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-<!-- This is the second edition of Free Software, Free Society: Selected Essays of Richard M. Stallman.
-
-Free Software Foundation
-
-51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor
-
-Boston, MA 02110-1335
-Copyright C 2002, 2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
-Verbatim copying and distribution of this entire book are permitted
-worldwide, without royalty, in any medium, provided this notice is
-preserved. Permission is granted to copy and distribute translations
-of this book from the original English into another language provided
-the translation has been approved by the Free Software Foundation and
-the copyright notice and this permission notice are preserved on all
-copies.
-
-ISBN 978-0-9831592-0-9
-Cover design by Rob Myers.
-
-Cover photograph by Peter Hinely.
- -->
-
-
- <a name="Misinterpreting-Copyright_002d_002d_002dA-Series-of-Errors">
- </a>
- <h1 class="chapter">
- 18. Misinterpreting Copyright—A Series of Errors
- </h1>
- <a name="index-Constitution_002c-copyright-and-US">
- </a>
- <p>
- Something strange and dangerous is happening in copyright law. Under
-the US Constitution, copyright exists to benefit users—those
-who read books, listen to music, watch movies, or run software—not
-for the sake of publishers or authors. Yet even as people tend
-increasingly to reject and disobey the copyright restrictions imposed
-on them “for their own benefit,” the US government is
-adding more restrictions, and trying to frighten the public into
-obedience with harsh new penalties.
- </p>
- <p>
- How did copyright policies come to be diametrically opposed to their
-stated purpose? And how can we bring them back into alignment with that
-purpose? To understand, we should start by looking at the root of
-United States copyright law: the US Constitution.
- </p>
- <a name="Copyright-in-the-US-Constitution">
- </a>
- <h3 class="subheading">
- Copyright in the US Constitution
- </h3>
- <p>
- When the US Constitution was drafted, the idea that authors were
-entitled to a copyright monopoly was proposed—and rejected. The
-founders of our country adopted a different premise, that copyright is
-not a natural right of authors, but an artificial concession made to
-them for the sake of progress. The Constitution gives permission for a
-copyright system with this clause (Article I, Section 8,
-Clause 8):
- </p>
- <blockquote class="smallquotation">
- <p>
- [Congress shall have the power] to promote the Progress of Science and
-the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
-the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
- </p>
- </blockquote>
- <a name="index-Supreme-Court_002c-US-1">
- </a>
- <p>
- The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that promoting progress means
-benefit for the users of copyrighted works. For example, in
- <em>
- Fox Film
-v. Doyal,
- </em>
- <a href="#FOOT36" name="DOCF36">
- (36)
- </a>
- the court said,
- </p>
- <blockquote class="smallquotation">
- <p>
- The sole interest of the United States and the primary object in
-conferring the [copyright] monopoly lie in the general benefits
-derived by the public from the labors of authors.
- </p>
- </blockquote>
- <p>
- This fundamental decision explains why copyright is
-not
- <em>
- required
- </em>
- by the Constitution, only
- <em>
- permitted
- </em>
- as an
-option—and why it is supposed to last for “limited
-times.” If copyright were a natural right, something that
-authors have because they deserve it, nothing could justify
-terminating this right after a certain period of time, any more than
-everyone’s house should become public property after a certain lapse
-of time from its construction.
- </p>
- <a name="The-_0060_0060Copyright-Bargain_0027_0027">
- </a>
- <h3 class="subheading">
- The “Copyright Bargain”
- </h3>
- <a name="index-copyright_002c-_0060_0060copyright-bargain_0027_0027">
- </a>
- <p>
- The copyright system works by providing privileges and thus benefits
-to publishers and authors; but it does not do this for their sake.
-Rather, it does this to modify their behavior: to provide an incentive
-for authors to write more and publish more. In effect, the government
-spends the public’s natural rights, on the public’s behalf, as part of
-a deal to bring the public more published works. Legal scholars call
-this concept the “copyright bargain.” It is like a
-government purchase of a highway or an airplane using taxpayers’
-money, except that the government spends our freedom instead of our
-money.
- </p>
- <p>
- But is the bargain as it exists actually a good deal for the public?
-Many alternative bargains are possible; which one is best? Every
-issue of copyright policy is part of this question. If we
-misunderstand the nature of the question, we will tend to decide the
-issues badly.
- </p>
- <p>
- The Constitution authorizes granting copyright powers to authors. In
-practice, authors typically cede them to publishers; it is usually the
-publishers, not the authors, who exercise these powers and get most of
-the benefits, though authors may get a small portion. Thus it is
-usually the publishers that lobby to increase copyright powers. To
-better reflect the reality of copyright rather than the myth, this
-article refers to publishers rather than authors as the holders of
-copyright powers. It also refers to the users of copyrighted works as
-“readers,” even though using them does not always mean
-reading, because “the users” is remote and abstract.
- </p>
- <a name="The-First-Error_003a-_0060_0060Striking-a-Balance_0027_0027">
- </a>
- <h3 class="subheading">
- The First Error: “Striking a Balance”
- </h3>
- <a name="index-copyright_002c-erroneous-concept-of-_0060_0060striking-a-balance_0027_0027">
- </a>
- <p>
- The copyright bargain places the public first: benefit for the reading
-public is an end in itself; benefits (if any) for publishers are just
-a means toward that end. Readers’ interests and publishers’ interests
-are thus qualitatively unequal in priority. The first step in
-misinterpreting the purpose of copyright is the elevation of the
-publishers to the same level of importance as the readers.
- </p>
- <p>
- It is often said that US copyright law is meant to “strike a
-balance” between the interests of publishers and readers. Those
-who cite this interpretation present it as a restatement of the basic
-position stated in the Constitution; in other words, it is supposed to
-be equivalent to the copyright bargain.
- </p>
- <p>
- But the two interpretations are far from equivalent; they are
-different conceptually, and different in their implications. The
-balance concept assumes that the readers’ and publishers’ interests
-differ in importance only quantitatively, in
- <em>
- how much
-weight
- </em>
- we should give them, and in what actions they apply to.
-The term “stakeholders” is often used to frame the issue
-in this way; it assumes that all kinds of interest in a policy
-decision are equally important. This view rejects the qualitative
-distinction between the readers’ and publishers’ interests which is at
-the root of the government’s participation in the copyright
-bargain.
- </p>
- <p>
- The consequences of this alteration are far-reaching, because the
-great protection for the public in the copyright bargain—the
-idea that copyright privileges can be justified only in the name of
-the readers, never in the name of the publishers—is discarded
-by the “balance” interpretation. Since the interest of
-the publishers is regarded as an end in itself, it can justify
-copyright privileges; in other words, the “balance”
-concept says that privileges can be justified in the name of someone
-other than the public.
- </p>
- <p>
- As a practical matter, the consequence of the “balance”
-concept is to reverse the burden of justification for changes in
-copyright law. The copyright bargain places the burden on the
-publishers to convince the readers to cede certain freedoms. The
-concept of balance reverses this burden, practically speaking, because
-there is generally no doubt that publishers will benefit from
-additional privilege. Unless harm to the readers can be proved,
-sufficient to “outweigh” this benefit, we are led to
-conclude that the publishers are entitled to almost any privilege they
-request.
- </p>
- <p>
- Since the idea of “striking a balance” between publishers and
-readers denies the readers the primacy they are entitled to, we must
-reject it.
- <a name="index-copyright_002c-erroneous-concept-of-_0060_0060striking-a-balance_0027_0027-1">
- </a>
- </p>
- <a name="Balancing-against-What_003f">
- </a>
- <h3 class="subheading">
- Balancing against What?
- </h3>
- <p>
- When the government buys something for the public, it acts on behalf
-of the public; its responsibility is to obtain the best possible
-deal—best for the public, not for the other party in the
-agreement.
- </p>
- <p>
- For example, when signing contracts with construction companies to build
-highways, the government aims to spend as little as possible of the
-public’s money. Government agencies use competitive bidding to push the
-price down.
- </p>
- <p>
- As a practical matter, the price cannot be zero, because contractors
-will not bid that low. Although not entitled to special
-consideration, they have the usual rights of citizens in a free
-society, including the right to refuse disadvantageous contracts; even
-the lowest bid will be high enough for some contractor to make money.
-So there is indeed a balance, of a kind. But it is not a deliberate
-balancing of two interests each with claim to special consideration.
-It is a balance between a public goal and market forces. The
-government tries to obtain for the taxpaying motorists the best deal
-they can get in the context of a free society and a free market.
- </p>
- <p>
- In the copyright bargain, the government spends our freedom instead of
-our money. Freedom is more precious than money, so government’s
-responsibility to spend our freedom wisely and frugally is even
-greater than its responsibility to spend our money thus. Governments
-must never put the publishers’ interests on a par with the public’s
-freedom.
- </p>
- <a name="Not-_0060_0060Balance_0027_0027-but-_0060_0060Trade_002dOff_0027_0027">
- </a>
- <h3 class="subheading">
- Not “Balance” but “Trade-Off”
- </h3>
- <p>
- The idea of balancing the readers’ interests against the publishers’
-is the wrong way to judge copyright policy, but there are indeed two
-interests to be weighed: two interests
- <em>
- of the readers.
- </em>
- Readers
-have an interest in their own freedom in using published works;
-depending on circumstances, they may also have an interest in
-encouraging publication through some kind of incentive system.
- </p>
- <p>
- The word “balance,” in discussions of copyright, has come
-to stand as shorthand for the idea of “striking a balance”
-between the readers and the publishers. Therefore, to use the word
-“balance” in regard to the readers’ two interests would be
-confusing. We need another term.
- </p>
- <p>
- In general, when one party has two goals that partly conflict, and
-cannot completely achieve both of them, we call this a
-“trade-off.” Therefore, rather than speaking of
-“striking the right balance” between parties, we should
-speak of “finding the right trade-off between spending our
-freedom and keeping it.”
- </p>
- <a name="The-Second-Error_003a-Maximizing-One-Output">
- </a>
- <h3 class="subheading">
- The Second Error: Maximizing One Output
- </h3>
- <a name="index-copyright_002c-erroneous-concept-of-maximizing-one-output">
- </a>
- <p>
- The second mistake in copyright policy consists of adopting the goal
-of maximizing—not just increasing—the number of
-published works. The erroneous concept of “striking a
-balance” elevated the publishers to parity with the readers;
-this second error places them far above the readers.
- </p>
- <p>
- When we purchase something, we do not generally buy the whole quantity
-in stock or the most expensive model. Instead we conserve funds for
-other purchases, by buying only what we need of any particular good, and
-choosing a model of sufficient rather than highest quality. The
-principle of diminishing returns suggests that spending all our money on
-one particular good is likely to be an inefficient allocation of resources;
-we generally choose to keep some money for another use.
- </p>
- <p>
- Diminishing returns applies to copyright just as to any other
-purchase. The first freedoms we should trade away are those we miss
-the least, and whose sacrifice gives the largest encouragement to
-publication. As we trade additional freedoms that cut closer to home,
-we find that each trade is a bigger sacrifice than the last, while
-bringing a smaller increment in literary activity. Well before the
-increment becomes zero, we may well say it is not worth its
-incremental price; we would then settle on a bargain whose overall
-result is to increase the amount of publication, but not to the utmost
-possible extent.
- </p>
- <p>
- Accepting the goal of maximizing publication rejects all these wiser,
-more advantageous bargains in advance—it dictates that the
-public must cede nearly all of its freedom to use published works, for
-just a little more publication.
- <a name="index-copyright_002c-_0060_0060copyright-bargain_0027_0027-1">
- </a>
- </p>
- <a name="The-Rhetoric-of-Maximization">
- </a>
- <h3 class="subheading">
- The Rhetoric of Maximization
- </h3>
- <a name="index-_0060_0060piracy_002c_0027_0027-erroneous-use-of-term-5">
- </a>
- <p>
- In practice, the goal of maximizing publication regardless of the cost
-to freedom is supported by widespread rhetoric which asserts that
-public copying is illegitimate, unfair, and intrinsically wrong. For
-instance, the publishers call people who copy “pirates,” a
-smear term designed to equate sharing information with your neighbor
-with attacking a ship. (This smear term was formerly used by authors
-to describe publishers who found lawful ways to publish unauthorized
-editions; its modern use by the publishers is almost the reverse.)
-This rhetoric directly rejects the constitutional basis for copyright,
-but presents itself as representing the unquestioned tradition of the
-American legal system.
- </p>
- <p>
- The “pirate” rhetoric is typically accepted because it
-so pervades the media that few people realize how radical it is. It
-is effective because if copying by the public is fundamentally
-illegitimate, we can never object to the publishers’ demand that we
-surrender our freedom to do so. In other words, when the public is
-challenged to show why publishers should not receive some additional
-power, the most important reason of all—“We want to
-copy”—is disqualified in advance.
- </p>
- <p>
- This leaves no way to argue against increasing copyright power except
-using side issues. Hence, opposition to stronger copyright powers today
-almost exclusively cites side issues, and never dares cite the freedom
-to distribute copies as a legitimate public value.
- </p>
- <p>
- As a practical matter, the goal of maximization enables publishers to
-argue that “A certain practice is reducing our sales—or
-we think it might—so we presume it diminishes publication by
-some unknown amount, and therefore it should be prohibited.” We
-are led to the outrageous conclusion that the public good is measured
-by publishers’ sales: What’s good for General Media is good for the
-USA.
- <a name="index-_0060_0060piracy_002c_0027_0027-erroneous-use-of-term-6">
- </a>
- </p>
- <a name="The-Third-Error_003a-Maximizing-Publishers_0027-Power">
- </a>
- <h3 class="subheading">
- The Third Error: Maximizing Publishers’ Power
- </h3>
- <a name="index-copyright_002c-erroneous-concept-of-maximizing-publishers_0027-power">
- </a>
- <p>
- Once the publishers have obtained assent to the policy goal of
-maximizing publication output at any cost, their next step is to infer
-that this requires giving them the maximum possible powers—making
-copyright cover every imaginable use of a work, or applying
-some other legal tool such as “shrink wrap” licenses to
-equivalent effect. This goal, which entails the abolition of
- <a name="index-copyright_002c-fair-use">
- </a>
- <a name="index-fair-use-_0028see-also-copyright_0029">
- </a>
- “fair use” and the “right of first sale,” is
-being pressed at every available level of government, from states of
-the US to international bodies.
- </p>
- <p>
- This step is erroneous because strict copyright rules obstruct the
-creation of useful new works. For instance,
- <a name="index-Shakespeare_002c-William">
- </a>
- Shakespeare borrowed the
-plots of some of his plays from works others had published a few decades
-before, so if today’s copyright law had been in effect, his plays would
-have been illegal.
- </p>
- <p>
- Even if we wanted the highest possible rate of publication, regardless
-of cost to the public, maximizing publishers’ power is the wrong way to
-get it. As a means of promoting progress, it is self-defeating.
- </p>
- <a name="The-Results-of-the-Three-Errors">
- </a>
- <h3 class="subheading">
- The Results of the Three Errors
- </h3>
- <a name="index-copyright_002c-duration-of-term-of">
- </a>
- <p>
- The current trend in copyright legislation is to hand publishers broader
-powers for longer periods of time. The conceptual basis of copyright,
-as it emerges distorted from the series of errors, rarely offers a basis
-for saying no. Legislators give lip service to the idea that copyright
-serves the public, while in fact giving publishers whatever they ask
-for.
- </p>
- <p>
- For example, here is what Senator
- <a name="index-Hatch_002c-Senator-Orrin">
- </a>
- Hatch said when introducing S. 483,
- <a href="#FOOT37" name="DOCF37">
- (37)
- </a>
- a 1995 bill to increase the term of copyright by 20 years:
- </p>
- <blockquote class="smallquotation">
- <p>
- I believe we are now at such a point with respect to the question of
-whether the current term of copyright adequately protects the
-interests of authors and the related question of whether the term of
-protection continues to provide a sufficient incentive for the
-creation of new works of authorship.
- <a href="#FOOT38" name="DOCF38">
- (38)
- </a>
- </p>
- </blockquote>
- <p>
- This bill extended the copyright on already published works written
-since the 1920s. This change was a giveaway to publishers with no
-possible benefit to the public, since there is no way to retroactively
-increase now the number of books published back then. Yet it cost the
-public a freedom that is meaningful today—the freedom to
-redistribute books from that era.
- </p>
- <p>
- The bill also extended the copyrights of works yet to be written. For
-works made for hire, copyright would last 95 years instead of the
-present 75 years. Theoretically this would increase the incentive to
-write new works; but any publisher that claims to need this extra
-incentive should be required to substantiate the claim with projected
-balance sheets for 75 years in the future.
- </p>
- <p>
- Needless to say, Congress did not question the publishers’ arguments:
-a law extending copyright was enacted in 1998. It was officially
-called the
- <a name="index-Sonny-Bono-Copyright-Term-Extension-Act-_0028also-known-as">
- </a>
- the Mickey Mouse Copyright Act
- <em>
- )
- </em>
- Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, named after one of
-its sponsors who died earlier that year. We usually call it the
-Mickey Mouse Copyright Act, since we presume its real motive was to
-prevent the copyright on the appearance of Mickey Mouse from expiring.
-Bono’s widow, who served the rest of his term, made this statement:
- </p>
- <blockquote class="smallquotation">
- <p>
- Actually,
- <a name="index-Bono_002c-Congressman-Sonny">
- </a>
- Sonny wanted the term of copyright protection to last forever.
-I am informed by staff that such a change would violate the Constitution.
-I invite all of you to work with me to strengthen our copyright laws in
-all of the ways available to us. As you know, there is also
- <a name="index-Valenti_002c-Jack">
- </a>
- Jack Valenti’s
- <a href="#FOOT39" name="DOCF39">
- (39)
- </a>
- proposal for term to last forever less one
-day. Perhaps the Committee may look at
-that next Congress.
- <a href="#FOOT40" name="DOCF40">
- (40)
- </a>
- </p>
- </blockquote>
- <a name="index-Supreme-Court_002c-US-2">
- </a>
- <p>
- The Supreme Court later heard a case that sought to overturn the law
-on the grounds that the retroactive extension fails to serve the
-Constitution’s goal of promoting progress. The court responded by
-abdicating its responsibility to judge the question; on copyright, the
-Constitution requires only lip service.
- <a name="index-copyright_002c-duration-of-term-of-1">
- </a>
- </p>
- <p>
- Another law, passed in 1997, made it a felony to make sufficiently many
-copies of any published work, even if you give them away to friends just
-to be nice. Previously this was not a crime in the US at all.
- </p>
- <a name="index-DMCA_002c-publishers-and">
- </a>
- <p>
- An even worse law, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), was
-designed to bring back copy protection (which computer users detest)
-by making it a crime to break copy protection, or even publish
-information about how to break it. This law ought to be called the
-“Domination by Media Corporations Act” because it
-effectively offers publishers the chance to write their own copyright
-law. It says they can impose any restrictions whatsoever on the use
-of a work, and these restrictions take the force of law provided the
-work contains some sort of encryption or license manager to enforce
-them.
- </p>
- <p>
- One of the arguments offered for this bill was that it would implement
-a recent treaty to increase copyright powers. The treaty was
-promulgated by the
- <a name="index-World-_0060_0060Intellectual-Property_0027_0027-Organization-_0028WIPO_0029-_0028see-also-_0060_0060intellectual-property_0027_0027_0029-3">
- </a>
- World “Intellectual
-Property” Organization, an organization dominated by
-copyright- and patent-holding interests, with the aid of
-pressure from the
- <a name="index-Clinton-administration">
- </a>
- Clinton administration; since the treaty only
-increases copyright power, whether it serves the public interest in
-any country is doubtful. In any case, the bill went far beyond what
-the treaty required.
- </p>
- <a name="index-libraries_002c-DMCA_002c-fair-use_002c-and-_0028see-also-DMCA_0029">
- </a>
- <p>
- Libraries were a key source of opposition to this bill, especially to
-the aspects that block the forms of copying that are considered
- <a name="index-copyright_002c-fair-use-and-libraries">
- </a>
- fair use. How did the publishers respond? Former
-representative
- <a name="index-Schroeder_002c-Pat">
- </a>
- Pat Schroeder, now a lobbyist for the
- <a name="index-copyright_002c-Association-of-American-Publishers">
- </a>
- <a name="index-Association-of-American-Publishers-_0028see-also-copyright_0029">
- </a>
- Association of
-American Publishers, said that the publishers “could not live
-with what [the libraries were] asking for.” Since the libraries
-were asking only to preserve part of the status quo, one might respond
-by wondering how the publishers had survived until the present
-day.
- </p>
- <a name="index-copyright_002c-disregard-for-US-Constitution_0027s-view-of">
- </a>
- <p>
- Congressman
- <a name="index-Frank_002c-Congressman-Barney">
- </a>
- Barney Frank, in a meeting with me and others who opposed
-this bill, showed how far the US Constitution’s view of copyright
-has been disregarded. He said that new powers, backed by criminal
-penalties, were needed urgently because the “movie industry is
-worried,” as well as the “music industry” and other
-“industries.” I asked him, “But is this in the
-public interest?” His response was telling: “Why are you
-talking about the public interest? These creative people don’t have
-to give up their rights for the public interest!” The
-“industry” has been identified with the “creative
-people” it hires, copyright has been treated as its entitlement,
-and the Constitution has been turned upside down.
- <a name="index-Constitution_002c-copyright-and-US-1">
- </a>
- </p>
- <a name="index-DMCA_002c-and-fair-use">
- </a>
- <p>
- The DMCA was enacted in 1998. As enacted, it says that fair use remains
-nominally legitimate, but allows publishers to prohibit all software or
-hardware that you could practice it with. Effectively, fair use
-is prohibited.
- </p>
- <p>
- Based on this law, the movie industry has imposed censorship on free
-software for reading and playing DVDs, and even on the information
-about how to read them. In April 2001, Professor
- <a name="index-Felten_002c-Edward">
- </a>
- Edward Felten of
-Princeton University was intimidated by lawsuit threats from the
- <a name="index-Recording-Industry-Association-of-America-_0028RIAA_0029">
- </a>
- Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) into withdrawing a
-scientific paper stating what he had learned about a proposed
-encryption system for restricting access to recorded music.
- </p>
- <a name="index-libraries_002c-e_002dbooks-and">
- </a>
- <a name="index-e_002dbooks">
- </a>
- <p>
- We are also beginning to see e-books that take away many of readers’
-traditional freedoms—for instance, the freedom to lend a book
-to your friend, to sell it to a used book store, to borrow it from a
-library, to buy it without giving your name to a corporate data bank,
-even the freedom to read it twice. Encrypted e-books generally
-restrict all these activities—you can read them only with
-special secret software designed to restrict you.
- </p>
- <p>
- I will never buy one of these encrypted, restricted e-books, and I
-hope you will reject them too. If an e-book doesn’t give you the same
-freedoms as a traditional paper book, don’t accept it!
- </p>
- <p>
- Anyone independently releasing software that can read restricted
-e-books risks prosecution. A Russian programmer,
- <a name="index-Sklyarov_002c-Dmitry">
- </a>
- Dmitry Sklyarov, was
-arrested in 2001 while visiting the US to speak at a conference,
-because he had written such a program in
- <a name="index-Russia-1">
- </a>
- Russia, where it was lawful
-to do so. Now Russia is preparing a law to prohibit it too, and the
- <a name="index-European-Union-1">
- </a>
- European Union recently adopted one.
- </p>
- <p>
- Mass-market e-books have been a commercial failure so far, but not
-because readers chose to defend their freedom; they were unattractive
-for other reasons, such as that computer display screens are not easy
-surfaces to read from. We can’t rely on this happy accident to
-protect us in the long term; the next attempt to promote e-books will
-use “electronic paper”—book-like objects into
-which an encrypted, restricted e-book can be downloaded. If this
-paper-like surface proves more appealing than today’s display screens,
-we will have to defend our freedom in order to keep it. Meanwhile,
-e-books are making inroads in niches:
- <a name="index-NYU-1">
- </a>
- NYU and other dental schools
-require students to buy their textbooks in the form of restricted
-e-books.
- <a name="index-e_002dbooks-1">
- </a>
- </p>
- <p>
- The media companies are not satisfied yet. In 2001,
- <a name="index-Disney-1">
- </a>
- Disney-funded
-Senator
- <a name="index-Hollings_002c-Senator-Ernest-1">
- </a>
- Hollings proposed a bill called the
- <a name="index-Security-Systems-Standards-and-Certification-Act-_0028SSSCA_0029-_0028see-also-Consumer-Broadband-and-Digital-Television-Promotion-Act-_0028CBDTPA_0029_0029-1">
- </a>
- “Security Systems
-Standards and Certification Act”
-(SSSCA),
- <a href="#FOOT41" name="DOCF41">
- (41)
- </a>
- which would require all computers
-(and other digital recording and playback devices) to have
-government-mandated copy-restriction systems. That is their ultimate
-goal, but the first item on their agenda is to prohibit any equipment
-that can tune digital
- <a name="index-HDTV">
- </a>
- HDTV unless it is designed to be impossible for
-the public to “tamper with” (i.e., modify for their own
-purposes). Since free software is software that users can modify, we
-face here for the first time a proposed law that explicitly prohibits
-free software for a certain job. Prohibition of other jobs will
-surely follow. If the
- <a name="index-FCC">
- </a>
- FCC adopts this rule, existing free software
-such as
- <a name="index-GNU_002c-GNU-Radio">
- </a>
- GNU Radio would be censored.
- </p>
- <p>
- To block these bills and rules requires political
-action.
- <a href="#FOOT42" name="DOCF42">
- (42)
- </a>
- </p>
- <a name="Finding-the-Right-Bargain">
- </a>
- <h3 class="subheading">
- Finding the Right Bargain
- </h3>
- <a name="index-copyright_002c-_0060_0060copyright-bargain_0027_0027-2">
- </a>
- <p>
- What is the proper way to decide copyright policy? If copyright is a
-bargain made on behalf of the public, it should serve the public
-interest above all. The government’s duty when selling the public’s
-freedom is to sell only what it must, and sell it as dearly as possible.
-At the very least, we should pare back the extent of copyright as much
-as possible while maintaining a comparable level of publication.
- </p>
- <p>
- Since we cannot find this minimum price in freedom through competitive
-bidding, as we do for construction projects, how can we find it?
- </p>
- <p>
- One possible method is to reduce copyright privileges in stages, and
-observe the results. By seeing if and when measurable diminutions in
-publication occur, we will learn how much copyright power is really
-necessary to achieve the public’s purposes. We must judge this by
-actual observation, not by what publishers say will happen, because
-they have every incentive to make exaggerated predictions of doom if
-their powers are reduced in any way.
- </p>
- <p>
- Copyright policy includes several independent dimensions, which can be
-adjusted separately. After we find the necessary minimum for one policy
-dimension, it may still be possible to reduce other dimensions of
-copyright while maintaining the desired publication level.
- </p>
- <p>
- One important dimension of copyright is its duration, which is now
-typically on the order of a century. Reducing the monopoly on copying
-to ten years, starting from the date when a work is published, would be
-a good first step. Another aspect of copyright, which covers the
-making of derivative works, could continue for a longer period.
- </p>
- <a name="index-copyright_002c-duration-of-term-of-2">
- </a>
- <p>
- Why count from the date of publication? Because copyright on
-unpublished works does not directly limit readers’ freedom; whether we
-are free to copy a work is moot when we do not have copies. So giving
-authors a longer time to get a work published does no harm. Authors
-(who generally do own the copyright prior to publication) will rarely
-choose to delay publication just to push back the end of the copyright
-term.
- </p>
- <p>
- Why ten years? Because that is a safe proposal; we can be confident on
-practical grounds that this reduction would have little impact on the
-overall viability of publishing today. In most media and genres,
-successful works are very profitable in just a few years, and even
-successful works are usually out of print well before ten. Even for
-reference works, whose useful life may be many decades, ten-year
-copyright should suffice: updated editions are issued regularly, and
-many readers will buy the copyrighted current edition rather than copy a
-ten-year-old public domain version.
- </p>
- <p>
- Ten years may still be longer than necessary; once things settle down,
-we could try a further reduction to tune the system. At a panel on
-copyright at a literary convention, where I proposed the ten-year term,
-a noted fantasy author sitting beside me objected vehemently, saying
-that anything beyond five years was intolerable.
- </p>
- <p>
- But we don’t have to apply the same time span to all kinds of works.
-Maintaining the utmost uniformity of copyright policy is not crucial
-to the public interest, and copyright law already has many exceptions
-for specific uses and media. It would be foolish to pay for every
-highway project at the rates necessary for the most difficult projects
-in the most expensive regions of the country; it is equally foolish to
-“pay” for all kinds of art with the greatest price in
-freedom that we find necessary for any one kind.
- </p>
- <p>
- So perhaps novels, dictionaries, computer programs, songs, symphonies,
-and movies should have different durations of copyright, so that we can
-reduce the duration for each kind of work to what is necessary for many
-such works to be published. Perhaps movies over one hour long could
-have a 20-year copyright, because of the expense of producing them.
-In my own field, computer programming, three years should suffice,
-because product cycles are even shorter than that.
- </p>
- <p>
- Another dimension of copyright policy is the extent of
- <a name="index-copyright_002c-fair-use-1">
- </a>
- <a name="index-fair-use-_0028see-also-copyright_0029-1">
- </a>
- fair use: some
-ways of reproducing all or part of a published work that are legally
-permitted even though it is copyrighted. The natural first step in
-reducing this dimension of copyright power is to permit occasional
-private small-quantity noncommercial copying and distribution among
-individuals. This would eliminate the intrusion of the copyright
-police into people’s private lives, but would probably have little
-effect on the sales of published works. (It may be necessary to take
-other legal steps to ensure that shrink-wrap licenses cannot be used
-to substitute for copyright in restricting such copying.) The
-experience of
- <a name="index-Napster">
- </a>
- Napster shows that we should also permit noncommercial
-verbatim redistribution to the general public—when so many of
-the public want to copy and share, and find it so useful, only
-draconian measures will stop them, and the public deserves to get what
-it wants.
- </p>
- <p>
- For novels, and in general for works that are used for entertainment,
-noncommercial verbatim redistribution may be sufficient freedom for
-the readers. Computer programs, being used for functional purposes
-(to get jobs done), call for additional freedoms beyond that,
-including the freedom to publish an improved version. See “The Free
-Software Definition,” in this book, for an explanation of the
-freedoms that software users should have. But it may be an acceptable
-compromise for these freedoms to be universally available only after a
-delay of two or three years from the program’s publication.
- </p>
- <p>
- Changes like these could bring copyright into line with the public’s
-wish to use digital technology to copy. Publishers will no doubt find
-these proposals “unbalanced”; they may threaten to take
-their marbles and go home, but they won’t really do it, because the
-game will remain profitable and it will be the only game in town.
- </p>
- <p>
- As we consider reductions in copyright power, we must make sure media
-companies do not simply replace it with end-user license agreements.
-It would be necessary to prohibit the use of contracts to apply
-restrictions on copying that go beyond those of copyright. Such
-limitations on what mass-market nonnegotiated contracts can require
-are a standard part of the US legal system.
- <a name="index-copyright_002c-_0060_0060copyright-bargain_0027_0027-3">
- </a>
- </p>
- <a name="A-Personal-Note">
- </a>
- <h3 class="subheading">
- A Personal Note
- </h3>
- <a name="index-call-to-action_002c-do-not-surrender-freedom-in-author_0027s-name">
- </a>
- <a name="index-users_002c-premise-of-author-supremacy-_0028see-also-ownership_0029-4">
- </a>
- <p>
- I am a software designer, not a legal scholar. I’ve become concerned
-with copyright issues because there’s no avoiding them in the world of
-computer networks, such as the Internet. As a user of computers and networks for 30 years, I value the freedoms that we have lost, and the ones we
-may lose next. As an author, I can reject the romantic mystique of the
-author as semidivine creator, often cited by publishers to justify
-increased copyright powers for authors—powers which these authors
-will then sign away to publishers.
- </p>
- <p>
- Most of this article consists of facts and reasoning that you can
-check, and proposals on which you can form your own opinions. But I ask
-you to accept one thing on my word alone: that authors like me don’t
-deserve special power over you. If you wish to reward me further for
-the software or books I have written, I would gratefully accept a
-check—but please don’t surrender your freedom in my name.
- </p>
- <div class="footnote">
- <hr>
- <h3>
- Footnotes
- </h3>
- <h3>
- <a href="#DOCF36" name="FOOT36">
- (36)
- </a>
- </h3>
- <a name="index-Fox-Film-Corp_002e-v_002e-Doyal-1">
- </a>
- <p>
- <cite>
- Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal,
- </cite>
- 286 US 123, 1932.
- </p>
- <h3>
- <a href="#DOCF37" name="FOOT37">
- (37)
- </a>
- </h3>
- <p>
- <cite>
- Congressional Record,
- </cite>
- S. 483, “The Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995,” 2 March 1995, pp. S3390–4.
- </p>
- <h3>
- <a href="#DOCF38" name="FOOT38">
- (38)
- </a>
- </h3>
- <p>
- <cite>
- Congressional
-Record,
- </cite>
- “Statement on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions,”
-2 March 1995, p. S3390,
- <a href="http://gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-1995-03-02/pdf/CREC-1995-03-02-pt1-PgS3390-2.pdf">
- http://gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-1995-03-02/pdf/CREC-1995-03-02-pt1-PgS3390-2.pdf
- </a>
- .
- </p>
- <h3>
- <a href="#DOCF39" name="FOOT39">
- (39)
- </a>
- </h3>
- <p>
- Jack Valenti was a longtime president of the Motion
-Picture Association of America.
- </p>
- <h3>
- <a href="#DOCF40" name="FOOT40">
- (40)
- </a>
- </h3>
- <p>
- <cite>
- Congressional Record,
- </cite>
- remarks of
-Rep.
- <a name="index-Bono_002c-Congresswoman-Mary">
- </a>
- Bono, 7 October 1998, p. H9952,
- <a href="http://gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-1998-10-07/pdf/CREC-1998-10-07-pt1-PgH9946.pdf">
- http://gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-1998-10-07/pdf/CREC-1998-10-07-pt1-PgH9946.pdf
- </a>
- .
- </p>
- <h3>
- <a href="#DOCF41" name="FOOT41">
- (41)
- </a>
- </h3>
- <p>
- Since renamed to the unpronounceable
- <a name="index-Consumer-Broadband-and-Digital-Television-Promotion-Act-_0028CBDTPA_0029-2">
- </a>
- CBDTPA,
-for which a good mnemonic is “Consume, But Don’t Try
-Programming Anything,” but it really stands for the
-“Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion
-Act.”
- </p>
- <h3>
- <a href="#DOCF42" name="FOOT42">
- (42)
- </a>
- </h3>
- <p>
- If you would like to help, I recommend the web
-sites
- <a name="index-Defective-by-Design-_0028see-also-DRM_0029-2">
- </a>
- <a href="http://defectivebydesign.org">
- http://defectivebydesign.org
- </a>
- ,
- <a href="http://publicknowledge.org">
- http://publicknowledge.org
- </a>
- , and
- <a href="http://eff.org">
- http://eff.org
- </a>
- .
- </p>
- </hr>
- </div>
- <hr size="2"/>
-