From d840a071ca48ea3b084b6d78b904b25c822d5ce4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Florian Dold Date: Wed, 26 Sep 2018 00:02:58 +0200 Subject: remove weird sentence --- taler-fc19/paper.tex | 26 +++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) (limited to 'taler-fc19/paper.tex') diff --git a/taler-fc19/paper.tex b/taler-fc19/paper.tex index 81038f0..50cf0c8 100644 --- a/taler-fc19/paper.tex +++ b/taler-fc19/paper.tex @@ -368,19 +368,19 @@ of parties maintained by the challenger in the security games which we define la %necessarily have access to all oracles simultaneously. We refer to customers in the parameters to an oracle query simply by their -public key. For coins, however, the situation is more complicated. The -adversary needs the ability to refer to coins to trigger operations such as -spending and refresh, but to model anonymity we cannot give the adversary access -to the coins' public keys directly. Therefore we allow the adversary to use -the (successful) transcripts of the withdraw, refresh and link protocols to -indirectly refer to coins. We refer to this as a coin handle $\mathcal{H}$. -Since the execution of a link protocol results in a transcript $\mathcal{T}$ -that can contain multiple coins, the adversary needs to select a particular -coin from the transcript via the index $i$ as $\mathcal{H} = (\mathcal{T}, i)$. -The respective oracle tries to find the coin that resulted from the transcript -given by the adversary. If the transcript has not been seen before in the -execution of a link, refresh or withdraw protocol; or the index for a link -transcript is invalid, the oracle returns an error to the adversary. +public key. The adversary needs the ability to refer to coins to trigger +operations such as spending and refresh, but to model anonymity we cannot give +the adversary access to the coins' public keys directly. Therefore we allow +the adversary to use the (successful) transcripts of the withdraw, refresh and +link protocols to indirectly refer to coins. We refer to this as a coin handle +$\mathcal{H}$. Since the execution of a link protocol results in a transcript +$\mathcal{T}$ that can contain multiple coins, the adversary needs to select a +particular coin from the transcript via the index $i$ as $\mathcal{H} = +(\mathcal{T}, i)$. The respective oracle tries to find the coin that resulted +from the transcript given by the adversary. If the transcript has not been +seen before in the execution of a link, refresh or withdraw protocol; or the +index for a link transcript is invalid, the oracle returns an error to the +adversary. In oracles that trigger the execution of one of the interactive protocols defined in Section~\ref{sec:algorithms}, we give the adversary the ability to actively -- cgit v1.2.3