**diff options**

-rw-r--r-- | doc/paper/taler.tex | 17 |

1 files changed, 10 insertions, 7 deletions

diff --git a/doc/paper/taler.tex b/doc/paper/taler.tex index 0bc678f1..fd7a74ed 100644 --- a/doc/paper/taler.tex +++ b/doc/paper/taler.tex @@ -70,6 +70,9 @@ %\setcopyright{cagovmixed} +\newcommand\inecc{\in \mathbb{Z}_{|\mathbb{E}|}} +\newcommand\inept{\in {\mathbb{E}}} +\newcommand\inrsa{\in \mathbb{Z}_{|\mathrm{dom}(\FDH_K)|}} % DOI \acmDOI{10.475/123_4} @@ -813,8 +816,8 @@ exchange and one of its public denomination public keys $K_p$ whose value $K_v$ corresponds to an amount the customer wishes to withdraw. We let $K_s$ denote the exchange's private key corresponding to $K_p$. We use $\FDH_K$ to denote a full-domain hash where the domain is the -public key $K_p$. Now the customer carries out the following -interaction with the exchange: +modulos of the public key $K_p$. Now the customer carries out the +following interaction with the exchange: % FIXME: These steps occur at very different points in time, so probably % they should be restructured into more of a protocol description. @@ -824,9 +827,9 @@ interaction with the exchange: \begin{enumerate} \item The customer randomly generates: \begin{itemize} - \item reserve key $W := (w_s,W_p)$ with private key $w_s$ and public key $W_p := w_sG$, - \item coin key $C := (c_s,C_p)$ with private key $c_s$ and public key $C_p := c_s G$, - \item blinding factor $b$ + \item reserve key $W := (w_s,W_p)$ with private key $w_s \inecc$ and public key $W_p := w_sG \inept$, + \item coin key $C := (c_s,C_p)$ with private key $c_s$ and public key $C_p := c_s G \inept$, + \item RSA blinding factor $b \inrsa$. \end{itemize} The customer first persists\footnote{When we say ``persist'', we mean that the value is stored in such a way that it can be recovered after a system crash, and @@ -1008,9 +1011,9 @@ comparable proposed uses of zero-knowledge proof in BOLT~\cite{BOLT}. \begin{enumerate} \item %[POST {\tt /refresh/melt}] For each $i = 1,\ldots,\kappa$, the customer randomly generates - a transfer private key $t^{(i)}_s$ and computes + a transfer private key $t^{(i)}_s \inecc$ and computes \begin{enumerate} - \item the transfer public key $T^{(i)}_p := t^{(i)}_s G$ and + \item the transfer public key $T^{(i)}_p := t^{(i)}_s G \inept$ and \item the new coin secret seed $L^{(i)} := H(c'_s T_p^{(i)})$. \end{enumerate} We have computed $L^{(i)}$ as a Diffie-Hellman shared secret between |