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diff --git a/talermerchantdemos/blog/articles/en/surveillance-vs-democracy.html b/talermerchantdemos/blog/articles/en/surveillance-vs-democracy.html new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c69d3a7 --- /dev/null +++ b/talermerchantdemos/blog/articles/en/surveillance-vs-democracy.html @@ -0,0 +1,635 @@ +<!--#include virtual="/server/header.html" --> +<!-- Parent-Version: 1.90 --> +<title>How Much Surveillance Can Democracy Withstand? +- GNU Project - Free Software Foundation</title> +<style type="text/css" media="print,screen"><!-- +#intro { margin: 2em auto 1.5em; } +.pict.wide { width: 23em; } +.pict p { margin-top: .2em; } +@media (min-width: 55em) { + #intro { max-width: 55em; } + .pict.wide { margin-bottom: 0; } +} +--></style> +<!-- GNUN: localize URL /graphics/dog.small.jpg --> +<!--#include virtual="/philosophy/po/surveillance-vs-democracy.translist" --> +<!--#include virtual="/server/banner.html" --> +<h2 class="center">How Much Surveillance Can Democracy Withstand?</h2> + +<address class="byline center">by +<a href="http://www.stallman.org/">Richard Stallman</a></address> + +<!-- rms: I deleted the link because of Wired's announced + anti-ad-block system --> +<blockquote class="center"><p><em>A version of this article was first published in +<cite>Wired</cite> in October 2013.<br /> +Also consider reading “<a +href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/apr/03/facebook-abusing-data-law-privacy-big-tech-surveillance">A +radical proposal to keep your personal data safe</a>,” published in +<cite>The Guardian</cite> in April 2018.</em></p></blockquote> + +<div class="article"> + +<div id="intro"> +<div class="pict wide"> +<a href="/graphics/dog.html"> +<img src="/graphics/dog.small.jpg" alt="Cartoon of a dog, wondering at the three ads that popped up on his computer screen..." /></a> +<p>“How did they find out I'm a dog?”</p> +</div> + +<p>Thanks to Edward Snowden's disclosures, we know that the current +level of general surveillance in society is incompatible with human +rights. The repeated harassment and prosecution of dissidents, +sources, and journalists in the US and elsewhere provides +confirmation. We need to reduce the level of general surveillance, +but how far? Where exactly is the +<em>maximum tolerable level of surveillance</em>, which we must ensure +is not exceeded? It is the level beyond which surveillance starts to +interfere with the functioning of democracy, in that whistleblowers +(such as Snowden) are likely to be caught.</p> +</div> +<div class="columns" style="clear:both"> +<p>Faced with government secrecy, we the people depend on +whistleblowers +to <a href="https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/11/reddit-tpp-ama">tell +us what the state is doing</a>. (We were reminded of this in 2019 as +various whistleblowers gave the public increments +of <a href="https://www.commondreams.org/views/2019/09/27/trumps-ukraine-scandal-shows-why-whistleblowers-are-so-vital-democracy">information +about Trump's attempt to shake down the president of Ukraine</a>.) +However, today's surveillance intimidates potential whistleblowers, +which means it is too much. To recover our democratic control over +the state, we must reduce surveillance to the point where +whistleblowers know they are safe.</p> + +<p>Using free/libre +software, <a href="/philosophy/free-software-even-more-important.html">as +I've advocated since 1983</a>, is the first step in taking control +of our digital lives, and that includes preventing surveillance. We +can't trust nonfree software; the NSA +<a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20130622044225/http://blogs.computerworlduk.com/open-enterprise/2013/06/how-can-any-company-ever-trust-microsoft-again/index.htm">uses</a> +and +even <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security">creates</a> +security weaknesses in nonfree software to invade our own computers +and routers. Free software gives us control of our own computers, +but <a href="http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/149481/">that won't +protect our privacy once we set foot on the Internet</a>.</p> + +<p><a +href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/10/nsa-surveillance-patriot-act-author-bill">Bipartisan +legislation to “curtail the domestic surveillance +powers”</a> in the U.S. is being drawn up, but it relies on +limiting the government's use of our virtual dossiers. That won't +suffice to protect whistleblowers if “catching the +whistleblower” is grounds for access sufficient to identify him +or her. We need to go further.</p> +</div> + +<h3 class="subheader" style="clear: both">The Upper Limit on Surveillance in a Democracy</h3> + +<div class="columns"> +<p>If whistleblowers don't dare reveal crimes and lies, we lose the +last shred of effective control over our government and institutions. +That's why surveillance that enables the state to find out who has +talked with a reporter is too much surveillance—too much for +democracy to endure.</p> + +<p>An unnamed U.S. government official ominously told journalists in +2011 that +the <a href="http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/news-media-law/news-media-and-law-summer-2011/lessons-wye-river">U.S. would +not subpoena reporters because “We know who you're talking +to.”</a> +Sometimes <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/sep/24/yemen-leak-sachtleben-guilty-associated-press">journalists' +phone call records are subpoenaed</a> to find this out, but Snowden +has shown us that in effect they subpoena all the phone call records +of everyone in the U.S., all the +time, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jun/06/verizon-telephone-data-court-order">from +Verizon</a> +and <a href="http://www.marketwatch.com/story/nsa-data-mining-digs-into-networks-beyond-verizon-2013-06-07">from +other companies too</a>.</p> + +<p>Opposition and dissident activities need to keep secrets from +states that are willing to play dirty tricks on them. The ACLU has +demonstrated the U.S. government's <a +href="http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/Spyfiles_2_0.pdf">systematic +practice of infiltrating peaceful dissident groups</a> on the pretext +that there might be terrorists among them. The point at which +surveillance is too much is the point at which the state can find who +spoke to a known journalist or a known dissident.</p> +</div> + +<h3 class="subheader">Information, Once Collected, Will Be Misused</h3> + +<div class="columns"> +<p id="willbemisused">When people recognize +that the level of general surveillance is too +high, the first response is to propose limits on access to the +accumulated data. That sounds nice, but it won't fix the problem, not +even slightly, even supposing that the government obeys the rules. +(The NSA has misled the FISA court, which said it +was <a href="http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/09/nsa-violations/">unable +to effectively hold the NSA accountable</a>.) Suspicion of a crime +will be grounds for access, so once a whistleblower is accused of +“espionage,” finding the “spy” will provide an +excuse to access the accumulated material.</p> + +<p>In practice, we can't expect state agencies even to make up excuses +to satisfy the rules for using surveillance data—because US +agencies +already <a href="https://theintercept.com/2018/01/09/dark-side-fbi-dea-illegal-searches-secret-evidence/"> +lie to cover up breaking the rules</a>. These rules are not seriously +meant to be obeyed; rather, they are a fairy-tale we can believe if we +like.</p> + +<p>In addition, the state's surveillance staff will misuse the data +for personal reasons. Some NSA +agents <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/24/nsa-analysts-abused-surveillance-systems">used +U.S. surveillance systems to track their lovers</a>—past, +present, or wished-for—in a practice called +“LOVEINT.” The NSA says it has caught and punished this a +few times; we don't know how many other times it wasn't caught. But +these events shouldn't surprise us, because police have +long <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20160401102120/http://www.sweetliberty.org/issues/privacy/lein1.htm#.V_mKlYbb69I">used +their access to driver's license records to track down someone +attractive</a>, a practice known as “running a plate for a +date.” This practice has expanded +with <a href="https://theyarewatching.org/issues/risks-increase-once-data-shared">new +digital systems</a>. In 2016, a prosecutor was accused of forging +judges' signatures to get authorization +to <a href="http://gizmodo.com/government-officials-cant-stop-spying-on-their-crushes-1789490933"> +wiretap someone who was the object of a romantic obsession</a>. The AP +knows +of <a href="https://apnews.com/699236946e3140659fff8a2362e16f43">many +other instances in the US</a>. +</p> + +<p>Surveillance data will always be used for other purposes, even if +this is prohibited. Once the data has been accumulated and the state +has the possibility of access to it, it can misuse that data in +dreadful ways, as shown by examples +from <a href="http://falkvinge.net/2012/03/17/collected-personal-data-will-always-be-used-against-the-citizens/">Europe</a>, +<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_American_internment">the +US</a>, and most +recently <a href="http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/terrifying-how-a-single-line-of-computer-code-put-thousands-of-innocent-turks-in-jail-1.4495021">Turkey</a>. +(Turkey's confusion about who had really used the Bylock program only +exacerbated the basic deliberate injustice of arbitrarily punishing +people for having used it.) +</p> + +<p>Personal data collected by the state is also likely to be obtained +by outside crackers that break the security of the servers, even +by <a href="https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20150612/16334231330/second-opm-hack-revealed-even-worse-than-first.shtml">crackers +working for hostile states</a>.</p> + +<p>Governments can easily use massive surveillance capability +to <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/22/world/europe/macedonia-government-is-blamed-for-wiretapping-scandal.html">subvert +democracy directly</a>.</p> + +<p>Total surveillance accessible to the state enables the state to +launch a massive fishing expedition against any person. To make +journalism and democracy safe, we must limit the accumulation of data +that is easily accessible to the state.</p> +</div> + +<h3 class="subheader">Robust Protection for Privacy Must Be Technical</h3> + +<div class="columns"> +<p>The Electronic Frontier Foundation and other organizations propose +a set of legal principles designed to <a +href="https://necessaryandproportionate.org">prevent the +abuses of massive surveillance</a>. These principles include, +crucially, explicit legal protection for whistleblowers; as a +consequence, they would be adequate for protecting democratic +freedoms—if adopted completely and enforced without exception +forever.</p> + +<p>However, such legal protections are precarious: as recent history +shows, they can be repealed (as in the FISA Amendments Act), +suspended, or <a +href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/16/us/16nsa.html">ignored</a>.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile, demagogues will cite the usual excuses as grounds for +total surveillance; any terrorist attack, even one that kills just a +handful of people, can be hyped to provide an opportunity.</p> + +<p>If limits on access to the data are set aside, it will be as if +they had never existed: years worth of dossiers would suddenly become +available for misuse by the state and its agents and, if collected by +companies, for their private misuse as well. If, however, we stop the +collection of dossiers on everyone, those dossiers won't exist, and +there will be no way to compile them retroactively. A new illiberal +regime would have to implement surveillance afresh, and it would only +collect data starting at that date. As for suspending or momentarily +ignoring this law, the idea would hardly make sense.</p> +</div> + +<h3 class="subheader">First, Don't Be Foolish</h3> + +<div class="columns"> +<p>To have privacy, you must not throw it away: the first one who has +to protect your privacy is you. Avoid identifying yourself to web +sites, contact them with Tor, and use browsers that block the schemes +they use to track visitors. Use the GNU Privacy Guard to encrypt the +contents of your email. Pay for things with cash.</p> + +<p>Keep your own data; don't store your data in a company's +“convenient” server. It's safe, however, to entrust a +data backup to a commercial service, provided you put the files in an +archive and encrypt the whole archive, including the names of the +files, with free software on your own computer before uploading +it.</p> + +<p>For privacy's sake, you must avoid nonfree software; if you give +control of your computer's operations to companies, they +are <a href="/malware/proprietary-surveillance.html">likely to make it +spy on you</a>. +Avoid <a href="/philosophy/who-does-that-server-really-serve.html">service +as a software substitute</a>; in addition to giving others control of +how your computing is done, it requires you to hand over all the +pertinent data to the company's server.</p> + +<p>Protect your friends' and acquaintances' privacy, +too. <a href="http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/05/21/in-cybersecurity-sometimes-the-weakest-link-is-a-family-member/">Don't +give out their personal information</a> except how to contact them, +and never give any web site your list of email or phone contacts. +Don't tell a company such as Facebook anything about your friends that +they might not wish to publish in a newspaper. Better yet, don't be +used by Facebook at all. Reject communication systems that require +users to give their real names, even if you are happy to divulge yours, +since they pressure other people to surrender their privacy.</p> + +<p>Self-protection is essential, but even the most rigorous +self-protection is insufficient to protect your privacy on or from +systems that don't belong to you. When we communicate with others or +move around the city, our privacy depends on the practices of society. +We can avoid some of the systems that surveil our communications and +movements, but not all of them. Clearly, the better solution is to +make all these systems stop surveilling people other than legitimate +suspects.</p> +</div> + +<h3 class="subheader">We Must Design Every System for Privacy</h3> + +<div class="columns"> +<p>If we don't want a total surveillance society, we must consider +surveillance a kind of social pollution, and limit the surveillance +impact of each new digital system just as we limit the environmental +impact of physical construction.</p> + +<p>For example: “smart” meters for electricity are touted +for sending the power company moment-by-moment data about each +customer's electric usage, including how usage compares with users in +general. This is implemented based on general surveillance, but does +not require any surveillance. It would be easy for the power company +to calculate the average usage in a residential neighborhood by +dividing the total usage by the number of subscribers, and send that +to the meters. Each customer's meter could compare her usage, over +any desired period of time, with the average usage pattern for that +period. The same benefit, with no surveillance!</p> + +<p>We need to design such privacy into all our digital +systems [<a href="#ambientprivacy">1</a>].</p> +</div> + +<h3 class="subheader">Remedy for Collecting Data: Leaving It Dispersed</h3> + +<div class="columns"> +<p>One way to make monitoring safe for privacy is +to <a name="dispersal">keep the data dispersed and inconvenient to +access</a>. Old-fashioned security cameras were no threat to privacy(<a href="#privatespace">*</a>). +The recording was stored on the premises, and kept for a few weeks at +most. Because of the inconvenience of accessing these recordings, it +was never done massively; they were accessed only in the places where +someone reported a crime. It would not be feasible to physically +collect millions of tapes every day and watch them or copy them.</p> + +<p>Nowadays, security cameras have become surveillance cameras: they +are connected to the Internet so recordings can be collected in a data +center and saved forever. In Detroit, the cops pressure businesses to +give them <a +href="https://eu.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/detroit-city/2018/01/23/detroit-green-light/109524794/">unlimited +access to their surveillance cameras</a> so that they can look through +them at any and all times. This is already dangerous, but it is going +to get worse. Advances in face recognition may bring the day when +suspected journalists can be tracked on the street all the time to see +who they talk with.</p> + +<p>Internet-connected cameras often have lousy digital security +themselves, which means <a +href="https://www.csoonline.com/article/2221934/cia-wants-to-spy-on-you-through-your-appliances.html">anyone +can watch what those cameras see</a>. This makes internet-connected +cameras a major threat to security as well as privacy. For privacy's +sake, we should ban the use of Internet-connected cameras aimed where +and when the public is admitted, except when carried by people. +Everyone must be free to post photos and video recordings +occasionally, but the systematic accumulation of such data on the +Internet must be limited.</p> + +<p><a name="privatespace"><b>*</b></a> I assume here that the security +camera points at the inside of a store, or at the street. Any camera +pointed at someone's private space by someone else violates privacy, +but that is another issue.</p> +</div> + +<h3 id="digitalcash" class="subheader">Remedy for Internet Commerce Surveillance</h3> + +<div class="columns"> +<p>Most data collection comes from people's own digital activities. +Usually the data is collected first by companies. But when it comes +to the threat to privacy and democracy, it makes no difference whether +surveillance is done directly by the state or farmed out to a +business, because the data that the companies collect is +systematically available to the state.</p> + +<p>The NSA, through PRISM, +has <a href="https://www.commondreams.org/headline/2013/08/23-2">gotten +into the databases of many large Internet corporations</a>. AT&T +has saved all its phone call records since 1987 +and <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/02/us/drug-agents-use-vast-phone-trove-eclipsing-nsas.html?_r=0">makes +them available to the DEA</a> to search on request. Strictly +speaking, the U.S. government does not possess that data, but in +practical terms it may as well possess it. Some companies are praised +for <a href="https://www.eff.org/who-has-your-back-government-data-requests-2015">resisting +government data requests to the limited extent they can</a>, but that +can only partly compensate for the harm they do to by collecting that +data in the first place. In addition, many of those companies misuse +the data directly or provide it to data brokers.</p> + +<p>The goal of making journalism and democracy safe therefore requires +that we reduce the data collected about people by any organization, +not just by the state. We must redesign digital systems so that they +do not accumulate data about their users. If they need digital data +about our transactions, they should not be allowed to keep them more +than a short time beyond what is inherently necessary for their +dealings with us.</p> + +<p>One of the motives for the current level of surveillance of the +Internet is that sites are financed through advertising based on +tracking users' activities and propensities. This converts a mere +annoyance—advertising that we can learn to ignore—into a +surveillance system that harms us whether we know it or not. +Purchases over the Internet also track their users. And we are all +aware that “privacy policies” are more excuses to violate +privacy than commitments to uphold it.</p> + +<p>We could correct both problems by adopting a system of anonymous +payments—anonymous for the payer, that is. (We don't want to +help the payee dodge +taxes.) <a href="http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/05/lets-cut-through-the-bitcoin-hype/">Bitcoin +is not anonymous</a>, though there are efforts to develop ways to pay +anonymously with Bitcoin. However, technology +for <a href="http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/2.12/emoney_pr.html">digital +cash was first developed in the 1980s</a>; the GNU software for doing +this is called <a href="http://taler.net/">GNU Taler</a>. Now we need +only suitable business arrangements, and for the state not to obstruct +them.</p> + +<p>Another possible method for anonymous payments would +use <a href="https://stallman.org/articles/anonymous-payments-thru-phones.html">prepaid +phone cards</a>. It is less convenient, but very easy to +implement.</p> + +<p>A further threat from sites' collection of personal data is that +security breakers might get in, take it, and misuse it. This includes +customers' credit card details. An anonymous payment system would end +this danger: a security hole in the site can't hurt you if the site +knows nothing about you.</p> +</div> + +<h3 class="subheader">Remedy for Travel Surveillance</h3> + +<div class="columns"> +<p>We must convert digital toll collection to anonymous payment (using +digital cash, for instance). License-plate recognition systems +<a href="https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/11/eff-and-muckrock-release-records-and-data-200-law-enforcement-agencies-automated"> +recognize all cars' license plates</a>, and +the <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/whos_watching_you/8064333.stm">data +can be kept indefinitely</a>; they should be required by law to notice +and record only those license numbers that are on a list of cars +sought by court orders. A less secure alternative would record all +cars locally but only for a few days, and not make the full data +available over the Internet; access to the data should be limited to +searching for a list of court-ordered license-numbers.</p> + +<p>The U.S. “no-fly” list must be abolished because it is +<a href="https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security-technology-and-liberty-racial-justice/victory-federal-court-recognizes">punishment +without trial</a>.</p> + +<p>It is acceptable to have a list of people whose person and luggage +will be searched with extra care, and anonymous passengers on domestic +flights could be treated as if they were on this list. It is also +acceptable to bar non-citizens, if they are not permitted to enter the +country at all, from boarding flights to the country. This ought to +be enough for all legitimate purposes.</p> + +<p>Many mass transit systems use some kind of smart cards or RFIDs for +payment. These systems accumulate personal data: if you once make the +mistake of paying with anything but cash, they associate the card +permanently with your name. Furthermore, they record all travel +associated with each card. Together they amount to massive +surveillance. This data collection must be reduced.</p> + +<p>Navigation services do surveillance: the user's computer tells the +map service the user's location and where the user wants to go; then +the server determines the route and sends it back to the user's +computer, which displays it. Nowadays, the server probably records +the user's locations, since there is nothing to prevent it. This +surveillance is not inherently necessary, and redesign could avoid it: +free/libre software in the user's computer could download map data for +the pertinent regions (if not downloaded previously), compute the +route, and display it, without ever telling anyone where the user is +or wants to go.</p> + +<p>Systems for borrowing bicycles, etc., can be designed so that the +borrower's identity is known only inside the station where the item +was borrowed. Borrowing would inform all stations that the item is +“out,” so when the user returns it at any station (in +general, a different one), that station will know where and when that +item was borrowed. It will inform the other station that the item is +no longer “out.” It will also calculate the user's bill, +and send it (after waiting some random number of minutes) to +headquarters along a ring of stations, so that headquarters would not +find out which station the bill came from. Once this is done, the +return station would forget all about the transaction. If an item +remains “out” for too long, the station where it was +borrowed can inform headquarters; in that case, it could send the +borrower's identity immediately.</p> +</div> + +<h3 class="subheader">Remedy for Communications Dossiers</h3> + +<div class="columns"> +<p>Internet service providers and telephone companies keep extensive +data on their users' contacts (browsing, phone calls, etc). With +mobile phones, they +also <a href="http://www.zeit.de/digital/datenschutz/2011-03/data-protection-malte-spitz">record +the user's physical location</a>. They keep these dossiers for a long +time: over 30 years, in the case of AT&T. Soon they will +even <a href="http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/the-trojan-horse-of-the-latest-iphone-with-the-m7-coprocessor-we-all-become-qs-activity-trackers/">record +the user's body activities</a>. It appears that +the <a href="https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security-technology-and-liberty/it-sure-sounds-nsa-tracking-your-location">NSA +collects cell phone location data</a> in bulk.</p> + +<p>Unmonitored communication is impossible where systems create such +dossiers. So it should be illegal to create or keep them. ISPs and +phone companies must not be allowed to keep this information for very +long, in the absence of a court order to surveil a certain party.</p> + +<p>This solution is not entirely satisfactory, because it won't +physically stop the government from collecting all the information +immediately as it is generated—which is what +the <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order">U.S. does +with some or all phone companies</a>. We would have to rely on +prohibiting that by law. However, that would be better than the +current situation, where the relevant law (the PAT RIOT Act) does not +clearly prohibit the practice. In addition, if the government did +resume this sort of surveillance, it would not get data about +everyone's phone calls made prior to that time.</p> + +<p>For privacy about who you exchange email with, a simple partial +solution is for you and others to use email services in a country that +would never cooperate with your own government, and which communicate +with each other using encryption. However, Ladar Levison (owner of +the mail service Lavabit that US surveillance sought to corrupt +completely) has a more sophisticated idea for an encryption system +through which your email service would know only that you sent mail to +some user of my email service, and my email service would know only +that I received mail from some user of your email service, but it +would be hard to determine that you had sent mail to me.</p> +</div> + +<h3 class="subheader">But Some Surveillance Is Necessary</h3> + +<div class="columns"> +<p>For the state to find criminals, it needs to be able to investigate +specific crimes, or specific suspected planned crimes, under a court +order. With the Internet, the power to tap phone conversations would +naturally extend to the power to tap Internet connections. This power +is easy to abuse for political reasons, but it is also necessary. +Fortunately, this won't make it possible to find whistleblowers after +the fact, if (as I recommend) we prevent digital systems from accumulating +massive dossiers before the fact.</p> + +<p>Individuals with special state-granted power, such as police, +forfeit their right to privacy and must be monitored. (In fact, +police have their own jargon term for perjury, +“<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Police_perjury&oldid=552608302">testilying</a>,” +since they do it so frequently, particularly about protesters +and <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20131025014556/http://photographyisnotacrime.com/2013/10/23/jeff-gray-arrested-recording-cops-days-becoming-pinac-partner/"> +photographers</a>.) +One city in California that required police to wear video cameras all +the time +found <a href="http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2013/08/ubiquitous-surveillance-police-edition">their +use of force fell by 60%</a>. The ACLU is in favor of this.</p> + +<p><a +href="https://web.archive.org/web/20171019220057/http://action.citizen.org/p/dia/action3/common/public/?action_KEY=12266">Corporations +are not people, and not entitled to human rights</a>. It is +legitimate to require businesses to publish the details of processes +that might cause chemical, biological, nuclear, fiscal, computational +(e.g., <a href="http://DefectiveByDesign.org">DRM</a>) or political +(e.g., lobbying) hazards to society, to whatever level is needed for +public well-being. The danger of these operations (consider the BP +oil spill, the Fukushima meltdowns, and the 2008 fiscal crisis) dwarfs +that of terrorism.</p> + +<p>However, journalism must be protected from surveillance even when +it is carried out as part of a business.</p> +</div> +<div class="column-limit"></div> + +<div class="reduced-width"> +<p>Digital technology has brought about a tremendous increase in the +level of surveillance of our movements, actions, and communications. +It is far more than we experienced in the 1990s, and <a +href="https://hbr.org/2013/06/your-iphone-works-for-the-secret-police">far +more than people behind the Iron Curtain experienced</a> in the 1980s, +and proposed legal limits on state use of the accumulated data would +not alter that.</p> + +<p>Companies are designing even more intrusive surveillance. Some +project that pervasive surveillance, hooked to companies such as +Facebook, could have deep effects on <a +href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/aug/10/internet-of-things-predictable-people">how +people think</a>. Such possibilities are imponderable; but the threat +to democracy is not speculation. It exists and is visible today.</p> + +<p>Unless we believe that our free countries previously suffered from +a grave surveillance deficit, and ought to be surveilled more than the +Soviet Union and East Germany were, we must reverse this increase. +That requires stopping the accumulation of big data about people.</p> +</div> +<div class="column-limit"></div> + +<h3 style="font-size: 1.2em">End Note</h3> +<ol> +<li id="ambientprivacy">The condition of <em>not being monitored</em> +has been referred to as <a +href="https://idlewords.com/2019/06/the_new_wilderness.htm">ambient +privacy</a>.</li> +</ol> +</div> + +</div><!-- for id="content", starts in the include above --> +<!--#include virtual="/server/footer.html" --> +<div id="footer"> +<div class="unprintable"> + +<p>Please send general FSF & GNU inquiries to +<a href="mailto:gnu@gnu.org"><gnu@gnu.org></a>. +There are also <a href="/contact/">other ways to contact</a> +the FSF. 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