taler-android

Android apps for GNU Taler (wallet, PoS, cashier)
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unreachable-host-leaves-blank-retrying-purchase.md (8093B)


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      5   GNU Taler is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the
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     16 
     17 # A prompt the app cannot prepare shows an empty screen and retries for ever
     18 
     19 Found by random exploration (seeds 31 and 33, from the hostile-URI corpus) and
     20 reproduced deliberately.
     21 
     22 **Severity: moderate.** The original trigger was a URI the wallet cannot reach
     23 — a stale QR code, a typo, a developer pointing the wallet at `127.0.0.1` —
     24 and what the user gets is a screen with nothing on it and a transaction that
     25 never stops trying. Fault injection then showed the same empty screen for
     26 eleven unrelated failures of the exchange, including ones that look like an
     27 attack, and that it does not recover when the failure goes away.
     28 
     29 ## What happens
     30 
     31 Sharing `taler+http://pay/127.0.0.1:8080/instances/sim/AAAA…/` into the wallet:
     32 
     33 * the purchase screen opens with **no content at all** — the only labels are
     34   "Purchase", "Go back" and the developer-mode log button;
     35 * the request is refused by the platform, 32 times in the first ten seconds:
     36 
     37   ```
     38   D taler-wallet: java.net.UnknownServiceException: CLEARTEXT communication to
     39   127.0.0.1 not permitted by network security policy
     40   ```
     41 
     42 * wallet-core records it as a retried operation and keeps going — the retry
     43   counter was still climbing (7 → 8 → …) a minute later, and in the
     44   exploration runs it reached 12.
     45 
     46 `[::1]` behaves identically. The refusal is permanent: the app's
     47 `res/xml/network_security_config.xml` permits cleartext for the name
     48 `localhost` only, so no number of retries will ever make `127.0.0.1` or `::1`
     49 work.
     50 
     51 ## Reproduce by hand
     52 
     53 1. Install a debug build and enable **Developer mode** (needed for
     54    `taler+http://`; an `https://` URI to an unreachable host shows the same
     55    empty screen without it).
     56 2. Run `adb logcat | grep -E "CLEARTEXT|taler-wallet"`.
     57 3. Share the URI into the wallet:
     58 
     59    ```bash
     60    adb shell am start -a android.intent.action.SEND -t text/plain \
     61      -n net.taler.wallet.fdroid.debug/net.taler.wallet.main.MainActivity \
     62      --es android.intent.extra.TEXT \
     63      'taler+http://pay/127.0.0.1:8080/instances/sim/AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA/'
     64    ```
     65 
     66 4. The wallet opens an empty "Purchase" screen. The log fills with cleartext
     67    refusals, and they keep coming.
     68 
     69 Expected: the screen says what went wrong, and a refusal the platform will
     70 never allow is not retried.
     71 
     72 ## Reproduce with the simulator
     73 
     74 ```bash
     75 ssh root@tripwire.taler.net
     76 cd /opt/taler-sim/driver
     77 python3 ../findings/repro_unreachable_host_zombie_purchase.py
     78 ```
     79 
     80 ## The empty prompt is not specific to this cause
     81 
     82 Fault injection showed the same screen for every way of spoiling the
     83 exchange's replies. With `taler-twister` in front of the exchange, a
     84 withdrawal whose preparation fails renders as
     85 
     86 ```
     87 ['Go back', 'Withdraw UNKNOWN', 'Internal event log']
     88 ```
     89 
     90 — no amount, no error, and "UNKNOWN" where the currency belongs. That held for
     91 a truncated response, HTTP 500, 404, 403 and 502, a wrong content type, and
     92 for structural damage (a deleted `denoms`, a deleted signature, a flipped
     93 master public key, a rewritten version or currency).
     94 
     95 In that run the wallet was in fact refusing for a different reason —
     96 `WALLET_EXCHANGE_BASE_URL_MISMATCH` (7030), logged six times — which makes the
     97 point more sharply: the wallet detected a problem and told the user nothing.
     98 A prompt with no error state looks the same whatever went wrong.
     99 
    100 A later fault-injection run put a number on "whatever went wrong". With
    101 `taler-twister` between the wallet and the exchange, kept armed for the whole
    102 withdrawal, **eleven different faults all produced the same screen**:
    103 
    104 ```
    105 ['Go back', 'Withdraw UNKNOWN', 'Internal event log']
    106 ```
    107 
    108 a truncated response, HTTP 500, 404, 403 and 502, a response with the wrong
    109 content type, a `/keys` with its denomination list deleted, with a flipped
    110 master public key, with a forged denomination signature, with no wire fees, and
    111 with an impossible protocol version. The withdrawal prompt is empty in all
    112 eleven cases, and the title reads "Withdraw UNKNOWN" — the placeholder
    113 currency, because the wallet has no exchange configuration to take a currency
    114 from.
    115 
    116 Two things make this worse than the original observation:
    117 
    118 * **It does not recover.** The run disarmed each fault and waited; the screen
    119   was still `['Go back', 'Withdraw UNKNOWN', 'Internal event log']` afterwards
    120   for every fault that damaged `/keys`. There is nothing on the screen to
    121   retry with, so a withdrawal interrupted by a bad reply is lost even once the
    122   exchange is healthy again.
    123 * **The same screen means "your exchange is lying to you".** A forged
    124   denomination signature and a flipped master public key are what an attack
    125   looks like, and the wallet shows the same blank page it shows for a
    126   typo.
    127 
    128 ## Why
    129 
    130 Two separate things meet here.
    131 
    132 * **The screen renders nothing while it has nothing.** `PromptPayment` is
    133   waiting for contract terms that will never arrive, and there is no state for
    134   "still fetching" or "could not fetch" — so the user is left looking at an
    135   empty page rather than a spinner or an error.
    136 * **A policy refusal looks like a network blip.** `UnknownServiceException`
    137   reaches wallet-core as a generic HTTP failure (code 7003), which is retried
    138   with backoff like any transient error. It is not transient: the cleartext
    139   policy is fixed at build time.
    140 
    141 ## The cheapest reproduction of the empty prompt
    142 
    143 No proxy needed at all: one injected error does it. With developer mode on,
    144 
    145 ```bash
    146 adb shell am start -a android.intent.action.VIEW -d \
    147   'taler+http://dev-experiment/api-error?operation=getWithdrawalDetailsForAmount&detail=eyJjb2RlIjogNzAwMSwgImhpbnQiOiAiaW5qZWN0ZWQifQ&count=4'
    148 ```
    149 
    150 then tapping **Withdraw** gives
    151 `['Go back', 'Withdraw from bank', 'Internal event log']` — the same empty
    152 screen, from a single failed call. This is one of the screens
    153 [`a-failed-query-is-shown-as-an-empty-wallet.md`](a-failed-query-is-shown-as-an-empty-wallet.md)
    154 sweeps.
    155 
    156 ## Reproduce with fault injection
    157 
    158 No manual reproduction for this half: it needs a proxy between the wallet and
    159 the exchange.
    160 
    161 ```bash
    162 ssh root@tripwire.taler.net
    163 cd /opt/taler-sim/driver
    164 ./phase.sh sim-twister.conf twister_withdraw_faults twister_field_faults
    165 ```
    166 
    167 The phase swaps in `backend/sim-twister.conf` (the exchange behind
    168 `taler-twister` on port 8088), runs the scenarios and restores the ordinary
    169 stack. Each scenario's notes list what every fault produced, and how many
    170 times the fault was re-armed — a fault is one-shot, so it has to be re-armed
    171 continuously or it lands on an unrelated poll instead of on the request under
    172 test.
    173 
    174 ## Suggested fix
    175 
    176 Give the payment and withdrawal prompts something to show while they are
    177 loading, and an error state when the load fails — the error sheet used
    178 elsewhere would do. The withdrawal prompt additionally needs a title that does
    179 not say "UNKNOWN" when it has no currency yet, and a way to try again.
    180 
    181 For the retries, treat `UnknownServiceException` (and the cleartext refusal in
    182 particular) as permanent in `NetworkInterface`, so the transaction fails with
    183 an explanation instead of looping. A user-visible "this address cannot be
    184 reached over plain HTTP" is far more useful than silence.
    185 
    186 Worth considering separately: `network_security_config.xml` permits cleartext
    187 for the name `localhost` but not for `127.0.0.1` or `::1`, which are the same
    188 machine. Adding both would save developers this exact confusion.