diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'man/taler-exchange-offline.1')
| -rw-r--r-- | man/taler-exchange-offline.1 | 56 |
1 files changed, 28 insertions, 28 deletions
diff --git a/man/taler-exchange-offline.1 b/man/taler-exchange-offline.1 index 656ce1d6..d38871b5 100644 --- a/man/taler-exchange-offline.1 +++ b/man/taler-exchange-offline.1 @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ .\" Man page generated from reStructuredText. . -.TH "TALER-EXCHANGE-OFFLINE" "1" "Jan 27, 2021" "0.8pre0" "GNU Taler" +.TH "TALER-EXCHANGE-OFFLINE" "1" "Apr 26, 2021" "0.8" "GNU Taler" .SH NAME taler-exchange-offline \- operations using the offline key of a Taler exchange . @@ -38,24 +38,24 @@ level margin: \\n[rst2man-indent\\n[rst2man-indent-level]] [\fB\-L\fP\ \fILOGLEVEL\fP\ |\ \fB––loglevel=\fP\fILOGLEVEL\fP] [\fB\-l\fP\ \fIFILENAME\fP\ |\ \fB––logfile=\fP\fIFILENAME\fP] [\fB\-v\fP\ |\ \fB––version\fP] -[subcommand …] +[subcommand ...] .SH DESCRIPTION .sp \fBtaler\-exchange\-offline\fP is a command\-line tool to interact with the Taler -exchange’s master private key. Most operations of this tool require access to +exchange\(aqs master private key. Most operations of this tool require access to the exchange’s long\-term offline signing key and should be run in a secure (offline) environment under strict controls. The tool takes a list of subcommands as arguments which are then processed sequentially. .sp -The tool includes two subcommands to interact \fIonline\fP with the exchange’s +The tool includes two subcommands to interact \fIonline\fP with the exchange\(aqs REST APIs. The \fBdownload\fP subcommand downloads the future public keys from the running exchange. The resulting data serves as input to the \fBsign\fP and \fBshow\fP subcommands. The \fBupload\fP subcommand uploads the signatures created with the private master key to the exchange. It handles the output of all subcommands (except \fBdownload\fP). The \fBdownload\fP and \fBupload\fP subcommands must naturally be -run “online” and do not require access to the offline key. +run "online" and do not require access to the offline key. .sp -All other subcommands are intended to be run “offline”. However, especially +All other subcommands are intended to be run "offline". However, especially when testing, it is of course possible to run the subcommands online as well. Generally, subcommands read inputs (beyond command\-line arguments) from \fBstdin\fP\&. However, they may also consume outputs of previous @@ -99,17 +99,17 @@ $ taler\-exchange\-offline setup .UNINDENT .sp Note that if the private key file already exists, the above will simply output -the existing key. Passing additional arguments after setup (including “\-“) +the existing key. Passing additional arguments after setup (including "\-") will cause the output to be encapsulated in JSON. .sp Relevant configuration options for \fBtaler\-exchange\-offline\fP are: .INDENT 0.0 .IP \(bu 2 -\fB[exchange/BASE_URL]\fP — how to reach the exchange (for download/upload) +\fB[exchange/BASE_URL]\fP \-\-\- how to reach the exchange (for download/upload) .IP \(bu 2 -\fB[exchange\-offline/MASTER_PRIV_FILE]\fP — where to store the private keys +\fB[exchange\-offline/MASTER_PRIV_FILE]\fP \-\-\- where to store the private keys .IP \(bu 2 -\fB[exchange\-offline/SECM_TOFU_FILE]\fP — where to store TOFU data +\fB[exchange\-offline/SECM_TOFU_FILE]\fP \-\-\- where to store TOFU data .UNINDENT .SH SUBCOMMANDS .SS setup @@ -169,23 +169,23 @@ in a format suitable for the \fBupload\fP subcommand. .sp This subcommand informs an exchange that an auditor is to be activated. Afterwards, the -exchange will accept inputs from that auditor’s \fBtaler\-auditor\-offline\fP +exchange will accept inputs from that auditor\(aqs \fBtaler\-auditor\-offline\fP tool. Note that the auditor also must add the exchange to the list of exchanges that it audits via \fBtaler\-auditor\-exchange\fP\&. Furthermore, the -exchange’s database will need to be provided to the auditor. This subcommand +exchange\(aqs database will need to be provided to the auditor. This subcommand only informs the exchange about the auditor, but does not perform those additional mandatory steps for a working auditor. .sp -The auditor’s public key must be given in the usual base32\-encoding as the +The auditor\(aqs public key must be given in the usual base32\-encoding as the first argument. .sp -The auditor’s REST API base URL must be given as the second argument. The tool -performs a minimal sanity check, namely that the URL begins with “http” -(this also allows “https”), but as it runs offline does not perform any further +The auditor\(aqs REST API base URL must be given as the second argument. The tool +performs a minimal sanity check, namely that the URL begins with "http" +(this also allows "https"), but as it runs offline does not perform any further validation! .sp The third argument must be a human\-readable name for the auditor. This may -be shown to users and should identify the auditor’s business entity. If +be shown to users and should identify the auditor\(aqs business entity. If the name includes spaces, the argument should be quoted. .sp The subcommand takes no inputs from \fBstdin\fP or other subcommands. @@ -196,10 +196,10 @@ in a format suitable for the \fBupload\fP subcommand. .sp This subcommand informs an exchange that an auditor is to be deactivated. Afterwards, the -exchange will refuse inputs from that auditor’s \fBtaler\-auditor\-offline\fP +exchange will refuse inputs from that auditor\(aqs \fBtaler\-auditor\-offline\fP tool. .sp -The auditor’s public key must be given in the usual base32\-encoding as the +The auditor\(aqs public key must be given in the usual base32\-encoding as the first argument. .sp The subcommand takes no inputs from \fBstdin\fP or other subcommands. @@ -216,9 +216,9 @@ transfers! For this, the \fBtaler\-exchange\-transfer\fP and \fBtaler\-exchange\-wirewatch\fP tools must be configured. Furthermore, the bank account information advertised could theoretically differ from that which these tool actually use, for example if the public bank account is only a -front for the actual internal business acounts. +front for the actual internal business accounts. .sp -The \fBpayto://\fP URI (RFC 8905) of the exchange’s bank account must be given +The \fBpayto://\fP URI (RFC 8905) of the exchange\(aqs bank account must be given as the first argument to the subcommand. .sp The subcommand takes no inputs from \fBstdin\fP or other subcommands. @@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ This subcommand informs an exchange that it should stop advertising a bank account as belonging to the exchange on its \fB/wire\fP endpoint. .sp -The \fBpayto://\fP URI (RFC 8905) of the exchange’s (former) bank account must be +The \fBpayto://\fP URI (RFC 8905) of the exchange\(aqs (former) bank account must be given as the first argument to the subcommand. .sp The subcommand takes no inputs from \fBstdin\fP or other subcommands. @@ -396,7 +396,7 @@ $ taler\-exchange\-offline revoke\-signkey $SK revoke\-denomkey $DKH > mix.json .UNINDENT .UNINDENT .sp -The outputs (“revoke.json”, “mix.json”) must be uploaded using the \fBupload\fP +The outputs ("revoke.json", "mix.json") must be uploaded using the \fBupload\fP subcommand to the exchange to actually revoke the keys. .SH SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS .sp @@ -405,18 +405,18 @@ system with \fImonotonic time\fP\&. The time does not have to precisely match th of the exchange, but it must be monotonic across tool invocations. The clock of the offline system is used in the enable/disable signatures to communicate an order of the events to the exchange. This prevents someone from replaying -an older “enable” (or “disable”) message after a more recent “disable” (or -“enable”) message has been provided to the exchange. Thus, there is no need +an older "enable" (or "disable") message after a more recent "disable" (or +"enable") message has been provided to the exchange. Thus, there is no need to keep the actual files exchanged with the offline tool secret. .sp The \fBtaler\-exchange\-offline\fP tool tries to make sure that the online signing -keys of the the exchange are always created by the same two security modules. +keys of the exchange are always created by the same two security modules. The goal here is to prevent an attacker who compromised \fBtaler\-exchange\-httpd\fP but \fInot\fP the security modules from providing attacker\-controlled keys to the offline signing process. .sp For this, the \fBtaler\-exchange\-offline\fP signing subcommand always -automatically learns the security module’s public signing key and \fItrusts it +automatically learns the security module\(aqs public signing key and \fItrusts it on first use\fP (TOFU), but stores it to disk (see the \fBSECM_TOFU_FILE\fP option in the \fB[exchange\-offline]\fP section of the configuration). If the keys change subsequently, the tool will refuse to sign. @@ -430,6 +430,6 @@ mail to <\fI\%taler@gnu.org\fP>. .SH AUTHOR GNU Taler contributors .SH COPYRIGHT -2014-2020 Taler Systems SA (GPLv3+ or GFDL 1.3+) +2014-2021 Taler Systems SA (GPLv3+ or GFDL 1.3+) .\" Generated by docutils manpage writer. . |