56 informational self-determination for collaborative computing and 57 communication over networks. 58 59 The Internet is shaped as much by code and protocols as it is by its 60 associated political processes (IETF, ICANN, IEEE, etc.). Similarly its 61 flaws are not limited to the protocol design. Thus, technical excellence 62 by itself will not suffice to create a better network. We also need to 63 build a community that is wise, humble and has a sense of humor to 64 achieve our goal to create a technical foundation for a society we would 65 like to live in. 66 67 Project governance 68 ================== 69 70 GNUnet, like the GNU project and many other free software projects, 71 follows the governance model of a benevolent dictator. This means that 72 ultimately, the GNU project appoints the GNU maintainer and can overrule 73 decisions made by the GNUnet maintainer. Similarly, the GNUnet 74 maintainer can overrule any decisions made by individual developers. 75 Still, in practice neither has happened in the last 20 years for GNUnet, 76 and we hope to keep it that way. 77 78 The current maintainers of GNUnet are: 79 80 - `Christian Grothoff <https://grothoff.org/christian/>`__ 81 - `Martin Schanzenbach <https://schanzen.eu/>`__ 82 83 The GNUnet project is supported by GNUnet e.V., a German association 84 where any developer can become a member. GNUnet e.V. serves as a legal 85 entity to hold the copyrights to GNUnet. GNUnet e.V. may also choose to 86 pay for project resources, and can collect donations as well as choose 87 to adjust the license of the software (with the constraint that it has 88 to remain free software). In 2018 we switched from GPL3 to AGPL3, in 89 practice these changes do not happen very often. 90 91 Philosophy 92 ========== 93 94 The primary goal of the GNUnet project is to provide a reliable, open, 95 non-discriminating and censorship-resistant system for information 96 exchange. We value free speech above state interests and intellectual 97 monopoly. GNUnet’s long-term goal is to serve as a development platform 98 for the next generation of Internet protocols. 99 100 Participants are encouraged to contribute at least as much resources 101 (storage, bandwidth) to the network as they consume, so that their 102 participation does not have a negative impact on other users. 103 104 Design Principles 105 ----------------- 106 107 These are the GNUnet design principles, in order of importance: 108 109 - GNUnet must be implemented as Free Software — This means that you 110 have the four essential freedoms: to run the program, to study and 111 change the program in source code form, to redistribute exact copies, 112 and to distribute modified versions. 113 (https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.html). 114 - GNUnet must minimize the amount of personally identifiable 115 information exposed. 116 - GNUnet must be fully distributed and resilient to external attacks 117 and rogue participants. 118 - GNUnet must be self-organizing and not depend on administrators or 119 centralized infrastructure. 120 - GNUnet must inform the user which other participants have to be 121 trusted when establishing private communications. 122 - GNUnet must be open and permit new peers to join. 123 - GNUnet must support a diverse range of applications and devices. 124 - GNUnet must use compartmentalization to protect sensitive 125 information. 126 - The GNUnet architecture must be resource efficient. 127 - GNUnet must provide incentives for peers to contribute more resources 128 than they consume. 129 130 Privacy and Anonymity 131 --------------------- 132 133 The GNUnet protocols minimize the leakage of personally identifiable 134 information of participants and do not allow adversaries to control, 135 track, monitor or censor users activities. The GNUnet protocols also 136 make it as hard as possible to disrupt operations by participating in 137 the network with malicious intent. 138 139 Analyzing participant’s activities becomes more difficult as the number 140 of peers and applications that generate traffic on the network grows, 141 even if the additional traffic generated is not related to anonymous 142 communication. This is one of the reasons why GNUnet is developed as a 143 peer-to-peer framework where many applications share the lower layers of 144 an increasingly complex protocol stack. The GNUnet architecture 145 encourages many different forms of peer-to-peer applications. 146 147 Practicality 148 ------------ 149 150 Wherever possible GNUnet allows the peer to adjust its operations and 151 functionalities to specific use cases. A GNUnet peer running on a mobile 152 device with limited battery for example might choose not to relay 153 traffic for other participants. 154 155 For certain applications like file-sharing GNUnet allows participants to 156 trade degrees of anonymity in exchange for increased efficiency. 157 However, it is not possible for any user’s efficiency requirements to 158 compromise the anonymity of any other user. 159 160 Key Concepts 161 ============ 162 163 GNUnet is an alternative network stack for building secure, decentralized and privacy-preserving distributed applications. Our goal is to replace the old insecure Internet protocol stack. Starting from an application for secure publication of files, it has grown to include all kinds of basic protocol components and applications towards the creation of a GNU internet. 164 165 Today, the actual use and thus the social requirements for a global network differs widely from those goals of 1970. While the Internet remains suitable for military use, where the network equipment is operated by a command hierarchy and when necessary isolated from the rest of the world, the situation is less tenable for civil society. 166 167 Due to fundamental Internet design choices, Internet traffic can be misdirected, intercepted, censored and manipulated by hostile routers on the network. And indeed, the modern Internet has evolved exactly to the point where, as Matthew Green put it, "the network is hostile". 168 169 We believe liberal societies need a network architecture that uses the anti-authoritarian decentralized peer-to-peer paradigm and privacy-preserving cryptographic protocols. The goal of the GNUnet project is to provide a Free Software realization of this ideal. 170 171 Specifically, GNUnet tries to follow the following design principles, in order of importance: 172 173 1. GNUnet must be implemented as Free Software. 174 2. GNUnet must minimize the amount of personally identifiable information exposed. 175 3. GNUnet must be fully distributed and resilient to external attacks and rogue participants. 176 4. GNUnet must be self-organizing and not depend on administrators or centralized infrastructure. 177 5. GNUnet must inform the user which other participants have to be trusted when establishing private communications. 178 6. GNUnet must be open and permit new peers to join. 179 7. GNUnet must support a diverse range of applications and devices. 180 8. GNUnet must use compartmentalization to protect sensitive information. 181 9. The GNUnet architecture must be resource efficient. 182 10. GNUnet must provide incentives for peers to contribute more resources than they consume. 183 184 Architecture 185 ------------ 186 187 GNUnet consists of a set of services. 188 In order to realize a peer-to-peer network stack, a subset of GNUnet subsystems 189 emulate what can be found in the ISO/OSI layer of the Internet. 190 (TODO insert image here) 191 192 Peer Identities 193 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 194 195 In GNUnet, the identity of a host is its public key called **Peer Identity**. 196 For that reason, man-in-the-middle attacks will not break the authentication or 197 accounting goals. Essentially, for GNUnet, the IP of the host has 198 nothing to do with the identity of the host. As the public key is the 199 only thing that truly matters, faking an IP, a port or any other 200 property of the underlying transport protocol is irrelevant. In fact, 201 GNUnet peers can use multiple IPs (IPv4 and IPv6) on multiple ports — or 202 even not use the IP protocol at all (by running directly on layer 2). 203 204 Peer identities are used to identify peers in the network and are unique 205 for each peer. The identity for a peer is simply its public key, which 206 is generated along with a private key when the peer is started for the 207 first time. While the identity is binary data, it is often expressed as 208 an ASCII string. For example, the following is a peer identity as you 209 might see it in various places: 210 211 :: 212 213 UAT1S6PMPITLBKSJ2DGV341JI6KF7B66AC4JVCN9811NNEGQLUN0 214 215 You can find your peer identity by running ``gnunet-pils --once``. 216 217 Almost all peer-to-peer communications in GNUnet are between mutually 218 authenticated peers. 219 GNUnet uses a special type of message to communicate a binding between 220 public (ECC) keys to their current network address. These messages are 221 commonly called **HELLOs** or peer advertisements. They contain the public 222 key of the peer and its current network addresses for various transport 223 services. A transport service is a special kind of shared library that 224 provides (possibly unreliable, out-of-order) message delivery between 225 peers. For the UDP and TCP transport services, a network address is an 226 IP and a port. GNUnet can also use other transports (HTTP, HTTPS, WLAN, 227 etc.) which use various other forms of addresses. Note that any node can 228 have many different active transport services at the same time, and each 229 of these can have a different addresses. Binding messages expire after 230 at most a week (the timeout can be shorter if the user configures the 231 node appropriately). This expiration ensures that the network will 232 eventually get rid of outdated advertisements. 233 234 For more information, refer to the following paper: 235 236 Ronaldo A. Ferreira, Christian Grothoff, and Paul Ruth. A Transport 237 Layer Abstraction for Peer-to-Peer Networks Proceedings of the 3rd 238 International Symposium on Cluster Computing and the Grid (GRID 2003), 239 2003. (https://git.gnunet.org/bibliography.git/plain/docs/transport.pdf) 240 241 242 Security goals and threat model 243 ------------------------------- 244 245 GNUnet is designed as to subsist in the face of a strong adversaries (malicous, bad actors). 246 This includes, in decending strength, malicous 247 248 1. nation states, 249 2. network operators, 250 3. peer operators, 251 4. and GNUnet users. 252 253 External, network-level adversaries may attempt to identify GNUnet traffic 254 and throttle or otherwise impair its use. 255 To prevent easy identification, GNUnet communication is cryptographically and 256 steganographically obfuscated. 257 For example, GNUnet traffic can be made to look like QUIC or HTTP/3 traffic or 258 even look like random noise on the network. 259 Further, through the use of multiple communication protocols at the same time 260 (e.g. QUIC and Ad-hoc WiFi), loss of a single communication method does not cause complete communication breakdown. 261 Adversaries outside of GNUnet are not supposed 262 to know what kind of actions a peer is involved in. Only the specific 263 neighbor of a peer that is the corresponding sender or recipient of a 264 message may know its contents, and then application protocols may 265 place further restrictions on that knowledge. In order to ensure 266 confidentiality, GNUnet uses link encryption, that is each message 267 exchanged between two peers is encrypted using a pair of keys only known 268 to these two peers. Encrypting traffic like this makes any kind of 269 traffic analysis much harder. Naturally, for some applications, it may 270 still be desirable if even neighbors cannot determine the concrete 271 contents of a message. In GNUnet, this problem is addressed by the 272 specific application-level protocols. See for example the following 273 sections: `Anonymity`_, `How file-sharing achieves Anonymity`_, 274 and `Deniability`_. 275 276 GNUnet attemtps to satisfy the following security goals in the face of those adversaries: 277 278 1. Censorship resistance 279 2. Confidential communication 280 3. Anonymity (where possible) 281 282 283 From the lowest layer to the applications layer, the securty goals and associated subsystems are: 284 285 1. Base layer (Communicators/TRANSPORT): This layer optionally provides steganographic and ad-hoc security guarantees against external adversaries that largely depend on the communicator(s) used. For example, use of the HTTP3/QUIC communicator will use TLS and try to validate a certificate signed by the peer we want to connect to. Other communicators may not provide the same properties. 286 287 - QUIC Communicator: Appears to be a regular TLS connection (EdDSA/X25519). 288 - TCP/UDP Communicator: Uses Diffie-Hellman with Elligator (`LSD 0011 <https://lsd.gnunet.org/lsd0011/>`_) to look like random noise. 289 290 2. Peer connectivity and routing layer (CORE, R5N): This layer provides a secure channel between two (physically) connected peers. Peers are mutually authenticated and a secure cryptographic channel is established, but there is no particular trust required between the communication partners. It does not assume any security guarantees from the previous layer. It provides confidential communication in the face of an external adversary. The R5N uses this layer to establish an overlay network (DHT). 291 292 - CORE: DTLS-style KEMTLS called CAKE with EdDSA and X25519. Specification: `LSD 0012 <https://lsd.gnunet.org/lsd0012/>`_ 293 - R5N: EdDSA signatures for route recording: `LSD 0004 <https://lsd.gnunet.org/lsd0004/>`_ 294 295 3. Peer connectivity layer (CADET): This layer provides an end-to-end secure secure cryptographic channel between two peers. It is assumed that this channel is established between to peers that share a strong trust relationship. 296 297 - CADET: Axolotl 3DH with EdDSA Peer Identities to provide perfect forward secrecy, post-compromise security, secure out-of-order delivery and participant repudication (deniability). 298 299 4. Application layer: Each :ref:`subsystem <subsystems>` of GNUnet incorporates its own security mechanism taking the existing baseline of the GNUnet network as well as the adversary model into account. See the respective section in the User handbook. 300 301 - GNS: Resource records are signed using ECDSA or EdDSA (depending on the zone type) for data origin authentication and encrypted using AES-CTR (ECDSA zones) or XSalsa20-Poly1305 (EdDSA zones) to achieve data confidentiality against certain adversaries. Public keys are blinded to prevent censorship. Specification: `LSD 0001 <https://lsd.gnunet.org/lsd0001/>`_ (:rfc:`9498`) 302 303 304 Cryptography 305 ------------ 306 307 Cryptographic Inventory 308 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 309 310 GNUnet makes heavy use of standard, well-tested cryptographic primitives to 311 implement its protocols. The primary primtives are: 312 313 - Digital signatures: For Peer Identities and general (data origin) authentication. Scheme: EdDSA. 314 - Key exchange and KEMs: For handshakes. Schemes: X25519 (with Ed25519-to-Curve25519 transformations where necessary, such as CORE). 315 - Blindable signature keys: For the GNU Name System. Schemes: ECDSA and EdDSA. 316 - Blind signatures: For blind signing. Primarily used by GNU Taler. Scheme: RSA-FDH. 317 - Symmetric encryption: For secure communication. Schemes: XSalsa20-Poly1305, AES (to be phased out in favor of AEGIS where possible). 318 - Public-key encryption: To send encrypted messages. Schemes: HPKE (RFC 9180), only DHKEM(X25519, HKDF-SHA256), HKDF-SHA256, ChaCha20-Poly1305. 319 - Hash functions and KDF: GNUnet primarily uses SHA(-512) and HKDF. 320 321 Currently, no clear path to post-quantum primitives has been laid out. 322 This is mostly due to open research questions in the areas of key blinding and blind signatures. 323 324 Egos 325 ~~~~ 326 327 **Egos** are your “identities” in GNUnet. Any user can assume multiple 328 identities, for example to separate their activities online. Egos can 329 correspond to “pseudonyms” or “real-world identities”. Technically an 330 ego is first of all a key pair of a public- and private-key. 331 The current primary use for Egos are in the GNU Name System as zone keys. 332 333 Zones in the GNU Name System 334 """""""""""""""""""""""""""" 335 336 Egos are used as **GNS zones**. 337 338 GNS zones are similar to those of DNS zones, but instead of a hierarchy 339 of authorities to governing their use, GNS zones are controlled by a 340 private key. When you create a record in a DNS zone, that information is 341 stored in your nameserver. Anyone trying to resolve your domain then 342 gets pointed (hopefully) by the centralised authority to your 343 nameserver. Whereas GNS, being fully decentralized by design, stores 344 that information in DHT. The validity of the records is assured 345 cryptographically, by signing them with the private key of the 346 respective zone. 347 348 Anyone trying to resolve records in a zone of your domain can then 349 verify the signature of the records they get from the DHT and be assured 350 that they are indeed from the respective zone. To make this work, there 351 is a 1:1 correspondence between zones and their public-private key 352 pairs. So when we talk about the owner of a GNS zone, that’s really the 353 owner of the private key. And a user accessing a zone needs to somehow 354 specify the corresponding public key first. 355 356 For more information, refer to RFC 9498. 357 358 359 360 Anonymity 361 --------- 362 363 Providing anonymity for users is the central goal for the anonymous 364 file-sharing application. Many other design decisions follow in the 365 footsteps of this requirement. Anonymity is never absolute. While there 366 are various scientific metrics (Claudia Díaz, Stefaan Seys, Joris 367 Claessens, and Bart Preneel. Towards measuring anonymity. 2002. 368 (https://git.gnunet.org/bibliography.git/plain/docs/article-89.pdf)) 369 that can help quantify the level of anonymity that a given mechanism 370 provides, there is no such thing as “complete anonymity”. 371 372 GNUnet’s file-sharing implementation allows users to select for each 373 operation (publish, search, download) the desired level of anonymity. 374 The metric used is based on the amount of cover traffic needed to hide 375 the request. 376 377 While there is no clear way to relate the amount of available cover 378 traffic to traditional scientific metrics such as the anonymity set or 379 information leakage, it is probably the best metric available to a peer 380 with a purely local view of the world, in that it does not rely on 381 unreliable external information or a particular adversary model. 382 383 The default anonymity level is 1, which uses anonymous routing but 384 imposes no minimal requirements on cover traffic. It is possible to 385 forego anonymity when this is not required. The anonymity level of 0 386 allows GNUnet to use more efficient, non-anonymous routing. 387 388 How file-sharing achieves Anonymity 389 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 390 391 Contrary to other designs, we do not believe that users achieve strong 392 anonymity just because their requests are obfuscated by a couple of 393 indirections. This is not sufficient if the adversary uses traffic 394 analysis. The threat model used for anonymous file sharing in GNUnet 395 assumes that the adversary is quite powerful. In particular, we assume 396 that the adversary can see all the traffic on the Internet. And while we 397 assume that the adversary can not break our encryption, we assume that 398 the adversary has many participating nodes in the network and that it 399 can thus see many of the node-to-node interactions since it controls 400 some of the nodes. 401 402 The system tries to achieve anonymity based on the idea that users can 403 be anonymous if they can hide their actions in the traffic created by 404 other users. Hiding actions in the traffic of other users requires 405 participating in the traffic, bringing back the traditional technique of 406 using indirection and source rewriting. Source rewriting is required to 407 gain anonymity since otherwise an adversary could tell if a message 408 originated from a host by looking at the source address. If all packets 409 look like they originate from one node, the adversary can not tell which 410 ones originate from that node and which ones were routed. Note that in 411 this mindset, any node can decide to break the source-rewriting paradigm 412 without violating the protocol, as this only reduces the amount of 413 traffic that a node can hide its own traffic in. 414 415 If we want to hide our actions in the traffic of other nodes, we must 416 make our traffic indistinguishable from the traffic that we route for 417 others. As our queries must have us as the receiver of the reply 418 (otherwise they would be useless), we must put ourselves as the receiver 419 of replies that actually go to other hosts; in other words, we must 420 indirect replies. Unlike other systems, in anonymous file-sharing as 421 implemented on top of GNUnet we do not have to indirect the replies if 422 we don’t think we need more traffic to hide our own actions. 423 424 This increases the efficiency of the network as we can indirect less 425 under higher load. Refer to the following paper for more: Krista Bennett 426 and Christian Grothoff. GAP — practical anonymous networking. In 427 Proceedings of Designing Privacy Enhancing Technologies, 2003. 428 (https://git.gnunet.org/bibliography.git/plain/docs/aff.pdf) 429 430 How messaging provided Anonymity 431 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 432 433 While the file-sharing tries to achieve anonymity through hiding actions 434 in other traffic, the messaging service provides a weaker form of 435 protection against identification. 436 437 The messaging service allows the use of an anonymous ego for the signing 438 and verification process of messages instead of a unique ego. This 439 anonymous ego is a publicly known key pair which is shared between all 440 peers in GNUnet. 441 442 Using this ego only ensures that individual messages alone can’t 443 identify its sender inside of a messenger room. It should be clarified 444 that the route of the traffic for each message can still be tracked to 445 identify the senders peer inside of a messenger room if the threat agent 446 controls certain peers hosting the room. 447 448 Also opening a room in the messenger service will potentially match your 449 peer identity with the internal member identity from the messenger 450 service. So despite using the anonymous ego you can reveal your peer 451 identity. This means to decrease the chance of being identified, it is 452 recommended to enter rooms but you should not open them for others. 453 454 Deniability 455 ----------- 456 457 Even if the user that downloads data and the server that provides data 458 are anonymous, the intermediaries may still be targets. In particular, 459 if the intermediaries can find out which queries or which content they 460 are processing, a strong adversary could try to force them to censor 461 certain materials. 462 463 With the file-encoding used by GNUnet’s anonymous file-sharing, this 464 problem does not arise. The reason is that queries and replies are 465 transmitted in an encrypted format such that intermediaries cannot tell 466 what the query is for or what the content is about. Mind that this is 467 not the same encryption as the link-encryption between the nodes. GNUnet 468 has encryption on the network layer (link encryption, confidentiality, 469 authentication) and again on the application layer (provided by 470 gnunet-publish, gnunet-download, gnunet-search and gnunet-fs-gtk). 471 472 Refer to the following paper for more: Christian Grothoff, Krista 473 Grothoff, Tzvetan Horozov, and Jussi T. Lindgren. An Encoding for 474 Censorship-Resistant Sharing. 2009. 475 (https://git.gnunet.org/bibliography.git/plain/docs/ecrs.pdf) 476 477 Accounting to Encourage Resource Sharing 478 ---------------------------------------- 479 480 Most distributed P2P networks suffer from a lack of defenses or 481 precautions against attacks in the form of freeloading. While the 482 intentions of an attacker and a freeloader are different, their effect 483 on the network is the same; they both render it useless. Most simple 484 attacks on networks such as Gnutella involve flooding the network with 485 traffic, particularly with queries that are, in the worst case, 486 multiplied by the network. 487 488 In order to ensure that freeloaders or attackers have a minimal impact 489 on the network, GNUnet’s file-sharing implementation (FS) tries to 490 distinguish good (contributing) nodes from malicious (freeloading) 491 nodes. In GNUnet, every file-sharing node keeps track of the behavior of 492 every other node it has been in contact with. Many requests (depending 493 on the application) are transmitted with a priority (or importance) 494 level. That priority is used to establish how important the sender 495 believes this request is. If a peer responds to an important request, 496 the recipient will increase its trust in the responder: the responder 497 contributed resources. If a peer is too busy to answer all requests, it 498 needs to prioritize. For that, peers do not take the priorities of the 499 requests received at face value. First, they check how much they trust 500 the sender, and depending on that amount of trust they assign the 501 request a (possibly lower) effective priority. Then, they drop the 502 requests with the lowest effective priority to satisfy their resource 503 constraints. This way, GNUnet’s economic model ensures that nodes that 504 are not currently considered to have a surplus in contributions will not 505 be served if the network load is high. 506 507 For more information, refer to the following paper: Christian Grothoff. 508 An Excess-Based Economic Model for Resource Allocation in Peer-to-Peer 509 Networks. Wirtschaftsinformatik, June 2003. 510 (https://git.gnunet.org/bibliography.git/plain/docs/ebe.pdf) 511