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+<!-- This is the second edition of Free Software, Free Society: Selected Essays of Richard M. Stallman.
+
+Free Software Foundation
+
+51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor
+
+Boston, MA 02110-1335
+Copyright C 2002, 2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+Verbatim copying and distribution of this entire book are permitted
+worldwide, without royalty, in any medium, provided this notice is
+preserved. Permission is granted to copy and distribute translations
+of this book from the original English into another language provided
+the translation has been approved by the Free Software Foundation and
+the copyright notice and this permission notice are preserved on all
+copies.
+
+ISBN 978-0-9831592-0-9
+Cover design by Rob Myers.
+
+Cover photograph by Peter Hinely.
+ -->
+
+
+ <a name="Can-You-Trust-Your-Computer_003f">
+ </a>
+ <h1 class="chapter">
+ 32. Can You Trust Your Computer?
+ </h1>
+ <a name="index-proprietary-software-_0028see-also-software_0029-1">
+ </a>
+ <a name="index-Microsoft_002c-Palladium-_0028see-also-both-Palladium-and-_0060_0060trusted-computing_0027_0027_0029">
+ </a>
+ <a name="index-Intel-_0028see-also-_0060_0060trusted-computing_0027_0027_0029-1">
+ </a>
+ <a name="index-_0060_0060trusted-computing_002c_0027_0027-avoid-use-of-term-_0028see-also-treacherous-computing_0029-2">
+ </a>
+ <a name="index-treacherous-computing-2">
+ </a>
+ <a name="index-traps_002c-treacherous-computing-_0028see-also-treacherous-computing_0029">
+ </a>
+ <a name="index-Palladium-1">
+ </a>
+ <p>
+ Who should your computer take its orders from? Most people think
+their computers should obey them, not obey someone else. With a plan
+they call “trusted computing,” large media corporations
+(including the movie companies and record companies), together with
+computer companies such as Microsoft and Intel, are planning to make
+your computer obey them instead of you. (Microsoft’s version of this
+scheme is called Palladium.) Proprietary programs have
+included malicious features before, but this plan would make it
+universal.
+ </p>
+ <p>
+ Proprietary software means, fundamentally, that you don’t control what
+it does; you can’t study the source code, or change it. It’s not
+surprising that clever businessmen find ways to use their control to
+put you at a disadvantage. Microsoft has done this several times: one
+version of Windows was designed to report to Microsoft all the
+software on your hard disk; a recent “security” upgrade in
+ <a name="index-Windows-Media-Player-_0028see-also-both-DRM-and-treacherous-computing_0029">
+ </a>
+ Windows Media Player required users to agree to new restrictions. But
+Microsoft is not alone: the
+ <a name="index-KaZaA-_0028see-also-both-DRM-and-treacherous-computing_0029">
+ </a>
+ KaZaA music-sharing software is designed
+so that KaZaA’s business partner can rent out the use of your computer
+to its clients. These malicious features are often secret, but even
+once you know about them it is hard to remove them, since you don’t
+have the source code.
+ </p>
+ <p>
+ In the past, these were isolated incidents. “Trusted
+computing” would make the practice pervasive. “Treacherous
+computing” is a more appropriate name, because the plan is
+designed to make sure your computer will systematically disobey you.
+In fact, it is designed to stop your computer from functioning as a
+general-purpose computer. Every operation may require explicit
+permission.
+ </p>
+ <p>
+ The technical idea underlying treacherous computing is that the
+computer includes a digital encryption and signature device, and the
+keys are kept secret from you. Proprietary programs will use this
+device to control which other programs you can run, which documents or
+data you can access, and what programs you can pass them to. These
+programs will continually download new authorization rules through the
+Internet, and impose those rules automatically on your work. If you
+don’t allow your computer to obtain the new rules periodically from
+the Internet, some capabilities will automatically cease to function.
+ </p>
+ <a name="index-DRM_002c-treacherous-computing-and">
+ </a>
+ <a name="index-Hollywood-1">
+ </a>
+ <p>
+ Of course, Hollywood and the record companies plan to use treacherous
+computing for Digital Restrictions Management (DRM), so
+that downloaded videos and music can be played only on one specified
+computer. Sharing will be entirely impossible, at least using the
+authorized files that you would get from those companies. You, the
+public, ought to have both the freedom and the ability to share these
+things. (I expect that someone will find a way to produce unencrypted
+versions, and to upload and share them, so DRM will not entirely
+succeed, but that is no excuse for the system.)
+ </p>
+ <p>
+ Making sharing impossible is bad enough, but it gets worse. There are
+plans to use the same facility for email and documents—resulting
+in email that disappears in two weeks, or documents that can only be
+read on the computers in one company.
+ </p>
+ <p>
+ Imagine if you get an email from your boss telling you to do something
+that you think is risky; a month later, when it backfires, you can’t
+use the email to show that the decision was not yours. “Getting
+it in writing” doesn’t protect you when the order is written in
+disappearing ink.
+ </p>
+ <p>
+ Imagine if you get an email from your boss stating a policy that is
+illegal or morally outrageous, such as to shred your company’s audit
+documents, or to allow a dangerous threat to your country to move
+forward unchecked. Today you can send this to a reporter and expose
+the activity. With treacherous computing, the reporter won’t be able
+to read the document; her computer will refuse to obey her.
+Treacherous computing becomes a paradise for corruption.
+ </p>
+ <p>
+ Word processors such as
+ <a name="index-Word_002c-and-treacherous-computing-_0028see-also-treacherous-computing_0029-2">
+ </a>
+ Microsoft Word could use treacherous computing
+when they save your documents, to make sure no competing word
+processors can read them. Today we must figure out the secrets of
+Word format by laborious experiments in order to make free word
+processors read Word documents. If Word encrypts documents using
+treacherous computing when saving them, the free software community
+won’t have a chance of developing software to read them—and if
+we could, such programs might even be forbidden by the
+ <a name="index-DMCA-_0028see-also-_0060_0060Right-to-Read_002c_0027_0027-fair-use_002c-DRM_002c-and-libraries_0029-3">
+ </a>
+ Digital
+Millennium Copyright Act.
+ </p>
+ <p>
+ Programs that use treacherous computing will continually download new
+authorization rules through the Internet, and impose those rules
+automatically on your work. If Microsoft, or the US government, does
+not like what you said in a document you wrote, they could post new
+instructions telling all computers to refuse to let anyone read that
+document. Each computer would obey when it downloads the new
+instructions. Your writing would be subject to 1984-style retroactive
+erasure. You might be unable to read it yourself.
+ </p>
+ <p>
+ You might think you can find out what nasty things a treacherous-computing
+application does, study how painful they are, and decide
+whether to accept them. Even if you can find this out, it would
+be foolish to accept the deal, but you can’t even expect the deal
+to stand still. Once you come to depend on using the program, you are
+hooked and they know it; then they can change the deal. Some
+applications will automatically download upgrades that will do
+something different—and they won’t give you a choice about
+whether to upgrade.
+ </p>
+ <p>
+ Today you can avoid being restricted by proprietary software by not
+using it. If you run GNU/Linux or another free operating system, and
+if you avoid installing proprietary applications on it, then you are
+in charge of what your computer does. If a free program has a
+malicious feature, other developers in the community will take it out,
+and you can use the corrected version. You can also run free
+application programs and tools on nonfree operating systems; this
+falls short of fully giving you freedom, but many users do it.
+ </p>
+ <p>
+ Treacherous computing puts the existence of free operating systems and
+free applications at risk, because you may not be able to run them at
+all. Some versions of treacherous computing would require the
+operating system to be specifically authorized by a particular
+company. Free operating systems could not be installed. Some
+versions of treacherous computing would require every program to be
+specifically authorized by the operating system developer. You could
+not run free applications on such a system. If you did figure out
+how, and told someone, that could be a crime.
+ </p>
+ <p>
+ There are proposals already for US laws that would require all computers to
+support treacherous computing, and to prohibit connecting old computers to
+the Internet. The
+ <a name="index-Consumer-Broadband-and-Digital-Television-Promotion-Act-_0028CBDTPA_0029-3">
+ </a>
+ CBDTPA (we call it the Consume But Don’t Try Programming
+Act) is one of them. But even if they don’t legally force you to switch to
+treacherous computing, the pressure to accept it may be enormous. Today
+people often use
+ <a name="index-Word_002c-and-treacherous-computing-_0028see-also-treacherous-computing_0029-3">
+ </a>
+ Word format for communication, although this causes
+several sorts of problems (see “We Can Put an End to Word
+Attachments,” on p. @refx{No Word Attachments-pg}{). If only a treacherous-computing machine can read the
+latest Word documents, many people will switch to it, if they view the
+situation only in terms of individual action (take it or leave it). To
+oppose treacherous computing, we must join together and confront the
+situation as a collective choice.
+ </p>
+ <p>
+ For further information about treacherous computing, see
+ <a href="http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/rja14/tcpa-faq.html">
+ http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/rja14/tcpa-faq.html
+ </a>
+ .
+ </p>
+ <a name="index-call-to-action_002c-block-treacherous-computing">
+ </a>
+ <p>
+ To block treacherous computing will require large numbers of citizens
+to organize. We need your help! Please support
+ <a name="index-Defective-by-Design-_0028see-also-DRM_0029-3">
+ </a>
+ Defective by Design, the
+FSF’s campaign against Digital Restrictions Management.
+ </p>
+ <a name="Postscripts">
+ </a>
+ <h3 class="subheading">
+ Postscripts
+ </h3>
+ <ol>
+ <li>
+ The computer security field uses the term “trusted
+computing” in a different way—beware of confusion
+between the two meanings.
+ </li>
+ <li>
+ The GNU Project distributes the
+ <a name="index-Privacy-Guard-_0028GPG_0029_002c-GNU-1">
+ </a>
+ <a name="index-GNU_002c-GNU-Privacy-Guard-_0028GPG_0029-1">
+ </a>
+ <a name="index-GPG-_0028GNU-Privacy-Guard_0029-1">
+ </a>
+ GNU Privacy Guard, a program that
+implements public-key encryption and digital signatures, which you can
+use to send secure and private email. It is useful to explore how GPG
+differs from treacherous computing, and see what makes one helpful and
+the other so dangerous.
+ <p>
+ When someone uses GPG to send you an encrypted document, and you use
+GPG to decode it, the result is an unencrypted document that you can
+read, forward, copy, and even reencrypt to send it securely to
+someone else. A treacherous-computing application would let you read
+the words on the screen, but would not let you produce an unencrypted
+document that you could use in other ways. GPG, a free software
+package, makes security features available to the users;
+ <em>
+ they
+ </em>
+ use
+ <em>
+ it.
+ </em>
+ Treacherous computing is designed to impose restrictions on the users;
+ <em>
+ it
+ </em>
+ uses
+ <em>
+ them.
+ </em>
+ </p>
+ </li>
+ <li>
+ The supporters of treacherous computing focus their discourse on its
+beneficial uses. What they say is often
+correct, just not important.
+ <p>
+ Like most hardware, treacherous-computing hardware can be used for
+purposes which are not harmful. But these features can be implemented in
+other ways, without treacherous-computing hardware. The principal
+difference that treacherous computing makes for users is the nasty
+consequence: rigging your computer to work against you.
+ </p>
+ <p>
+ What they say is true, and what I say is true. Put them together and
+what do you get? Treacherous computing is a plan to take away our
+freedom, while offering minor benefits to distract us from what we
+would lose.
+ </p>
+ </li>
+ <li>
+ Microsoft presents
+ <a name="index-Microsoft_002c-Palladium-_0028see-also-both-Palladium-and-_0060_0060trusted-computing_0027_0027_0029-1">
+ </a>
+ Palladium as a security measure, and claims that
+it will protect against viruses, but this claim is evidently false. A
+presentation by Microsoft Research in October 2002 stated that one of
+the specifications of Palladium is that existing operating systems and
+applications will continue to run; therefore, viruses will continue to
+be able to do all the things that they can do today.
+ <p>
+ When Microsoft employees speak of “security” in connection with
+Palladium, they do not mean what we normally mean by that word:
+protecting your machine from things you do not want. They mean
+protecting your copies of data on your machine from access by you in
+ways others do not want. A slide in the presentation listed several
+types of secrets Palladium could be used to keep, including
+“third party secrets” and “user
+secrets”—but it put “user secrets” in
+quotation marks, recognizing that this is somewhat of an absurdity in the
+context of Palladium.
+ </p>
+ <p>
+ The presentation made frequent use of other terms that we frequently
+associate with the context of security, such as “attack,”
+“malicious code,” “spoofing,” as well as
+“trusted.” None of them means what it normally means.
+“Attack” doesn’t mean someone trying to hurt you, it means
+you trying to copy music. “Malicious code” means code
+installed by you to do what someone else doesn’t want your machine to
+do. “Spoofing” doesn’t mean someone’s fooling you, it means
+your fooling Palladium. And so on.
+ </p>
+ </li>
+ <li>
+ A previous statement by the Palladium developers stated the basic
+premise that whoever developed or collected information should have
+total control of how you use it. This would represent a revolutionary
+overturn of past ideas of ethics and of the legal system, and create
+an unprecedented system of control. The specific problems of these
+systems are no accident; they result from the basic goal. It is the
+goal we must reject.
+ </li>
+ </ol>
+ <a name="index-_0060_0060trusted-computing_002c_0027_0027-avoid-use-of-term-_0028see-also-treacherous-computing_0029-3">
+ </a>
+ <a name="index-treacherous-computing-3">
+ </a>
+ <a name="index-traps_002c-treacherous-computing-_0028see-also-treacherous-computing_0029-1">
+ </a>
+ <a name="index-proprietary-software-_0028see-also-software_0029-2">
+ </a>
+ <a name="index-Palladium-2">
+ </a>
+ <hr size="2"/>
+