analysis.rs (1740B)
1 /* 2 This file is part of TALER 3 Copyright (C) 2022-2025 Taler Systems SA 4 5 TALER is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the 6 terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by the Free Software 7 Foundation; either version 3, or (at your option) any later version. 8 9 TALER is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY 10 WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR 11 A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU Affero General Public License for more details. 12 13 You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License along with 14 TALER; see the file COPYING. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/> 15 */ 16 17 use tracing::warn; 18 19 use super::LoopResult; 20 use crate::rpc::{ChainTipsStatus, Rpc}; 21 22 /// Analyse blockchain behavior and return the new confirmation delay 23 pub async fn analysis(rpc: &mut Rpc, current: u32, max: u32) -> LoopResult<u32> { 24 // Get biggest known valid fork 25 let fork = rpc 26 .get_chain_tips() 27 .await? 28 .into_iter() 29 .filter_map(|t| (t.status == ChainTipsStatus::ValidFork).then_some(t.length)) 30 .max() 31 .unwrap_or(0) as u32; 32 // If new fork is bigger than what current confirmation delay protect against 33 if fork >= current { 34 // Limit confirmation growth 35 let new_conf = fork.saturating_add(1).min(max); 36 warn!( 37 target: "analysis", 38 "found dangerous fork of {fork} blocks, adapt confirmation to {new_conf} blocks capped at {max}, you should update taler.conf" 39 ); 40 return Ok(new_conf); 41 } 42 43 // TODO smarter analysis: suspicious transaction value, limit wire bitcoin throughput 44 Ok(current) 45 }