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+Supporting DDoS blockers with Taler
+ In many IP reputation systems, CAPTCHAS are used to separate humans from
+ bots, allowing humans to access resources while blocking automated
+ attackers. However, especially complex modern Web sites require many
+ resources and thus can triger a large number of CAPTCHAS, limiting
+ usability. The problem is compounded if users access the Web via
+ Tor or VPNs, as this means mechanisms to track users cannot be used to
+ reduce the number of CAPTCHAS.
+ We propose an alternative where we use Taler-style micropayments to
+ automatically pay for access to resources. The micropayments would
+ be done in a provider-specific currency, effectively turning Taler
+ payments into anonymous credentials or tokens. Tokens would be
+ provided by the provider in exchange for the user solving CAPTCHAS,
+ but instead of solving one CAPTCHA per request a user may be issued
+ thousands of tokens for one CAPTCHA, which could then be used across
+ multiple websites without creating anonymity/linkability issues.
+ Reducing the use of CAPTCHA's improves usability for everybody, and
+ by (re)using Taler we limit the need for security audits for custom
+ solutions. Furthermore, it also becomes conceivable to move from
+ CAPTCHAS to actual payments or other mechanisms to hand out tokens
+ (i.e. researchers that legitimately need to perform automated
+ requests may apply for a token grant).
+ To make this work, we need to address three issues:
+ 1) Taler needs to add support for an 'auto-pay' flag that would be
+ associated with a currency. If the flag is present, the wallet
+ would not interactively ask the user to confirm the payment, but
+ just automatically pay (if funds are available; otherwise it
+ should redirect to the provider's "bank" where the user would
+ solve a CAPTCHA to obtain tokens). This is relatively trivial
+ and necessary for usability.
+ 2) Right now, the Wallet-Web site interaction uses JavaScript. This
+ is not acceptable for some of the CAPTCHA-use case domains, as
+ Tor users may disable JavaScript and injecting Taler-specific
+ JavaScript into generic Web sites is messy.
+ 3) The solution needs to work with embedded resources and POST requests,
+ where running a JavaScript interaction for each resource is both
+ too expensive and rather complicated. Instead, a page should indicate
+ that all resources associated with a DOM require payment, and then
+ payment should automatically and efficiently be provided with each
+ request.
+Required changes to Taler:
+ We mainly need to make three changes:
+ 1) Support for auto-pay (rather trivial), by tagging currencies, and
+ by redirecting to a "bank" page to withdraw tokens if funds are
+ insufficient.
+ 2) In the 'withdraw' protocol, the bank should be able to specify the
+ payment system provider and tell the wallet to skip the interactive
+ selection/confirmation dialog (as there is only one provider and
+ thus no choice to be made). This change is also rather trivial.
+ 3) Change Wallet to check for HTTP headers requesting payment for the
+ DOM, and then inject an HTTP header in all subsequent requests generated
+ by that page with the payment (i.e. signing the request's URI with
+ the coin/token). This change is non-trivial, and may require
+ browser-specific solutions.
+Technical differences to captcha-plugin-draft.txt:
+ * both solutions use RSA blind signatures for privacy, my reading
+ of the draft is that 256-bits are proposed, while Taler leaves
+ the bit length variable (to the payment service provider).
+ * Taler uses Ed25519 for "tokens", while the draft proposes
+ random nonces as tokens. Taler can thus spend tokens using
+ EdDSA signatures, while the draft uses encryption (of the
+ nonce/Token) with the server's key and a keyed HMAC. I do not
+ attribute either design a significant performance advantage,
+ except with Taler the server could skip checking either signature
+ (to shard load if stressed), while the draft requires server-side
+ decryption to obtain the nonce.
+ Taler's use of an EdDSA signature is also more flexibile for other
+ applications, but in this particular context there is no
+ significant difference to the keyed HMAC with encrypted nonce.
+ * Instead of using the draft's scheme for withdrawing coins by
+ a magic HTML form attribute, Taler's bank API would be used,
+ where the bank (in this case the CAPTCHA-DDoS-protection provider)
+ signals to the wallet that a withdraw operation is being authorized
+ using a JavaScript signal. This is significantly more efficient,
+ as registering a signal handler is O(1) per page, while parsing
+ all DOMs to find a magic HTML form attribute is O(n) (where n is
+ the size of the DOM).
+ Given that DDoS-protection has weaker requirements, it would be
+ trivial to use regional double-spending detection instead of global
+ double-spending detection. Also, a custom exchange could use
+ probabilistic data structures to improve efficiency.
+ Alternatively, multiple currencies could be used; for this, the
+ HTTP header requiring auto-pay should simply specifiy the desired
+ currency, enabling further sharding of the load.
+Benefits of integrated solution with Taler:
+ * significant re-use of expertise, code, auditing effort and
+ protocol design
+ * provider-independent free software solution
+ * possibility to trivially "upgrade" to payment or data grants
+ * solution that is not Tor-specific, plugin should work for
+ various browsers
+ * 1 bit information leakage (is plugin present), instead of 2 bits
+ (if there are two separate plugins)
+ * Tor wants to solve CAPTCHA problem, Tor wants to support
+ anonymous payments. This could solve both with 98%
+ shared code.