From 514b29688f1dd48f93392931c58d21cbea8be5c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christian Grothoff Date: Mon, 17 Sep 2018 12:06:00 +0200 Subject: formatting --- taler-fc19/paper.tex | 12 +++++++----- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'taler-fc19') diff --git a/taler-fc19/paper.tex b/taler-fc19/paper.tex index abfcecf..baa7b14 100644 --- a/taler-fc19/paper.tex +++ b/taler-fc19/paper.tex @@ -782,7 +782,7 @@ We require the following two security properties for $\textsc{BlindSign}$: set of all possible blinded messages. Then the distribution of \[ \left\{ (m, \sigma, \overline{m}, \overline{\sigma}) \,\middle| \begin{array}{c} - m\, \randsel M, + m\, \randsel M, \\ \overline{m} \leftarrow \algo{Blind}_{BS}(\mathcal{S}(\V{sk}), m), \\ \overline{\sigma} \leftarrow \algo{Sign}_{BS}(\V{sk}, \overline{m}), \\ \sigma \leftarrow \algo{UnblindSig}_{BS}(r, m, \overline{\sigma}) @@ -790,11 +790,13 @@ We require the following two security properties for $\textsc{BlindSign}$: \right\} \] must be computationally indistinguishable from - \[ \left\{ (m, \sigma, x, \sigma_x) \,\middle|\, - m \randsel M, - \sigma \leftarrow \algo{UnblindSig}_{BS}(r, m, \algo{Sign}_{BS}(\V{sk}, \algo{Blind}_{BS}(\mathcal{S}(\V{sk}), m)) ) - x \randsel \overline{M}, + \[ \left\{ (m, \sigma, x, \sigma_x) \,\middle|\, + \begin{array}{c} + m \randsel M, \\ + \sigma \leftarrow \algo{UnblindSig}_{BS}(r, m, \algo{Sign}_{BS}(\V{sk}, \algo{Blind}_{BS}(\mathcal{S}(\V{sk}), m)) ) \\ + x \randsel \overline{M}, \\ \sigma_x \leftarrow \algo{UnblindSig}_{BS}(r, x, \algo{Sign}_{BS}(\V{sk}, \algo{Blind}_{BS}(\mathcal{S}(\V{sk}), x)) ) + \end{array} \right\}. \] \item \emph{unforgeability}: An adversary that requests $k$ signatures with $\algo{Sign}_{BS}$ is unable to produce $k+1$ valid signatures with non-negligible probability. -- cgit v1.2.3